CourtListener 10360631•In re S.F. CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/20/25 In re S.F. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
In re S.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C099783
Law.
THE PEOPLE, (Super. Ct. No. 22DQ00208)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Minor S.F. shot into a crowded house, hitting five people. On the prosecutor’s
petition, the juvenile court held a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 707. After the hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
1 Further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1
minor was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court and ordered minor transferred to criminal court. Minor appeals, challenging the
juvenile court’s analysis under former section 707 and in light of recent amendments to
section 707 made by Senate Bill No. 545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 545).
Minor also raises multiple issues related to the testimony of two experts. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I
Petition And Circumstances Of The Allegations
A petition under section 602 was filed alleging minor committed six crimes in
Chico on September 3, 2022, when he was 16 years old: five counts of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm and one count of discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling,
with firearm and great bodily injury enhancements alleged for all counts. In the petition,
the prosecution requested a hearing to determine whether minor should be transferred to
criminal court under section 707.
The juvenile court held a transfer hearing over eight days in July, August,
September, and October 2023. At the hearing, a video was played showing two synced
camera angles from outside and inside a house during a party in Chico after 1:00 a.m. on
September 3, 2022. The video shows an argument at the front door with someone later
identified as minor. After the argument, minor walked into the party, came back outside,
and began to walk down the front steps of the porch. Minor then stopped, turned around,
walked back up the stairs, pulled out a gun, pointed it through a crowd of people on the
porch, and fired several rounds through the front door into the house, pulling the trigger
multiple times after all the ammunition had been fired. Minor then ran away. Witnesses
testified the argument depicted in the video was because minor’s acquaintances were not
allowed to enter the party. Witnesses also testified that, sometime before minor shot his
firearm, he said, “ ‘I’m going to blow this bitch up,’ ” or he was “going to light the place
2
up.” Minor was arrested shortly after the incident with his hair cut shorter than it had
been during the incident.
Minor’s bullets struck five people inside the house and four testified to their
injuries at the hearing. One victim testified he was paralyzed from the waist down and
could no longer perform basic life functions without help.
In the juvenile court transfer report2 prepared before the hearing, minor told the
probation officer he lived with his biological father after meeting him for the first time
when minor was 12 years old. Minor said his father was a “ ‘general in the 20 Bloods’
gang” and “encouraged [minor] to assist him in a [cannabis] robbery at the age of
thirteen.”
II
Amenability Testimony
Detective Jack Ditty testified at the hearing he had been a sworn police officer for
over 10 years and had for the prior three years been a City of Chico police officer
assigned to the violence suppression unit, which deals with gang-related crimes.
Detective Ditty testified to the gang training he received, including while in the police
academy and most recently an “ICI [c]ore [g]ang [t]raining,” which was “a 40-hour gang
course.” After the defense cross-examined him on his qualifications, the juvenile court
designated Detective Ditty as “an expert in the area of criminal street gangs within Butte
County, in particular[] the Crip criminal street gang as it applies to the locality of Chico.”
For this case, Detective Ditty interviewed witnesses, reviewed bodycam footage,
reviewed interviews of minor, and researched social media. Based on this information,
Detective Ditty concluded minor was a member of the Crips criminal street gang.
Specifically, Detective Ditty pointed to a bodycam video, which was played at the
2 The juvenile court and the parties refer to this report as the probation report. For
consistency, so shall we.
3
hearing, from one incident in October 2020 when minor was detained after being reported
for trespassing on school property. Detective Ditty testified minor was defiant towards
officers, calling one “bitch”; used the word “cuz,” which the “Crip gang” uses “as a slang
word talking to each other”; and wore a “royal blue, hooded sweatshirt,” the “same color
that the Crips wear.” Detective Ditty testified about another bodycam video, which was
also played at the hearing, from May 2022 outside of a hospital after “some sort of
confrontation between two rival gangs.” On that video minor can be heard claiming “to
be a Crip” and mentioning a rival gang named the Norteños. Detective Ditty also
reviewed a police report describing minor’s arrest for public intoxication and “his
behavior [as] threatening to the point where [officers] had to keep him in handcuffs.”
Detective Ditty also testified about the video from the shooting and noticed minor
displayed “some gang sign” to someone inside the party wearing red, which could have
been “a threatening gesture” if that person was an opposing gang member.
The prosecutor also called psychologist Dr. Anthony Urquiza who had over 10
years of experience performing evaluations of minors in juvenile hall. The juvenile court
recognized him as an expert in the areas of child development, psychopathology,
delinquency, and mental health treatment and rehabilitation. Dr. Urquiza reviewed
Detective Ditty’s report, the probation report, minor’s high school records, minor’s
behavioral report from juvenile hall, and the defense’s transfer hearing brief, which
included Dr. Amir Ramezani’s report. Based on this review, Dr. Urquiza testified that
minor “has a long history, getting close to two decades’ worth of history, at minimum a
decade and a half, of aggression, defiance, noncompliance, things that have been
problematic in his life. And being in a classroom where somebody is going to tell him --
teach him about having a better attitude, about sort of being more patient, that is not
going to have an effect on his behavior.” Assuming minor had eight years in the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Urquiza believed it “would certainly be possible [for minor to
change] . . . . But it would be incredibly difficult to do.”
