CourtListener 10363618•People v. Pratt CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/25/25 P. v. Pratt CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B338996
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA036565)
v.
RYANT TRIMALE PRATT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
Ryant Trimale Pratt, in pro. per.; and Nancy Gaynor, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Ryant Pratt appeals from an order denying his Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 His appellate counsel
filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), and Pratt filed a supplemental brief arguing the
trial court erred in denying his petition. We consider Pratt’s
contentions and affirm the trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying crime
We take the following facts from the opinion affirming
Pratt’s convictions on direct appeal.2 (People v. Pratt (July 1,
1998, B111400) [nonpub. opn.].)
“1. Facts.
“Ahmad Amer owned the 95 Cent Plus Store. On October
27, 1994, at approximately 7 p.m., the store was robbed. Amer
was not present at the time; he returned to the store shortly
thereafter. When Amer learned of the robbery, he became angry
and began yelling.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code. Pratt’s petition was filed pursuant to former
section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We refer to the Court of Appeal opinion only “for
background purposes and to provide context” for Pratt’s
arguments. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978,
fn. 2, disapproved of on another ground in People v. Patton (Mar.
3, 2025, S279670) __ Cal.5th __ [2025 WL 666005].) We do not
rely on the facts in the opinion to review the trial court’s
determination of Pratt’s eligibility for resentencing at the prima
facie stage. (Flores, at p. 988.)
2
“Appellant and other persons were outside the store, near
some pay phones. Amer demanded they leave the area, but the
persons refused. Amer went outside, taking with him a pair of
scissors; he cut the phone lines. Appellant made statements such
as, ‘Blood, you cut the wire on a homey, like that. Why?’
Appellant also said, ‘[Y]ou done this so I’m gonna do that, . . .’ or,
‘How would you like it if I do this, . . .’ Appellant then shot Amer.
Amer died from one gunshot wound to the head.
“At the time of the shooting, Twana Thomas and her
cousin, Obie King, were near the store. Thomas identified
appellant as the shooter. A police officer testified that soon after
the killing, King identified appellant in a photo lineup as being
the shooter. Amer’s son identified appellant as being one of the
persons near the pay phones.
“Josefa Patricia Escobar worked in a laundromat, located
next door to the 95 Cent Plus Store. She identified appellant in a
photo lineup as one of the people she saw minutes before the
shooting.
“After the crime, appellant admitted to his girlfriend,
Tameca Walker, he ‘just smoked this fool at the 95 Cent Store.’
Appellant owned a shirt consistent with the one described to have
been worn by the killer.
“2. Procedure.
“Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and
possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),
[former] 12021, subd. (a).) It was found true that appellant
personally used a handgun. (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a).) He
admitted he had two prior serious (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1))
and serious or violent felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667,
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subds. (b)–(i)). Appellant was sentenced to 90 years to life in
state prison.”
Resentencing
In 2021, Pratt filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
seeking resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95. He
asserted he had been convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, a felony murder theory, or another theory
under which malice was imputed.
The People filed an opposition, arguing Pratt was not
prosecuted pursuant to a felony murder or natural and probable
consequences theory and the jury had not been instructed on
either theory. In support of the opposition, the People submitted
a copy of the jury instructions from Pratt’s trial. As relevant
here, the jury was instructed on the definition of murder
(CALJIC No. 8.10); the definition of malice aforethought (CALJIC
No. 8.11); deliberate and premeditated murder (CALJIC
No. 8.20); unpremeditated murder of the second degree (CALJIC
No. 8.30); implied malice second degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.31
[Second degree murder – Killing resulting from unlawful act
dangerous to life]); duty of jury as to degree of murder (CALJIC
No. 8.70); doubt whether first or second degree murder (CALJIC
No. 8.71); unanimous agreement as to first or second degree
murder (CALJIC No. 8.74); and personal use of a firearm
(CALJIC No. 17.19).
The trial court appointed defense counsel. Pratt filed a
brief in support of his original petition. Pratt argued he had
established a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing
because the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.11 on implied
malice. Pratt asserted the instruction’s “[n]atural and [p]robable
consequences theory language for implied malice,” allowed the
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jury to convict him on a now-invalid theory.
