People v. Richardson CA5

CourtListener 10364805Calctapp26.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/26/25 P. v. Richardson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087201
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F21903972)
v.

JUSTIN ALLAN RICHARDSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Alvin M.
Harrell III, Judge.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Charlotte
Woodfork, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
A jury found defendant Justin Allan Richardson guilty of kidnapping, battery
against a spouse, false imprisonment by violence, and making criminal threats. The trial
court found true the allegation that defendant suffered prior “strike” convictions within
the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code,1 §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). Declining to
strike defendant’s prior serious felony convictions, the court sentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of 11 years.
Defendant argues on appeal: (1) his conviction for false imprisonment should be
vacated as a prohibited lesser included offense of kidnapping; (2) his punishment for
kidnapping or making criminal threats must be stayed under section 654; and (3) we must
remand this case for resentencing to permit the trial court to exercise its sentencing
discretion under section 654. We agree with defendant’s first argument but not his
second and third arguments. As modified, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 18, 2022, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1),
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 2), false imprisonment by violence (§ 236; count 3),
and making criminal threats (§ 422; count 4). The prosecution further alleged prior
serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
On July 7, 2023, the jury found defendant not guilty of count 1 but convicted him
of the lesser included offense of battery against a spouse, a misdemeanor (§ 243,
subd. (e)(1)). The jury convicted defendant on the remaining counts as charged.
On September 29, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term
of 11 years in prison.2 Defendant timely appealed.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Specifically, after denying defendant’s request to strike his prior serious felony
convictions, the trial court imposed (1) the mitigated term of three years for kidnapping,
doubled to six years; (2) the five-year enhancement for defendant’s prior serious felony
convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), for a total term of 11 years, and (3) 16 months for each
of counts 3 and 4, doubled to 32 months, to run concurrent to defendant’s sentence for
kidnapping.

2.
BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2021, defendant and Jane Doe3 attended a marital counseling session
at around 4:00 p.m. due to ongoing marital issues. Those issues stemmed from
defendant’s frustration that Doe had friendships outside the marriage that meant she was
not spending enough time with him. During the counseling session, defendant was “very
angry.” He accused Doe of “lying to the counselor to make him look bad and he was
very agitated” toward Doe. At one point, he left the session, came back, and called her
names.
After the approximately hour-long session, defendant and Jane Doe left in
defendant’s vehicle to go to a casino. Doe sat in the front passenger seat. Their dog was
in the vehicle’s back seat. As they drove, defendant renewed his accusations that Doe
lied to the counselor and made him “look bad.” Doe thought he was “general[ly] angry
with [her]” and “irritated.” On the way to the casino, defendant stopped at a “grocery
store” and purchased a beer. He drank some of it in the vehicle while driving to the
casino. The couple argued about defendant’s drinking until they arrived at the casino.
Once they arrived at the casino, defendant “demanded” Doe to come in with him.
Doe refused because defendant was upset, he had a history of being loud in public when
angry, and their dog was in the vehicle. Doe remained in the vehicle when defendant
went into the casino. After about 45 minutes to an hour, he returned angrier than when he
went into the casino. He quickly approached the vehicle, got in, slammed the door,
quickly backed the vehicle out, and asked Doe if she “was ready to die.” At that point,
Doe assessed whether she could get out of the car, or if defendant was simply saying that
because he was angry.
Defendant repeatedly asked Doe if she was ready to die, yelling various forms of
that question. Doe repeatedly responded, telling him to stop the vehicle and let her out,

