People v. Molina CA2/1

CourtListener 10362751Calctapp24.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Molina CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337845
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. NA023660)

v.

RAUL GARCIA MOLINA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Raul Garcia Molina appeals from the denial of
his resentencing petition under Penal Code1 section 1172.6,
previously numbered section 1170.95. He contends the jury
instructions at his trial allowed the jury to convict him by
imputing his confederate’s implied malice to him. Based on the
instructions given in this case, we conclude the jury necessarily
convicted defendant under a theory of express malice. He
therefore is ineligible for relief, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

1. Conviction and sentence
As summarized in our decision from defendant’s direct
appeal, in March 1985, defendant and Macedonio Rodriguez
attacked Manuel Garcia in a parking lot in Wilmington, and
Garcia died from multiple stab wounds.2
Rodriguez was not apprehended until 1994. In 1995,
defendant and Rodriguez were charged by information with
murder, with an allegation that defendant personally used a
knife in committing the offense. Defendant was tried later that
same year.
Defendant’s jury received the following instructions
relevant to this appeal.

1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 We provide these facts solely as context for the charge
filed against defendant, recognizing factual summaries from
appellate opinions “may not be used to determine a petitioner’s
eligibility at the prima facie stage” of a section 1172.6 proceeding.
(People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183 (Lee).) The
factual summary has no bearing on our resolution of the issues
on appeal.

2
CALJIC No. 3.00 explained “principals in the crime”
included “[t]hose who directly and actively commit the act
constituting the crime” as well as “[t]hose who aid and abet the
commission of the crime.”
CALJIC No. 3.01 provided, “A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he, [¶] (1) with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
commission of the crime, by act or advice aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
CALJIC No. 8.10 set forth the elements of murder: “1. A
human being was killed. [¶] 2. The killing was unlawful, and
[¶] 3. The killing was done with malice aforethought.”
CALJIC No. 8.11 provided, “ ‘Malice’ may be either express
or implied. [¶] Malice is express when there is manifested an
intention unlawfully to kill a human being. [¶] Malice is implied
when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2.
The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life,
and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of
the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.”
CALJIC No. 8.70 stated, “Murder is classified into two
degrees, and if you should find the defendant guilty of murder,
you must determine and state in your verdict whether you find
the murder to be of the first or second degree.”
CALJIC No. 8.20 provided, “All murder which is
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first
degree.” The instruction then defined “willful,” “deliberate,” and
“premeditated.”

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CALJIC No. 8.30 provided, “Murder of the second degree is
[also] the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to
kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish
deliberation and premeditation.”
The jury was not instructed on theories of felony murder or
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, nor on any
offense other than murder.
On July 27, 1995, the jury convicted defendant of second
degree murder, but found the allegation that he personally used a
knife not true. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to
life. We affirmed the judgment.

2. Petition for resentencing
On May 31, 2023, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.3 The People filed a response
to the petition, arguing defendant was ineligible for relief because
he had been convicted either as the actual killer or a direct aider
and abettor, and not under a theory that imputed malice to him
based on his participation in a crime. For reasons undisclosed in
the record, the People incorrectly stated, “[Defendant] was
convicted of both second-degree murder and attempted murder.”

3 This was defendant’s second resentencing petition. The
trial court denied his first petition, filed August 8, 2019, at the
prima facie stage, and we affirmed. (People v. Molina (June 18,
2020, B301642) [nonpub. opn.].) At the hearing on defendant’s
second petition, the parties agreed defendant was entitled to file
that petition given changes in the law since the court adjudicated
his first petition, and the Attorney General does not argue
otherwise in his respondent’s brief. We accept this concession for
purposes of this appeal.

4
Defendant filed a reply to the People’s response, arguing
under People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) and
other authorities, the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict
him for murder based on aiding and abetting an assault, and
thus he was entitled to relief.
Following a hearing, the trial court concluded defendant
had not made a prima facie showing for relief, and denied his
petition. The court stated it was relying on the jury instructions
at defendant’s trial. The court stated that “attempted murder is
a specific intent crime” for which the jury had to find “express
malice.” In regard to the second degree murder conviction, the
court stated that “implied malice murder still exists,” and based
on the instructions the question presented to the jury was
whether defendant aided and abetted murder, not any other
crime.
Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism for defendants to
seek retroactive resentencing if they could no longer be convicted
of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under
amendments to the Penal Code enacted in 2018. (See Lee,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.) Relief is potentially available
to, inter alia, people “convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
“If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of relief under
section 1172.6—that is, a showing that the petitioner was

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convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a
theory no longer valid under the amended Penal Code—the
resentencing court must issue an order to show cause for an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v.
Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891.)” (Lee, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) “If, however, the record of conviction
or the court’s own documents indicate the petitioner is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law, the resentencing court may
deny the petition without issuing an order to show cause.” (Ibid.)
We review de novo whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie showing. (See Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.)

