CourtListener 10361137•People v. Meza CA2/1
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Filed 3/21/25 P. v. Meza CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B335096
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA029459)
v.
ROBERT ANTHONY MEZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Joy Maulitz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In 1991, a jury convicted appellant Robert Anthony Meza of
second degree murder. Although the court did not instruct the
jury on felony murder, the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or any theory in which malice could have been imputed
to Meza, thirty years later, Meza filed a petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.96.1 After an evidentiary hearing,
the superior court denied Meza’s petition, finding him ineligible
for relief as a matter of law and, alternatively, guilty of second
degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, Meza contends he is not ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because a section 1172.6 petition permits him to
challenge a conviction for implied malice murder even when
malice was not imputed to him. He also argues the court erred
because: (1) it failed to act as an independent factfinder; (2) it
used an incorrect standard of proof to deny his petition; (3)
substantial evidence would not support a finding that he was
guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the court did not
sufficiently consider Meza’s youth at the time of the crime; and
(5) “cumulative error” warrants reversal. We hold Meza has
failed to demonstrate error and therefore affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered as
1172.6 without substantive change. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.) For clarity, we use the current statutory
numbering.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Meza Is Convicted of Second Degree Murder
1. Information
In 1991, an information charged that Meza “did willfully,
unlawfully, and with malice aforethought[,] murder ARCENIO
BELTRAN.” The information also charged Meza with the
attempted murders of Jose Navar and Moises Rodriguez.
2. Testimony
A jury trial began in October 1991. Rodriguez testified
that, on the night of the incident, he and his nephews—Navar
and Beltran—stopped by a “lunch truck” to get some food.3 Meza
and a companion had arrived before Rodriguez and his nephews,
and Meza was ordering food. After Meza finished, and Rodriguez
began placing his order, Rodriguez noticed that “something
happened,” and Meza and his companion began chasing
Rodriguez’s nephews.
Navar testified that, as Rodriguez was ordering, Meza’s
companion asked Beltran where he was from.4 Beltran
2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history
relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3 Navar testified that the time was a little after midnight.
4 A gang expert later explained that “where are you from”
was a “question that one gang member asks another to determine
his gang affiliation.”
3
answered, “Rookstown.” Meza responded, “Fuck Rookstown” and
“Stoners Trece” and punched Beltran in the face.5
Rodriguez testified he saw Beltran lying in the street,
“already knocked out,” but Meza “kept on hitting him, jumping on
his face, stomach and hands.” He also saw Meza’s companion
“beating up” Navar. Rodriguez ran toward where Meza was
attacking Beltran, shouting at Meza to leave Beltran alone; Meza
continued beating Beltran. When Rodriguez was approximately
15 feet away from the two, Meza drew a gun, declared that they
were in his gang’s territory, threatened to shoot Rodriguez if he
got closer, and fired a shot into the air. Rodriguez ran, joined by
Navar, who had been able to escape Meza’s companion; Meza
fired “three or four shots” at the pair. After the shooting stopped,
Rodriguez returned, worried about Beltran, who was still lying in
the street, unconscious. Meza and his companion were across the
street, having walked away from the scene. But when Rodriguez
tried to step onto the street to approach his nephew, Meza fired
one more shot at Rodriguez, causing him to flee again. Soon
after, a car ran over Beltran, killing him. The lunch trunk
proprietor testified that, right before the car struck Beltran, the
proprietor saw Beltran “bend his neck forward” as if trying to lift
his head up.
When a police officer later asked the lunch truck proprietor
to describe where Beltran was, the lunch truck proprietor pointed
to an area between two double yellow lines in the middle of the
street, which the officer described as a “turn bay,” or a lane from
which turns could be made. However, the sheriff’s deputy
5 The same gang expert also testified that the area in which
the incident occurred was the territory of the Stoners Trece gang,
who did not “get along” with the Rookstown gang.
