People v. Cole CA2/8

CourtListener 10370757Calctapp28.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Cole CA2/8
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B316819

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA492587)
v.

GERALD COLE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Robert L. Hernandez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
This case is before us again on remand from the California
Supreme Court. A jury convicted appellant Gerald Cole of first
degree residential burglary (Pen. Code,1 § 459; count 1), criminal
threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2), and contempt of court (§ 166,
subd. (c)(1); count 3). The trial court sentenced Appellant to the
upper term of six years on count 1, a consecutive term of eight
months on count 2, and a concurrent term of 364 days on count 3.
On appeal, Appellant argued he was entitled to a jury instruction
on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats, and
the case must be remanded for resentencing due to a change in
the law governing determinate sentencing. In our original
opinion, we affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.
The California Supreme Court granted Appellant’s petition
for review. Following its decision in People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), the Supreme Court returned the case to
us with directions to vacate our prior decision and to reconsider
the appeal in light of Lynch. In Lynch, the Supreme Court
addressed what standard of review applies when deciding
whether remand for resentencing is required under the amended
law. Although we allowed both parties an opportunity to file
supplemental briefs, only the People did so. After considering the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch and the People’s brief, we
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would
have found true every aggravating factor on which the trial court
relied in imposing an upper term sentence. Accordingly, a
remand for resentencing is required in this case.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

2
BACKGROUND
A. Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Between
Appellant and Fae
Appellant and his wife Fae A. were married for
approximately eight years and had three children. Over that
period of time, there were several instances of domestic violence
between them. The first occurred about a month after they met,
where Appellant slammed Fae into a bed, choked her, and
punched her in the face. Fae stayed with Appellant after that
because Appellant apologized to her.
A few years later into their marriage, in 2014, another
domestic violence incident took place after they had both
consumed alcohol at a family birthday party. Fae testified that
Appellant was calling her offensive names and then he struck her
in the chest, causing her to fall. When Fae got up, she began
hitting Appellant, and they then proceeded to hit each other. Fae
ran outside, but the fighting continued. The fighting stopped
when the neighbors came out. Appellant denies that he hit or
pushed Fae that day.
On New Year’s Day 2020, Appellant and Fae were at a bus
stop and began arguing. Appellant called Fae a “bitch” and
“whore” in front of their children. Appellant believed that Fae
had been cheating on him with another man. As Appellant
moved closer and closer to Fae, he pushed her in the head. Fae
then hit him, and they both started fighting. Eventually,
someone separated them, and the fighting stopped. Fae had
some scratches on her face, and Appellant was bleeding from his
mouth. Appellant denied striking Fae during this incident and
said she was the sole aggressor. Fae flagged down a passing

3
police officer. After the police interviewed Appellant and Fae, the
police officer decided to arrest Fae, but no charges were pressed.
Appellant and Fae separated after the bus stop incident.
Sometime in March 2020, they resumed their relationship but did
not live together.
Sometime in July 2020, Appellant was living with his
brother when another violent incident took place between
Appellant and Fae. Appellant, who had been drinking, told Fae
he wanted nothing to do with her and told her to leave. When
Fae tried to leave, Appellant prevented her from taking any
belongings that he had personally purchased. Appellant began
kicking Fae and grabbed onto her bag as she attempted to run
out into the street. Once outside, Appellant struck Fae, knocking
her to the ground. He continued punching her after she was
down for several more minutes.
Sometime after this incident, Appellant was served with a
protective order requiring him to stay away from Fae. By
November 2020, Fae ended her relationship with Appellant.
B. January 11, 2021 Incidents at Issue in This Case
On January 10, 2021, Appellant called Fae asking to sleep
with her. When Fae said “No,” Appellant became angry and
threatened to kill Fae. At the time, Fae did not take the threat
seriously and hung up the phone.
After that, Appellant continued to call back, asking to get
back together with Fae. Each time, she told him “No.” Finally,
Fae stopped answering the phone.
The next day, Fae noticed that she had tens of missed calls
and a voice message from Appellant. The voice message said,
“Fae, man, if I can’t have you . . . ain’t nobody gonna have you,
Fae.” After hearing the voice message, Fae was afraid because

