People v. Angel CA3

CourtListener 10367969Calctapp28.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Angel CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099049

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-FE-
1997-0005545, SC061252A)
v.

GARY GENE ANGEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Gary Gene Angel appeals a judgment entered following his
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He contends that the trial court
erred by failing to recall his original sentence and pronounce the individual components
of his new sentence as required. We conclude that Angel forfeited these claims by failing
to object below. We also reject his contention that this failure amounted to prejudicial
ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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BACKGROUND
The People’s information charged Angel with first degree murder with a firearm
use enhancement (§§ 187, 12022.5, subd. (a); count one); attempted murder with a
firearm use enhancement (§§ 664, 187, 12022.5, subd. (a); count two); evading a peace
officer in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2; count three); and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (former
§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count four). The information also alleged that he had suffered
three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior strike conviction for grand theft
(§§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subd. (d)).
The jury found Angel guilty of murder with a firearm enhancement, evading a
peace officer with willful or wanton disregard for safety, and being a felon in possession
of a firearm. It found him not guilty of attempted murder. A bench trial on the prior
conviction allegations was scheduled to take place the next day. The court’s specific
findings are not part of the record on appeal.
In September 1997, the trial court sentenced Angel to an aggregate prison term of
61 years four months to life comprised of: four years for count three (the middle term
doubled); 16 months for count four (one-third the middle term doubled); four years for
the firearm enhancement associated with count one; two one-year terms for the prior
prison term enhancements; and 50 years to life for count one, the murder with a strike
prior. We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Angel (Feb. 27, 2001, C027546) [nonpub.
opn.].)
In December 2022, the trial court issued an ex parte order noting that the court’s
records indicated that Angel’s judgment included an enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020. Under what is now
section 1172.75, sentence enhancements imposed prior to January 1, 2020 pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b), except for enhancements imposed for sexually violent
offenses, are “legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) In April 2023, Angel filed a

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motion and supporting papers asking the trial court to recall his sentence under
section 1172.75, conduct a full resentencing, and strike his prior prison enhancements and
his prior strike conviction.
The People filed a written response, agreeing that Angel’s two prior prison
enhancements should be stricken but arguing that any further reduction of his sentence
would endanger public safety and that the trial court should not strike the prior strike. In
support of this opposition, the People filed a request for judicial notice of Angel’s prison
records and a 1997 probation report.
At the section 1172.75 hearing, several of Angel’s family members addressed the
trial court, attesting to his reformed character and the family’s support. Angel also
testified concerning his rehabilitative efforts and accomplishments while in custody.
Defense counsel argued that Angel was entitled to “a whole new resentencing hearing”
and asked the court to strike his prior strike. The court took the matter under submission
to review Angel’s prison file.
At a subsequent hearing, the trial court dismissed the three prior prison
enhancements. The court then explained, “with regard to the Court’s review of the entire
sentence,” that section 1172.75 required it to consider “any other changes in law that
reduce the sentences,” as well as “post conviction factors, including but not limited to
disciplinary, record of rehabilitation, defendant’s age, diminished physical condition and
how those things may have reduced the risk for future violence, and any evidence that
reflects circumstances have changed since the original sentencing that resulted in . . .
incarceration no longer being in the interest of justice.” The court further noted that
section 1385 allows courts to strike enhancements and gives courts “the ability to afford
great weight to evidence offered by [a] defendant to prove mitigating circumstances.”
The court stated its ruling: “I think Mr. Angel is on the right path, but at this point,
I don’t find it would be in the interest of justice to—what was the request from the
defense was to strike one of the strikes at this point. And so the Court is not going to

