CourtListener 10367941•People v. Icea CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Icea CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B334446
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA139579
v.
ALVA L. ICEA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II and Sean D. Coen, Judges.
Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Sophia A. Lecky,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Alva L. Icea appeals from her conviction for first degree
residential burglary. Icea contends the trial court should have
granted her motion under Penal Code section 1538.51 to suppress
the evidence of her crime. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2016, the People charged Icea with the first
degree residential burglary of an inhabited dwelling occupied
by Kornel Garme Crisostomo. The People alleged Icea had
a strike prior, also for first degree residential burglary.
The court arraigned Icea on the information on May 13, 2016.
Icea apparently was released on her own recognizance.
Icea’s counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence.
The prosecution apparently filed a response. The record on
appeal does not contain either the motion or the response.
On August 31, 2016, the court (the Honorable H. Clay Jacke II)
held a hearing on the motion.
Deputy Sheriff Emily Dilelio testified the Carson station
“received a prowler call” around 1:25 p.m. on March 15, 2016.
“The call stated that a female Hispanic with a colored shirt”
and dark blue pants “was riding a bike out of a location” on
West 230th Street in Carson. Dilelio “requested for an aero
to respond.”2 The aero “saw a female matching the description
1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.
2 By “aero,” Dilelio was referring to a helicopter. Deputy
Bryan Marr testified at trial that he worked as a tactical flight
deputy who “ride[s] around in a helicopter all day long.” He helps
deputies “with whatever they need,” from “finding suspects” to
“look[ing] for lost hikers.” On the day in question, Marr received
a dispatch to a location on West 230th Street. He saw a woman
get off her bicycle at the front of the house, walk underneath
2
riding southbound on Main Street on a black bike.” Before
arriving at the location, Dilelio had “information” that “the
female Hispanic was seen exiting the rear of the location.”
Dilelio went to the location and saw a woman riding a
black bike. At the suppression hearing, Dilelio identified that
woman as Icea. Dilelio and her partner Johnny Romero—who
was Dilelio’s trainee—told Icea to stop and asked her to get off
the bike. They “detained her pending a burglary investigation.”
Icea was carrying a purse. Dilelio “wanted to pat her down
and make sure she didn’t have any weapons . . . on her.”
Romero took Icea’s purse immediately.
Dilelio and Romero walked Icea over to stand outside
the patrol car. Romero was just holding the purse in his hands.
Dilelio asked Icea for her identification. Icea “told [Dilelio] it
was in her purse and that [Dilelio] could get it.” Romero then
“retrieved [Icea’s] I.D. along with a vehicle title to the residence
that was just burglarized.” The vehicle title was “right in the
middle of the purse,” “[a]s you open it.” It “had the address [on it]
that was in the call” to the station. Icea then “spontaneously
said, ‘I wasn’t inside the house. I was in the backyard.’ ”
On cross-examination at the hearing, Dilelio testified
a “witness” had “called in” about the prowler. Dilelio and
her partner arrived at the location three to five minutes later.
At that point, no one (except the 911 operator) had spoken to
the witness who reported the suspicious activity. Dilelio said
she’d “had another unit go over to the location and make contact”
the front porch, then walk around on the south side of the house.
Marr also saw the woman briefly on the north side of the house.
Marr eventually directed deputies “to that location on [We]st
230th.”
3
with the witness. When asked, “So at the point in time that
your partner went into Ms. Icea’s purse, you did not know if
there had even been a crime committed, correct?”, Dilelio replied,
“That’s correct, ma’am.” When asked why she didn’t have Icea
get her I.D. out of her purse, Dilelio replied, “For my safety,
ma’am, I don’t allow people to go into stuff.” Dilelio said
she always “ask[ed] first.”
Icea testified on her own behalf at the hearing. Icea said
she was riding her bike, “looking for someone’s house.” She was
carrying only her purse. The police told her to stop and she did.
Icea testified, “The male officer approached me and asked me to
hand him my purse, and I did. He put it on the hood of the car.”
The male officer then “told [Icea] to interlock [her] fingers
behind [her] back.” Icea testified the male officer “patted [her]
down, and he walked [her] to the vehicle and put [her] in the
[back seat of the] patrol car” and closed the door. He did not
ask her for identification. Through the car window, Icea said,
she could see “them going in [her] purse.” Icea testified the
officers did not ask if they could search her purse, or ask her
where her I.D. was, or tell her they were going to search
the purse. Icea denied having told the deputies they could
“enter” her purse.
