Razuki v. Malan CA4/1

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Filed 3/20/25 Razuki v. Malan CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SALAM RAZUKI, D082560

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
00034229-CU-BC-CTL)
NINUS MALAN et al.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with
directions.
Law Offices of John W. Zryd and John W. Zryd for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Demergian Law and David K. Demergian for Defendant and
Respondent.
Salam Razuki appeals an order awarding Ninus Malan $200,000 in
monetary sanctions for Razuki’s conduct in conspiring to kidnap Malan
several months after this lawsuit was filed. Razuki argues that the trial
court erred because: (1) criminal conduct is not sanctionable under Code of
Civil Procedure1 section 128.5; (2) there was insufficient admissible and
relevant evidence to prove he acted in bad faith; (3) the motion for sanctions
was not timely served; (4) the motion failed to adequately state the amount of
sanctions requested and how they were calculated; and (5) awarding
sanctions while Razuki’s appeal in his criminal case was pending undermined
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In a supplemental
letter brief filed at our request, Razuki further contends that Malan did not
demonstrate the $200,000 awarded by the trial court was “incurred as a
direct result” of Razuki’s sanctionable conduct, as required for a sanctions
award payable to the opposing party under section 128.5, subdivision (f)(2).
We reject all of Razuki’s contentions but the last one. Although the
trial court committed no error in finding that Razuki engaged in sanctionable
bad faith conduct, the court abused its discretion by awarding sanctions of
$200,000 payable to Malan in the absence of any showing that these fees
were “incurred as a direct result” of Razuki’s sanctionable conduct. (§ 128.5,
subd. (f)(2).) We therefore affirm the finding of sanctionable conduct but
reverse the $200,000 award to Malan and remand the matter to allow the
court to exercise its discretion whether to impose sanctions as a penalty
payable to the court and/or receive additional evidence that would otherwise
support a sanctions award payable to Malan under section 128.5, subdivision
(f)(2).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Civil and Criminal Proceedings
In July 2018, Razuki sued Malan and several entities over disputed
business dealings and property investments. Razuki alleged that he was
entitled to damages and injunctive relief because Malan misappropriated and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
mishandled assets in connection with their marijuana businesses. Other
entities intervened as plaintiffs or filed separate lawsuits in connection with
the business assets. Malan and several defendants also filed cross-
complaints against Razuki, his family members, and various entities
connected to him.
According to a federal criminal complaint and probable cause
statement in United States v. Razuki, et al., Case No. 3:18-mj-05915-MDD, in
November 2018, Razuki, Sylvia Gonzales, and Elizabeth Juarez conspired to
kidnap and murder Malan in Mexico. The complaint alleged that as part of
that conspiracy, Razuki and Gonzales paid a confidential informant to kill
Malan because of Razuki’s frustration with the civil litigation. The probable
cause statement described how Gonzales paid the informant a deposit and
told the informant how he could spot Malan after a court hearing.
Malan attested in a declaration that on November 14, 2018, he and his
girlfriend awoke to several federal agents ringing his doorbell to tell him his
life was in danger. For 90 minutes, the agents created a staged murder scene
in Malan’s home by gagging him, duct-taping him to a chair, tearing his
clothes, and applying makeup to make it look like he had been beaten. Then,
at the agents’ direction, Malan and his girlfriend had to surrender their
electronic devices and refrain from contacting any friends and family while
they were sequestered in a hotel room with armed security personnel
stationed outside.
According to the probable cause statement, late the next day on
November 15, 2018, the confidential informant had a recorded meeting with
Razuki and told him that he “took care of it,” and that it was “done.” The
informant offered to show Razuki “proof,” but Razuki said he did not want to
see it.

