People v. Hendrix CA3

CourtListener 10361219Calctapp21.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/21/25 P. v. Hendrix CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100116

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. CR20153634
& CR20161094)
v.

STEVEN HENDRIX,

Defendant and Appellant.

The trial court resentenced defendant Steven Hendrix pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.75,1 reducing his prison sentence by five years. On appeal, defendant
contends the trial court erred by imposing an upper term sentence for his gross vehicular
manslaughter conviction. The People contend the trial court complied with section
1172.75 in imposing the upper term sentence. We do not resolve this dispute because
defendant failed to object to the upper term sentence and has therefore forfeited the issue.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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We agree with the parties that we must nevertheless remand the case for the trial court to
update the credit defendant has earned for time served in custody and to include his
updated credit totals on the abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, in Yolo County case No. CR2015-3634, a jury found defendant guilty of
two counts of inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon his
fiancée. The court then found true allegations that defendant had been convicted of the
same offense within the prior seven years; had been convicted of a serious felony, as
defined in section 667, subdivision (c); and had served a prior prison term.
In 2017, in Yolo County case No. CR2016-1094, a jury found defendant guilty of
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, causing bodily injury while driving
under the influence of drugs, and four counts of endangering the health of a child in his
care. The jury also found true allegations that defendant proximately caused injury to
seven victims while driving under the influence of drugs. In a bifurcated trial, the jury
also found true allegations that defendant had been convicted of a serious felony, as
defined in section 667, subdivisions (a) and (c); had served a prior prison term; and was
out of custody on bail when he committed the offenses.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 42 years four months in prison for both
cases, including a one-year enhancement for having served a prior prison term, pursuant
to former section 667.5, subdivision (b). (See Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65.) The court
struck the remaining prior prison term enhancement allegation.
In 2022, after the Legislature repealed most prior prison term enhancements and
created a process for resentencing prisoners whose sentences included repealed
enhancements (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), the trial court set a
resentencing hearing pursuant to what is now section 1172.75 (see Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12 [renumbering section 1171.1 without substantive change]).

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Prior to that hearing, defendant filed a brief asking the trial court to impose a 31-
year prison sentence by making four discretionary sentencing decisions that the prior
sentencing court had rejected: (1) dismissing the repealed prior prison term
enhancement; (2) dismissing a two-year on-bail enhancement; (3) dismissing a two-year
enhancement for multiple victims injured while driving under the influence; and
(4) imposing a concurrent sentence for case No. CR2015-3634, which would require
dismissing the prior serious felony conviction allegation in that case.
In response, the People argued that the trial court should not dismiss any
enhancements other than the repealed prior prison term enhancement because doing so
would endanger public safety and would not be in the interest of justice. The People also
argued that dismissing the prior serious felony conviction allegation in case No. CR2015-
3634 would not be in furtherance of justice and that the court should impose a
consecutive sentence in that case because the offenses were independent crimes.
In a supplemental brief, defendant conceded that the upper term sentence for gross
vehicular manslaughter was appropriate: “It is important to note that [defendant] is not
moving the court to reduce his sentence as it relates to his gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated conviction.” At the resentencing hearing, defendant’s counsel
reiterated to make it “very clear” that defendant was “not asking for relief for anything
that happened with [the manslaughter victim].”
For case No. CR2016-1094, the trial court imposed the upper term sentence of 10
years for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, doubled due to the prior serious
felony conviction. The court also imposed a consecutive term of eight months for
causing bodily injury while driving under the influence of drugs, doubled to 16 months,
and 16 months for each of the four counts of endangering the health of a child in his care,
with each doubled to 32 months. The court dismissed the repealed one-year prior prison
term enhancement and the enhancement for injuring multiple victims driving while
intoxicated. The court also dismissed the two-year enhancement alleging defendant

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committed the offenses while released on bail. The court explained that it dismissed
these two additional enhancements in the interest of justice, even though defendant had
failed to establish a nexus between his childhood trauma and the crimes he committed.
For case No. CR2015-3634, the trial court declined to dismiss the prior serious
felony conviction or to impose a concurrent sentence. Instead, the court imposed a
consecutive term of 16 months for each count of inflicting corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition upon his fiancée, with each sentence doubled due to the prior serious
felony conviction. In total, the court sentenced defendant to 37 years four months in
prison. The court told defendant that his custody credits would “be determined by the
California Department of Corrections [and Rehabilitation].”
Defendant did not object to the trial court’s imposition of the upper term sentence
for gross vehicular manslaughter. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred at the resentencing hearing by imposing
an upper term sentence for gross vehicular manslaughter without having a jury find the
facts underlying the applicable aggravating circumstances. The People contend the trial
court complied with section 1172.75 in imposing the upper term sentence. We do not
resolve this dispute because defendant failed to object to the upper term sentence and has
therefore forfeited the issue. We agree with the parties that we must nevertheless remand
the case for the trial court to update the credit defendant has earned for time served in
custody and to include his updated credit totals on the abstract of judgment.
I
Forfeiture
Under the current version of section 1170, subdivision (b), which defendant
contends should have applied at his resentencing hearing, the trial court may impose an
upper term sentence if justified by aggravating circumstances that were either admitted

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by the defendant, found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact, or involve
consideration of prior convictions found true based on certified records. (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(2)-(3).) A defendant must object to a court’s failure to follow the procedures in
section 1170, subdivision (b) to preserve the issue for appeal. (People v. Achane (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043-1044; see also People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354
[“claims deemed waived on appeal involve sentences which, though otherwise permitted
by law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner”].)
Here, defendant did not object to the trial court finding facts underlying
aggravating circumstances and determining that those aggravating circumstances justified
an upper term. To the contrary, defendant repeatedly assured the trial court that he was
not challenging the upper term sentence for gross vehicular manslaughter. Accordingly,
defendant may not raise the issue on appeal.
II
Custody Credits
Pursuant to section 2900.1, “[w]here a defendant has served any portion of his
sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently
declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be
credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the
same criminal act or acts.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 32.) As such, the
sentencing court must credit the defendant “with all actual days he had spent in custody,
whether in jail or prison, up to that time.” (Id. at p. 37; §§ 2900.1, 2900.5) The updated
total of credits must then be added to the abstract of judgment. (People v. Phoenix (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125, 1130; § 2900.5.) The trial court must also include on the
abstract presentence credit earned prior to the execution of the prison sentence.
(Buckhalter, at p. 33; § 2900.5.)
The trial court need not calculate or determine the conduct credits earned by a
defendant after the execution of the prison sentence. (See §§ 2930-2935.) The

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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is responsible for awarding such conduct
credits, so those credits need not be added to the updated abstract. (In re Martinez (2003)
30 Cal.4th 29, 37; Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(2).)
Here, the trial court declared that all custody and conduct credits should be
determined by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and left blank the
“Credit for Time Served” section of the abstract of judgment. We agree with the parties
that this was error. We will remand the case with instructions to calculate the total time
defendant has served in custody and include that in an amended abstract of judgment,
along with presentence credit defendant earned prior to the initial execution of his prison
sentence.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with instructions to the trial court to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment showing defendant’s updated credit for time served, as discussed
above, and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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