4
she thought maybe Appellant was serious about killing her.
However, she did not call the police at that time.
Later that afternoon, Fae heard someone trying to break in
through the window in her apartment. Fae ran outside and went
to the next-door neighbor’s house. Fae called 911 and said she
did not see who broke in but assumed it might be a male. Fae did
not tell the 911 operator that she thought it might have been
Appellant trying to break in. At trial, Fae testified that because
of Appellant’s prior threats, she feared it was Appellant breaking
in.
When the police arrived, one officer saw a man exiting a
broken window of the building. The officer told the man to stop,
but the man ran toward the back of the building. Another officer
went to the rear of the building and saw Appellant on the
opposite side of a five-foot wall. Appellant was then arrested.
During trial, Fae testified that she was still afraid of Appellant.
C. Relevant Procedural History
Appellant was charged with three crimes. In count 1,
Appellant was charged with first degree residential burglary with
a person present (§ 459), a serious and violent felony within the
meanings of sections 1192.7, subdivision (c), and 667.5,
subdivision (c). In count 2, Appellant was charged with making a
criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)). Finally, in count 3, Appellant
was charged with misdemeanor contempt of court (§ 166,
subd. (c)(1)). On November 10, 2021, a jury convicted Appellant
of all three charged crimes.
Appellant was sentenced on November 18, 2021. The court
sentenced Appellant to a total of six years and eight months
consisting of: the upper term of six years for count 1; eight
months (one-third the midterm of two years) on count 2, to run

5
consecutively to count 1; and 364 days on count 3, to run
concurrent with count 1. Appellant received credit for 235 days
(204 actual plus 15 percent conduct credit).
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Had a Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct
on Lesser Included Offenses and Defense Counsel
Did Not Invite Any Error
Because an attempted criminal threat is a lesser included
offense of a criminal threat (See People v. Toledo (2001)
26 Cal.4th 221, 230–232 (Toledo); In re Sylvester C. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 601, 607), the trial court had a duty to instruct
the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of attempted
criminal threats, if there was substantial evidence from which a
jury could reasonably conclude the defendant committed the
lesser, uncharged offense, but not the greater. (See People v.
Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 29; People v. Birks (1998)
19 Cal.4th 108, 118 [“even absent a request, and even over the
parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser
offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is
substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser”];
see also People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162
(Breverman), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Schuller
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7 [trial court errs if it fails to
instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense
which find substantial support in the evidence].) Substantial
evidence is evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.
(People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1263.)
Further, the invited error doctrine does not apply here
when there is no evidence that defense counsel made a “tactical

6
decision to force the jury to an all-or-nothing choice.” (People v.
Walker (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 111, 118 (Walker).) “The trial
court’s duty to fully and correctly instruct the jury on the basic
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence in a
criminal case is so important that it cannot be nullified by
defense counsel’s negligent or mistaken failure to object to an
erroneous instruction or the failure to request an appropriate
instruction.” (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 229.) An
express tactical objection is required before a failure to instruct
on a lesser included offense may be found to have been “invited.”
(People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 335, disapproved on
other grounds by People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.)
Here, the record is silent as to whether defense counsel
thought about an attempted criminal threat instruction at all,
let alone made a tactical choice about whether to request it. (See
Walker, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 118.) When the court said it
did not believe there were any lesser included offenses, defense
counsel only addressed whether an attempted burglary
instruction should be given: “No, it’s up to the jury to decide
what they decide was his reason for going in. So . . . I am not
asking for a lesser.” Accordingly, we find no invited error.
On appeal, we review the trial court’s failure to instruct on
a lesser included offense de novo, considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the defendant. (People v. Millbrook (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.) The erroneous failure to instruct
sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is not
subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record
establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the
outcome. In other words, we apply the People v. Watson (1956)