In 2024, the trial court denied the petition at the prima
facie stage after hearing argument. The court reviewed the court
file, the information, the jury instructions, the verdict forms, and
the parties’ briefing. The court determined that Pratt was
prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of the murder, not under a
theory of natural and probable consequences or felony murder.
The court further reasoned that although the defense argued for
resentencing based on the jury instructions for second degree
murder, the jury had rejected any second degree murder theory
and instead found Pratt guilty of first degree murder. The jury
also found true that Pratt personally used a gun to commit the
murder. The court concluded: “So with the first-degree murder
conviction, it implies that you were the only perpetrator and that
you indeed had actual malice when they determined that you
were guilty of murder in the first degree.” The court therefore
found Pratt ineligible for relief.
Pratt timely appealed. Court-appointed appellate counsel
filed an opening brief that raised no issues and asked this court
to independently review the record under Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th 216. We directed appellate counsel to send Pratt the
record and a copy of the opening brief. We additionally advised
that within 30 days of the date of the notice, Pratt could submit a
supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds for an appeal,
contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Pratt
timely submitted a supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 188 to limit accomplice liability by eliminating theories of
imputed malice as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
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murder. Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), thus provides that a
“person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter” may
petition to have the conviction vacated and to be resentenced.
(See generally People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959
(Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
(Gentile).)
A defendant commences the resentencing procedure by
filing a petition declaring the defendant was prosecuted under a
theory of imputed malice for murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter, and “could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 . . . .”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) If the trial court determines the
petitioner made a prima facie case for relief, the court must issue
an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing within 60
days. (Id., subds. (c) & (d).)
The amendments to the Penal Code did not invalidate
murder convictions based on the theory that the defendant was
the actual killer or intended to kill. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707; People v.
Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166, review granted May 1,
2024, S284232.) And, while Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated
natural and probable consequences liability for second degree
murder based on imputed malice, implied malice remains a valid
theory of second degree murder liability. (§ 188, subd. (a); People
v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–991; Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 850; People v. Werntz (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093,
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1112, review granted Aug. 9, 2023, S280278; People v. Vizcarra
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
The record of conviction in this case demonstrates that
Pratt was not convicted on an invalid theory. The jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
a felony murder theory. Indeed, there was no theory of aiding
and abetting or other accomplice liability presented to the jury.
(People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [petitioner
ineligible for relief where he alone attempted to commit murder].)
The jury was not instructed on any theory under which malice
could be imputed to Pratt. He was prosecuted as a sole
perpetrator, and the jury necessarily found that he was the
actual killer, demonstrated by the true finding on the personal
gun use allegation. (People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
735, 744.)
Moreover, the jury was instructed on only one theory of
first degree murder: willful, deliberate and premeditated killing
with express malice aforethought. The jury was informed that to
conclude Pratt was guilty of first degree murder, it was required
to find “that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear,
deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill,” and, “[t]o
constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must
weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for
and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences,
[he] decides to and does kill.” The jury could not have found
Pratt guilty of first degree murder without determining that he
acted with express malice.
On appeal, Pratt appears to contend, as he did in the trial
court, that he made a prima facie showing because the jury was
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instructed on an implied malice theory of second degree murder.3
We reject this argument because implied malice theories of
murder remain valid under current law and, in any event, the
jury unequivocally determined Pratt acted with express malice
when it found him guilty of first degree murder.
Finally, Pratt argues the trial court engaged in improper
factfinding. We disagree. The court’s ruling was permissibly
based on the record of conviction and the court’s own documents
that demonstrated Pratt’s ineligibility for resentencing relief as a
matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972 [trial
court may look at the record of conviction at prima facie stage
and deny petition where court’s own documents refute the
allegations in the petition].) The trial court properly denied
Pratt’s section 1172.6 petition.
3 The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.11 on malice
aforethought, which defined implied malice: “Malice is implied
when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,
[¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to
human life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life.” The phrase “natural consequences of the act” is not
a reference to the natural and probable consequences theory of
accomplice liability that was eliminated by Senate Bill No. 1437.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
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