4
responding to the scene testified that Beltran “was lying on his
back near the curb, the south curb of Olympic Boulevard. His
head was near the curb. His head was to the south. His feet
were to the north.” The deputy later described a picture shown to
him as “the scene as it appeared that night. The victim lying
next to the curb.”
The lunch truck proprietor guessed that, around the time
the incident occurred, there were typically one to two cars per
minute driving down the road that Beltran was lying on.
Rodriguez testified that when he drove down the street where the
lunch truck was, there were “one or two cars.” Navar also
testified that there were cars driving on that street. The
responding sheriff’s deputy, who arrived at 2:45 a.m., testified
there were cars driving “up and down the street” as he
investigated the crime scene; he estimated there was “less than
one [car] a minute.”
3. Closing Arguments
After the People rested, the court granted a defense motion
to dismiss a first degree murder charge—citing insufficient
evidence to show premeditation and deliberation—but denied the
motion as to second degree murder, finding “more than ample
evidence to support a conviction of second degree murder.”
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the
People had proven the element of implied malice because Meza
beat and kicked Beltran until he was unconscious, left him lying
on a “four lane highway” at night when it would be “much more
difficult to see” someone lying in the street, and then prevented
Rodriguez from helping him. The prosecutor argued the same
facts would support a finding that Meza had an intent to kill
Beltran, which constituted express malice.
5
In his closing argument, defense counsel contended Beltran
was left in a turn bay, not a traffic lane, which was a “portion of
the street where cars don’t go.” Counsel also argued that if Meza
had wanted to kill Beltran, he would have shot him.
4.
Jury Instructions
The court instructed the jury with two definitions of second
degree murder: (1) “the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention
unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient
to establish deliberation and premeditation”; and (2) “the
unlawful killing of a human being when: One, the killing
resulted from an intentional act. Two, the natural consequences
of the act are dangerous to human life. And, three, the act was
deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for human life.”6
The court did not instruct the jury on felony murder, on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or on any theory in
which malice was imputed to Meza solely based on aiding and
abetting a crime.7
6 Based on a jury question, an additional instruction on
second degree murder was given in which the third element was
articulated as “the act was deliberately performed by a person
who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and
who acts with conscious disregard for life.”
7 While the implied malice instruction incorporated an idea
of natural and probable consequences, that is separate from the
natural and probable consequences doctrine at issue here. (See,
e.g., People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 231, fn. omitted
[“Before Senate Bill No. 1437, ‘the natural and probable
consequences doctrine was an exception to the actual malice
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
6
5. Conviction and Appeal
The jury found Meza guilty of second degree murder (and
found true that Meza personally used a firearm during the
murder), assault, and the grossly negligent discharge of a
firearm. The court sentenced Meza to 15 years to life—with an
additional 4 years for a firearm enhancement—on the second
degree murder conviction, 3 years for assault (to run
concurrently), and 2 years for the grossly negligent discharge of a
firearm, which sentence was stayed under section 654. Meza
appealed and we affirmed. (People v. Meza (Apr. 26, 1993,
B063864) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza I).) In response to “defendant’s
contention that the evidence was insufficient to show malice,” we
disagreed, finding “the evidence sufficient to justify a finding of
implied malice” because “Defendant not only beat the victim
senseless and left him helpless on a public street, but used a
firearm to insure no one would intercede to help the victim.” We
expressly found that such an action “amply demonstrated a
conscious disregard for human life.” We also found that “the
evidence would have supported express malice by a finding that
requirement’—i.e., the requirement of either express or implied
malice. [Citations.] The name of the doctrine is confusing, since
implied malice also incorporates the idea of ‘natural and probable
consequences,’ but the two concepts are distinct. Whereas
implied malice is based on ‘the “natural and probable
consequences” of a defendant’s own act’ the natural and probable
consequences doctrine was ‘a theory of vicarious liability under
which “[a]n aider and abettor [was] guilty not only of the
intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal
in the target crime actually commit[ted] (the nontarget
crime)” ’—including murder—‘ “that [was] a natural and probable
consequence of the target crime” ’ ”].)