4
Dr. Urquiza also analyzed each criterion under section 707 and found they all
weighed in favor of transferring minor to criminal court except for the criterion
considering previous juvenile court attempts to rehabilitate minor. Dr. Urquiza
consequently testified his ultimate opinion was that minor should be “transfer[red] to the
adult system” because “it would be very difficult to successfully rehabilitate” minor
while in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. On cross-examination, Dr. Urquiza conceded
he had not interviewed minor nor talked with anybody in his family.
Minor’s counsel called Dr. Ramezani to testify, whom the juvenile court
designated as an expert in neuropsychology. Dr. Ramezani conducted a neuropsychology
evaluation of minor and found minor “has severely compromised executive functioning
relative to decision-making and reasoning,” including diagnoses for “mild neurocognitive
disorder,” “posttraumatic stress” disorder, “depressive disorder,” “an anxiety disorder,”
and “multiple substance use diagnoses that were in remission, because [minor] was in a
controlled environment.” Dr. Ramezani believed “with appropriate rehabilitation,
[minor] can make some significant improvement in his thinking abilities, his cognitive
functions.” Dr. Ramezani also commented on all of the criteria under section 707 and
testified only one favored transferring minor to criminal court in his opinion, the gravity
of the alleged offense. Based on this, Dr. Ramezani testified it was his overall opinion
minor can be “rehabilitated within the timeline of the juvenile [court’s] jurisdiction.”
Dr. Urquiza also commented on Dr. Ramezani’s analysis during his testimony,
noting he is familiar with the neuropsychology tests Dr. Ramezani used because
Dr. Urquiza has used them in the past to inform treatment plans. But Dr. Urquiza does
not personally administer the tests because he is “not a neuropsychologist.” Some of the
results from Dr. Ramezani’s neuropsychology evaluation confirmed Dr. Urquiza’s
opinions. For example, the evaluation showed an “extremely high combination of drug
and alcohol scales” for minor, and “those are really hard to treat, that combination of
drugs and alcohol and trauma symptoms.”
5
Minor called several witnesses who testified to his behavior in juvenile hall. This
included a teacher at juvenile hall who testified minor “wanted to learn immediately,”
and though he came in with very few credits, minor was now ready to graduate early
from high school with a 3.4 grade point average and had no behavior issues. A teacher of
an anger reflection replacement training said over the year she had known minor, she had
“seen nothing but more improvements” on “maturity.” And a “social impact consultant”
testified as “an expert for the purpose of evaluation and rehabilitation of youthful and
adult offenders.” This expert testified it was his opinion minor “should be retained in
juvenile court” because he thought minor “can be rehabilitated. [Minor] can have an
opportunity to create really productive relationships and grow and mature into
adulthood.”
III
Juvenile Court’s Analysis
After closing arguments, the juvenile court took the matter under submission and
then announced its decision two weeks later on October 25, 2023. The court first stated
the evidence it considered, which included notes from all testimony, the parties’ briefs,
all exhibits, and the probation report. The juvenile court also determined the maximum
jurisdiction of the court was until minor’s 25th birthday, which was seven years five
months and two days from that day. The juvenile court then went through each criterion
under section 707 and found two weighed against transfer, ability for rehabilitation
within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate; two weighed in favor of transfer, criminal sophistication and gravity of the
offense; and one weighed neutrally, delinquency history.
In analyzing the criteria collectively, the juvenile court noted the gravity of the
offense criterion “cannot be the sole basis” for transferring, and instead, the “weight of no
single criteri[on] can answer the question the [c]ourt must address.” The juvenile court
therefore “weighed all the criteria in the context of whether [minor] is amenable to
6
rehabilitation within the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt” and ultimately found “by clear and
convincing evidence that [minor] is not amenable and order[ed] that the jurisdiction over
[minor] be transferred to the criminal court.” The court noted that “this was a very close
case in light of the significant mental and emotional issues, childhood trauma, and
negative familial influences that [minor] suffered. But the [c]ourt did weigh all of that
evidence and exercise[d] its discretion to order transfer of jurisdiction.”
Minor appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
No Reversible Error With The Juvenile Court’s Section 707 Criteria Analysis
Minor challenges the juvenile court’s section 707 analysis, arguing “the treatment
of the criteria and the rendering of this decision . . . went wrong, in multiple ways and for
a variety of reasons.” Minor specifically targets the juvenile court’s analysis as to three
of the criteria, and we will address each separately.