When asked by the prosecutor if her purse had
“contain[ed]” “the vehicle title belonging to an individual
by the name of Cristomo Garme [sic],” Icea replied, “Yes.”
The court denied the suppression motion. The court told
defense counsel, “If I’m a cop, I get information that, hey, there’s
a suspicious person leaving, I’m going to stop the person. Okay.
You’ve got to stop them.” The court viewed the key issue not
as the validity of the detention but as the consent to search
4
the purse. The court stated, “I don’t have a problem with the
initial stop.” The court concluded, “[B]ased upon all the evidence
adduced, the court believes that there was valid consent.”
On April 3, 2017, the case proceeded to trial before the
Honorable Pat Connolly. Voir dire began and continued on
the next court day, April 5. At the end of that court day, Icea
requested—and the court conducted—a Marsden3 hearing.
The court denied Icea’s Marsden motion and ordered Icea
to return to court the next day.
On the next day, April 6, Icea did not appear in court.
Icea’s boyfriend called the court to say Icea was “not feeling well,
and she was either in the hospital or they were going to the
hospital.” The court sent the jurors home. Later that afternoon,
defense counsel told the court she’d called the emergency
department at Harbor UCLA and a nurse confirmed Icea was
there and “waiting for a room.” The court issued a warrant
for Icea’s arrest.
On the following Monday, April 10, Icea did not appear.
The court directed both counsel to call Harbor UCLA. The
court and counsel confirmed there was no one at the hospital by
that name, and “there was no patient there that was admitted.”
The court found Icea had voluntarily absented herself from
the proceedings and—over defense counsel’s objection—
the trial would proceed with Icea in abstentia.4
3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
4 After counsel had presented opening statements, a
“messenger” arrived in the courtroom with “a motion for [an]
emergency writ,” filed by Icea in propria persona, “asking either
for a 170.6 on [Judge Connolly], or . . . a motion for new counsel.”
5
After hearing from nine witnesses, the jury convicted Icea
of the charge. The jury also found true the allegation that Icea
had suffered a prior strike. The warrant remained outstanding.
Some five and a half years later, Icea was apprehended
on the warrant. When brought to court on November 16, 2022,
Icea told the court, “I filed 170.6 motion with Mr. Connolly, and
he denied me. He ignored it.” Icea replaced her court-appointed
attorney with retained counsel. On February 9, 2023, the case
was reassigned to the Honorable Sean D. Coen. Icea’s new
counsel told the court Icea “was in the emergency [sic] with a
severe anxiety attack on April 6, 2017,” after the court denied
her Marsden motion.
On July 7, 2023, Icea’s counsel filed a motion for a
new trial. The prosecution filed an opposition. After hearing
argument, the court denied the new trial motion.
On September 26, 2023, the court sentenced Icea to
13 years in the state prison, calculated as the midterm of four
years, doubled because of the strike prior, plus five years for
the serious felony prior under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
DISCUSSION
The sole issue Icea raises on appeal is the legality of her
detention and the search of her purse, resulting in the discovery
of a title to the victim’s vehicle. Icea contends Dilelio did not
have a “reasonable suspicion” to detain her because Dilelio
didn’t “know the source of” the “prowler” report nor did she
know whether Icea lived at the residence or might have been
“merely a caretaker, house cleaner, dog-walker, or visitor.”
Icea also contends Romero “exceeded the scope” of her consent
to “remove her I.D. card from the purse.” She asserts she
6
“did not give permission for a general search of the purse or
for any other item to be removed.”
A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground
that a search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) A warrantless search is presumed
to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of
demonstrating a legal justification for the search. (People v.
Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719 (Redd).)
The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress is well-established. We defer to the
trial court’s factual findings—express or implied—where
substantial evidence supports them. In determining whether,
on those facts, the search or seizure was unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.
(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119; Redd, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 719.)
1. The investigatory detention was lawful
Our Supreme Court has “consistently held that
circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may
still justify an officer’s stopping pedestrians or motorists on the
streets for questioning.” (People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d
448, 450.) “[A]n officer of the law, employed to maintain the
peace and to prevent crime, as well as to apprehend criminals
after the fact, has both the right and the duty to make reasonable
investigation of all suspicious activities even though” their
nature “may fall short of grounds sufficient to justify an arrest
or a search of the persons or the effects of the suspects.”
(People v. Cowman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 109, 117.)
