People v. Clayton CA2/1

CourtListener 10373713Calctapp07.04.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/7/25 P. v. Clayton CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340774

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA139632)
v.

DEANDRE CARRNELL
CLAYTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________

We decide this matter by memorandum disposition.
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) Deandre Carrnell Clayton
appeals from the denial of his resentencing petition under
Penal Code1 section 1172.6. For the reasons set forth below, we
reverse. We begin with the applicable law and then turn to the
facts of the case.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015), which went into effect January 1, 2019,
“amended sections 188 and 189 of the Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ]
natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it
applies to aiding and abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the
felony-murder rule.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173 (Lee).) “[T]he
amended section 188 provides that, except as stated in the
amended section 189 governing felony murder, ‘in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)”
(Lee, supra, at p. 1173.)
The bill also added former section 1170.95, now numbered
1172.6, “ ‘which creates a procedure for convicted murderers who
could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively
seek relief.’ [Citation.]” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.)
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551), which, inter alia, extended
relief under former section 1170.95 to those convicted of
attempted murder. (See Lee, supra, at pp. 1173–1174.)

1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2
“If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of relief under
section 1172.6—that is, a showing that the petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a
theory no longer valid under the amended Penal Code—the
resentencing court must issue an order to show cause for an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)” (Lee, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) “If, however, the record of conviction
or the court's own documents indicate the petitioner is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law, the resentencing court may
deny the petition without issuing an order to show cause.” (Ibid.)
On January 7, 2020, defendant pleaded no contest to
attempted murder (§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and admitted to gang
enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and that he
personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).2 The trial court sentenced him
to 15 years, but stayed the sentence on the firearm enhancement
pursuant to the plea agreement.
On August 22, 2023, defendant petitioned for resentencing
under section 1172.6, alleging the information filed against him
allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of imputed malice.
The People filed an opposition to the petition, arguing that the
evidence set forth in defendant’s preliminary hearing transcript

2 Section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) allows imposition of a
firearm enhancement on a gang-related offense when any
principal to the offense discharges a firearm, even if the
defendant did not personally do so. (See § 12022.53, subd. (e).)
The information alleged not that defendant personally discharged
a firearm, but that his codefendants did. It is therefore unclear
why defendant pleaded to personally discharging a firearm. That
question is not before us, however, and we do not address it
further.

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as well as surveillance camera footage demonstrated defendant
was a coconspirator to murder and an aider and abettor to
attempted murder, and therefore “defendant had the requisite
intent, and malice was not imputed to him.” Defendant filed a
reply arguing, inter alia, reliance on the preliminary hearing
transcript at the prima facie stage of the resentencing proceeding
constituted improper fact-finding, and the evidence from that
hearing did not “conclusively establish the theory under which
[defendant] pleaded.”
The resentencing court denied the petition at the prima
facie stage, noting defendant had entered his plea and been
convicted in 2020, a year after the law on imputed malice already
had changed under Senate Bill No. 1437. The court concluded
the prosecution therefore could not have proceeded under a
theory of imputed malice. Defendant’s counsel countered that at
the time of defendant’s plea, the amended law applied only to
murder, not attempted murder, so the prosecution could have
proceeded on an imputed malice theory as to defendant, who was
charged with attempted murder. The court adhered to its ruling.
Defendant timely appealed.
As the Attorney General concedes in this appeal, the
resentencing court erred in denying defendant’s petition at the
prima facie stage. At the time of defendant’s plea, there was a
split of authority in the Courts of Appeal as to whether Senate
Bill No. 1437’s amendment to the malice requirement in section
188 applied to attempted murder. For example, People v. Lopez
(Aug. 21, 2019, B271516), opinion ordered depublished
November 10, 2021, S258175, concluded that “extend[ing] the
legislation’s ameliorative provisions to . . . convictions for
attempted premeditated murder” “does violence to the governing

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principles of statutory interpretation,” and “[h]ad the Legislature
meant to bar convictions for attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, it could easily have done so.”
In contrast, People v. Medrano (Dec. 3, 2019, F068714, F069260),
opinion ordered depublished January 26, 2022, S259948, held,
“Because malice cannot be imputed to a defendant who aids and
abets a target offense without the intent to kill, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine is no longer a viable theory of
accomplice liability for attempted murder.”
The Legislature resolved this split of authority through
Senate Bill No. 775, which “clarified [Senate Bill No. 1437] by
amending [former] section 1170.95 to make clear the natural and
probable consequences doctrine no longer supplies accomplice
liability to attempted murder.” (People v. Sanchez (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 191, 193.)
As noted, Senate Bill No. 775 was enacted in 2021, after
defendant entered his plea. Given the split of authority at the
time of his plea, it is conceivable the prosecution could have
proceeded on a theory of imputed malice as to defendant’s
attempted murder charge. The fact that he pleaded no contest
and was convicted after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437,
therefore, does not render him ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6.
Defendant asks that we direct the resentencing court on
remand to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing. The Attorney General agrees with this disposition and
asserts nothing in the record of conviction establishes ineligibility
as a matter of law.
We decline to direct the resentencing court to issue an
order to show cause, and instead remand for the resentencing

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court to decide whether, in light of our opinion, defendant has
made a prima facie showing for relief. As our Supreme Court
recently decided in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, when a
defendant is convicted pursuant to a plea, a resentencing court
may under certain circumstances consider the preliminary
hearing transcript in assessing the defendant’s prima facie
showing in a section 1172.6 proceeding. The People below raised
arguments based on the preliminary hearing transcript, which
the resentencing court has yet to assess because of the
alternative basis for its ruling. We cannot assess those
arguments in this appeal because the preliminary hearing
transcript is not before us.

DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s resentencing petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded for the resentencing court to
determine, consistent with this opinion, whether defendant has
made a prima facie showing that he is eligible for relief, and if he
has, to set an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.

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