7
defendant, by leaving the victim in such a precarious position,
intended the death.”
B. Meza Petitions for Resentencing
1. Petition
In December 2021, Meza filed a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing, contending that he “was convicted of Second-
Degree murder and attempted murder with true findings on
related firearm allegations.” In an accompanying declaration,
Meza averred that “[a] complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against me that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of First-Degree Felony Murder under the Natural and
Probable Consequences Doctrine”; that he “was charged with first
degree felony murder” and “[h]ad I went to trial there was a
possibility that I could be convicted of First-Degree Felony
Murder under the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine.
(Accomplice Liability)”; and that he “could not now be convicted of
First-Degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code § §
188 and 189.” He also declared that he was not the “actual
perpetrator”; that he did not, “with the intent to kill,” aid the
“actual shooter in[] the commission of attempted murder”; that he
was “not a major participant in the felony”; that he did not “act
with reckless indifference to human life”; and that a court or jury
had already determined he was not a major participant and did
not act with reckless indifference to human life. He requested
the court appoint counsel for him, and the court obliged.
2. Opposition
In July 2022, the People opposed Meza’s petition, arguing
that “the jury [in Meza’s trial] was not instructed on felony
8
murder, natural and probable consequences or any other theory
of culpability that imputed malice to Petitioner,” and “was not
even instructed on aiding and abetting.” The People asserted
that Meza was “prosecuted as the actual perpetrator who
committed this crime with actual malice” and therefore was
ineligible for relief. Attached to the People’s opposition were our
1993 opinion affirming the judgment and the jury instructions
from Meza’s trial.
The attached instructions informed the jury that, to convict
Meza of murder, it was required to find that a human being was
unlawfully killed “with malice aforethought.” Malice was defined
as “either express or implied.” The jury was instructed that
“Malice is express when there is manifested an intention
unlawfully to kill a human being” and that “Malice is implied
when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2.
The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life,
and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of
the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.”
The instructions also contained two definitions of second
degree murder: (1) “Murder of the second degree is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought when there is
manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the
evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and
premeditation”; and (2) “Murder of the second degree is [also] the
unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. The killing
resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural consequences
of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3. The act was
deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for, human life.”
9
3. Reply
In his reply, Meza argued that there was evidence that a
“companion” was present at the scene of the crime, and with
conflicting testimony about the actions taken by Meza and by his
companion, it would be “improper” for the court to engage in fact-
finding at the prima facie stage. Meza additionally argued that,
while no felony murder instruction was given at his trial, “the
argument of the prosecutor was the functional equivalent.” Meza
concluded that, “[i]n essence, in their closing argument, the
prosecution asked the jury to impute malice onto Mr. Meza based
purely on his participation in the underlying felonies of assault
on Mr. Beltran, assault with a deadly weapon on Mr. Navar, and
negligent discharge of a firearm on Mr. Rodriguez.”
4. Ruling
In its April 2023 ruling, the court noted that the jury “was
not instructed on a theory of felony murder or on a theory of
natural and probable consequences, or as an aider and abettor”
but had “convicted the defendant of second degree murder,
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury,
and grossly negligent discharge of a firearm.” However,
referencing Meza’s contention that “based upon the prosecutor’s
argument to the jury, it was unclear whether or not he had
imputed the defendant’s malice based on his conduct prior to the
death of the victim, complicated by the fact that there had been a
third co-defendant present at the scene but who was never
apprehended,” the court found it could not “come to an accurate
decision without an evidentiary hearing” and ordered counsel to
confer with the court clerk to set a date for such a hearing. In
May 2023, the People filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that
relief was available only to those convicted “based on vicarious
10
liability.” Meza opposed the motion, arguing the People had
raised “no new legal issues.” The court denied the motion
without articulating its reasoning.