To justify a temporary detention related to crime, “the
detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis
7
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”
(United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417–418.) A
detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that,
considered in the light of the totality of the circumstances,
provide some objective manifestation that the person detained
may be involved in criminal activity. (People v. Souza (1994)
9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) The “circumstances known or apparent
to the officer must include specific and articulable facts which,
viewed objectively, would cause a reasonable officer to suspect
that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or
is occurring or is about to occur, and (2) the person the officer
intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (People
v. Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385, 388 (Conway).)
In making reasonable suspicion determinations,
reviewing courts must consider the totality of the circumstances
of each case. (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.)
That the circumstances also may be consistent with lawful
activity does not render the detention invalid. “The possibility
of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the
capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
Indeed, the principal function of [her] investigation is to resolve
that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in
fact legal or illegal—to ‘enable the police to quickly determine
whether they should allow the suspect to go about [her] business
or hold [her] to answer charges.’ ” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21
Cal.3d 888, 894. See also Arvizu, at pp. 274–278.) The guiding
principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory
detention is “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of
8
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal
security.” (Terry v. State of Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19.)
Dilelio testified at the hearing on the suppression motion
that deputies had “received a prowler call.” The informant caller
described a Hispanic woman wearing a colored shirt and dark
blue pants riding a bicycle away from the residence. When
Dilelio and her partner arrived at the reported address a
few minutes later, Dilelio saw a woman matching that exact
description, riding a black bicycle.
Dilelio did not stop and detain Icea “predicated on mere
curiosity, rumor, or hunch.” (See In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d
at p. 893.) The 911 call sheriffs had received from the witness
did not merely say that a person was seen leaving the property
on a bicycle. The witness reported a prowler at the home. A
“prowler” is typically defined as a person who moves stealthily
around or loiters near a place with a view to committing a crime,
especially burglary. (See, e.g., https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/prowler [as of Mar. 27, 2025], archived at <https://
perma.cc/GQA4-9Q3S> [“a person who moves through an area
or place in a quiet and stealthy way in order to commit a crime”];
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/prowler>
[as of Mar. 27, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/RG85-XG6A>
[“someone who moves about quietly in a place, trying not to be
seen, often before committing a crime”].)
Dilelio had dispatched a helicopter to fly over the location.
The record is unclear as to whether, when Dilelio arrived at
the scene minutes after the call came in, she had been informed
of Marr’s observations (which, among other things, confirmed
the witness caller’s description of the person he’d seen at the
9
property).5 According to the testimony at the hearing, the events
unfolded in a matter of minutes.
In any event, when Dilelio asked Icea to stop and get off
the bike, Dilelio had information that a witness had called 911
to report prowler activity, that witness had given a fairly detailed
description of the suspicious person, and Icea matched that
description. These facts were sufficient to establish that a
reasonable officer would have had a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was occurring or had occurred, and that the
woman on the bike wearing clothing described in the 911 call was
involved in that activity. Accordingly, Dilelio’s investigatory stop
of Icea was lawful. (See People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078,
5 That witness who called authorities turned out to be
Uriel Aguilar, Jr., Crisostomo’s neighbor on West 230th Street.
At trial, Aguilar testified he had gone out for a walk around
1:25 p.m. on March 15, 2016. He saw a woman—later identified
as Icea—riding a bike down the street. The street ends in a
cul-de-sac. At the cul-de-sac, Icea started circling and circling on
her bike for about five minutes. Icea then rode up the driveway.
Aguilar saw Icea “trying to open the wooden gate” on the right
side of the house. Icea was “pulling on the gate, and the gate
[wouldn’t] open.” Next she tried to open the front door. Then she
walked over to a steel gate on the left side of the house, opened it,
and walked towards the back of the house. Aguilar called the
sheriff’s department. Aguilar’s 911 call was played for the
jury at trial. Aguilar told the operator, “There’s a break in
at [address] West 230th Street.” Aguilar confirmed it was
“happening right now.” Aguilar gave a description of the woman.
As Aguilar was on the phone with the operator, Icea came out of
the house carrying a backpack and began riding west on the bike.
Aguilar then told the operator the helicopter was “overhead
but he’s in the wrong position. He should be further south.”