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Razuki was arrested the next day on November 16, 2018. Federal
prosecutors charged him with conspiring to kidnap Malan for the purpose of
intimidation and murder (18 U.S.C. § 1201, subd. (c) (count 2)) and
conspiring to commit an act that would constitute the offense of murder,
kidnapping, or maiming, in Mexico (18 U.S.C. § 956 (count 1)).
B. Malan’s First Motion for Sanctions
Shortly after Razuki’s arrest, Malan moved for approximately $31,000
in costs, fees, and expenses as sanctions in the civil case under section 128.5,
subdivision (a). Malan’s attorney, Daniel Watts, submitted a declaration in
support of the motion stating that because of Malan’s protective custody and
Razuki’s arrest, he and co-counsel had to research how to handle the unusual
circumstances, spend time requesting a restraining order, and prepare for a
hearing that had to be continued. Watts included a list of the hours he and
others billed, along with hourly rates to support the request for attorney fees.
Malan also submitted a declaration summarizing some of the allegations in
the criminal complaint and stating that he had incurred expenses from being
in protective custody and attending the restraining order hearing. Malan
requested that the court take judicial notice of, among other things, the
complaint and probable cause statement in the criminal case.
The court denied Malan’s motion without prejudice, finding that much
of Malan’s evidence was related to the petition for a restraining order that
was ultimately vacated. It also found that some of the fees Malan was
seeking in a separate civil case against Razuki appeared to overlap with the
fees he was requesting in his sanctions motion. The court further noted that
according to the criminal complaint, Razuki denied being involved in any
conspiracy to kidnap and kill Malan. The court therefore concluded that
Malan’s motion for sanctions was premature.

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C. Razuki’s Guilty Plea to Conspiracy to Kidnap Malan
In November 2022, Razuki pled guilty to conspiring to kidnap Malan
(count 2), and in February 2023, he was sentenced to seven years in federal
custody. Notwithstanding his guilty plea, Malan appealed his conviction to

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.2
D. Malan’s Second Motion for Sanctions
Malan filed a second motion for sanctions in April 2023, submitting his
own revised declaration and another declaration from his new attorney,
David Demergian. Malan’s revised declaration included detailed information
from the criminal complaint, the probable cause statement, and the
prosecution’s sentencing memorandum in the criminal case. His declaration
referenced the roughly $31,000 expended at the time of his original motion,
and then stated that “[s]ince that time my attorney’s fees and expenses which
have been occasioned by RAZUKI’s tactics have well-exceeded $200,000.” He
also attested that “in the context of punitive damages,” he suffers from
“extreme emotional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder” and “medical
and domestic issues from the anxiety associated” with Razuki’s plot.
Demergian, who was present at the hearing when Razuki pled guilty,
stated in his declaration that Razuki admitted under penalty of perjury that
between September and November 2018, he, Gonzales, and Juarez agreed to
solicit someone to kidnap Malan and transport him to Mexico to either
intimidate or kill him. Razuki further admitted that in furtherance of that
agreement, he met with an individual to arrange the kidnapping and gave
the person $1,000 as partial payment for the kidnapping and transport.

2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the Ninth Circuit’s docket
in Razuki’s appeal, which shows that Razuki voluntarily dismissed the Ninth
Circuit appeal while this appeal was pending. (United States v. Salam
Razuki, No. 23-352, D.C. No. 3:18-cr-05260-CAB-1, Dkt. No. 260.)
5
Demergian attested that he had represented Malan “through dozens of Court
proceedings, read thousands of pages of documents, and briefed two appeals
taken by Razuki-controlled entities/persons relative to the Court’s
disqualification of [cross-defendants’ counsel].” He stated that his “own fees
occasioned by Mr. Razuki’s clearly frivolous appeals . . . approach $100,000.”
Razuki opposed the motion, arguing that because he had appealed his
criminal conviction, the Fifth Amendment prevented him from submitting a
declaration that would “expand on . . . or inform the court more thoroughly”
about his guilty plea admissions and respond to the allegations against him.
He further argued, among other things, that the motion was untimely and
failed to state a requested amount, that there was insufficient admissible
evidence to support sanctions under section 128.5, and that Malan failed to
present an accounting of his costs and attorney fees. Razuki’s attorney, John
Zryd, submitted a short declaration addressing the trial court’s appointment
of a receiver and the separate restraining order proceedings.
Razuki filed objections to Malan’s declaration asserting that any
statements from the criminal complaint, probable cause statement, and
sentencing memorandum were inadmissible hearsay. He objected to Malan’s
statements about his protective custody on similar grounds. As for
Demergian’s declaration, Razuki asserted that any statements related to his
guilty plea were irrelevant and constituted hearsay.
At the motion hearing, Demergian clarified that Malan was only
requesting section 128.5 sanctions, not any “punitive damages.” When asked
by the court where the money for sanctions would “come from,” Demergian
suggested that the court use “a couple hundred thousand dollars in
[Demergian’s] trust account from the sale of the estate” as a “nice source of
money.” The court and Demergian also discussed “another pot of money”