7
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) standard of prejudice. (Breverman,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165.)
II. Even Assuming the Trial Court Failed to Instruct on
Attempted Criminal Threat, Any Error Was Harmless
“In order to prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution
must establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant
‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in
death or great bodily injury to another person’; (2) that the
defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the
statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent
of actually carrying it out’; (3) that the threat . . . was ‘on its face
and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey
to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat’; (4) that the threat actually
caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or
her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety’; and
(5) that the threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the
circumstances.” (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 227–228; see
also § 422.)
Sustained fear, the fourth element of a criminal threat,
“requires proof of a mental element in the victim” (People v. Allen
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 (Allen)) and “has a subjective
and an objective component.” (In re Ricky T. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1140.) “A victim must actually be in
sustained fear, and the sustained fear must also be reasonable
under the circumstances.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Sustained fear’ refers to a
state of mind,” and “describes the emotion the victim
experiences.” (People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349
(Fierro).) Within the meaning of section 422, “sustained” means

8
“a period of time that extends beyond what is momentary,
fleeting, or transitory.” (Allen, at p. 1156.) However, no set time
frame exists for a victim to be in a statutorily sufficient state of
“sustained fear.” (Id. at p. 1156, fn. 6.) For example, case law
qualifies a victim’s fear as sufficiently “sustained” within the
meaning of section 422 when the fear lasts anywhere between
one and 15 minutes. (See Fierro, at p. 1349 [one minute
sufficient to qualify as sustained fear when a defendant threatens
to kill a victim with a visible weapon]; Allen, at p. 1156
[15 minutes sufficient to qualify as sustained fear].) In addition,
a “victim’s knowledge of defendant’s prior conduct is relevant in
establishing that the victim was in a state of sustained fear.”
(Allen, at p. 1156; but see In re Ricky T., at p. 1138 [a victim’s
lack of history with defendant paired with victim’s one-day delay
in calling police evidenced a fear that was merely fleeting].)
An attempted criminal threat is a lesser included crime of a
criminal threat. (People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 514
(Chandler); Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 226.) “ ‘[I]f a
defendant . . . acting with the requisite intent, makes a sufficient
threat that is received and understood by the threatened person,
but, for whatever reason, the threat does not actually cause the
threatened person to be in sustained fear for his or her safety
even though, under the circumstances, that person reasonably
could have been placed in such fear, the defendant properly may
be found to have committed the offense of attempted criminal
threat.’ ” (Chandler, at p. 515.)
We need not reach whether there was substantial evidence
to warrant the lesser included instruction of attempted criminal
threat because we conclude any error was harmless. “[E]vidence
sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense

9
does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a
reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction
been given.” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1161,
disapproved on another point in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th
363, 391, fn. 3.) We agree with the Attorney General that after
examining the entire record, we cannot conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have found Appellant
guilty of attempted criminal threat, rather than the completed
crime of criminal threat. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 165.)
“[I]n a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to
instruct . . . on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof
which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for
prejudice exclusively under Watson.” (Breverman, supra,
19 Cal.4th at p. 178.) “Such posttrial review focuses not on what
a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have
done in the absence of the error under consideration. In making
that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other
things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is
so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different
outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable
probability the error of which the defendant complains affected
the result.” (Id. at p. 177.) “ ‘ “The Supreme Court [in Watson]
has emphasized ‘that a “probability” in this context does not
mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more
than an abstract possibility.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 140, 155.) “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must
show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would
have been obtained absent the error.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013)
56 Cal.4th 935, 955.)