A
Legal Standards
Section 707 provides the only method for the prosecution to try a juvenile offender
in criminal court. To transfer a minor under this section, the prosecution must show “by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) The statute sets out
five criteria that juvenile courts must consider in making this determination. These are
“[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(i)); “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); “[t]he minor’s previous
delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); and “[t]he
7
circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed
by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)).
The juvenile court does not consider these criteria in isolation. Instead, the statute
“requires the juvenile court to consider all five [criteria] together in determining whether
the minor is amenable to rehabilitation.” (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 417.)
Nor does the statute dictate the importance of one criterion over another: “[T]he court
has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five [criteria] predominate so as to
determine the result, even though some or all of the other [criteria] might point to a
different result.” (Ibid.)
Each of the five criteria in turn includes instructions for factors a court considers
when evaluating that criterion. Following the conclusion of minor’s transfer hearing in
October 2023, the instructions following each criterion changed. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii); Stats. 2023, ch.716, § 1.) At the time of the
hearing, they stated that “the juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor”
within each criterion. (Former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), italics added; accord, former
§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii); see Stats. 2023, ch.716, § 1.) Effective
January 1, 2024, Senate Bill 545 amended the statute to change may to shall, thereby
“mak[ing] consideration of any relevant factor mandatory.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen.
Bill 545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2023, ch. 716; see In re Miguel R. (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164-165 (Miguel R.).)
We review a juvenile court’s decision whether to transfer a minor to criminal court
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680;
Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Under this standard, “[t]he court’s factual
findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo.” (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187 (Kevin P.).) “ ‘[I]ts
application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ”
(Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 383.) “Because the juvenile court
8
must make [the transfer] finding by clear and convincing evidence, we ‘determine
whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the
clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Miguel R., at p. 165.)
To the extent we are called on to interpret statutory text, “ ‘ “ ‘ “our fundamental
task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.
[Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning.” ’ ” [Citation.] “[W]e consider the language of the entire
scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.” ’ [Citations.] If the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial
construction and our task is at an end. If the language is reasonably susceptible of more
than one meaning, however, we may examine extrinsic aids such as the apparent purpose
of the statute, the legislative history, the canons of statutory construction, and public
policy.” (Earnest v. Commission on Teacher Credentialing (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 62,
74.)
B
The Juvenile Court’s Criminal Sophistication Finding Was Not Erroneous
Minor makes both a legal and substantial evidence challenge to the juvenile court
finding the criminal sophistication criterion weighed in favor of transfer. First, minor
contends the juvenile court “misinterpreted” the criterion because the court (1)
“incorrectly viewed indicia of ordinary criminal behavior as evidence of sophistication,”
and (2) “it used evidence of normal intelligence to support a sophistication finding,
despite a clear bar on such use.” These errors also resulted in “a decision [that] was
unsupported by substantial evidence.” We disagree.
9
1
Relevant Background
For criminal sophistication, the juvenile court noted minor had “suffered
significant negative influences throughout his youth,” had a lack of “any family member
to protect him or guide him in positive or prosocial thinking,” and has been diagnosed
with “mental and emotional health issues.” But the court was “not persuaded that those
factors compelled [minor] to commit the acts here.” Instead, the court found minor “was
not acting impetuously and fully appreciated the risks of his behavior, and acted with
sophistication both in the commission of the offense and in his efforts to conceal that he
was the offender.” This was based on minor threatening to shoot into the party prior to
the shooting, “[t]here were objectively no imminent threats to [minor] when [minor]
turned to shoot,” there was “substantial evidence [minor] was motivated by a gang
mentality regardless of whether he was a bona fide member of a gang or simply idealized
the lifestyle,” “his readiness to shoot by being armed with a loaded firearm and an
apparent knowledge and ability to use it,” “[minor] modifi[ng] his appearance by cutting
his hair in a much less distinctive style than he wore at the time of the shooting,” and
minor demonstrating “aptitude in his school work” while in juvenile hall reflecting “at
least average intellectual capacity at the time of the shooting.” Specifically on the
evidence of gang involvement, the court noted “his father’s negative role modeling as a
gang member and drug dealer,” but found minor’s identification with the “Crips
magnifies his criminal sophistication, as he appears to have personified the principles of
respect and fearmongering perpetrated by the gang during this event as evidenced in
other interactions with law enforcement prior to this event.” Thus, the juvenile court was
“persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that [minor] acted with elevated criminal
sophistication,” which “weighs in favor of transfer to the criminal court.”
10
2
Legal Standards
When evaluating the “degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor”
criterion, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not
limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and
emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to
appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or
peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community
environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child
welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human
trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).)
