CourtListener 10367964•People v. Quiroz CA1/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Quiroz CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169971
v.
ADER ALDAIR QUIROZ, (Napa County Super. Ct.
Nos. 21CR000171, 21CR000232)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
The People charged defendant Ader Aldair Quiroz by amended
complaint in Napa County Superior Court case no. 21CR000171 (hereafter
case no. 171) with numerous felonies, including possession of a controlled
substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), possession of a controlled
substance with a firearm (id., § 11370.1, subd. (a)), unlawful possession of a
firearm (Pen. Code, § 29815, subd. (a)2), and resisting and obstructing,
delaying a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)). The People alleged nearly all the
crimes charged were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with, a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Defendant
1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
pled no contest to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29815,
subd. (a); hereafter the “section 29815(a) count”) and admitted the criminal
street gang enhancement. He also pled no contest to a misdemeanor
section 148, subdivision (a) count, and admitted a probation violation in
another case (case no. 19CR001675). Defendant stipulated that the factual
basis for the plea was set out in the police report, and he entered a Harvey
waiver3 as to the remaining counts and allegations.
Contemporaneous with case no. 171, the People charged defendant in
Napa County Superior Court case no. 21CR000232 (hereafter case no. 232)
with unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years
younger than defendant (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) and personal infliction of great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant pled no contest to the charged
count, stipulated that the factual basis for the plea was set out in the police
report, and entered a Harvey waiver as to the great bodily injury allegation.
As part of his plea, he again admitted to a probation violation in case
no. 19CR001675.
At a March 22, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court suspended
imposition of a sentence and granted defendant two years of formal probation
in case no. 171, and three years of formal probation in case no. 232.
In September 2023, the People filed petitions to revoke probation in
both case nos. 171 and 232, alleging that defendant violated the terms of his
probation by committing domestic violence battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) on
September 8, 2023. In November 2023, the People filed a second petition to
3 Pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, “facts underlying
charges dismissed as part of a negotiated plea may not, absent contrary
agreement by the defendant (now called a Harvey waiver), be used to impose
adverse sentencing consequences.” (People v. Weatherton (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 676, 678.)
2
revoke probation in both cases, alleging defendant committed domestic
violence battery in May, June, and July 2023. The People also charged
defendant in a new Napa County Superior Court case (case no. 23CR002057)
with one misdemeanor count of domestic violence battery. After trial, a jury
found defendant guilty of the domestic violence battery count, and the trial
court found defendant violated the terms of probation.
Prior to sentencing in case nos. 171 and 232, the People filed a
sentencing brief requesting that the court terminate probation and impose
the following prison sentence: the middle term of two years for the
section 29815(a) count (unlawful possession of a firearm); three years for the
criminal street gang enhancement; and eight months consecutive for the
section 261.5, subdivision (c) count (unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor). As relevant here, the People discussed numerous aggravating factors
relating to defendant, e.g., his status as a probationer when committing the
underlying offenses, and his prior unsatisfactory performance on probation.
In terms of mitigating factors, the People stated: “Probation found no
circumstances in mitigation in this case. Defendant was not a passive
participant in the crimes and the crimes weren’t committed out of coercion or
distress. The circumstance that could potentially apply in this case is that
Defendant was less than 26 years old at the time he committed the felony
offenses.”
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel urged the court to reinstate
probation and argued, pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the fact
that defendant was under the age of 26 at the time of his felony offenses was
3
a mitigating factor that outweighed the aggravating factors pled to or proven
at trial, thus requiring imposition of a low term.4
The trial court terminated probation and sentenced defendant in accord
with the People’s requested sentence. In doing so, the court discussed the
criteria affecting the decision to grant or deny probation, including: the court
believed the sex offense was more serious because defendant refused the
victim’s request to wear a condom and the victim became pregnant; the
victim in the sex offense case was “significantly vulnerable” due to her age;
defendant was an active participant in both cases; the crimes were not
committed because of unusual circumstances; defendant took advantage of a
position of trust and confidence in the sex offense case; defendant’s
performance on probation has been “very unsatisfactory”; the court remained
unconvinced defendant was adequately remorseful; and the court believed
defendant would pose a danger to others if not imprisoned. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.414.) Thereafter, the court addressed the circumstances in
aggravation and mitigation in both cases, finding no mitigating
circumstances. Defendant appeals from judgment terminating probation and
sentencing him to state prison.
On appeal, defendant’s sole contention concerns the imposition of the
middle term rather than the low term on the section 29815(a) count pursuant
to section 1170. More specifically, he contends the trial court wrongly relied
on certain aggravating factors—i.e., that the minor victim of the sex offense
was particularly vulnerable and that he took advantage of a position of trust
and confidence—because a jury never found these factors true beyond a
4 The record reflects that defendant was 22 years old when he committed
the sex offense in case no. 232, and 23 years old at the time of the offenses in
case no. 171.
