People v. Rogers CA4/1

CourtListener 10360627Calctapp20.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/20/25 P. v. Rogers CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083905

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS323318)

KEITH LAMAR ROGERS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Enrique Camarena, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Keith Lamar Rogers pleaded guilty to one count of failure to register as
a sex offender and was placed on formal probation for two years subject to a
condition that he submit to polygraph testing at the direction of his probation
officer. Upon Rogers’ release from custody, he went into a polygraph service
provider’s office at the instruction of his probation officer. However, he
refused to sign a standard release form necessary to receive polygraph
testing, told the office manager he neither wanted nor needed to submit to
polygraph testing, and was asked to leave the office due to his aggressive and
disruptive demeanor. The trial court found Rogers violated his polygraph
testing probation condition, revoked probation, declined to reinstate
probation, and sentenced him to state prison for two years.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Rogers contends the trial
court abused its discretion when it revoked and declined to reinstate his
probation. He claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
court’s finding that he violated his polygraph testing probation condition; and
(2) assuming a violation of the probation condition, the court nonetheless
abused its discretion because the violation was de minimis. We reject these
arguments and affirm the judgment.
II
BACKGROUND
A. Probation Sentence
Rogers is subject to a mandatory lifetime sex offender registration
requirement. He is required to reregister as a sex offender within five
working days upon his release after spending more than 30 days in custody.

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In 2022, the district attorney filed a felony complaint against Rogers
alleging he willfully and unlawfully failed to register as a sex offender within
five working days upon his release from jail in violation of Penal Code section

290.018, subdivision (b).1 Rogers pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to a
plea agreement with a stipulated sentence of formal probation and 365 days
in local custody.
The trial court accepted the plea, suspended imposition of the sentence,
and placed Rogers on formal probation for two years with a custodial term of
365 days and 100 credits for time served. Rogers completed the remainder of
his custodial term and was released from jail.
B. Probation Revocation
One of the conditions of Rogers’ probation (hereafter, Condition 10(h))
required him to “[u]ndergo periodic polygraph examinations at the direction
of the [probation officer] with the results of those tests released to the
[probation officer].” Condition 10(h) stated that the “[p]olygraph questions
shall be limited to items which are relevant to the crime(s) for which the
defendant was convicted and shall assist with supervision, treatment, and
rehabilitative efforts.” (Underscoring omitted.)
About seven months after his release from custody, Rogers met with his
probation officer and was instructed to complete a polygraph test in
accordance with Condition 10(h). When Rogers met with his probation officer
two weeks later, he had not yet completed the polygraph testing. Rogers’
probation officer reminded him to complete the polygraph testing and
instructed him to provide the test results within the next few days. The
probation officer directed Rogers to polygraph service providers and gave him
bus passes to defray transportation costs. He also informed Rogers he needed

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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to complete the polygraph testing and return with the test results, or else he
would be in “direction violation” of Condition 10(h).
A few days later, Rogers went into the office of one of the recommended
polygraph service providers. The office manager gave Rogers a standard
release form to sign, but he became agitated and refused to sign it. The office
manager advised Rogers several times he needed to sign the release form to
take a polygraph test. However, Rogers repeatedly refused to sign the
release form. He became increasingly agitated and told the office staff he
neither wanted nor needed to sign the paperwork or take the polygraph test.
According to the office manager, Rogers moved aggressively towards her and
acted in a “violent” and “offensive” manner. The interaction lasted between
15 and 20 minutes, at which point Rogers left the office at the office
manager’s request.
The office manager alerted Rogers’ probation officer about his refusal to
sign the release form or take the polygraph test. Rogers was rearrested and
the probation department issued a notice to show cause why probation should
not be revoked or modified based on Rogers’ violation of Condition 10(h). The
trial court set a probation revocation hearing.
At the hearing, the parties elicited testimony from Rogers’ probation
officer and the office manager from the polygraph service provider. At the
end of the hearing, the court formally revoked probation, declined to reinstate
probation, and sentenced Rogers to prison for the middle term of two years
with 737 credits for time served. Rogers was released from custody because
his credits exceeded the custodial term imposed.

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III
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
“Following a defendant’s conviction of a crime, the sentencing court
may choose among a variety of dispositional options. One option is to release
the offender on probation. ‘Probation is generally reserved for convicted
criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public
safety and promotes rehabilitation.’ [Citation.] A grant of probation is
‘qualitatively different from such traditional forms of punishment as fines or
imprisonment. Probation is neither “punishment” (see § 15) nor a criminal
“judgment” (see § 1445). Instead, courts deem probation an act of clemency
in lieu of punishment [citation], and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in
nature [citation].’ [Citation.] Accordingly, … a grant of probation is an act of
grace or clemency, and an offender has no right or privilege to be granted
such release. [Citation.] Stated differently, ‘[p]robation is not a right, but a
privilege.’ ” (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402 (Moran).)
“When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration,
state law authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such
release that are ‘fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that
amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done
to any person resulting from that breach, and ... for the reformation and
rehabilitation of the probationer.’ ” (Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 402–403,
citing § 1203.1, subd. (j).) In the present case, the court imposed Condition
10(h), the polygraph testing requirement, as a condition of Rogers’ probation.
Section 1203.2, subdivision (a), authorizes a trial court to revoke and
terminate probation “if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its
judgment, has reason to believe … that the person has violated any of the