“The criminal-sophistication criterion ‘requires a juvenile court . . . to consider the
whole picture, that is, all the evidence that might bear on the minor’s criminal
sophistication, including any criminal sophistication manifested in the present crime.’ ”
(Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192.) Criminal sophistication can be shown with
facts demonstrating an ‘ “ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of [one’s]
criminal behavior’ and [one’s] awareness ‘of the wrongfulness . . . of [one’s] conduct.’ ”
(Id. at p. 193.) Positive factors such as “normal cognitive functioning” or intelligence by
itself “do not affirmatively demonstrate criminal sophistication.” (Ibid.) But they can
support finding this criterion “weighs in favor of transfer to the extent [the positive
factors] fail to mitigate other evidence that does affirmatively demonstrate criminal
sophistication.” (Ibid.; see In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 214 [“There was little
to no indication [the minor] suffered from any intellectual deficits. While in custody, [the
minor] was able to finish high school and had taken college level courses”].)
11
3
Juvenile Court Did Not Commit Legal Error
By Applying The Criminal Sophistication Criterion
Minor asserts for his first argument of legal error that the use of guns or
associations with gangs indicates normal criminal behavior, as opposed to sophisticated
criminal behavior. We reject this contention because it misunderstands the purpose of
this criterion. The criminal sophistication criterion examines the minor’s criminal
sophistication as it relates to adult criminal behavior. The investigation is not into
whether the minor is sophisticated as compared to adult criminals, but whether the minor
is sophisticated as compared to other minors, such that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation under juvenile jurisdiction. This is why the criterion examines factors such
as “maturity” and whether the minor acted from “peer pressure.” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Whether a minor used a gun would certainly show criminal sophistication for
section 707 purposes, as it is a much more effective and adult means of committing a
crime. This is especially true within the context of retaliation for perceived slights where
there are much more juvenile forms of retaliation for being denied admission to a party,
such as throwing eggs at a house. So too with gangs. As the juvenile court found,
notwithstanding the evidence of his father’s influence, minor’s interactions with law
enforcement established a desire to personify gang principles. This was not the result of
peer pressure, which is a factor mitigating against criminal sophistication. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(ii).) The interactions with law enforcement supported finding minor made a
willful and mature decision to associate with an adult gang, including flashing gang signs
shortly before the shooting. We therefore conclude the juvenile court properly found
evidence of minor’s use of a gun and gang association supported this criterion.
Minor also argues the juvenile court improperly “weaponize[ed] . . . minor’s
intelligence against him.” But the juvenile court did not use minor’s normal intelligence
12
in isolation, as disapproved of in Kevin P. (Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 193
[“We agree that such positive factors do not affirmatively demonstrate criminal
sophistication”].) Instead, the juvenile court noted minor’s “at least average intellectual
capacity” after it had analyzed minor’s use of a gun, gang participation, and other factors
supporting the criminal sophistication criterion weighing in favor of transfer. We
therefore understand the juvenile court was finding minor’s intelligence did not mitigate
those factors against transfer, an analysis approved of in Kevin P.: “Positive background
factors may support a juvenile court’s finding that this criterion weighs in favor of
transfer to the extent they fail to mitigate other evidence that does affirmatively
demonstrate criminal sophistication. [T]he gang involvement of a minor with poor
cognitive functioning might demonstrate a lesser degree of criminal sophistication than
the gang involvement of a minor with normal cognitive functioning.” (Ibid.) This is
what the juvenile court did here, it therefore did not abuse its discretion by finding
minor’s intelligence did not mitigate minor’s criminal sophistication.
4
Substantial Evidence Supported The Juvenile
Court’s Criminal Sophistication Finding
Minor also argues the juvenile court finding the criminal sophistication criterion
weighed in favor of transfer lacked substantial evidence. This is in part based on his
argument the juvenile court could not rely on the evidence of “ordinary criminality,”
which we have already rejected. But minor makes additional arguments that the evidence
the juvenile court relied on did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard; we
disagree.
For the reasons stated above, the evidence of minor’s gun use and gang association
support criminal sophistication. The juvenile court also relied on substantial evidence
minor was acting without an imminent threat, not only had a gun but knew how to use it,
and cut his hair to avoid detection. Dr. Urquiza, an expert in child development and
13
rehabilitation with over 10 years of experience evaluating youth in juvenile hall, also
testified it was his opinion minor exhibited criminal sophistication weighing in favor of
transfer. We conclude this constitutes “ ‘substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the clear and
convincing evidence standard.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
C
The Juvenile Court’s Delinquent History Criterion Finding Was Not Erroneous
Minor also makes both legal and substantial evidence challenges to the juvenile
court finding minor’s prior delinquent history criterion weighed neutrally. Here, minor
argues the juvenile court (1) could not find this weighed neutrally because it was the
prosecutor’s burden to establish the criterion; (2) erred by “adopt[ing] a definition of
‘delinquent history’ [that] expansively included every misbehavior by [minor], at any age,
in any context”; and (3) “improperly used [minor’s] positive post-detention progress as a
negative characteristic.” Minor also contends the finding lacked substantial evidence.