B. Defendant Is Ineligible for Resentencing as a Matter
of Law
Defendant on appeal relies on Langi, which held the
defendant made a prima facie showing for relief under former
section 1170.95 because his jury instructions “create[d] an
ambiguity under which the jury [could] find the defendant guilty
of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding that
he personally acted with malice.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 982, 984.) Defendant argues the instructions in Langi had
“the same wording” as the instructions given at his trial. As we
shall explain, the instructions at defendant’s trial materially
differed from those in Langi and render him ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law.

1. Langi
At issue in Langi were CALJIC No. 8.31 and CALJIC
No. 3.01. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) CALJIC
No. 8.31, as given in Langi, “stated that a killing is a second
degree murder if ‘1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,

6
[¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to
human life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an
act, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that
the act would result in the death of a human being.’ ” (Langi,
supra, at p. 981.)
CALJIC No. 3.01, as given in Langi, provided, “ ‘A person
aids and abets the commission . . . of a crime when he or she:
[¶] (1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and [¶] (2) With the intent or purpose of committing
or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, . . .
[¶] (3) By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
the commission of the crime.’ ” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 981.)
The Langi court observed, because CALJIC No. 8.31, as
given, did not require the direct perpetrator to “act with the
unlawful intent of causing death,” his “unlawful purpose,” as the
term is used in CALJIC No. 3.01, “may have been only to strike
or to injure, or conceivably only to embarrass, the victim.”
(Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) “Since the perpetrator’s
purpose need not have been to kill the victim, the aider and
abettor’s knowledge of that purpose similarly need not have been
knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill. If the perpetrator
need not have had ‘murderous intent,’ certainly the aider and
abettor need not have had such an intent.” (Id. at pp. 982–983.)
The court acknowledged that, even absent an intent to kill,
under CALJIC No. 8.31 the direct perpetrator could be guilty of
murder under a theory of implied malice if he “acted with
conscious disregard for human life.” (See Langi, supra,

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73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.) That “conscious disregard”
requirement, however, did not appear in CALJIC No. 3.01.
(Langi, supra, at p. 983.) “Thus, under the instructions that were
given, the jury was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an
aider and abettor of second degree murder, appellant need only
have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in
this case, punching [the victim]—whether or not appellant
intended to aid or encourage [the victim’s] killing, and whether or
not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of such a
killing.” (Ibid.)
The court concluded, “Because the record of conviction
does not conclusively negate the possibility that the jury found
appellant guilty of second degree murder by imputing to him the
implied malice of the actual killer, without finding that he
personally acted ‘with knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for, human life’ (CALJIC No. 8.31), an
evidentiary hearing is required.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th
at p. 984.)

2. Analysis
Because the jury found the allegation that defendant
personally used a knife not true, we accept for purposes of this
appeal that the jury convicted him as an aider and abettor, not as
the actual perpetrator of the murder. That being said, there is a
crucial and dispositive distinction between the instructions in
Langi and those given to defendant’s jury. Although defendant’s
jury was instructed on aiding and abetting under CALJIC
No. 3.01, the jury was not instructed with CALJIC No. 8.31,
defining implied malice second degree murder. Instead,
defendant’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.30, which
defined second degree murder as “the unlawful killing of a

8
human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested
an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is
insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation.” Thus,
the only instruction on second degree murder defendant’s jury
received required a finding of intent to kill, i.e., express malice.
In light of this instruction, the verdict of second degree
murder indicates the jury necessarily found the perpetrator acted
with intent to kill. (People v. Love (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280,
1290 [“We presume that the jury understood and followed the
court’s instructions in reaching its verdict.”].) To the extent the
jury found defendant guilty as an aider and abettor under
CALJIC No. 3.01, therefore, the jury necessarily found he knew
the “unlawful purpose” of the perpetrator, i.e., that the
perpetrator was acting with intent to kill, and defendant
intentionally “aid[ed], promote[d], encourage[d] or instigate[d]”
the murderous act. The possibility identified in Langi that the
jury might impute the perpetrator’s implied malice to the aider
and abettor did not exist under these instructions.
It is true defendant’s jury was instructed generally on
principles of implied malice under CALJIC No. 8.11, but unlike in
Langi, no instruction tied those principles to particular degrees of
murder. The malice instructions may have suggested to the jury
that murder as a general matter could be established under an
implied malice theory, but no instruction allowed them to convict
defendant of second degree murder without a finding of intent to
kill. Because the jury specifically convicted defendant of second
degree murder, the record of conviction in this case establishes as
a matter of law defendant was convicted under a theory of
express malice, and he therefore is ineligible for resentencing.

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Defendant argues the trial court denied his petition based
on the erroneous conclusion he had been convicted of attempted
murder. He also suggests the trial court improperly relied on the
factual summary from the decision in defendant’s direct appeal.
Assuming arguendo the trial court erred in either regard, the
error was harmless given defendant’s ineligibility for relief. (See
People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 957 [trial court’s
misreading of record of conviction immaterial when defendant
was ineligible for relief under former section 1170.95 as a matter
of law].) Indeed, defendant’s sole argument against harmless
error is that under Langi he is eligible for relief, an argument we
have rejected.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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