3 To protect the complaining witness’s confidentiality, proceedings in the trial court
utilized “Jane Doe” or “Doe.”

3.
and that they could talk about the situation. She unsuccessfully tried using a tactic that
previously worked to calm him down. He drove erratically: honking at other vehicles
and likely driving as fast as 70 miles per hour. Eventually, the vehicle reached an
intersection. Instead of turning back toward Fresno, defendant turned toward Shaver
Lake. When asked by Doe where he was going, defendant told her that he was “going to
drive [them] off the cliff.” All the while, Doe felt “terrified” that defendant would kill
her. Though Doe believed defendant’s threats before this point, she truly believed him
“[e]specially once he turned left and went up to Shaver … I thought I was dead, I thought
for sure I was dead.”
Defendant began driving toward the highway’s edge, then back, as they drove
toward Shaver Lake, screaming at her the whole way. According to Doe, he struck her
three times: once with his closed fist on Doe’s jaw, again on her cheek, and another time
on her mouth, busting her lip. He did not listen to Doe’s requests to exit the vehicle. He
also knocked Doe’s phone out of her hand when she tried to call emergency services.
Eventually, with the cliffside on the right and a mountain on the left, defendant lost
control of the vehicle, collided with the mountain, and flipped the vehicle. Doe lost
consciousness and when she regained consciousness, she observed defendant outside the
vehicle screaming that he was going to jail.4
A California Highway Patrol officer, Fresno County Sheriff’s deputies, and
paramedics arrived at the scene. When interviewed by officers at the scene, Doe did not
report that defendant struck her, his statements about killing her, or defendant’s other
erratic conduct because she was scared given defendant was nearby. Though she told an
officer that she and defendant were fighting prior to the crash, defendant interrupted her
before she was able to say anything more.

4 The dog was not in the vehicle when Jane Doe awoke, but the dog survived the
crash.

4.
The highway patrol officer interviewed defendant about the crash. Defendant
stated he was travelling too fast around a curve in the road, lost control of the vehicle,
and crashed. Defendant stated it was not intentional. The officer formed the opinion
that, though defendant consumed alcohol, he was not over the legal limit. Defendant also
informed the officer that he and Doe were in a verbal argument at the time of the crash.
A Fresno Sheriff’s Department vehicle took Doe and defendant back to Fresno.
The vehicle dropped them off at a gas station. After the law enforcement vehicle left,
Doe arranged for transportation to her home, and defendant walked off on foot. Once
home, Doe took her vehicle and immediately left. Eventually, she presented at an
emergency room and informed staff that she did not feel safe at home. She recounted the
events that led to the crash to hospital staff and requested they call law enforcement. Doe
gave a statement to law enforcement at the hospital, and an officer photographed her
physical injuries.
The same officer who interviewed Doe at the hospital interviewed defendant in the
early morning after the night of the crash. Defendant recounted the counseling
appointment and indicated he was upset with Doe for purportedly making the issues one-
sided and blaming him for their problems. Defendant affirmed he argued with Doe in the
vehicle before going to the casino. When asked why he went the wrong way after leaving
the casino, defendant explained he was too angry to remember. He affirmed the
argument continued after leaving the casino, and it was possible that he threatened Doe.
He stated he could not remember whether Doe asked him to leave the vehicle because he
was so angry. He also stated that it was possible he struck Doe when he threw his hand
up during the crash. He also stated the crash was an accident because he was looking at
Doe, not at the curve in the road.
After advising defendant of his charges, the officer walked with defendant to the
patrol vehicle. Due to the crash and pain in defendant’s foot, the officer took defendant
to a hospital for medical clearance prior to booking him at the jail. While riding in the

