Elizabeth v. Braithwaite CA2/1

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Filed 3/24/25 Elizabeth v. Braithwaite CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SIERRA ELIZABETH, B336284, B336287

(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant Super. Ct. No. 23STRO04619,
and Appellant, 23CHRO01211)

v.

WARREN BRAITHWAITE,

Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Respondent.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michael R. Powell, Judge. Reversed in part and
dismissed in part.
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, John J. Metzidis and
Cynthia Tobisman for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant, Cross-complainant and
Respondent.

_______________________________
In July 2023, appellant Sierra Elizabeth and her husband
respondent Warren Braithwaite each filed a request for a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the other.
Both requests were based on the same July 2, 2023 incident. At
trial, Braithwaite and Elizabeth offered conflicting accounts of
the event, each claiming the other was the aggressor. The court
granted Braithwaite’s request and denied Elizabeth’s.
Braithwaite died while this appeal was pending,1 rendering
it moot. We nevertheless exercise our discretion to consider
the merits of Elizabeth’s appeal to the extent it addresses the
DVRO against her, because she has shown that it is likely to
have negative legal and practical consequences for her in the
future. We dismiss the remainder of the appeal as moot.
Although Elizabeth challenges the trial court’s actions
and rulings before, during, and after trial, we conclude that
the court’s refusal to allow her to present rebuttal evidence
to Braithwaite’s DVRO request alone requires reversal on due
process grounds. Accordingly, we will not discuss her other

1 We grant Elizabeth’s motion asking that we take judicial
notice of additional evidence bearing on the issue of whether
her appeal is moot. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 909 [“reviewing
court may . . . for any . . . purpose in the interests of justice,
take additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring at
any time prior to the decision of the appeal”]; In re M.B. (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 617, 627 [Code of Civil Procedure section 909
permits appellate courts to take and consider postjudgment
evidence “to determine whether an issue on appeal is moot”];
see also In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 287 (D.P.) [Code of
Civil Procedure section 909 may be used to “introduce additional
evidence in support of discretionary review” of otherwise moot
appeal].)

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challenges. And because Braithwaite is deceased, we do not
remand for a retrial.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. The DVRO Requests
On July 7, 2023, Elizabeth filed a request for a DVRO
against Braithwaite. On July 17, 2023, Braithwaite filed a
request for a DVRO against Elizabeth. The primary basis for
each request was a July 2, 2023 incident at the couple’s home.
Elizabeth’s request describes the events of that night
as follows: [A]round 1:00 a.m., “[u]pon entering [the] home,
[Braithwaite] . . . came out of a dark room [and] rushed to [her],
took [her] phone [and] slammed it on the ground [and] proceeded
to yell at [her],” “curse [her] out, push [her], pull out [her]
hair, choke [her], open our oven door [and] turned on the stove
threatening to ‘blow the house up,’ slap [her] in the ear (which
resulted in loss of hearing [and] perforated ear drum), [and]
pulled a knife out of the butcher block [and] knocked [her] to the
ground waving the knife (blade down) over [her] telling [her] he
could stab [her]. [He] [o]rdered [her] to sit in [the] kitchen with
the knife placed between [them],” then “[o]rdered [her] to get
the ‘fuck out of the/his house’ [and] made [her] start packing [her]
things. This abuse lasted for almost 2.5 hours.” In the section
of the DVRO request form asking “[h]ow often. . . [Braithwaite
had] abused [her] like this,” Elizabeth checked the box for
“[o]ther” and provided the following explanation: “In July 2021,
[Braithwaite] threatened me very badly, threw something at
me and dragged me off the bed. There have been other instances
of verbal threats to me or about my family that he was going to
‘put me in the hospital’ but no physical violence.”

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Braithwaite’s DVRO request, by contrast, describes
Elizabeth as the aggressor. His request states that Elizabeth
came home late on July 2, 2023 and “approached [him] while [she
was] under the influence of both alcohol and drugs” and “began
insulting [him], cursing at [him] and . . . threatened to harm
[him]. Thereafter, she retrieved one of the sharpest knives in
the home and cut [him] badly” on his leg. The request attached
iPhone screen shots which the request describes as photos of
“the knife and injury.” In the section asking “[h]ow often has
[Elizabeth] abused you like this,” Braithwaite checked the box
for “[j]ust this once.” In the section requesting additional details
about the July 2, 2023 incident, however, Braithwaite wrote that
he “came home late on 10-14-21 and because [he] didn’t answer
[Elizabeth’s] call she accuse[d] [him] of cheating and pull[ed] a
knife on [him] saying she will kill [him] if she finds out [he is]
cheating on her.”