We disagree.
1
Relevant Background
For the previous delinquent history criterion, the juvenile court noted minor “had
no formal prior contact with the juvenile court. However, [minor’s] school records
demonstrate a persistent and troubling pattern of disrespectful, disruptive, and intentional
behavior, especially from the point of the [sixth] grade forward, and often in the presence
of substitute teachers.” This included abusive and defiant language towards teachers and
staff, and “[o]f great concern [were] separate incidents while [minor] was 11 years old.
He stabbed another youth with a pencil. He bit another youth, causing her to require
medical attention. He threatened to harm another youth. All separate events.” The court
noted minor “had little to no stability or encouragement to support his attendance in
school,” but found clear and convincing evidence minor had the opportunity to “modify
14
his behaviors and take advantage of educational opportunities by school staff consistently
throughout his education,” and his “capacity to be successful in the school environment is
evidenced by his performance more recently” in juvenile hall. But ultimately, the
juvenile court found minor’s “prior delinquent history weighs neutrally as to transfer to
the criminal court or retention with the juvenile court.”
2
Legal Standards
When evaluating the “minor’s previous delinquent history” criterion, “the juvenile
court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the
seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s
family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous
delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).)
In D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 453, the appellate court
found this criterion’s statutory language is “ambiguous as to whether ‘delinquent history’
and ‘delinquent behavior’ refer to conduct resulting in a delinquency petition or to any
delinquent conduct.” But the court concluded: “[T]he legislative history of the section
707 criteria indicates an overarching intent to grant judges broad discretion to consider all
evidence relevant to this inherently case-by-case determination. Narrowly construing the
statutory language to prohibit the juvenile court from considering relevant information
would be contrary to this legislative intent.” (Id. at p. 455.) The D.C. court thus affirmed
the juvenile court considering the minor’s “behavior documented in his school records.”
(Id. at p. 456; see In re J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 214-215 [transfer finding
appropriate considering, among other things, the minor’s “ ‘significant school
delinquency’ history starting in the seventh grade, including poor behavior, suspensions,
and multiple attempts by school officials to rehabilitate [the minor]”].)
15
3
Juvenile Court Did Not Commit Legal
Error In Applying The Delinquent History Criterion
We first reject minor’s contention a juvenile court cannot find a criterion weighs
neutrally. Determining section 707 amenability is not a mathematical analysis where the
juvenile court must decide based on how many of the criteria are or are not in favor of
transfer. The analysis is holistic, permitting courts discretion to examine the relative
weight of the criteria, not just the number of criteria, and if they weigh collectively in
favor of transfer by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); Kevin P., supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 186 [“ ‘The weight to be given [to] each of these factors is within
the court’s discretion’ ”].) And finding a criterion neutral is effectively finding it has no
weight given the conflicting evidence. This is entirely reasonable within the context of
the juvenile court’s discretion. (Cf. C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009,
1030, 1031 [finding the juvenile court did not specify whether several criteria “weighed
in favor of transfer, against transfer, or was neutral”].)
We also decline minor’s invitation to disagree with D.C., which found juvenile
courts enjoy “broad discretion to consider all evidence relevant to this inherently case-by-
case determination,” including all forms of delinquent behavior. (D.C. v. Superior Court,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 455.) We find persuasive the D.C. court’s analysis of section
707’s legislative history. The court there examined from when the five criteria were
added in 1975 through legislative changes in 2015 concluding the history collectively
“indicates an intent to maintain judicial discretion to consider all relevant evidence.”
(D.C., at pp. 453-455.)
Minor contends this analysis is no longer appropriate because Senate Bill 545
“strengthen[ed] the value of the factors in assigning meaning to the criterion they
support.” But minor does not argue or present any legal support for the proposition that
Senate Bill 545, discussed more fully infra, limited the juvenile court’s discretion to
16
consider all relevant evidence. Senate Bill 545 instead mandated courts consider any
relevant factors while still leaving courts to decide what evidence is relevant. (Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill 545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2023, ch. 716.) This is
further supported by the language in section 707 left unchanged by Senate Bill 545
stating juvenile courts consider the probation report and “any other relevant evidence.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) Courts therefore still have discretion to consider all relevant
evidence, and we conclude the juvenile court properly considered the full history of
minor’s delinquency.
Minor asserts for his final legal challenge to the juvenile court’s analysis of this
criterion that the juvenile court “misuse[d]” minor’s capacity to do well in school. But
this was similar to the juvenile court’s use of minor’s intelligence for the criminal
sophistication criterion, and we conclude it is similarly appropriate here. In the context
of the juvenile court’s analysis of this criterion, it was not finding minor’s scholastic
aptitude supported transfer, but that the “little to no stability or encouragement” minor
received only minimally mitigated the prior delinquency because of his recently
displayed scholastic aptitude. Indeed, the juvenile court did not find this criterion
weighed in favor of transfer, indicating it believed minor’s scholastic aptitude could not
completely overcome the minimal stability of his home life. We therefore conclude it
was appropriate to use this fact to show other facts were nonmitigating in analyzing
minor’s prior delinquency.
