CourtListener 10362764•Horner v. Carver CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/24/25 Horner v. Carver CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Nevada)
----
MICHAEL W. HORNER, C100619
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CU21086089)
v.
DEBORAH J. CARVER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Plaintiffs Michael W. Horner (son) and his now deceased father, George L. Horner
(father), sued defendant Deborah J. Carver seeking partition of real property located in
Grass Valley (the property). Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court ordered
partition of the property by sale. Defendant appeals the judgment in propria persona.
With no record of the testimony at trial, defendant challenges plaintiffs’ complaint, the
absence of a court reporter at trial, the court’s admission, exclusion, and consideration of
certain evidence, and the correctness of the judgment. Because defendant fails to meet
her burden to show error, we affirm. We also deny son’s request for sanctions.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant seeking partition
of the property by sale. Father passed away a few months later and was dismissed as a
plaintiff.
In a trial memorandum, son claimed that defendant moved to the property in 2004
and lived there with father’s friend. Father’s mother owned the property at that time until
2007 when father inherited it. Father agreed that neither he nor son would live at the
property. Defendant paid to live at the property by making payments ranging from $450
per month in 2007 to $1,000 per month in 2015. Father understood these payments were
for rent. In 2015, father deeded a one-sixth ownership interest in the property to
defendant. The remaining five-sixth interest was owned by father and son and later
solely by son after father’s death. In 2019, defendant stopped making monthly payments
and refused to vacate or sell the property. Asserting that the property was not susceptible
to division in kind, son sought partition by sale.
Represented by counsel, defendant admitted she started paying father on a regular
basis in late 2004 but argued that she understood those payments would be applied to her
purchase of the property. Defendant also claimed she bore the maintenance and
improvement expenses at the property since the time she moved there and calculated her
payments as totaling $256,688. Father represented to defendant that the money she spent
on repair, replacement, maintenance, and other household expenses would go towards
purchase of the property. Defendant acknowledged that a purchase agreement could not
be found or produced. She argued son had no ownership interest in the property and
should be equitably estopped from denying defendant her ownership based on father’s
unclean hands and the promises father made to induce defendant to invest money in the
property. She also argued that the statute of frauds did not bar her claim to the property
because she had performed under an oral contract with father to purchase the property.
2
The matter proceeded to trial without a court reporter. Son called himself,
defendant, and another person as witnesses. Defendant testified in her defense. The
court admitted 10 exhibits from son and 3 exhibits from defendant. Son’s admitted
exhibits included the following: (1) a 2007 court order distributing the property to father;
(2) a 2008 recorded grant deed by father conveying the property to father and son as joint
tenants; (3) a 2015 recorded grant deed by father conveying his interest in the property to
father, son, and defendant as joint tenants; (4) a 2019 recorded grant deed by father and
son (by father as son’s attorney in fact) conveying their interests in the property to father
and son as tenants in common; and (5) a 2021 recorded grant deed by father and son (by
father as son’s attorney in fact) conveying their interests in the property to father and son
as joint tenants. One of defendant’s admitted exhibits included a document from a
multiple real estate listing service identifying “Michael W. Homer” and “George L.
Homer” as owners of the property. The court sustained an objection to lists of property
expenses included in one of defendant’s exhibits after concluding that the lists and the
documents supporting them were hearsay.
In a post-trial memorandum, son argued the evidence at trial reflected his five-
sixth interest in the property and defendant’s one-sixth interest. As to defendant’s claim
that she had an agreement with father to purchase the property, defendant emphasized the
lack of any written document reflecting such an agreement. Son disputed defendant’s
claim that she spent over $250,000 on the property, maintaining that her monthly
payments constituted rent until she acquired an interest in the property and then became
payments for the right to exclusive occupancy of the property. Son acknowledged that
defendant began paying insurance premiums for the property in 2016 and property taxes
starting in 2021, both payments totaling around $8,700. He also acknowledged
defendant’s claim to have paid for other improvements to the property totaling just over
$9,000. Anticipating defendant would argue that she should be reimbursed for these
expenses before the proceeds of the sale were divided, son argued that defendant should
3
be charged for the fair rental value for her continued exclusive occupancy of the property
beginning with May 2019, and that amount would exceed her purported expenses.
In her written closing argument, defendant argued that son did not get along with
father, did nothing to contribute to the property, and had no equity in the property. She
maintained that her monthly payments were to be applied to the purchase of the property
and that she bore the expense of all maintenance and improvements at the property that
exceeded the one-sixth interest she acquired in 2015. She “firmly believe[d] that she
purchased the home, though in an unconventional manner.” She insisted that equitable
estoppel and unclean hands should apply in her defense, that she relied on the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in investing in the property, and that she partially performed
an oral contract to purchase the property.
The trial court issued a proposed statement of decision, finding that (1) son owned
a five-sixth interest in the property, (2) defendant owned the remaining one-sixth interest,
and (3) partition by sale was warranted. The court was not persuaded that unclean hands
or equitable estoppel applied. Defendant objected to the decision, arguing that defendant
should have received more than one-sixth of the property to account for the funds she put
toward the property. In its final statement of decision, the court adopted its proposed
decision and rejected defendant’s objection as forfeited and without merit.
Acting in propria persona, defendant timely appealed from the interlocutory
judgment for partition of the property by sale.