B. Pretrial Proceedings
The court ordered the two requests related to each other
and to the parties’ dissolution of marriage action.
Elizabeth sought discovery related to both her request and
Braithwaite’s. Among the discovery she sought were native files
of the photos attached to Braithwaite’s request, so that a forensic
expert could examine them and their associated metadata to
determine whether they had been “doctored.” The court denied
the motion without prejudice, instructing Elizabeth to make
such motions to the judicial officer ultimately assigned to try the
DVRO requests.
At the initial pretrial conference, Elizabeth repeated her
discovery requests, but the court denied them. The court also
ordered the parties to file supplemental declarations “if they

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[were] alleging other acts of domestic violence that were not
clearly identified within the [DVRO] request for each party.”
Such supplemental declarations were to “delineat[e] the date,
times, and what happened on those occasions” of alleged
prior abuse. Elizabeth filed such a declaration, but Braithwaite
did not.
The court set the matter for a three-day trial, set a
schedule for disclosing exhibit and witness lists, and required the
parties to meet and confer regarding the admissibility of exhibits.
The versions of the photographs attached to Braithwaite’s DVRO
request included in the exhibits Braithwaite identified and
served were versions without any date or time identifiers.

C. Trial
1. Elizabeth’s Case-in-Chief
On the first day of trial, Elizabeth testified that
Braithwaite had been the aggressor, not she.2 She also testified
that she had never been violent towards Braithwaite. During
cross-examination, Braithwaite’s counsel attempted to impeach
this testimony by asking whether, in October 2022, Elizabeth
had hit Braithwaite on the head during a rooftop event in Miami.
Elizabeth denied that this occurred. Braithwaite’s counsel also
attempted to impeach Elizabeth’s testimony with time-stamped
versions of the photographs attached to Braithwaite’s DVRO
request, which purportedly showed Braithwaite’s wounds from
the July 2 incident, but the court interposed its own objections

2 Elizabeth’s testimony was extensive, and addressed
the incident, as well as other issues. The details of Elizabeth’s
testimony, however, do not affect our analysis of the issues on
appeal, and we thus only describe it briefly.

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thereto based on lack of foundation, and the time-stamped
photos were not admitted into evidence.
In support of her case, Elizabeth’s friend, Jonathan
Williams, testified that, on the morning after the incident, he
had observed injuries to Elizabeth’s person.3 Elizabeth’s also
offered, inter alia, a July 3, 2023 hospital record which the
court “admitted for the truth of the matter,” showing she sought
treatment for pain in her ear that day, and that the treating
physician’s “clinical impression” (capitalization omitted) was
that she had a “[p]erforation of [the] right tympanic membrane.”

2. Braithwaite’s Case-in-Chief
Braithwaite’s friend, Brenton Brooks, testified to seeing
Elizabeth slap Braithwaite at a hotel bar in Miami Beach in
October 2022. Braithwaite’s adult son, Tyler,4 testified that
he had witnessed Elizabeth slap and push his father on one
occasion, jump on Braithwaite’s back on another occasion, and
throw a binder at Braithwaite during an argument on a third
occasion.
During cross-examination of Tyler, Elizabeth’s counsel
attempted to introduce evidence of four “restraining orders that
ha[d] been issued against [Braithwaite].” The court excluded the
evidence on the ground of improper character evidence, rejecting
Elizabeth’s argument that they were admissible to show a
“scheme” that “[e]very time [Braithwaite] believes that a wife of

3 The court excluded as hearsay Williams’s testimony that
Elizabeth identified Braithwaite as causing those injuries.
4 Because Walter Braithwaite and Tyler Braithwaite share
the same surname, we refer to the latter by his first name only.
No disrespect is thereby intended.