5.
vehicle’s back seat, defendant initiated a conversation. He asked if there was some way
to drop his charges or secure lesser charges. Defendant then changed his statement,
admitting that he struck Doe in the face. He also admitted that he threatened to kill Doe
because he was angry.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 654
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to (1) conduct a section 654
analysis and (2) stay defendant’s sentence for making criminal threats because this
conduct is inseparable from the conduct constituting the kidnapping. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
During closing argument, the prosecution relied upon the same conduct by
defendant—his repeated threats to Jane Doe while in the vehicle—for the kidnapping and
criminal threats charges. As to the kidnapping charge, the prosecution did not argue that
defendant detained Doe by physical force but rather reasonable fear through his repeated
threats. As to the criminal threats charge, the prosecution argued that defendant’s
repeated threats satisfied that charge’s requirement that defendant threatened to
unlawfully kill or cause great bodily injury to Doe.
During sentencing, the trial court remarked on the gravity of defendant’s conduct:
“[I]t was not lost on me the fear that [Doe] must have been going through as the cars
[were] flying up the four lane, and there are statements being made that, I’m going to kill
you, and the method of death is going to be plunging off a cliff. I can’t imagine that. No
one should go through that.” The court imposed the punishment for count 4 (criminal
threats) concurrent with defendant’s punishment for count 2 (kidnapping). However, the
court did not explain on the record why it did not exercise its discretion under section 654
to stay any of defendant’s punishments.

6.
B. Analysis
Section 654 provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no
case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654,
subd. (a).) “[T]he purpose of section 654 is to ensure that a defendant’s punishment will
be commensurate with his culpability.” (People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 341.)
Section 654 does not allow multiple punishments, including concurrent sentences,
for the same conduct. (People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 592.) Given this,
imposition of concurrent sentences constitutes an implied finding that section 654 is
inapplicable. (People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468, citing People v.
Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1564–1565 [“ ‘implicit in the trial court’s
concurrent sentencing order is that [the] defendant entertained separate intentions’ ”];
People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147 [same].) Here, because the trial court
imposed concurrent sentences for the kidnapping and making criminal threats
convictions, we reject defendant’s argument that the court erred by not making an explicit
section 654 finding on the record. We deem the court impliedly rejected this finding by
imposing concurrent sentences.
“A trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were separate,
involving separate objectives, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.) “ ‘The trial court has broad
latitude in determining whether section 654, subdivision (a) applies in a given case.’ ”
(People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737.) Under this standard, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and presume the existence
of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the record. (Ibid.; People v.
DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113.) Where the facts are undisputed, section
654’s applicability to the facts is a question of law. (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d
545, 552, fn. 5.)

7.
Section 654 “expressly prohibits separate punishment for two crimes based on the
same act, but has been interpreted to also preclude multiple punishment for two or more
crimes occurring within the same course of conduct pursuant to a single intent.” (People
v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 642; accord. People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321,
335 (Harrison).)
Determining “[w]hether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment
under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th
307, 311.) “We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical
act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act.
Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of
conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘ “intent
and objective” ’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.) Under this second step, “if
the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which
were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for the
independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations
were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Perez, supra,
23 Cal.3d at p. 551.)
This case does not involve a single physical act but a course of conduct: the
kidnapping and repeated threats during the erratic drive toward Shaver Lake. We thus
focus on the second step of section 654’s analysis: consider whether the crimes
constituted “ ‘a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time.’ ” (Harrison, supra,
48 Cal.3d at p. 335, quoting People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639.)
Generally, “ ‘[w]hether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore
gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent
and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the
defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ ”
(People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507.) However, “ ‘[b]ecause of the many

8.
differing circumstances wherein criminal conduct involving multiple violations may be
deemed to arise out of an ‘act or omission,’ there can be no universal construction which
directs the proper application of section 654 in every instance.’ ” (People v. Hicks (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 496, 514, quoting People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 636.)
Section 654 “is intended to ensure that [the] defendant is punished ‘commensurate with
his culpability’ ” (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 335), and our Supreme Court has
cautioned that “a ‘broad and amorphous’ view of the single ‘intent’ or ‘objective’ needed
to trigger the statute would impermissibly ‘reward the defendant who has the greater
criminal ambition with a lesser punishment’ ” (id. at pp. 335–336, quoting People v.
Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 552‒553).
Thus, “ ‘[i]f [the defendant] entertained multiple criminal objectives which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for
independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations
shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ”
(People v. Porter (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 34, 38; accord, Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at
p. 335; People v. Tom (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 250, 260.) “ ‘The temporal proximity of the
two offenses is insufficient by itself to establish that they were incident to a single
objective.’ ” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354; accord, Harrison, at p. 335.)
Objectives may be separate when “the objectives were either (1) consecutive even if
similar or (2) different even if simultaneous.” (People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944,
952, disapproved on another ground in People v. Correa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 343,
fn. 14; see People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211–1212.)
Here, the two crimes—the kidnapping and the criminal threats—are not
consecutive. Given Doe was, initially, willingly in the vehicle, the kidnapping began
when defendant began his threats and erratic driving and Doe requested to leave. (People
v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1017–1018 [when a victim has voluntarily entered the
defendant’s car, the kidnapping occurs when force or fear compels her to be transported a