4
reasonable doubt and defendant did not stipulate to them. As such, he
argues, there were no aggravating factors other than the sole fact that he
reoffended while on probation, which was outweighed by the mitigating factor
that he was under the age of 26 at the time of his felony offenses. We reject
this.5
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), provides: “When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms,
the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to
exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” In
turn, subdivision (b)(2) of section 1170 provides in relevant part: “The court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.”
The meaning of these provisions is clear: “Courts may not impose a
sentence greater than the middle term except when aggravating factors
justifying the imposition of the upper term have been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or the
judge in a court trial.” (Advisory Com. com., Cal. Rules of Court, foll.
rule 4.421.) However, “[t]hese requirements do not apply to consideration of
5 The aggravating circumstances concerning the sex offense seem
irrelevant given that defendant’s challenge is to the imposition of the middle
term on the section 29815(a) count. (Cf. People v. Garcia (1995) 32
Cal.App.4th 1756, 1779.) That said, as discussed below, the court appears to
have properly relied on other aggravating factors to justify the sentence it
imposed on the section 29815(a) count.
5
aggravating factors for the lower or middle term.” (Ibid.) “In selecting
between the middle and lower terms of imprisonment, the sentencing judge
may consider circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, and any other
factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision. The court may consider
factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether or not the factors have been
stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial. The relevant circumstances may
be obtained from the case record, the probation officer’s report, other reports
and statements properly received, statements in aggravation or mitigation,
and any evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.420(d).) Defendant’s reply brief concedes this legal point and
acknowledges that the trial court imposed the middle term and not the upper
term. But he insists his youth was a mitigating factor that should have
outweighed the “single” aggravating factor that he performed poorly on
probation. We are unpersuaded.
Subdivision (b)(6) of section 1170 provides: “Notwithstanding
paragraph (1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition
of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The person is a youth or was a
youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the
commission of the offense.” Section 1016.7 provides: “A ‘youth’ . . . includes
any person under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed.”
“ ‘Sentencing courts have wide discretion in weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors [citations], and may balance them against each other in
“qualitative as well as quantitative terms” [citation] . . . . We must affirm
6
unless there is a clear showing the sentence choice was arbitrary or
irrational.’ ” (People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1582 (Avalos).)
Here, the record reflects the trial court imposed the middle term on the
section 29815(a) count after hearing from defense counsel about defendant’s
youth. But in commenting that there were no mitigating factors, the court
evidently rejected, albeit implicitly, counsel’s position that youth was “a
contributing factor” to his commission of that offense. Moreover, in finding
the middle term warranted, the court found true the aggravating factors that
defendant was on probation when he committed his felony offenses and his
prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(4)–(5)). These factors would have sufficed to support the middle
term sentence (People v. Yim (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 366, 369), but the court
also discussed other factors pertaining to defendant and the circumstances
concerning the crime, e.g., defendant continues to deny that he is a gang
member even though he admitted the gang allegation in case no. 171, and he
has not taken full responsibility for his actions. (Id., rule 4.421(c).)
Defendant did not challenge the truth of any of the aggravating factors in the
proceeding below or in his opening brief on appeal.6
6 As noted, defendant’s opening brief argued there were no aggravating
factors, other than the sole fact that he reoffended while on probation,
because a jury never found other factors true beyond a reasonable doubt and
defendant did not stipulate to them. Although his reply brief concedes the
legal premise of this argument is incorrect, he continues to argue in a single
sentence that “the record only supports one aggravating factor, namely that
[defendant] violated the law while on probation in both cases leading to a
third conviction and, thus, performed poorly while on supervision. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5).)” This argument is conclusorily made
without citation to the record or to supporting legal authority, so we decline
to consider it. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–
785.)
7
In urging this court to find error, defendant contends “the law has
slowly recognized ‘[s]cientific evidence on adolescence and young adult
development and neuroscience shows that certain areas of the brain,
particularly those affecting judgement [sic] and decisionmaking, do not
develop until the early-to-mid-20s.’ ” But we are not empowered to reweigh
the circumstances of aggravation and mitigation in this case; rather, our role
is confined to determining whether the court abused its discretion. On this
record, we cannot conclude the court’s decision to impose the middle term on
the section 29815(a) count was arbitrary or irrational. (Avalos, supra, 47
Cal.App.4th at p. 1582.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Petrou, J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
People v. Quiroz (A169971)
8
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