C. The Court Denies Meza’s Petition
In August 2023, Meza filed a brief arguing he was entitled
to relief because he “was not the actual killer, he did not directly
aid and abet the actual killer, and he was not a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” He argued
that his assault was not the “legal cause” of Beltran’s death, but
that “the death was the unforeseeable result of a superseding
cause that exculpates him, namely the reckless conduct of a hit
and run driver.” He added that there was insufficient evidence to
prove express malice, and the court was not permitted to infer
malice based on the fact that he fired his gun at Rodriguez or
Navar. He also contended there was insufficient evidence to
prove implied malice because his actions did not have an
objectively high probability of death, and no evidence
demonstrated a subjective awareness of the risk of death.
Finally, Meza urged the court to consider that he was 20 years
old at the time of the incident, and that recent research had
demonstrated “a 20-year-old is much less able than an adult to
think through the consequences and recognize (and consciously
disregard) how his conduct might ultimately be dangerous to
life.” Therefore, “[b]ased on Mr. Meza’s youthfulness and
immaturity, in conjunction with how quickly this incident
escalated, it cannot be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he
acted with a specific intent to kill nor that he acted with a
conscious disregard of the danger to human life.”
At the October 2023 evidentiary hearing, the parties
presented no new evidence or testimony. Instead, both counsel
11
argued their position. The court took the matter under
submission.
In November 2023, the court denied Meza’s petition,
finding him ineligible for relief. The court set forth the facts it
had “[t]aken from the court reporters’ transcript:”
“The petitioner, along with another[,] confronted the victim,
his uncle and another of the uncle’s nephews, with a ‘where you
from’ challenge. When the victim answered with the name of a
gang that was rival of the petitioner[’]s, the petitioner hit the
victim in the face. Petitioner then pulled a gun from his pocket
and along with the other person chased the victim and the other
young man and beat and kicked him. The victim (Arsenio
[Beltran]) ended up lying senseless in the street. When the uncle
attempted to come to the aid of Arsenio, the petitioner fired into
the air. The other young man (Jose [Navar]) ran away, hearing
shots, one of which went by his head. A witness said the
petitioner fired towards the uncle and Jose. (The jury acquitted
petitioner of attempted murder for the shootings[.]) As petitioner
and the other individual fled the scene, a car ran over Arsenio,
killing him. A witness testified that Arsenio may have been
trying to get up when he was struck.”
The court noted that “[t]he jury was not instructed under
either the felony murder or natural and probable consequences
doctrines.” The court also recounted that Meza had asked it to
consider his “youth . . . in considering whether he could
appreciate what the consequences of his actions could be” and
“the facts that the street was well lit, lightly traveled and
decedent was in a turn bay.” The court stated it had considered
these factors, and found “a 20-year-old would recognize the risks
of the actions he took in this matter.” It concluded the People
12
“have proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner could
be convicted of second-degree implied malice murder under
current law.”
In response to Meza’s argument that the court could not
find implied malice because “he ‘did not commit any act the
natural and probable consequences of which involved a high
degree of death, and he did not consciously disregard that high
risk of death,’ ” the superior court noted that “[a]n 1172.6 Petition
is not a retrial,” and quoted from our affirmance of Meza’s
conviction:
“The victim was beaten senseless and left dying on [a]
public throughfare at night with a traffic rate of approximately
one car per minute. No one to whom the question was put could
conclude other than that it was likely the victim would be run
over sooner or later, nor would anyone hearing of such an
incident be surprised. Drunk drivers, reckless drivers,
inattentive drivers, hit and run drivers, half-blinded drivers,
incompetent drivers, unlicensed drivers, aggressive drivers,
drivers fleeing from the police, drivers racing with each other, are
all hazards with which motorists in Los Angeles must contend.