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his or girlfriend is cheating on him, he commits acts of domestic
violence.” In discussions with the court as to whether Elizabeth
could lay a proper foundation for admitting the DVROs on
this theory, the court stated that Elizabeth would have an
opportunity to do so later in the proceedings even though she had
rested her case-in-chief, because such evidence would “be rebuttal
potentially to [Braithwaite’s] . . . testimony” and Elizabeth’s
counsel “[could] bring witnesses in [Braithwaite’s] restraining
order [request]” even though she had rested as to her own
request.
Braithwaite’s oncologist, Dr. James Berenson, testified
that during a November 10, 2023 examination, Braithwaite’s leg
showed a healing cut. Berenson did not opine as to the age of the
cut.
During discussions about whether Braithwaite planned
to testify, Braithwaite’s counsel commented that Braithwaite
was still rebutting Elizabeth’s case. At that point, the court
ordered Braithwaite to begin putting on his case.
Braithwaite testified to his version of the events, including
his contention that Elizabeth has been physically violent towards
him on several occasions not identified in his DVRO request
or via a supplemental declaration. During his testimony, the
court asked him about Elizabeth’s claim that Braithwaite had
“manufactured [the] pictures” of his leg wound and the bloody
knife. Braithwaite responded that this was “not true” and
that he “took the pictures [that] same night.” The court then
ascertained that Braithwaite had on his person the phone
with which he took the pictures and stated its “intention to look
at that phone” after the lunch break. The court confirmed that
Elizabeth had never had the opportunity to review the photos on

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the device, and instructed Braithwaite to “show [Elizabeth] the
photos with the associated data about when they were taken,”
during a lunch-hour “meet and confer.”
During the lunch break, Elizabeth’s counsel examined
Braithwaite’s phone in the courthouse hallway. Counsel took
pictures and a video of Braithwaite’s phone with the images
pulled up. In this video, counsel documented that the to-the-
second time associated with all six photographs ended in :00,
namely: two photos bearing a timestamp of 2:05:00 a.m., two
photos bearing a timestamp of 2:06:00 a.m., and two photos
bearing a timestamp of 2:07:00 a.m. After the lunch break,
the court announced that it only “wanted to make sure counsel
looked at [the phone]” and that the court “[did not] need to see it”
after all.
When the trial resumed, Elizabeth’s counsel asked
Braithwaite whether he recalled a July 7, 2023 phone
conversation with Elizabeth during which he stated he “just
had a rage” and that he “thought she was cheating and then [he]
just lost it.” When Braithwaite denied making these statements,
the court did not allow Elizabeth to play the full recording of this
conversation, but did permit those portions thereof that directly
contradicted Braithwaite’s denials. In the excerpts played for
the court, and the transcript thereof, Elizabeth’s statement,
“the whole reason for [my DVRO request] is because you freaking
tried to kill me,” is immediately followed by Braithwaite stating,
“I’m not going to do anything. I give you my word.” Upon
hearing this, Braithwaite volunteered that his actual response
to Elizabeth’s statement was saying, “What? . . . You cut me,”
and that this was “missing” from the excerpt played in court.

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3. The Court Concludes Trial and Announces
Its Ruling
After Braithwaite concluded testifying and his counsel
indicated he had no further witnesses, the court asked for a copy
of Elizabeth’s previously admitted July 3 hospital record. The
court then took a brief recess.
Upon returning, and without explanation, the court began
announcing its ruling. Elizabeth’s counsel protested, stating
that Elizabeth wanted to present rebuttal evidence responding
to Braithwaite’s case-in-chief. The court responded: “You have
rebuttal? I think I’ve heard enough evidence.” When asked what
rebuttal evidence counsel would offer, counsel responded that
Elizabeth would again testify. The court responded it would
permit Elizabeth to do so. Specifically, the court stated: “You
know what? I’ll let you put your client up. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I think
I’ve heard all the evidence, but I’ll let her rebut.” The court then
granted a short recess so that Elizabeth could use the restroom.
Upon returning, however, without explanation, the
court did not permit Elizabeth to testify. Instead, the court
immediately issued its ruling on both requests, denying
Elizabeth’s and granting Braithwaite’s. In so doing, the court
found Elizabeth’s version of the July 2 incident to be not credible,
identifying as the “big problem” that Braithwaite had presented
the testimony of Dr. Berenson attesting to Braithwaite’s wound
and that “photos [of his wounds] that are time stamped” were “in
the exhibits,” disproving Elizabeth’s contention that the photos
were fake or had been manipulated. The court stated that
“[t]here could have easily been somebody to produce, you know,
some testimony to say this is how this was manipulated or that
was manipulated. It wasn’t. So I have a wound. I have a wound