10
To find Appellant guilty of the lesser offense of attempted
criminal threat based on the theory that Fae did not experience
sustained fear, the jury would have had to reach a set of
conclusions about the evidence that, taken together, do not
appear reasonably probable. “[W]hen a defendant is charged
with attempted criminal threat, the jury must be instructed that
the offense requires not only that the defendant have an intent to
threaten but also that the intended threat be sufficient under the
circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained
fear.” (Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525.) The jury would
have had to conclude that, even given Appellant’s abusive history
with Fae, Fae did not in fact experience sustained fear as a result
of the intended threat, despite her testimony that she felt afraid
when she received the second threat. (See Allen, supra,
33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156 [“victim’s knowledge of defendant’s
prior conduct is relevant in establishing that the victim was in a
state of sustained fear”].) In addition, Fae testified that she fled
from her home later that same day when she heard noises at her
window consistent with a break-in because she feared that her
husband was attempting to get into her home. Fae then called
911 from her neighbor’s home. (See Fierro, supra,
180 Cal.App.4th a pp. 1345–1346 [holding that person who drove
away and called 911 after defendant exposed a weapon was in
sustained fear].) Further, Fae’s fear was borne out as her
husband did break into her home that afternoon. Finally, Fae
further testified that her fear persisted to the time of trial.
The jury resolved the factual question regarding Fae’s
credibility against Appellant in convicting him of the criminal
threats, necessarily rejecting Appellant’s version of the events.
(See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 690 [“erroneous

11
failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if
‘it is possible to determine that . . . the factual question posed by
the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the
defendant under other, properly given instructions’ ”].) Having
credited Fae’s testimony about the underlying events, it is not
reasonably probable that the jury would then conclude Fae was
lying when she testified that she was afraid after hearing the
voice message, and testified that she feared it might be her
husband who was coming through the window of her apartment.
As such, Appellant’s contention that her fear of Appellant did not
continue when she heard the break-in is unavailing.
Accordingly, any error was harmless.
III. Appellant is Entitled to a Remand for Resentencing
Appellant contends the case must be remanded for
resentencing due to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended the standards for imposing an
upper term sentence under California’s determinate sentencing
law. The People agree the amended law applies retroactively to
Appellant, but argue a remand is unwarranted because the jury
would have found each aggravating sentencing factor relied upon
by the trial court to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th
730, we conclude that a remand for resentencing is required in
this case.
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended
section 1170, the determinate sentencing law. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3.) Section 1170 now provides, in relevant part, that
where a statute specifies three possible terms of imprisonment,
“the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise

12
provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) The middle
term, therefore, is the presumptive determinate sentence under
the amended law. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 748.)
A court has discretion, however, to impose an upper term
sentence if certain aggravating factors, aside from a defendant’s
prior convictions, are proven beyond a reasonable doubt or
stipulated to by the defendant. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 742.) Specifically, section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) states that the court “may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition” of an upper
term sentence, and “the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) The court may nevertheless
“consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (Rule 4.421) provides
a nonexhaustive list of aggravating sentencing factors that may
be used to increase a defendant’s sentence to the upper term
under section 1170, subdivision (b). Factors related to the
charged crime include: “(1) The crime involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness;
[¶] (2) The defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the
time of the commission of the crime; [and] [¶] (3) The victim was
particularly vulnerable.” (Rule 4.421(a)(1)–(3).) Factors related
to the defendant include: “(1) The defendant has engaged in
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society; [¶]

13
(2) The defendant’s prior convictions . . . are numerous or of
increasing seriousness; [¶] (3) The defendant has served a prior
term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h); [¶] (4) The
defendant was on probation . . . or parole when the crime was
committed; and [¶] (5) The defendant’s prior performance on
probation . . . or parole was unsatisfactory.” (Rule 4.421(b)(1)–
(5).) In addition, the court may consider “[a]ny other factors . . .
which reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances
under which the crime was committed.” (Rule 4.421(c).)
In Lynch, our Supreme Court held that, under current
section 1170, “a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial
court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper
term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on
have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 768.) Applying the harmless error standard set forth in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, the Supreme Court
further held that “[t]he violation is prejudicial unless an
appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a
jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied
upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the
current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so
determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the
defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Lynch, at
p. 768.) Moreover, “[t]his is true even if the [trial] court might
have imposed the same sentence based on fewer aggravating
circumstances than those it cites on the record. When the trial
court actually relies on improperly proven aggravating facts to
‘justify’ an upper term sentence, a Sixth Amendment violation
occurs and Chapman must be satisfied.” (Lynch, at p. 761.)

