CourtListener 10360626•People v. Rubino CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/20/25 P. v. Rubino CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083590
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE410434)
BRAD RUBINO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sherry M. Thompson-Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
Paul Stubb, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Brad Rubino guilty of one count of making a criminal
threat. (Pen. Code,1 § 422.) The trial court placed Rubino on two years
formal probation.
Rubino contends that insufficient evidence supports his conviction. We
conclude that Rubino’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence lacks
merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Rubino was convicted of making a criminal threat to H.R.2 The two
men had grown up together as close friends and neighbors, whose fathers
were business partners. In the years leading up to the instant incident, the
relationship between Rubino and H.R. had deteriorated. Rubino was angry
at H.R. based on his belief that H.R. had stolen tools from him several years
earlier. Rubino also had negative feelings toward H.R.’s father (Father)
because of Father’s recent business dealings with Rubino’s father.
At the time of the incident, Rubino was living in the house where he
grew up, with a backyard that adjoined the backyard of Father’s house. H.R.
was visiting Father’s house at the time. Rubino drove to the front gate of
Father’s house and started yelling through the driveway gate, in the presence
of both H.R. and Father.
Witnesses at trial gave different accounts of what Rubino said during
the incident at the front gate. According to H.R., Rubino was yelling
obscenities, accusing H.R. of stealing tools, and stating that he was going to
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 We refer to H.R. by his initials to protect his privacy.
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kill both H.R. and Father. Father similarly testified that Rubino used
obscenities and threatened to shoot him and “kill you guys.” Both Father and
H.R. described Rubino as “out of control.” A neighbor who witnessed the
incident at the front gate heard Rubino say “I’m going to kill you” in those or
similar words. Another neighbor, who could hear the incident at the front
gate, heard someone yell obscenities and state “I’ll kill you. I’ll kill you both.”
At some point that neighbor also heard Rubino refer to using a firearm when
he said “Let’s go. Bring it on. Do you want the AR-15 or the 45?”
Rubino admitted to yelling profanity and making insults toward H.R.
at the front gate to try to draw him out and confront him about the allegedly
stolen tools. However, Rubino denied that he threatened to kill or shoot H.R.
or Father. Rubino’s friend, who drove with Rubino to the front gate, heard
Rubino tell H.R. that he wanted to “beat him up” and “take his family down,”
but he did not hear Rubino threaten to shoot or kill H.R.
The incident at the front gate lasted approximately 10 minutes.
Rubino then drove to his own house and went to his backyard, near the
property line with Father’s backyard, where a three-foot tall fence separated
the properties. There, Rubino continued to yell at H.R. and Father. H.R.
made a video recording of some of Rubino’s statements in the backyard. In
the video, Rubino used extensive profanity and at one point threated to
“fucking beat the shit outta you.” Father and H.R. both testified that in
statements that were not captured on the video, Rubino again threatened to
kill them. Rubino testified that he made no such threats.
In response to a 911 call by Father, sheriff’s deputies arrived at
Father’s house a short time later. While the deputies were at Father’s house,
Rubino made phone calls to Father. During the calls, Rubino was on the
phone’s speaker, and he addressed both Father and the deputies. A portion
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of the conversation was recorded on the deputies’ body worn cameras. Rubino
informed the deputies that he owned firearms and suggested that if they
came to his house, there would be a violent encounter. Rubino told Father, “I
could give a flying fuck if I take my last breath . . . tonight,” and “[n]o one’s in
this house except for me, my ammo, my guns, and my vest.” Referring to
H.R., Rubino also stated to Father, “I’m gonna choke him out until he pays
me my money.”
The next day, after a detective obtained a search warrant and gun
violence restraining order against Rubino, a SWAT team searched Rubino’s
home. They recovered 11 firearms, including five rifles, four pistols, and two
shotguns, together with a large supply of ammunition and a bulletproof vest.
Rubino was charged with two counts of making a criminal threat.
(§ 422.) Count 1 specified Father as the victim. Count 2 specified H.R. as the
victim.
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge in count 1 that
Rubino made a criminal threat against Father. A mistrial was declared on
that count, and it was subsequently dismissed. However, the jury did find
Rubino guilty in count 2 of making a criminal threat against H.R.