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confirmed by a physician. And she said it never happened.
I have pictures that say it happened. [¶] Therefore, I’m left
with incompatible information. . . . I don’t believe that it never
happened. And so I don’t find [Elizabeth] credible. And I cannot
issue a restraining order against [Braithwaite] because I find
[Elizabeth] to be the aggressor.”
As an additional basis for its conclusion that Elizabeth’s
testimony was not credible, the court described Elizabeth’s
account of the July 2 altercation as “disordered,” “inconsistent,”
and “incomplete,” and that she had “all sorts of problems
recollecting.” The court acknowledged that an abuse victim
might have fragmented memories, but stated that it did not
believe this could explain the problems with Elizabeth’s
testimony. The court supported its evaluation with the note of
the treating physician reflected in Elizabeth’s July 3 hospital
record that Elizabeth was “not amnestic” to the event. In
addition, the court noted that Elizabeth never testified about
trying to “beat [Braithwaite] off ” or get away, or screaming, or
yelling and that she never even “tried to do anything.” The court
concluded: “[I]t’s almost like you were acquiescing and letting
this wave of violence happen” which “is very unlike human
behavior.”
By contrast, the court found Braithwaite’s testimony
“seamless[ ]” and “consistent” and, unlike Elizabeth’s,
corroborated by other witnesses. The court found Braithwaite
“was untruthful to a certain extent,” but did not elaborate.
When Elizabeth’s counsel again raised that Elizabeth had
not been given the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence to
Braithwaite’s DVRO request, the court stated: “I’m not going to
hear it anymore. You put your best shot up. Okay? This is not

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going to change. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Counsel, there’s nothing that
you can do to rebut this.” When Elizabeth’s counsel identified
additional evidence counsel sought to offer in rebuttal to
Braithwaite’s DVRO request, the court responded: “Counsel,
it doesn’t matter to me, because I still have that problem about
what actually exists. I have a person who has presented me
a photo of him being cut on that night on that day with a date
stamp, and the only person to rebut it is your client who has
no expertise in this . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Do not argue with me.
I have made my ruling. This is the situation. You cannot get
out of that dilemma. The doctor confirmed that he had been
cut. Okay? That—between those two things, she said she never
cut him. I disagree. Because I don’t believe that I’ve heard any
reasonable evidence to suggest that that date stamp was wrong
other than her [testimony,] which was a self-serving statement so
there is nothing to corroborate her testimony. Nothing. [¶] And
there’s no way to get out of that dilemma. . . . [¶] And like I said,
I found her not to be credible in the totality of the circumstances.”

D. Elizabeth’s Posttrial Filings
On December 15, 2023, 10 days after trial concluded,
Elizabeth moved for reconsideration. The motion included
a declaration of a forensic expert regarding the photos from
Braithwaite’s phone and Braithwaite’s medical records from a
July 10-11, 2023 hospital stay (unrelated to the July 2 incident).
These medical records were in response to a subpoena Elizabeth
had timely served during discovery, but that had not been
produced until after the trial had concluded.
The forensic expert analyzed the video Elizabeth’s counsel
had taken during the hallway examination and declared that
there were signs the date-and-time metadata of the photos

11
had been manipulated. Specifically, the expert stated that the
“seconds” field in the metadata for all four photos ended in “00”
seconds, which was impossible if, as Braithwaite testified, the
photos had been taken consecutively. He also noted that the
photos’ file names were nonsequential—e.g., “IMG_1409” vs.
“IMG_1560.” This, too, was inconsistent with Braithwaite’s
testimony that he took the photos consecutively. The expert
further declared that, given the suspicious nature of the
photographs, only a more comprehensive examination of the
native files would “definitively” determine whether they had been
falsified.
Braithwaite’s July 10, 2023 hospital record included the
doctor’s description of Braithwaite’s body. The description made
no reference to Braithwaite having had a cut, wound, injury or
any bandage on his leg.
Braithwaite opposed the motion but proffered no evidence
or declarations to support his opposition.
Elizabeth filed an offer of proof identifying evidence
that, “[i]f not precluded from doing so,” Elizabeth would have
presented to the court. Among them was the full transcript of
the approximately one-hour July 7, 2023 phone call, in which
Braithwaite discusses Elizabeth’s restraining order request
and the July 2 incident, but never mentions that Elizabeth was
the aggressor or had cut him. Included also was evidence of
pre-July 2, 2023 restraining orders, one in favor of Braithwaite’s
former girlfriend and one in favor of his former wife, both of
which the court had previously indicated would be potentially
admissible as rebuttal to Braithwaite’s DVRO evidence.
Regarding Braithwaite’s testimony that Elizabeth had