4
Substantial Evidence Supported The Juvenile Court’s Delinquent History Finding
Minor also challenges the underlying substantial evidence of the juvenile court
finding this criterion neutral because “[n]one of this was evidence of unamenability . . . .
[Minor’s] misbehavior in school, regardless of its severity, does not independently inform
this question.” But we have already found it does inform the question. The Legislature
has made one criterion for courts to consider in the amenability analysis “[t]he minor’s
17
previous delinquent history.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i).) And as discussed, this includes
any relevant delinquent history, including informal delinquent history. Because we reject
these arguments, we conclude the juvenile properly considered minor’s history of general
delinquent behavior. However, because none of this behavior resulted in a formal
petition, the juvenile court found this criterion weighed neutrally. This is supported by
substantial evidence.
D
The Juvenile Court’s Gravity Of The Offense
Criterion Finding Was Not Prejudicially Erroneous
Minor’s final attack on the juvenile court’s criteria analysis is a legal challenge to
the gravity of the offense criterion. Minor contends the juvenile court erred when it
considered public safety for this criterion, because “public safety is not the immediate
goal of the amenability scheme; rather, it is crafted to address a minor’s well-being and
chances of successful rehabilitation.” We conclude any error harmless.
1
Relevant Background
For the gravity of the offense criterion, the juvenile court found, “[B]eyond any
doubt, . . . [minor] committed the offenses and enhancements alleged.” The court added
minor’s “acts were intentional, extreme, callous, and designed to inflict great harm on
multiple victims.” The court then detailed the evidence of the shooting and its effects on
the victims, including that minor “knew it was highly likely he would hit multiple
victims,” and “shot with full appreciation of the risk to human life and with intention to
kill innocent individuals.” The court further added, “Notably, there has been no evidence
that [minor] has expressed any remorse or even regret for his actions.” Thus, the juvenile
court found “by clear and convincing evidence that [minor] is presently dangerous to this
community, that his lack of concern for and disregard of the lives of others makes him an
18
ongoing risk to public safety. [¶] The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged
weighs heavily in favor of transfer to the criminal court.”
2
Legal Standards
When evaluating the “circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition to have been committed by the minor,” “the juvenile court shall give weight to
any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the
mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of
harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional
development.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)-(ii).)
3
Any Error In The Juvenile Court Analysis
Of The Gravity Of The Offense Criterion Was Harmless
We conclude any error on this issue harmless even under the stricter Chapman
prejudice analysis. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”].) Even if a
juvenile court may not consider future public safety concerns in analyzing the gravity of
the offense criterion, the juvenile court’s comparatively brief statements on public safety
here came after a thorough analysis of the extensive and uncontested evidence of minor’s
violent behavior shooting into a crowded house. Minor was in the house immediately
before the shooting, thus imparting knowledge of likely victims, and then shot into the
house until his gun ran out of ammunition. There is strong evidence every listed factor
within the criterion supported transfer: minor’s behavior, mental state, degree of
involvement, level of harm caused, and mental and emotional development. Both
experts, including minor’s own expert Dr. Ramezani, concluded this factor weighed in
favor of transfer. We therefore conclude, had the juvenile court not considered minor’s
risk to public safety, assuming that was improper, it is beyond a reasonable doubt it still
19
would have properly found this criterion weighed heavily in favor of transfer and would
not have altered its overall analysis. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err by
transferring minor to adult court based on its gravity of the offense analysis.
II
The Juvenile Court Did Not Make Evidentiary Errors
Minor next challenges the expert testimony of both Dr. Urquiza and Detective
Ditty. We will discuss each witness separately and conclude there was no reversible
error.
A
Legal Standards
For the amenability decision, juvenile courts consider reports prepared by the
parties and “any other relevant evidence.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
Under the Evidence Code, “ ‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence . . . having any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.)3 Courts have discretion to exclude
relevant “evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (Evid. Code,
§ 352.)
Witnesses may be qualified as experts if they have “special knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify [them] as an expert on the subject
to which [their] testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 720.) “A trial court’s decision that a
proposed witness qualifies as an expert under Evidence Code section 720 is a matter
3 It is not entirely clear strict adherence to the Evidence Code is required at an
amenability hearing. (See People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 10 Cal.3d 698, 717 [“It is clear
that the very nature of the fitness hearing precludes imposition of strict evidentiary
standards”].) This issue is only briefly addressed in a footnote in minor’s reply brief.
Regardless, we apply the Evidence Code for the purposes of this opinion.