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strike one of the strikes. [¶] With regard to the enhancements, they didn’t take the
sentence over 20 years. The sentence, had it been just Count One, that was based on the
prior strike, that was 50 to life by itself. [¶] So with regard to the consideration of the
balance of the sentence, the Court is not inclined to modify that. However, the three
[section ]667[.5, subdivision ](b) enhancements that were found true will be dismissed.
[¶] . . . [T]he sentence was only imposed for two of those, but all three will be dismissed
from the record. And that’s the Court’s ruling.” The minute order from the hearing said:
“No modification other than dismissing/striking the invalid enhancements is to be made
to this sentence. [¶] . . . [¶] Original sentence of 09/08/1997 to remain in full force and
effect except as modified herein. [¶] Defendant sentenced to a total of 59 years and
4 months to life.”
Angel timely appealed, and his appellate counsel successfully obtained an order
updating his custody credits through the date of the resentencing hearing.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3) added section 1171.1, later renumbered as section 1172.75,
which provides: “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a
prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of
Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (a).) The statute also sets forth a recall and resentencing mechanism for individuals
serving prison sentences that include a qualifying section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)-(e).) Under that procedure, the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation notifies the sentencing court that an incarcerated person is
serving a sentence that includes a covered section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Upon receiving the notification, the trial court “shall review the
judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement

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described in [section 1172.75, ]subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current
judgment includes an enhancement described in [section 1172.75, ]subdivision (a), the
court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
Angel contends that the trial court in this case erred because it did not formally
recall his sentence or pronounce the individual components of his judgment at the
resentencing hearing. We conclude that he forfeited these contentions by failing to bring
them to the attention of the trial court at resentencing. “As a general rule, only ‘claims
properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.’ ” (People v.
Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852; accord People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353-354.)
Our Supreme Court adopted this forfeiture rule “ ‘to reduce the number of errors
committed in the first instance’ [citation], and ‘the number of costly appeals brought on
that basis.’ ” (Smith, at p. 852; accord People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235.) In the
context of criminal sentencing, this forfeiture rule applies “to claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” and
claims “concerning the manner in which sentence is imposed and the hearing is
conducted.” (Scott, at pp. 353, 352.) Here, Angel challenges the manner in which the
trial court imposed and articulated sentence. His failure to assert these claims below
therefore forfeits them on appeal. (See id. at p. 353.)
Angel argues that this case falls into an exception to the general forfeiture rule for
sentences that are unauthorized. A “sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could
not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case,” such as a
violation of “mandatory provisions governing the length of confinement.” (People v.
Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354; accord People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962.)
Angel does not contend that his 59-years-to-life sentence failed to comply with
provisions concerning the length of his confinement; rather, his claim is that the trial
court imposed a lawful sentence in a procedurally flawed manner. We disagree with
Angel’s argument that the sentence was unauthorized as a result of the court’s failure to

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pronounce sentence on all counts and enhancements. (See, e.g., People v. Alford (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472 [failure to impose and then stay sentence under § 654
resulted in unauthorized sentence]; People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 703
[failure to pronounce sentence for enhancement not cured by inclusion of sentence in
abstract of judgment].) When the trial court announced its ruling, it dismissed the prior
prison felony enhancements and declined to strike the strike conviction; it also indicated
that it would not otherwise modify Angel’s original sentence, and that original sentence
addressed the remaining elements of the judgment.

Finally, Angel has not demonstrated that his counsel’s failure to object constituted
prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. “To show ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant has the burden of proving that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have
been different.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519-520.) Angel claims that
without a complete, new pronouncement of sentence, the trial court failed to exercise its
discretion and fully reconsider his sentence as required under section 1172.75. We
disagree because the record demonstrates that the court recognized its obligation under
section 1172.75 to review “the entire sentence,” applying “any other changes in law that
reduce the sentences” and considering the factors identified in the statute. The court also
expressly considered Angel’s request to strike his prior strike conviction and
enhancement. On this record, we do not believe that the court misunderstood its
discretion to fully reconsider Angel’s sentence. Accordingly, it is not reasonably
probable Angel would have received a more favorable outcome had defense counsel
pointed out the court’s procedural errors in failing to formally recall his sentence and
individually pronounce the components thereof.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

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