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threatened him with a knife on October 14, 2021, Elizabeth
proffered evidence to show that she was out of town on that date.
At the hearing on the reconsideration motion, Elizabeth
also requested the court reopen discovery for the limited
purpose of permitting her to examine the metadata of the
photos on Braithwaite’s phone purportedly depicting the July 2
incident. The court denied Elizabeth’s request, as well as her
reconsideration motion. In describing the reasons for its ruling,
the court noted, inter alia, that the court was “buried” with an
“avalanche” of restraining order requests, and that reopening the
case “just invites further, I think, situations in which this court
would be adding onto a[n] already large caseload.”

E. Appeal and Posttrial Developments
Elizabeth appealed the court’s order denying her DVRO
request and granting Braithwaite’s, as well as its order denying
her motion for reconsideration. In February 2014, after
Elizabeth appealed,5 Braithwaite died. Braithwaite’s estate has
not sought to appear in this appeal. In May 2024, on Elizabeth’s
motion, the trial court issued an order terminating the DVRO
against Elizabeth due to Braithwaite’s death.

5 Elizabeth filed two separate appeals—one on January 30,
2024, and one on January 31, 2024—both from the same orders
and raising the same issues. The second appeal was filed “in an
abundance of caution, and solely to protect against loss of any
appellate rights, due to inconsistencies in the trial court case
numbers under which certain trial court filings were made. The
appeals involve identical parties, identical orders, and identical
records.” For these reasons, we granted Elizabeth’s motion to
consolidate the two appeals.

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DISCUSSION
Elizabeth challenges both the DVRO issued against
her and the court’s denial of her DVRO. She argues that the
DVRO against her must be reversed because, inter alia, the
court violated her right to due process by refusing to permit her
to present any evidence in rebuttal to the evidence Braithwaite
offered supporting his DVRO request. We agree.

A. Mootness
An appeal “becomes moot when events ‘ “ render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court . . . to grant . . . any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) Because an order restraining
the conduct of a deceased person cannot “ ‘have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status’ ” (id.
at p. 277), requiring the court to grant Elizabeth’s request for
a DVRO against Braithwaite would not provide her “effective
relief.” (See ibid. [describing when relief is “effective”].) The
portion of Elizabeth’s appeal regarding her request for a DVRO
against Braithwaite has thus become moot.
In addition, because the reversal of an order no longer
in effect is not effective relief, Elizabeth’s appeal is moot to the
extent it applies to the (now terminated) DVRO against her as
well. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 276–277; San Diego
Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 564
[recognizing the general rule is that “an appeal from an expired
restraining order is moot because the appellate court cannot
grant any effective relief from an expired order”].) We
nonetheless exercise our discretion to address the merits of this
aspect of Elizabeth’s appeal. (See D.P., supra, at pp. 282-283
[recognizing courts retain the discretion to address moot issues].)

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We consider the merits because the existence of that DVRO
in the past still could have serious negative legal and practical
consequences for Elizabeth in the future. (See D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 285 [possible future consequences of jurisdictional
order that are insufficient to avoid mootness may be considered
in deciding whether court should exercise its discretion to reach
the merits of a moot appeal].) In a declaration submitted to
this court, she describes how, in ongoing probate proceedings
regarding Braithwaite’s estate, Tyler cited the DVRO as a basis
for opposing her requests for spousal support and letters of
administration. (See In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th
199, 209 [finding relevant to mootness inquiry that expired
restraining order’s “issuance in the first instance could
have consequences for [the] mother in this and future court
proceedings”].) Tyler also used the findings underlying the
DVRO to file a lawsuit against Elizabeth, although he has since
dismissed it.
Also, according to her declaration, Elizabeth’s work
as a practicing attorney requires her to travel on a “weekly”
basis and, as a result of the DVRO, her “Global Entry and
TSA PreCheck privileges were revoked.” As of the date of her
declaration (November 15, 2024), these privileges still had not
been reinstated, despite the October 2024 termination of the
DVRO. The three times she had traveled internationally since
the issuance of the DVRO, she was “stopped by U.S. Customs
& Border Protection, separated from [her] group, detained in
a separate room, interviewed, and then finally released” after
“approximately 30-45 minutes.” “On one of those occasions,
[Elizabeth] was with business colleagues, and was embarrassed
about the possibility that [she] might have to explain to them

15
why [she] was being detained,” and “the increased time it takes
[her] to get through security” has “impacted [her] ability to book
flights with colleagues.”
Given these considerations, as well as the importance and
nature of the due process rights implicated by her arguments, we
exercise our discretion to address the merits of her due process
challenge.

