People v. Boyd CA2/8

CourtListener 10362755Calctapp24.03.2025

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Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Boyd CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B335180

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA438587-01
v.

AHJEEB JAMAL BOYD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with instructions.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
On March 15, 2016, appellant Ahjeeb Jamal Boyd pled no
contest to two counts of attempted murder. He also admitted
gang enhancement allegations. Defense counsel stipulated to a
factual basis based upon the police report and the preliminary
hearing transcript. The trial court sentenced Boyd to two
concurrent aggregate determinate prison terms of 12 years.
On April 19, 2023, Boyd filed a petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The petition was a pre-printed
form geared towards meeting the requirements for facial validity
and appointment of counsel. The form allows the petitioner to
declare eligibility for relief by checking boxes next to statements
that correspond to statutory requirements for relief, including
statements that petitioner was subject to prosecution and
conviction under an invalid theory and could not presently be
convicted because of changes to homicide law. The trial court
appointed counsel for Boyd and found him ineligible for
sentencing relief as a matter of law and summarily denied the
petition. Relying on the preliminary hearing transcript, the trial
court found Boyd was the actual perpetrator of the attempted
murders and acted with malice aforethought. The trial court
wrote: “After considering the record of this case, including the
available reporter’s daily transcripts of Petitioner’s plea and the
preliminary hearing transcript and the probation officer’s report,
the court has determined that Petitioner has not met his burden
of establishing a prima facie case for relief and respectfully
DENIES the petition.” “Petitioner’s objection to the court relying
on the preliminary hearing transcript in this matter is overruled
and the court will rely on the factual showings in that transcript

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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in determining whether Petitioner has established the necessary
prima facie case for relief.” “Because Petitioner personally
attempted to murder the victims in this case and personally
harbored malice aforethought, he is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law and the petition is DENIED.” This appeal followed.
Boyd contends the court improperly denied his petition at
the prima facie stage because the record of conviction did not
establish as a matter of law that he was ineligible for
resentencing, and the court could not have denied his petition
without improperly engaging in factfinding.
After the parties filed their briefs, our Supreme Court
decided People v. Patton (Mar. 3, 2025, S279670) ___ Cal.5th ___
[2025 Cal. LEXIS 1165] (Patton), which held that a “petitioner
who offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief
under section 1172.6 in response to a record of conviction that
demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid
theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie showing.” (Id. at
p. *2.) We affirm the trial court’s order. At Boyd’s request we
remand with directions to the trial court to permit Boyd to amend
his petition to comply with newly established caselaw.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We recite the facts drawn from the preliminary hearing
transcript, which establish probable cause to believe that Boyd
was the sole assailant of the two attempted murder victims. In
2015, a surveillance video at a 76 gas station captured Boyd
walking up to a car stopped at a gas pump. Two persons were in
the car while the driver was pumping gas. Boyd appeared on the
scene near the car and the driver pumping gas immediately fled.
Boyd pulled the gas pump out of the car and poured gasoline all
over it, including the area near the front windshield where the

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two people were sitting. He ignited the gasoline with a flame and
took off. The occupants of the car escaped the burning car. At
the preliminary hearing, a police officer who had spoken with
Boyd 10 to 12 times in the past identified Boyd as the person who
ignited the fire as seen on the surveillance video.
DISCUSSION
Boyd contends the trial court erred in denying his petition
at the prima facie stage because the trial court relied on the
preliminary hearing transcript to conclude appellant was the
actual perpetrator of the attempted murders and acted with
malice aforethought. He contends nothing in the record of
conviction establishes dispositively and as a matter of law the
identity or mens rea of the actual perpetrator. This argument is
predicated on the proposition that the preliminary hearing
transcript is not part of the record of conviction and his generic
plea did not specify any theory of liability or any particular fact,
i.e., that he was the person who actually perpetrated the
attempted murders. He argues the court engaged in
impermissible factfinding by relying on facts taken from the
preliminary hearing transcript. He contends we should reverse
the trial court and remand the petition for an evidentiary hearing
in accordance with the provisions of section 1172.6, subdivision
(d). We disagree.
I. Relevant Law and the Standard of Review
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder. (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842–843.) It also narrowed the scope of the felony-murder

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rule. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449 (Curiel); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
in section 189, subdivision (e). The latter provision requires the
prosecution to prove that the defendant was the actual killer
(§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an aider and abettor to murder who had the
intent to kill (id., subd. (e)(2)); or a major participant in an
underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), who acted
with reckless indifference to human life as described in
subdivision (d) of section 190.2. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at
p. 448; People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Gentile,
at pp. 842–843.)
The Legislature provided a procedure (now codified in
section 1172.6), extending protection to, among others, “[a]
person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) In
such cases, a defendant may petition the court to vacate their
conviction and seek resentencing on any remaining counts if the
person could not now be convicted of attempted murder because
of the changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see
Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1
[extending Senate Bill 1437's ameliorative changes and
procedure for potential relief to individuals convicted of
attempted murder or voluntary manslaughter].) Section 1172.6
applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a) [“A person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the

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natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a
petition . . . .”].)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains the requisite
information, the trial court must appoint counsel, upon request,
to represent the petitioner. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962–
963; § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3).) The prosecutor must file a
response to which the petitioner may reply, and the court must
hold a hearing to determine if the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the
court finds a prima facie case has been shown, it must issue an
OSC and conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to
vacate the conviction and resentence petitioner on any remaining
counts. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause [OSC].” ’ ” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The
court may consider the record of conviction, which will
“necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at
p. 971; see Curiel, at pp. 463–464.) “In reviewing any part of the
record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; see
People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)

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“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘ “[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’ ” ’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) We independently review the superior
court's prima facie determination under section 1172.6. (People
v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; Harden, at p. 52.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Summarily Denying Boyd’s
Petition Without Conducting an Evidentiary Hearing.
On its face, Boyd’s petition appears to satisfy the
requirements of subdivision (a) of section 1172.6. The petition
and declaration state: (1) an information was filed against him
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) he
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been
convicted of attempted murder; and (3) he could not presently be
convicted of murder due to amendments to sections 188 and 189.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) Because Boyd’s
statements must be accepted as true at the prima facie stage, the
trial court could deny his section 1172.6 petition only if the record
of conviction conclusively demonstrates he was not entitled to
relief as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 971.)
Nevertheless, the statements Boyd makes in his petition
are insufficient bases to go forward to an evidentiary hearing. As
Patton holds, “a section 1172.6 petitioner who, despite having
access to counsel upon submission of a facially sufficient petition,

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offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief, in
response to a record of conviction that demonstrates the
petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid theory, has not,
thereby, made a prima farcie showing.” (Patton, supra,
___ Cal.5th ___ [2025 Cal. LEXIS 1165 at pp. *19–20].) Here
Boyd made no factual assertions whatsoever in the trial court
and makes no factual assertions on appeal. He relies solely on
conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief. He has, therefore,
not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. We
affirm the trial court. In an abundance of caution, however, we
remand to the trial court to permit Boyd to amend his petition
within 30 days of the remand.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing is
affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to consider an amended petition should Boyd, within
30 days of that remand, seek to file one.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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