Rubino was placed on two years of formal probation, with a suspended
180-day jail term.
II.
DISCUSSION
Rubino’s sole contention on appeal is that insufficient evidence
supports his conviction for making a criminal threat against H.R.
A. Standard of Review
In evaluating Rubino’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we
must ‘ “review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment,” ’
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and then determine whether it contains ‘ “evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value” ’ such that a reasonable jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . ‘[S]ufficiency determinations
necessarily take account of the “standard of proof that applied before the trial
court.” ’ . . . ‘[T]hat is why in criminal cases we must ensure the record
demonstrates substantial evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [¶] . . . We must ‘ “presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence . . .
‘. . . for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends.’ ” ’ . . . But we cannot, however, venture beyond the
evidence presented at trial, and may consider only those inferences that are
reasonably supported by the record. ‘ “[A] reasonable inference . . . ‘may not
be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition,
surmise, conjecture, or guess work.’ ” ’ . . . It ‘must logically flow from other
facts established in the action,’ and it cannot be ‘based entirely on the
suspicions of the officers involved in the case and the conjecture of the
prosecution.’ ” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167–168, citations
omitted].)
B. Applicable Legal Standards
Section 422, subdivision (a) provides, “Any person who willfully
threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury
to another person, with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be
taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which,
on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the
person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
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execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in
sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s
safety, shall be punished . . . .”
The statutory language gives rise to five elements that must be proven.
“To establish a criminal threat, the prosecution must prove: (1) the
defendant willfully threatened death or great bodily injury to another person;
(2) the threat was made with the specific intent that it be taken as a threat,
regardless of the defendant’s intent to carry it out; (3) the threat was ‘on its
face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened,
a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution’; (4) the threat
caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety
or for his or her immediate family’s safety’; and (5) this fear was reasonable
under the circumstances.” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 826.)
“ ‘ “[A]ll of the surrounding circumstances should be taken into account to
determine if a threat falls within the proscription of section 422.” ’ ” (People
v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 631.)
C. Rubino’s Contentions
Rubino challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the third
and fourth elements needed for a conviction under section 422. We consider
each in turn.
1. Immediacy of Threat
Rubino first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding that the threat was “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an
immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (§ 422, subd. (a).)
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Rubino’s entire argument on the issue in his opening appellate brief
consists of the following: “No evidence shows [Rubino] ever attempted to
climb, open, or bypass the front gate or backyard fence. No evidence showed
[Rubino] was armed at [Father] and [H.R.’s] house[,] and even if the jury
believed that [Rubino] threatened to choke [H.R.], the evidence showed at all
times [H.R.] remained far away and on the other side of a physical barrier.
[¶] No evidence shows [Rubino] was ever armed or ever within 50 feet of
[H.R.] during the confrontation. [Citation.] It was physically impossible for
[Rubino] to touch [H.R.] or discharge a projectile, as he was not armed.
Accordingly, there was no immediate prospect of any threat being carried
out.”3
As we understand the crux of Rubino’s argument, he contends that the
threat was not sufficient to satisfy the third statutory element because he
could not have carried out the threat at the moment he was making it.
Specifically, he was not armed while making the threats, and he was behind
either the front gate or the backyard fence.
The argument fails because “section 422 does not require an immediate
ability . . . to carry out the threat.” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 809.) Instead, the word “immediate” in the statute
means “that degree of seriousness and imminence which is understood by the
victim to be attached to the future prospect of the threat being carried out.”
(People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1538 (Melhado).) The statute
was not “intended to place a limited timeline on when a specific and
unconditional threat would be executed.” (People v. Wilson (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 789, 816.) Moreover, a threat “ ‘is not insufficient simply
3 The argument is not addressed at all in Rubino’s appellate reply brief.
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because it does “not communicate a time or precise manner of execution.’ ”
(People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1431–1432.)