9.
substantial distance against her will].) The kidnapping ended at or after the crash.
(People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1159 [kidnapping continues until the victim is
released or is otherwise disposed of and reaches a place of “temporary safety”].)
Defendant continued to make criminal threats during the kidnapping.
Section 654 thus only applies if defendant harbored multiple, different, non-
incidental objectives. Initially, it appears this was not the case. The prosecution relied in
its closing argument upon defendant’s oral threats to establish both the reasonable fear
element of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)) and the threat of unlawful killing or great bodily
injury element of making criminal threats (§ 422). The prosecution’s theory was
apparently that the criminal threats were used to further the kidnapping. Similarly, Doe
testified that the kidnapping—defendant’s erratic, dangerous driving and threats that
compelled her to remain in the vehicle—solidified her belief that he would kill her. The
two crimes formed a symbiotic relationship, each furthering the other to apparently one
end: defendant’s control of Doe through terror.
Nor did defendant, as in other cases, utilize criminal threats to advance a distinct
objective. (See People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1022 [crimes of making a
criminal threat and arson were divisible under § 654 because the defendant had the
distinct objectives of frightening the victim with the criminal threat and destroying
property in the arson]; People v. Nichols (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1651, 1656–1658
[separate punishments for both kidnapping and threatening to kill the victim if he
“ ‘open[ed] [his] mouth’ ” was permissible under § 654 because the defendant had
separate objectives to (1) hijack a truck by kidnapping and robbing the victim and
(2) avoid detection and conviction by dissuading and intimidating the victim].)
But defendant’s conduct clearly escalated. What began with non-specific threats
to Doe’s life turned into nearly realized threats of driving off a tangible cliff as they
ascended the mountain. By that point, defendant had already accomplished the
kidnapping; though it had not ended, Doe was well within his control, fearful for her life.

10.
We are persuaded that the trial court could reasonably find that defendant’s further threats
after subduing Doe were gratuitous, forming a separate, elevated level of criminal intent.
People v. Nguyen (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 181 (Nguyen), which enumerated the
principle that “at some point the means to achieve an objective may become so extreme
they can no longer be termed ‘incidental’ and must be considered to express a different
and a more sinister goal than mere successful commission of the original crime,” applies
here. (Id. at p. 191.)
Other courts have applied the “gratuitous” test in cases factually like Nguyen.
(See People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1083 [robbers’ unexplained decision
to shoot into shed containing unresisting victims sufficient to establish “gratuitous,”
separate criminal objective]; People v. Bui (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1016 [remand
to exercise § 654 discretion for attempted murder, mayhem, and robbery convictions
appropriate where the defendant continued to shoot victim after “he fell to the floor, face
down, unable to move” during robbery]; People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263,
271–272 [sufficient evidence of divisible intents in committing robbery and attempted
murder where the defendant repeatedly hit feeble, unresisting victim with a two-by-four,
using far more force than necessary to achieve one objective].)
Though the conduct at issue, unlike that in the above cases, does not involve
physical violence, the threat of death or great bodily injury “constitutes a crime of
psychic violence.” (People v. Solis, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024.) There was
sufficient evidence that defendant’s threats against Doe’s life escalated beyond what was
necessary to secure control of Doe. Although defendant had an overarching objective to
ensure Doe’s compliance with the kidnapping, defendant did not inherently relinquish
any capability of committing separate and independent acts unnecessary for the
kidnapping. Defendant’s threats were not required to accomplish the kidnapping. He had
already obtained Doe’s compliance. “It is analogous to a needless or vicious assault
committed after a robbery, which has long been held separately punishable and