[¶] A law-abiding driver was likely to hit someone lying in the
middle of the street. Add to the mix one of the other kinds of
drivers, and the chances go up significantly. While not quite as
certain to cause death as tying someone to the railroad tracks
(where a train might come along only every several hours)
leaving someone helpless in the middle of the roadway where a
car will come along sooner or later creates such a likelihood of
death, that foreseeability, as opposed to inevitability, is a
foregone conclusion. [¶] Similarly, defendant here placed the
victim in a dangerous situation and the resulting death was a
13
foreseeable and direct consequence. The evidence established
causation.”
The superior court therefore found Meza ineligible for relief
and denied his petition. Meza timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Correctly Found Meza
Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Effective January 1, 2019, the law changed as to the “felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) As amended, the law provides that except for
first degree felony murder, “in order to be convicted of murder, a
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Eynon
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 974.) In other words, “[a] person’s
culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own
actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (g).)
Thus, to be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, a
petitioner must be a “person convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a).) A petitioner who was not convicted of felony murder,
14
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
any other theory under which malice was imputed to the person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime is ineligible
for relief under section 1172.6.
Here, the court initially stated it could not determine
Meza’s eligibility for relief without an evidentiary hearing.
Neither party introduced any new evidence at the evidentiary
hearing. The court found Meza ineligible for relief, citing the fact
that the jury did not receive instructions on felony murder, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or a theory of aiding
and abetting. We review de novo the legal question of whether
Meza is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Bodely
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
Meza does not dispute that he was not convicted of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or any other theory in which malice was imputed to
him. He argues that he is nevertheless eligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because, in People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981
(Reyes), our Supreme Court “held that an improper finding of
implied malice comes within the ambit of SB 1437, because the
relevant statute was amended to require malice.” Reyes is
inapposite.
In Reyes, a fellow gang member showed the defendant that
he was carrying a revolver. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 985.)
The defendant, the armed gang member, and several other gang
members then rode their bicycles “to an area on the edge of
territory belonging to a rival gang.” (Ibid.) Once there, the
armed gang member shot someone driving by in a car. (Ibid.)
The defendant was charged with murder. (Ibid.) “The
prosecutor’s principal arguments at trial were that [defendant]
15
Reyes had intended to aid either an assault or disturbing the
peace, or that he had conspired to commit one of those offenses.
Under the then–applicable natural and probable consequences
theory, Reyes could be found guilty of second degree murder if the
jury determined that he aided and abetted one of those target
crimes and that murder was a natural and probable consequence
of the offense.” (Id. at p. 984.) Reyes was convicted of second
degree murder. (Ibid.)
After the defendant petitioned for relief under section
1172.6, the superior court denied the petition after an evidentiary
hearing, finding him guilty of second degree murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 987.) Because
it was unclear whether the superior court “upheld Reyes’s
murder conviction on the theory that he was a direct perpetrator
who harbored implied malice” or “on the theory that he directly
aided and abetted implied malice murder,” our high court
addressed both theories. (Ibid.)
In addressing the first theory, our Supreme Court stated:
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is
proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) Citing People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 152, our high court added that “[t]o suffice
for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely
be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must
‘ “involve[] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.” ’ ” (Reyes, at p. 989.)
16
The defendant in Reyes was eligible for relief under section
1172.6 because he could have been convicted for murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Thus, at the
evidentiary hearing, the superior court determined whether he
was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, by
contrast, Meza could not have been convicted under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine for the simple reason that
the jury received no instructions on that doctrine. Nor did the
jury receive any instructions on any theories of murder now made
infirm “because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Indeed, Reyes’s
citation of the 2007 case of People v. Knoller to support its
statement of law indicates that this element of implied malice
murder was unaffected by the later enactment of SB 1437. (See
also People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 [while
“Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 . . . [and] abolished the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, it maintained the
viability of murder convictions based on implied malice, and the
definition of implied malice remains unchanged”].) Reyes did
nothing to expand the scope of a section 1172.6 hearing. (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 987–988 [“Nor do we have occasion, given
the parties’ contentions and the procedural posture of this
matter, to consider the overall scope of section 1172.6
resentencing proceedings”].) Meza is therefore ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6.