14
Here, the trial court applied the prior version of
section 1170, subdivision (b), that was in effect at the time of
Appellant’s 2021 sentencing. As the People concede, the 2022
amendments to the statute apply retroactively to Appellant
because his judgment was not final when those amendments took
effect. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 748–749.) In imposing
the upper term of six years on the count 1 burglary conviction,
the court found several aggravating factors applied and there
were no mitigating factors. The court first considered factors
related to the crime as set forth in Rule 4.421(a) and (c):
Appellant made death threats to the victim; the police recovered
a box cutter from Appellant’s clothing when he was arrested; Fae
was particularly vulnerable with young children and there was
an approximate age difference of 30 years; there were numerous
prior acts of domestic violence perpetrated by Appellant on Fae,
but noted that “in fairness, the victim testified, as did the
defendant, concerning an act of domestic violence that the victim
perpetrated on the defendant”; and the violence between them
was escalating, as Appellant violated a restraining order by
breaking into Fae’s home. The court then considered factors
related to Appellant’s criminal history as set forth in
Rule 4.421(b): Appellant’s “prior conviction in Texas [subjects]
him . . . to many years in state prison if he were to violate
parole,” and he suffered other prior convictions; Appellant served
prior prison terms; Appellant was on parole at the time he
committed the offenses in this case; and Appellant’s prior
performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory.
Applying the principles articulated in Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th 730, we hold that the trial court’s imposition of an
upper term sentence violated Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right

15
to a jury trial because the court relied on aggravating factors that
were not stipulated to by Appellant or found true by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. We further hold that the violation
was prejudicial because we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that a jury would have found all of the aggravating factors
upon which the trial court relied to be true. Appellant thus is
entitled to a remand for resentencing.
As we discussed in our original opinion, the aggravating
factor that the crime involved a threat of death or great bodily
harm to the victim was properly proven under amended
section 1170, subdivision (b). Because the offense of criminal
threats requires that the defendant “willfully threaten[ed] to
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury
to another person” (§ 422, subd. (a)), the jury necessarily found
this factor to be true beyond a reasonable doubt in convicting
Appellant of the criminal threats charge in count 2.
However, as we also explained in our prior opinion, at least
one other crime-related aggravating factor relied on by the trial
court in imposing an upper term sentence was not supported by
the evidence. Specifically, the court found that “in this situation
the victim was particularly vulnerable with young children that
she was caring for.” Yet Fae stated that she was home alone
when the burglary occurred. Indeed, at the time of the incident
in this case, custody of Fae’s children had been taken away from
her. In considering this factor, the court also noted that there
was “an approximate 30-year age difference between the victim
and the defendant.” But at the time of the trial, Fae was 34
years old. Given that her relationship with Appellant lasted
eight years, she would have been about 26 years old when the
relationship began. As such, Fae was not a child or underage.

16
Thus, “[t]he record . . . does not reflect such a clear-cut instance of
victim vulnerability that we confidently can conclude the jury
would have made the same findings, as might be the case if, for
example, the victim[] had been elderly, very young, or disabled,
or otherwise obviously and indisputably vulnerable.” (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 842, superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p 757.)
Because the evidence did not support at least one of the
aggravating factors on which the trial court based its sentencing
decision, we cannot conclude that “the omission of a jury trial was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact
the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence.” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.) Under these circumstances, Cole’s
sentence must be reversed, and the matter must be remanded to
allow the People to retry the aggravating factors and the trial
court to exercise its discretion under amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). (Lynch, at p. 776.) As the Supreme Court
instructed in Lynch, “[o]n remand, the parties remain free to
introduce at trial all relevant evidence to support or contest the
factual support for the aggravating circumstances set out in the
California Rules of Court. The court may rely on any properly
proven aggravating facts, including prior convictions or facts
necessarily found by the jury to support a verdict on underlying
counts and enhancements. The court retains its discretion to
impose an upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more
properly proved circumstances justify such a sentence.” (Id. at
pp. 777–778.)

17
DISPOSITION
Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. The judgment imposing
an upper term sentence on count 1 is reversed, and the matter is
remanded with directions for the trial court to conduct further
proceedings on the aggravating sentencing factors and to exercise
its discretion under section 1170, subdivision (b).

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.

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