People v. Greene CA2/2

CourtListener 10362625Calctapp24.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Greene CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B336519

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA084823)
v.

JESSE GREENE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alan K. Schneider, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and William H. Shin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Jesse Greene appeals the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 at the prima facie
stage. We affirm the summary denial because the preliminary
hearing transcript unequivocally shows appellant was the sole
perpetrator of the attempted murder, and he did not provide facts
beyond conclusory allegations to show his entitlement to relief.
BACKGROUND
In 2019, appellant pleaded no contest to attempted murder.
He further admitted that he had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)), that he inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that he personally used a
deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Appellant was sentenced
to 17 years in state prison.
I. Preliminary Hearing
At the preliminary hearing on April 3, 2017, the victim
testified that he drove to a parking lot to meet a woman he had
been seeing (appellant’s codefendant) to retrieve the Mercedes he
had lent her and to return her car that he had gotten repaired.
When the victim got out of the car, appellant—who he had never
met—jumped on him and stabbed him repeatedly in the face,
head, and neck. He lost several teeth, required 120 staples in his
head, and lost feeling in his lip and hand. A witness testified
that he saw the stabbing through his apartment window, and
that he saw a woman looking on as the attack occurred. The
witness yelled at the perpetrator to leave the victim alone, at
which point both the attacker and the woman fled the scene.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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II. The Charges and Plea Agreement
A three-count information charged appellant with
attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), carjacking (§ 215,
subd. (a)), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
As to the attempted murder count, it was further alleged that he
personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to all
counts, it was alleged he inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and had been convicted of a prior
strike (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
After the preliminary hearing, appellant entered his plea of
no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted the
additional allegations.
III. Petition for Resentencing
On November 7, 2022, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. He checked the boxes stating
he was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial or acceptance of a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which he could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder, and that he could not presently be convicted of murder
or attempted murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189,
effective January 1, 2019.
The People opposed the petition, arguing that appellant
had failed to make a prima facie showing because the
preliminary hearing transcript showed he was prosecuted and
convicted as the only person who stabbed the victim. Appellant
did not offer any facts to refute the version of events depicted at
the preliminary hearing.
At the prima facie hearing on January 19, 2024, the parties
submitted on their briefs, and the trial court denied the petition

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because appellant was prosecuted as a direct perpetrator, not
under any now defunct theory.
DISCUSSION
Enacted in 2018, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) effectively abolished the natural and probable
consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limited the
application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The legislation also served to eliminate murder convictions
premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by
which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed
by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove
that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to
kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard
to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).) Specifically,
the Legislature amended section 188 to require that when the
felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of
murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) Effective January 1,
2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 to expand its
coverage to individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (1172.6, subd. (a);
People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which
defendants may seek to vacate convictions that rested on a theory
of murder rendered invalid by the amendments to sections 188
and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.)

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Upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, the trial court
must entertain briefing and determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People
v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869; People v. Hill (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1065.) In conducting this review, our Supreme
Court has held that the trial court should look to the record of
conviction, and “[i]f the petition and the record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief,
the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. Strong
(2022)13 Cal.5th 698, 700, citing Lewis, at pp. 970–972.) The
trial court may not, however, reject the petitioner’s allegations
“ ‘ “on credibility grounds” ’ or engage in ‘ “factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.” ’ ” (People
v. Love (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1287.)
Until recently, the Courts of Appeal were split on the role
of the preliminary hearing transcript in determining whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie case under section 1172.6.
(Compare People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1167;
People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 990–993; People v.
Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657–658, with People v.
Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481; People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989–991.) Our Supreme Court resolved that
split in People v. Patton (Mar. 3, 2025, S279670) ___Cal.5th___
[2025 Cal. LEXIS 1165] (Patton), holding that a petitioner’s
“conclusory allegations of entitlement to resentencing relief under
section 1172.6” are insufficient to make a prima facie showing
where the otherwise uncontroverted facts related at the
preliminary hearing show that the petitioner was convicted
under a still-valid theory of liability. (Patton, at [pp. 3, 25].)
“Where facts from the record of conviction are undisputed,

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accepting them over contrary legal allegations that are merely
conclusory is not ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence
or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at [p. 20].) “Indeed, denial of
a resentencing petition because its conclusory allegations do not
counter the facts in a record of conviction that foreclose[] relief is
a determination that the petition’s allegations are legally
deficient.” (Ibid.) Patton’s reasoning tracks the principle,
applicable in other contexts, that “specific allegations in a
complaint control over an inconsistent general allegation.” (Perez
v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228,
1235–1236; accord, Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 437.)
Under this principle, specific allegations may render a complaint
defective when the general allegations might have been sufficient
standing alone. (Perez, at p. 1236.)
Here, although appellant checked the boxes next to the
conclusory allegations stating his eligibility for relief, the
preliminary hearing transcript shows that he was convicted of
attempted murder as the sole person who stabbed the victim.
Despite “multiple opportunities to proffer specific facts” that
would refute this version of events and support his entitlement to
relief, including in his brief responding to the People’s opposition
and at the prima facie hearing, appellant failed to do so and has
instead relied solely on his conclusory allegations stated on the
preprinted form petition. (Patton, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ at [p.
22].) On this record, the trial court’s conclusion that appellant
failed to make a prima facie case was correct.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.

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