20
within the court’s broad discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the [minor]
demonstrates a manifest abuse of that discretion.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th
899, 949.) Expert witness testimony is limited to opinions “[b]ased on matter . . .
perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him[, her, or them] at
or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be
relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his[, her, or
their] testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a
basis for his[, her, or their] opinion [or opinions].” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).)
Experts are not limited “to the use of admissible evidence in forming an opinion.
[Evidence Code section 801] expressly provides the basis for the opinion must be
reliable, ‘whether or not admissible.’ ” (Zuniga v. Alexandria Care Center, LLC (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 871, 887.) In short, “expert testimony can be based on a wide variety of
information so long as it is reliable.” (Jones, at p. 951.)
B
There Was No Error In Admitting Dr. Urquiza’s Testimony
Minor first argues Dr. Urquiza “[r]endered neuropsychological opinions despite
having admitted he lacked the expertise to do so.” This misstates Dr. Urquiza’s
testimony. Dr. Urquiza never gave a neuropsychological opinion, and stated he does not
personally administer the neuropsychological tests Dr. Ramezani uses because
Dr. Urquiza is “not a neuropsychologist.” Dr. Urquiza testified he had used the results
from these tests to inform treatment and in minor’s case Dr. Ramezani’s tests were
consistent with Dr. Urquiza’s recommendations. At bottom, Dr. Urquiza testified to the
extent his training and experience allowed.
Minor also argues Dr. Urquiza’s testimony was inadmissible because he “never
met with [minor], interviewed him, or performed tests,” nor did Dr. Urquiza request
consent to evaluate minor, and the prosecutor did not “exercise any existing statutory
mechanisms [that] might have given the doctor access to [minor].” But minor does not
21
provide any statutory requirement Dr. Urquiza interview him. Instead, “[i]t is the long-
standing rule in California that experts may rely upon and testify to the sources on which
they base their opinions [citations], including hearsay of a type reasonably relied upon by
professionals in the field. [Citations.] These rules apply to mental health experts.”
(People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 746-747, italics added.) We conclude
there was no error admitting Dr. Urquiza’s testimony even though he did not personally
interview minor. Dr. Urquiza’s failure to interview minor is relevant to weight not
admissibility.
Minor’s final two contentions on this issue are related: Dr. Urquiza (1) did not
obtain consent from minor to evaluate him and (2) “[e]ngaged in harmful advocacy
against [minor].” Both arguments are based on alleged violations of the American
Psychological Association’s Ethics Code, such as the obligation to “minimize harm where
it is foreseeable and unavoidable.” (American Psychological Assoc., Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct (2017) § 3.04(a) <https://www.apa.org/ethics/code>
[as of Mar. 20, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/Y5AG-ZKMB>.) But we are not
tasked with reviewing a violation of professional ethics. Our job is to determine the legal
issue of whether Dr. Urquiza’s testimony is admissible. And nowhere in the Evidence
Code, or any other applicable legal authority provided by minor, requires a psychologist
to obtain consent from the subject of expert testimony before delivering an opinion in
court, nor that this opinion cannot be that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation. We
therefore conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by permitting
Dr. Urquiza to testify on the matters that he did.
C
There Was No Reversible Error Admitting Detective Ditty’s Testimony
Minor also makes several challenges to Detective Ditty’s testimony. First, minor
argues, “[L]arge portions of Detective Ditty’s information consisted of restatements from
reports or footage [that had] already been admitted, but through his own subjective filter,”
22
thus “it was irrelevant.” Again, “expert testimony can be based on a wide variety of
information so long as it is reliable.” (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 951.)4
Minor does not challenge the reliability of the bodycam footage, police reports, and other
evidence Detective Ditty reviewed. We therefore reject this first challenge to Detective
Ditty’s testimony.
Second, minor contends, “[T]he detective lacked the qualification to provide
criminal street gang evidence.” We disagree. Detective Ditty was a 10-year veteran
police officer with three of those years serving in the unit specifically responsible for
gang investigations in Chico. Officer Ditty also received gang training prior to him
testifying, including a 40-hour gang specific training. This background establishes the
juvenile court did not demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion in finding Detective
Ditty had special knowledge, skill, and training relating to gangs in Chico. And
Detective Ditty’s testimony regarding minor’s potential gang involvement was relevant to
the criminal sophistication and gravity of the offense criteria.
Finally, minor contends, “Detective Ditty’s subjective and inflammatory opinions
on [minor’s] psychology had no place in this proceeding.” Minor refers to statements
made in Detective Ditty’s report such as minor “ ‘selfishly fulfilled his own egotistical
need . . . to be a criminal/gangster’ ” and the shooting also “ ‘gave [minor] the
criminal/gang street credit he so desperately idolized.” Before closing arguments,
defense counsel objected to admission of the report based on these statements being
irrelevant and lacking foundation. The juvenile court took it under submission and
ultimately admitted the report, finding most “if not wholly” the contents of the report
were presented by other means of evidence, including “video evidence that did overlap
the summation of Detective Ditty’s narrative in that investigative report.”