B. Alternatively, the Superior Court Properly
Found Meza Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
After finding Meza ineligible for relief, the superior court
addressed his contentions that: (1) he did not commit an act
whose natural and probable consequence involved a high
17
probability of death, given that the street was well lit and lightly
traveled, and Beltran was in a turn bay; and (2) Meza’s youth at
the time of the murder rendered him incapable of appreciating
the consequences of his actions and consciously disregarding a
high risk of death. In response to the first contention, the court
quoted our previous reasoning addressing Meza’s argument that
his actions did not proximately cause Beltran’s death. In
response to the second contention, the court found that “a 20-
year-old would recognize the risks of the actions he took in this
matter.”
Meza contends the superior court erred because: (1) it
failed to act as an independent factfinder; (2) it used the wrong
standard to find Meza guilty of murder; (3) substantial evidence
does not support a finding that Meza was guilty of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the court insufficiently considered
Meza’s youth; and (5) “cumulative error” warrants reversal. We
address each contention in turn.
1. The Court Acted as an Independent
Factfinder
Meza contends the court did not act as an independent
factfinder because it stated the petition was not a retrial and
then quoted our opinion in Meza I. We discern no error from
either action.
As Meza himself admits, in deciding a section 1172.6
petition, “the trial judge isn’t charged with holding a whole new
trial on all the elements of murder. Instead, the parties will
focus on evidence made relevant by the amendments to the
substantive definition of murder.” (People v. Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) As explained above, the “amendments to
the substantive definition of murder” did not change the
18
definition of implied malice. (Ibid.; see also People v. Knoller,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152 [“malice is implied when ‘the
defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton
disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree
of probability that it will result in death’ ” or “when the killing is
proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life” ’ ”].)
Thus, the court correctly understood the scope of a section 1172.6
hearing.
Additionally, while superior courts may be prohibited from
relying on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate
decisions (see People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
292), Meza cites no similar bar to a superior court’s consideration
and adoption of the legal reasoning contained in such decisions.
There is no reason the superior court should be required to
paraphrase our legal analysis.8
8 Meza also complains that the court’s statement
“Petitioner disputes that implied malice applies because he ‘did
not commit any act the natural and probable consequences of
which involved a high degree of death, and he did not consciously
disregard that high risk of death’ ” “makes no sense.”
Specifically, Meza claims “[i]t is unclear what the trial court
means when it states that ‘petitioner disputes that implied
malice applies,’ or when it references ‘a high degree of death.’ ”
The quotation marks in the court’s order makes clear that
the court was addressing a contention Meza made in his August
2023 brief, which contained a section headed: “Malice cannot be
implied because Mr. Meza did not commit any act the natural
and probable consequences of which involved a high degree of
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
19
Meza has failed to demonstrate the court did not act as an
independent factfinder.
2. The Court Used the Correct Standard
The parties agree that, at an evidentiary hearing, “the
burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Meza contends the court failed to meet
this standard because it found that “[t]he people have proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner could be convicted
of second-degree implied malice murder under current law.”
(Italics added.) We disagree.
While the superior court could have more precisely phrased
its conclusion, the record adequately demonstrates that it
employed the proper standard in finding Meza guilty of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt. As the People point out on appeal,
the parties correctly articulated the standard in their written
briefing. In the People’s initial response to Meza’s petition, it
stated that, at the evidentiary hearing, the People were required
“to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner ‘is guilty
of murder or attempted murder’ under current law.” Similarly,
death, and he did not consciously disregard that high risk of
death.” In this section, Meza argued that “[t]he evidence
presented cannot suffice to sustain a finding that Meza action’s
objectively had a high probability of death nor that he was
subjectively aware that the act posed a risk of death to Beltran.”