DISCUSSION
We begin with the well-established rule that an appealed order is presumed
correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “[A]ll intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of [the order’s] correctness.” (In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Appellants, even those representing
themselves, have the burden of demonstrating reversible error by providing an adequate
record. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; Huang v. Hanks (2018)
4
23 Cal.App.5th 179, 183, fn. 1.) Appellants also “ ‘must do more than assert error and
leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test [their]
claim[s]. [They] . . . must present an adequate argument including citations to supporting
authorities and to relevant portions of the record.’ ” (Ribakoff v. City of Long
Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 162.) With these rules in mind, we discuss each of
defendant’s asserted errors.
I
Asserted Errors in Complaint
Defendant contends son’s complaint should have been dismissed because it
included false allegations and other deficiencies. This contention is not properly before
us. There is no record that defendant challenged the complaint in the trial court. (See,
e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 436 (a) [motion to strike false matter in a pleading]; 128.7 (b)(3)
[sanctions for pleadings lacking evidentiary support].) False allegations in a complaint
that are not apparent from the face of the complaint should be denied in the defendant’s
answer and then proven false in trial or a motion for summary judgment. (See Weil &
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024)
¶ 7:59.) Here, the parties proceeded to trial and the court rendered a judgment based on
the evidence presented. On this record, defendant provides no basis for us to review the
allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint.
II
Asserted Denial of Court Reporter
Defendant contends the trial court committed a miscarriage of justice by
unreasonably denying her a court reporter, citing Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594
(Jameson). In her reply brief, she contends the court failed to comply with California
Rules of Court, rule 2.956 by failing to notify her before trial that court reporters are not
normally available for civil trials in Nevada County. Defendant is mistaken on both
counts.
5
In civil cases, a court reporter is not required except on court order or party
request. (Code Civ. Proc., § 269, subd. (a)(1).) Here, the record does not reflect any
request for a court reporter or any reason for the court to have ordered one. Defendant’s
reliance on Jameson and California Rules of Court, rule 2.956 is misplaced. Jameson
requires courts to appoint indigent litigants a court reporter upon request. (Jameson,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 599.) Here, there was no request or showing of indigence. And the
trial court complied with California Rules of Court, rule 2.956 by providing notice of the
lack of court reporters for civil trials in its local rules. (Super. Ct. Nevada County, Local
Rules, rule 1.08 (A); California Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(1), (2).)
III
Asserted Evidentiary Errors
Defendant asserts three evidentiary challenges. We conclude these challenges
have been forfeited, fail for lack of reporter’s transcript, or are beyond our review.
First, defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding the lists in one of her
exhibits that documented the property expenses she paid. She contends the trial court
excluded this evidence after concluding it could not examine the documents supporting
the lists “without great loss of time.” Defendant is mistaken. The court concluded that
the lists and the documents supporting them were inadmissible hearsay, and defendant
offers no reasoned argument as to why that conclusion was wrong. We reject this
contention as forfeited. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270,
277.)
Second, defendant contends the trial court erred by allowing son’s expert witness
to testify regarding the rental and resale values of the property without providing
substantiating evidence or exhibits. She also contends this expert was biased because the
expert and defendant had “worked together within the same organization for many
years.” But there is no indication that defendant objected on these grounds at trial.
(People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 45-46 [failure to make contemporaneous object
6
to expert testimony forfeits claim of error].) To the extent defendant questioned the
credibility of son’s expert, it was defendant’s job to do so at trial through objection, cross-
examination, or other evidence. (See Evid. Code, § 721.) Also, there is no reporter’s
transcript allowing us to review the expert’s testimony, so we must presume that the
expert’s unreported testimony would demonstrate no error. (Estate of Fain (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)
And third, defendant finds fault with one of son’s exhibits. But because the record
shows this exhibit was not admitted into evidence, we have no basis to address
defendant’s concern. (USLIFE Savings & Loan Assn. v. National Surety Corp. (1981)
115 Cal.App.3d 336, 343 [documents not admitted into evidence are outside scope of
appellate review].)
IV
Asserted Errors in Judgment
Defendant contends the interlocutory judgment is incorrect because the court
should have found one of the following: (1) father and son never had an interest in the
property; (2) defendant had an oral contract to purchase the property; or (3) defendant’s
unclean hands or estoppel defenses applied. The state of the record requires us to reject
these contentions. The “absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the trial
precludes a determination that the trial court abused its discretion.” (Vo v. Las Virgenes
Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 448.) That absence also compels us to
presume that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by
substantial evidence. (Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 918,
924; see Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109 [unclean hands]; Doe v.
Marten (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029 [estoppel]; Carmel Development Co., Inc. v.
Anderson (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 492, 518 [oral contracts].) Because there is no record of
7
the testimony at trial, and no reversible error appears on the record provided,1 we must
affirm the judgment.
V
Son’s Request for Sanctions
Following briefing, son moved for an order awarding sanctions under Code of
Civil Procedure section 907 and California Rules of Court, Rule 8.276 on the grounds
that defendant’s appeal is frivolous and taken solely for the purpose of delay. We deny
this motion. Whether to impose appellate sanctions is a matter within our discretion.
(Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159,
1194.) “An appeal that is simply without merit is not by definition frivolous and should
not incur sanctions.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) We
decline to describe defendant’s claims as frivolous or instituted solely for the purpose of
delay.
1 We do not reconsider the court’s apparent refusal to conclude that defendant’s multiple
listing service document shows that father and son lost their interests in the property by
conveying those interests to individuals with slightly different last names, “Michael W.
Homer” and “George L. Homer.” As the reviewing court, we do not reweigh the
evidence or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139,
1145.)
8
DISPOSITION
The interlocutory judgment is affirmed. Son shall recover his costs on appeal.
(California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
9
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.