Here, there was evidence that Rubino made threats to kill, beat up and
choke H.R., and to kill and shoot Father. Although Rubino did not brandish
a firearm during the incident, he had access to numerous firearms at his
home, which was a fact known to H.R. A neighbor heard Rubino specifically
express an intention to use one of his firearms during the incident, by asking
“[d]o you want the AR-15 or the 45?” There was clear line of sight from
Rubino’s backyard into Father’s living room. Moreover, Rubino testified he
knew how to open the front gate of Father’s house because he had done so
many times before, and he could access Father’s backyard over the low fence
or through a gate. As Rubino testified, “I know how to access the property at
any point in time.” Thus, although Rubino did not end up entering Father’s
property during the incident, Rubino had the ability to do so. Further,
because Rubino was “out of control” during the incident and clearly very
angry, it was reasonable for H.R. to form the belief that Rubino intended to
act on the threats.
Based on those facts, although Rubino did not ultimately take steps to
execute his threats, substantial evidence supports a finding that H.R. could
reasonably understand Rubino’s threats of physical harm as conveying a
sufficient “degree of seriousness and imminence” that they would be carried
out. (Melhado, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1538.) Therefore, we find no
merit to Rubino’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
third element of making a criminal threat in violation of section 422.
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2. Sustained Fear
Rubino next contends that insufficient evidence supports a finding that,
as a result of his threats, H.R. was “in sustained fear for his or her own safety
or for his or her immediate family’s safety.” (§ 422, subd. (a).)
The element of sustained fear in section 422 “requires proof of a mental
element in the victim.” (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.)
“The word fear, of course, describes the emotion the victim experiences.”
(People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349.) “Fear is “sustained”
when it involves “a period of time that extends beyond what is momentary,
fleeting, or transitory.” (Allen, at p. 1156.)
Rubino does not take issue with whether H.R.’s fear was sustained.
Instead, he takes issue with whether H.R. was afraid at all during the
incident. Rubino argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that H.R. was afraid because “the evidence showed that [H.R.] prolonged and
provoked the confrontation with [Rubino].” According to Rubino, because
H.R. provoked him during the incident, H.R. must not have “experienc[ed]
fear for his and his family’s safety.” Further, according to Rubino, it was only
Father “who testified to being very scared,” not Rubino.
Rubino’s argument lacks merit because it was not only Father who
testified to being scared. H.R. testified that, due to Rubino’s threats, he was
“scared” for his parents, and “very worried” about his parents’ safety. Rubino
would have us reject that testimony because H.R. purportedly provoked and
prolonged the confrontation and thus must not have been afraid. However, in
making this argument, Rubino is impermissibly asking us to reweigh the
evidence and make credibility determinations. (People v. Davis (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 771, 779 [“As a reviewing court, we can neither reweigh
evidence nor reevaluate a witness’s credibility.”].) It was the jury’s call to
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make, not ours, whether H.R.’s testimony about his state of mind should be
credited in light of the other evidence presented at trial. Based on H.R.’s
testimony about his state of mind and based on the facts we have described
above, including Rubino’s out-of-control and angry behavior, his access to
firearms, his line of sight to Father’s living room, and his ability to physically
enter Father’s property, there were ample reasons for the jury to conclude
that H.R. did, in fact, fear “for his . . . own safety or for his . . . immediate
family’s safety” (§ 422, subd. (a)) as a result of Rubino’s threats.
Further, Rubino’s argument relies on the factual premise that “[H.R.]
prolonged and provoked the confrontation with [Rubino].” However, the
evidence on that point at trial was disputed, and the jury could have
concluded that H.R. did not engage in such conduct. Rubino and his friend
testified that H.R. instigated the confrontation in the backyard by yelling at
Rubino from Father’s backyard as soon as Rubino arrived home. However,
both H.R. and Father denied that any such thing occurred. According to
them, Rubino was the one who started yelling in the backyard while they
were inside the house, and they did not remember that H.R. said anything at
all in the backyard. Indeed, H.R. testified that the only actions he took
during the incident that might have provoked Rubino were to “flip him off” at
the front gate and to record a video of Rubino in the backyard. The jury
reasonably could have concluded that the events occurred as H.R. and Father
described them.
In sum, there is no merit to Rubino’s contention that insufficient
evidence supports a finding that H.R. experienced sustained fear as a result
of Rubino’s threats.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
KELETY, J.
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