4 Minor does not challenge any expert witness testimony under People v. Sanchez
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665.
23
We conclude any error on this last issue harmless even under the stricter Chapman
prejudice analysis. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [“the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”].) Even
assuming the statements minor challenges in Detective Ditty’s report were outside the
bounds of his expertise, lacked foundation, and were irrelevant, they were
inconsequential in the context of the entirety of the evidence. The statements were
included in a report, not made by Detective Ditty at the hearing, and were obvious
subjective interpretations of the video evidence the juvenile court reviewed and analyzed
for itself. And this video evidence showed minor being combative with law enforcement
officers on multiple occasions while using words and wearing colors of the Crip gang,
and showed minor firing multiple rounds into a crowded party. The juvenile court was
consequently presented with the compelling, and reliable, primary sources of Detective
Ditty’s statements that would have beyond a reasonable doubt rendered inconsequential
any additional commentary Detective Ditty provided. Thus, any error in admitting
Detective Ditty’s opinions contained in his report was harmless.
III
Remand Is Not Required In Light Of Senate Bill 545
Minor’s 2023 hearing took place prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 545, which
amended section 707 to “make consideration of any relevant factor mandatory.” (Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Sen Bill 545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2023, ch. 716.) We agree
with the parties that the amendment, by “mak[ing] it more difficult to transfer juveniles
from juvenile court, which . . . reduces the possible punishment for juveniles” (In re S.S.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1289), is an ameliorative statute that applies retroactively to
minors whose cases were not final when the law became effective (see ibid.; In re J.M.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745, 753, review granted Sept. 25, 2024, S286259).
Nevertheless, it does not follow remand is required to allow the juvenile court to
conduct a second transfer hearing. Our Supreme Court explained in the context of a
24
change in sentencing law that when an ameliorative statute takes effect after the juvenile
court has made a ruling, “ ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless
the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the [juvenile] court would have reached the same
conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425.) Both sides agree, as do we, the analysis is the same for the
change in law at issue here, and the same standard applies.
Minor contends he is entitled to a new transfer determination because it is unclear
whether the juvenile court would make the same decision had it understood its duty to
weigh the statutory considerations when making its ruling. We disagree. The juvenile
court recited each criterion and the relevant factors while analyzing the facts of minor’s
case. The juvenile court’s oral recitation of its reasons demonstrates the relevant factors
weighed in the court’s mind when making its ruling. For example, when determining the
level of criminal sophistication exhibited by minor, the juvenile court analyzed the
statutory considerations, including minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, physical
and emotional health, and appreciation of the risks and consequences of his behavior.
The same level of engagement occurred with each criterion and the now mandatory
factors. Thus, this is not a basis for remand.
Minor further argues he is entitled to a new transfer determination because Senate
Bill 545 added relevant factors to the transfer analysis. Minor points to the fact the
juvenile court must now consider whether minors were involved in the child welfare or
foster care system or a victim of sexual abuse or trafficking. Minor concedes he was
never involved in the child welfare system, and he does not contend he is a victim of
sexual abuse or trafficking, but argues the “lack of involvement” is relevant because of
“the functional absence of the child welfare system from [minor’s] life, despite multiple
points at which involvement was plainly necessary.” We reject this novel argument
because it is against the language of the statute. After Senate Bill 545, juvenile courts are
25
mandated only to consider, if relevant, involvement in the foster care system, not lack of
involvement. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Accordingly, the record clearly indicates the juvenile court would have reached the
same conclusion had it been aware of current law.
IV
Substantial Evidence Supported The Juvenile Court’s Overall Analysis
Minor finally argues the juvenile court’s overall decision to transfer minor lacked
substantial evidence. This argument rests on two premises. First, minor contends the
errors discussed above individually and collectively eliminated any substantial evidence
justifying transfer, including the testimony from “two highly suspect experts,” neither of
whom “contributed to the already limited body of admissible evidence that arguably
supports transfer,” and the lack of evidence supporting the juvenile court’s “discussion of
criminal sophistication.” For the reasons discussed above, we found no prejudicial error
and so reject these bases to undermine the overall finding.
Second, minor reweighs the evidence, arguing “this was not a ‘close case’ ”
because “[e]veryone who actually knew anything about [minor] consistently praised his
post-detention rehabilitative efforts and offered a concretely positive view of his future.”
Even if there is substantial evidence supporting a decision not to transfer minor, that is
not our inquiry here. The juvenile court found there was clear and convincing evidence
supporting transfer so we must affirm if there is substantial evidence supporting transfer
at the requisite level of certainty. Having already concluded there is substantial evidence
for the criteria the juvenile court found supported transfer, and minor not presenting any
new arguments against the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding, we must
conclude there was substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s overall finding
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
26
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring minor to a court of criminal jurisdiction is
affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
27
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.