B. Due Process
“ ‘The term “due process of law” asserts a fundamental
principle of justice which is not subject to any precise definition
but deals essentially with the denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice.’ [Citation.]” (In re
Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 290
(Carlsson).) “ ‘One of the elements of a fair trial is the right
to offer relevant and competent evidence on a material issue.’ ”
(Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357 (Elkins),
italics omitted; see Carlsson, supra, at pp. 290–291; see, e.g., id.
at p. 291 [court “abruptly end[ing] the trial before [party] had
finished his presentation, cutting off any opportunity for rebuttal
evidence . . . or argument of counsel” was a denial of due
process]; Noergaard v. Noergaard (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 76, 87
[court denied mother due process when it did not provide her “the
opportunity to offer relevant and competent evidence on” an issue
“material” to her opposition to father’s petition].) Such a denial
of due process is reversible per se. (Elkins, supra, at p. 1357;
Carlsson, supra, at p. 291; Kelly v. New West Federal Savings
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 677 (Kelly).)
Here, the court “openly violated these precepts.” (Carlsson,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.) We recognize that, because
Elizabeth had the burden of proof on her request for a DVRO,

16
the court would have been entitled to deny a request that she
offer additional evidence in support of that request after she
had rested her case-in-chief. But Braithwaite had the burden of
proof on his request, so the “full and fair hearing” to which due
process entitled Elizabeth on Braithwaite’s request includes an
opportunity to demonstrate that Braithwaite failed to meet his
burden. Indeed, earlier in the proceedings, the court stated it
would afford Elizabeth that opportunity.
The fundamental right “ ‘ “to offer relevant and competent
evidence on a material issue” ’ ” is admittedly “ ‘ “[s]ubject
to such obvious qualifications as the court’s power to restrict
cumulative . . . [and] unduly prejudicial matter [citation].” ’ ”
(Carlsson, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 292.) But the court’s
role as an evidentiary gatekeeper cannot justify the court’s
actions in this case. The court did not exclude all the specific
rebuttal evidence Elizabeth offered—her own testimony and
the full transcript of the July 7, 2023 phone call—as cumulative,
prejudicial, or otherwise inadmissible. Nor do we see any
basis for implied rulings that all this evidence is inadmissible.
Even assuming the court was entitled to exclude parts of
Elizabeth’s testimony or parts of the transcript for various
reasons, the court’s blanket refusal to allow her to offer any
testimony or any other rebuttal evidence exceeded the bounds
of that evidentiary gatekeeping role. “The effect of [this blanket
refusal] was to prevent [Elizabeth] from offering evidence to
establish [her defense]” and thus violated due process. (Kelly,
supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 677.)
Nor can the court’s refusal to allow any rebuttal evidence
be explained by the fact that the parties’ cross-requests were
primarily based on the same alleged instance of domestic

17
violence. The court was not required to grant the restraining
order to one or the other party; the court could have found each
party failed to meet their respective individual burdens of proof.
Therefore, the court’s conclusion that it would deny Elizabeth’s
DVRO request could not dictate the outcome of Braithwaite’s
request and eliminate the need for a hearing on Braithwaite’s
DVRO request. Accordingly, even if we accept, for the sake of
argument, that the court could have properly concluded at the
end of Elizabeth’s presentation that it would deny her DVRO
request—a ruling we do not review on appeal—this could not
justify “abruptly end[ing] the trial . . . without giving [Elizabeth]
the opportunity to introduce or even propose additional
[admissible] evidence” after hearing Braithwaite’s presentation
on his request. (Carlsson, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 292.)
Because this error is reversible per se, and because
Braithwaite is deceased, we reverse without addressing the issue
of prejudice and without instructions that the court conduct a
retrial following remand.

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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot to the extent it addresses
the restraining order against respondent Walter Braithwaite.
The order against appellant Sierra Elizabeth is reversed.
Appellant shall bear her own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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