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conditions of their [probation].” “Revocation of probation typically requires
proof that the probation violation was willful.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2
Cal.5th 494, 498; see People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1186 [“a
trial court may not revoke probation unless the defendant willfully violated
the terms and conditions of probation”].) “The facts supporting a probation
revocation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v.
Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 163.)
A “decision to revoke probation when the defendant fails to comply with
its terms rests within the broad discretion of the trial court.” (People v.
Covington (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.) “[U]pon finding a violation of
probation and revoking probation, the court has several sentencing options.
[Citation.] It may reinstate probation on the same terms, reinstate probation
with modified terms, or terminate probation and sentence the defendant to
state prison.” (People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420; see People
v. Hawthorne (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 789, 792 [“When the trial court decide[s]
to revoke defendant’s probation, it ha[s] the option of either placing
defendant on probation once again, on the same or modified conditions, or
terminating probation and sentencing defendant to state prison.”].)
A trial court order revoking probation or declining to reinstate
probation will “not be disturbed under the abuse of discretion standard
unless it is arbitrary or capricious, applies the wrong legal standard, or is
based on factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence.” (People v.
Dauterman (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 603, 612.) “Substantial evidence is
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Buell
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 687.) “ ‘ “[O]nly in a very extreme case should an
appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of
denying or revoking probation.” ’ ” (People v Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th

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766, 773.) “[T]he burden of demonstrating an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion rests squarely on the [appellant].” (Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When it Revoked
Probation and Sentenced Rogers to Prison
Rogers contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking and
declining to reinstate probation because substantial evidence did not support
the court’s finding that he willfully violated Condition 10(h). According to
Rogers, the evidence revealed nothing more than a mere “miscommunication”
about whether he needed to complete the release form to obtain polygraph
testing and, in any event, he refused only to sign the release form, not to
comply with the polygraph testing requirement.
Substantial evidence from the probation revocation hearing established
that Rogers—fully apprised of the necessity of filling out the release form—
willfully refused to submit to polygraph testing as ordered by his probation
officer. At the hearing, Rogers’ probation officer testified that he told Rogers
he must complete the polygraph test and return with the test results, or he
would be in “direction violation” of Condition 10(h). The polygraph service
provider’s office manager, in turn, testified that she told Rogers he “needed to
sign his release [form] in order to take [the] polygraph test” ordered by his
probation officer. Further, she testified she instructed Rogers multiple times
her staff would not be able to administer polygraph testing unless he signed
the release form. This constitutes substantial evidence dispelling any notion
that Rogers’ refusal to comply with Condition 10(h) was the result of an
inadvertent “miscommunication” about the necessity of the release form.
Substantial evidence also refutes Rogers’ claim that he objected only to
the release form, rather than the underlying polygraph testing. As noted, the
office manager testified she told Rogers the release form was a prerequisite to
the administration of polygraph testing. Further, no evidence was

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presented—and no suggestion is made on appeal—that Rogers objected to the
release form because he believed its contents were problematic in any way.
Taken together, this gives rise to a reasonable inference that Rogers objected
to the polygraph testing, not merely the paperwork he needed to sign to
obtain the testing. In fact, Rogers himself vocalized his opposition to the
underlying polygraph testing during his contentious confrontation with the
office manager. According to the office manager, Rogers claimed he “didn’t
want to take the polygraph” and “didn’t have to take a polygraph.” This
testimony amply supported the trial court’s finding that Rogers willfully
refused to submit to polygraph testing in violation of Condition 10(h).
Rogers also argues the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously
because his failure to satisfy Condition 10(h) was a “de minimis” violation
resulting from a “misunderstanding” about the polygraph testing consent
form. However, as discussed, substantial evidence supported a contrary
finding that Rogers’ violation was deliberate. Further, the court gave careful
consideration to various factors bearing on its probation revocation and
reinstatement decision. It observed that Rogers had been sentenced to five
prior prison terms and had a “lengthy” history of violating the Sex Offender
Registration Act. The court also noted that Rogers had 20 prior sustained
parole violations, as well as past probation violations. In light of Rogers’
extensive criminal history, his unsatisfactory parole and probation
performance, and his willful violation of Condition 10(h), the court acted well
within its discretion when it terminated probation. (§ 1203.2, subd. (a)
[probation may be terminated “if the interests of justice so require and … the
[probationer] has violated any of the conditions” of probation]; People v.
Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 910 [court properly declined to reinstate
probation where it “gave a lengthy and reasoned explanation for its sentence

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choice, resting the decision not to [again] reinstate probation on [appellant’s]
demonstrated lack of commitment to carrying out the terms and conditions of
his probationary grant”]; People v. Jones (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1316
[“Defendant’s previous failures to comply with the terms of probation …
constitutes a sufficient reason for refusing to place her on probation once
again.”].)
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

DATO, J.

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