11.
distinguishable from an assault which is merely incidental to robbery.” (People v. Foster
(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 27–28.)
Though defendant’s initial threats were possibly incidental to the kidnapping, the
trial court could reasonably find that the subsequent threats made about driving off the
cliff, while defendant drove erratically toward the cliff, “express[ed] a different and …
more sinister goal than mere successful commission of the original crime” (People v.
Nguyen, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 191), specifically, to magnify the already terrorizing
ordeal. The court could reasonably determine that the subsequent threats were gratuitous.
Thus, substantial evidence supported the court’s imposition of a concurrent, unstayed
sentence for the criminal threats offense.5
II. Lesser Included Offense
The parties agree that defendant’s conviction for false imprisonment must be
reversed because it is a lesser included offense of kidnapping. We also agree and reverse
defendant’s conviction for count 3.
A. Additional Background
The prosecutor argued in closing argument that defendant was guilty of both false
imprisonment and kidnapping for the same conduct: refusing to stop the vehicle when
the victim asked, refusing to let the victim out of the vehicle, and threatening to kill the
victim by driving off a cliff, all while driving recklessly down a windy road.
After defendant’s conviction, the prosecution’s statement in aggravation argued,
for count 3, “that the [section] 236 felony offense [for false imprisonment] is charged
separately but it is a lesser included offense of [kidnapping under section] 207, charged in
Count 2. Therefore, the People recommend the [trial c]ourt stay the punishment for
Count 3, pursuant to [section] 654.”

5 Given we uphold the trial court’s implied exercise of its discretion to reject
section 654’s application, we reject defendant’s request to remand this case for
resentencing.

12.
B. Analysis
“Although, ordinarily, a defendant ‘may be convicted of any number of offenses
charged’ (§ 954), ‘a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions
based on necessarily included offenses.’ ” (People v. Aranda (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1077,
1089.) “An offense is necessarily included within another if ‘the statutory elements of
the greater offense … include all the elements of the lesser offense….’ ” (People v. Lewis
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 518, overruled on other grounds in People v. Black (2014)
58 Cal.4th 912, 919.)
False imprisonment—“ ‘the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another’ ”
(§ 236)—occurs “ ‘when “the victim is ‘compelled to remain where he does not wish to
remain, or to go where he does not wish to go.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2017)
7 Cal.App.5th 644, 672.) “A defendant guilty of kidnaping, as defined by either
section 207 or 209 … must necessarily be guilty of the ‘unlawful violation of the
personal liberty of’ his victim and therefore be guilty of false imprisonment as defined by
section 236” (People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 707, 713), so long as the false
imprisonment charge arises from the same act as the kidnapping. (See People v. Ratcliffe
(1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 808, 821 [“He who kidnaps a victim does so in order to restrain
the personal liberty of his victim (Pen. Code, § 236), whatever his purpose may be for the
false imprisonment (to rape, to rob, to obtain ransom, etc.).”].) Here, forcing Doe to
remain in the vehicle despite her requests to leave, constituted false imprisonment and
formed an intrinsic part of the kidnapping.
We agree with the parties that defendant’s false imprisonment conviction must be
reversed as a lesser-included offense of the kidnapping conviction.
DISPOSITION
We reverse defendant’s conviction for false imprisonment (count 3). As modified,
we affirm the judgment. We direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of

13.
judgment reflecting the reversal of defendant’s conviction for false imprisonment and to
forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to all relevant authorities.

DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

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