10
1080–1081 [limited traffic stop and detention of driver based
solely on uncorroborated phoned-in tip that accurately described
vehicle and location was permissible to confirm officer’s
reasonable suspicion of intoxicated driving]; People v. Little
(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1371–1373 [trial court did not
err in denying suppression motion where officer in field heard
dispatch with description of truck and two suspects; 33 minutes
later officer spotted a truck matching the description with two
occupants also matching the description; officer made traffic stop,
searched the truck, found victim’s property]; People v. Superior
Court (Backey) (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 1020, 1024 [suspect fit
description by citizen informant in police radio report, was
reported as “ ‘concealing something under his coat,’ ” and had
pockets full of large items]; Conway, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 388, 390 [officer received report of burglary in progress in
residential area; within two minutes he saw vehicle and two
passengers coming from area of reported burglary; no other
pedestrians or vehicles in area]; People v. Ramirez (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1608, 1611, 1619–1620 [anonymous tip about drug
dealing was corroborated by officers’ observations]. Cf. Navarette
v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393, 398–404 [caller’s use of 911
emergency number added to reliability of call because the 911
system permits law enforcement to verify important information
about the caller, and thus “a reasonable [police] officer could
conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using
such a system”].)
2. The deputies did not exceed the scope of the consent
Icea gave them to look into her purse
Icea also contends she “did not give permission for a
general search of [her] purse or for any . . . item [other than her
11
I.D. card] to be removed.” Icea implicitly—and correctly6—
seems to have abandoned the testimony she gave at the
suppression hearing that Romero never asked her for
identification and the deputies never asked if they could “go into”
her purse. Instead, Icea argues “Deputy Romero exceeded the
scope of [her] consent by removing the vehicle title paperwork
from [her] purse. A reasonable deputy would not mistake a
vehicle title document for an I.D. card.” Icea asserts “there
was no testimony that the vehicle title was in plain view
and immediately identifiable as a stolen item.”
“Consent to a search is a recognized exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.” (People v. Cantor (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 961, 965.) Dilelio testified at the suppression
hearing that Icea told Dilelio her I.D. was in her purse and
“told [her] to get it.” The following exchange then took place:
“Q: [D]id you see your partner attempt to
retrieve the I.D.?
“A: Yes, I did, ma’am.
“Q: And while he did so, what did you observe?
“A: He actually retrieved her I.D. along with
a vehicle title to the residence that was
just burglarized.
6 As the factfinder in a suppression hearing, the trial court
retains the power to “judge the credibility of the witnesses,
resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence
and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is
constitutionally reasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th
668, 673.) Here, the trial court judged the credibility of the
two witnesses who testified, Emily Dilelio and Icea.
12
“Q: And did you see where the vehicle title was
when . . . he opened the purse?
“A: It was right in the middle of the purse,
ma’am.
“The Court: It was right what?
“A: Right in the middle. As you open it, just
as soon as you—
“The Court: Right in the middle? Is that what
you said, ‘the middle?’
“A: The middle, yes, sir.”
Testifying on her own behalf, Icea said her I.D. was
in “an inside pocket on the inside that was zipped up, and it
was inside there.” We are not persuaded by Icea’s apparent
contention that Romero should have ignored a document—one
bearing the address of the location in question7—that was “right
in the middle” of the purse when Romero opened it, and instead
have dug down into a zippered pocket to withdraw only her I.D.
The warrantless search of an object in plain view does not
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy when (1) the officers
made their observations from a place where they had a right to
be; (2) the incriminating character of the object was immediately
apparent; and (3) the officers had a lawful right of access to the
object itself. (Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 136–137.)
Here, Dilelio and Romero had the right to be in front of the
victim’s house on a public street; the “incriminating character”
of the document that was the title to the victim’s car was
apparent; and the deputies had the lawful right to take that title
7 Victim Crisostomo testified at trial that the title to his car,
which he’d received in the mail from the Department of Motor
Vehicles, had been on the dining room table in his home.
13
as evidence of the burglary. Probable cause connecting an item
in plain view with criminal activity “is a flexible, commonsense
standard, which requires only that the facts available to the
officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing
that the item may be contraband or stolen property or evidence
of a crime. No showing is required that such a belief is correct
or more likely true than false.” (People v. Stokes (1990) 224
Cal.App.3d 715, 719.) Moreover, a reasonable suspicion short
of probable cause may justify a brief inspection of an object
in plain view. (People v. Clark (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1233,
1238–1239.)
In sum, neither the deputies’ investigatory detention
of Icea nor the removal of the incriminating evidence from her
purse was unlawful. The trial court did not err in denying Icea’s
motion to suppress the evidence against her.
14
DISPOSITION
We affirm Alva L. Icea’s conviction.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
15
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