In the section immediately following the sentence that confused
Meza, the court addressed and rejected this argument.
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in Meza’s May 2023 reply to the People’s initial response, he
stated that, at the evidentiary hearing, “the People bear the
burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt and using the
evidentiary rules described in section 1172.6, that Mr. Meza is
guilty of murder under current law.” He repeated this statement
in his August 2023 briefing.9 There is no record that the superior
court ever challenged these assertions. “In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and
applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People v. Thomas
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.)
Moreover, the court explicitly stated that it had considered
“the facts that the street was well lit, lightly traveled and
decedent was in a turn bay,” and that Meza was 20 years old
when the incident occurred. This suggests that the superior
court was aware of its role as a factfinder determining criminal
culpability.
3. Substantial Evidence Supports the
Finding of Guilt
Meza argues that “[h]is act of leaving the victim in the
roadway did not involve a ‘high degree of probability[’] that it
would result in death.”
We addressed this issue in Meza I, stating that “[t]he
victim was beaten senseless and left lying on a public
thoroughfare at night with a traffic rate of approximately one car
per minute. No one to whom the question was put could conclude
9 We note that, at the evidentiary hearing, Meza’s counsel
informed the court that “Per the statute, the prosecution bears
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Meza
can still be convicted of second degree murder.” (Italics added.)
21
other than that it was likely the victim would be run over sooner
or later, nor would anyone hearing of such an incident be
surprised. . . . [L]eaving someone helpless in the middle of any
roadway where a car will come along sooner or later creates such
a likelihood of death, that foreseeability, as opposed to
inevitability, is a foregone conclusion.” (Meza I, supra, B063864.)
When Meza’s actions created “such a likelihood of death” that its
foreseeability was “a foregone conclusion,” his actions involved a
high degree of probability that they would result in death. We
see no reason to paraphrase our original reasoning, with which
we still agree.
4. The Court Sufficiently Considered Meza’s
Youth
The superior court concluded that “a 20-year-old would
recognize the risks of the actions he took in this matter.” Meza
argues that this gives “short shrift to consideration of appellant’s
youth at the time of the crime,” and that the superior court’s
consideration was “not sufficient[].” He quotes studies regarding
adolescent brain development that discuss the probabilities and
likelihood someone of Meza’s age would appreciate the
consequences of his actions. Meza further argues because his
“actions were highly impulsive, involving a fight that broke out
when some young people met at a taco truck” and that “[t]here
was no planning or sophistication in the manner in which
appellant behaved,” the court could not find that he behaved in a
manner amounting to implied malice.
We reject these arguments. The fight that “broke out”
began when Meza’s companion asked Beltran and Navar about
their gang affiliation. When Beltran named a rival gang, Meza
derided it, shouted the name of his own gang, and then punched
22
Beltran. There is no evidence that Beltran fought back—instead
the evidence showed that Meza continued beating Beltran while
the latter was lying unconscious on the street. When Rodriguez
tried to come to Beltran’s aid, Meza was deliberate enough to
draw a firearm, deliver a warning not to come closer, and fire a
warning shot into the air. Finally, after Meza and his companion
had walked away from Beltran, and Rodriguez tried again to help
him, Meza fired another shot at Rodriguez, to keep him away
from Beltran.
Thus, even were Meza’s initial striking of Beltran borne of
impulse, every subsequent action Meza took shows planning and
sophistication in achieving his goal of preventing Rodriguez from
helping his nephew; these actions could not necessarily be only
considered “impulsive” due to youth. Substantial evidence thus
supports the court’s finding that Meza was not too young to
appreciate the consequences of his actions.
5. There Is No Cumulative Error
Because we hold that Meza failed to demonstrate any error,
his argument of “cumulative error” also fails.
DISPOSITION
The court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
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