6
amounting to about $700,000 which was somehow related to Watts and other
entities’ counsel. Later in the hearing, Demergian told the court that Malan
“has always said 4.3 million dollars” was an appropriate sanction because
that was the amount at stake in the litigation. He then said that one percent
of that amount—which he erroneously said was $430,000 rather than
$43,000—was also “reasonable,” and that Malan had proven “over $300,000
in attorney’s fees.” Demergian mentioned the idea of giving the court time
sheets “so [they could] talk about each .2 entry for a telephone call with
Malan and what it was about,” but he dismissed the idea as “ridiculous” and
cited Kravitz v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1015 (Kravitz) for the
proposition that the sanctions award did not have to be “related at all” to the
actual fees. Demergian ended his argument by asserting that the “$200,000
sitting in trust . . . seems like a perfect, perfect sanction amount” to award as
a partial reimbursement of attorney fees.
E. Trial Court’s Ruling
The court granted Malan’s motion for sanctions and awarded him
$200,000 in “reasonable litigation expenses” for Razuki’s “bad faith actions
and tactics that were frivolous.” The court started by granting Malan’s
request for judicial notice of the court’s prior ruling on his first motion for
sanctions, and of documents in Razuki’s criminal case. It also granted
Razuki’s request for judicial notice of his notice of appeal in the federal

criminal case3 and the complaint in Malan’s civil suit against Razuki arising
from the criminal case.
The court then overruled Razuki’s objections to Malan’s and
Demergian’s declarations, finding that any hearsay statements in the

3 The record only includes a blank page where the notice of appeal
should be.
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criminal complaint, probable cause statement, and Malan declaration were
admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of showing the effect on the listener.
The court held that Razuki’s “egregious” attempt to have Malan murdered
constituted an action or tactic made in bad faith under section 128.5, that the
attempted kidnapping and subsequent criminal cause unreasonably and
unnecessarily delayed the civil litigation, and that a motion for sanctions was
no longer premature because the criminal proceedings had ended. The court
further found that while Razuki was entitled to his Fifth Amendment rights
during his pending appeal, “nothing prevented a simple declaration
contesting the evidence presented” by Malan in support of the motion.
DISCUSSION
I
We disagree with Razuki’s first contention that criminal conduct is not
sanctionable under section 128.5. Our task when interpreting a statute is “to
give language used in a statute its ordinary meaning, and if the language is
clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary
to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . . To that end, we
generally must accord significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and
sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose,” and avoid a construction
that would make some words surplusage. (People v. Valencia (2017) 3
Cal.5th 347, 357 [cleaned up].)
We conclude that the plain language of the statute does not preclude
sanctions for conduct just because it may also be criminal. Section 128.5,
subdivision (a), provides that a trial court may order a party to pay
reasonable expenses “incurred by another party as a result of actions or
tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.” Section 128.5, subdivision (b)(1), states that “ ‘[a]ctions

8
or tactics’ include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing of motions
or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other
responsive pleading.” (Italics added.) Subdivision (b)(2) of that section
defines “frivolous” to mean “totally and completely without merit or for the
sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” (Italics added.)
Courts have interpreted “bad faith” in the context of section 128.5 to
mean “ ‘ “without subjective good faith or honest belief in the propriety or
reasonableness of such actions.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb &
Taeb (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 124, 135; see Summers v. City of Cathedral City
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1072 [bad faith “means simply that the action or
tactic is being pursued for an improper motive”]; see also Campbell v. Cal-
Gard Sur. Servs. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 563, 574 [“[a]n evil motive is not
required; subjective bad faith may be inferred”]; Llamas v. Diaz (1990) 218
Cal.App.3d 1043, 1047, fn. 9 [a finding of frivolousness may sometimes
equate with a finding of subjective bad faith].) We conclude that criminal
conduct can logically fall under the umbrella of sanctionable bad faith
conduct if it is done with an improper motive of harassing an opposing party.
There is nothing in the language of section 128.5 that categorically exempts
criminal behavior from serving as grounds for sanctions. In fact, it would be
illogical if acts done in extreme bad faith—such as forming a conspiracy to
kidnap and murder or intimidate a party opponent—were not sanctionable
merely due to their criminal nature.
Razuki makes no argument as to why his alleged misconduct, if
sufficiently supported by the evidence, was not “frivolous” as defined by
section 128.5. Rather, he argues that because section 128.5 sanctions are
more commonly imposed for acts like improper motions and filings, the
Legislature must have intended to limit the statute’s purview to those or

9
closely similar categories. We are not persuaded. In describing the kinds of
bad faith actions or tactics that are punishable by sanctions, the statutory
phrase “including, but are not limited to” in the definition is indicative of
enlargement, not restriction. (Wainwright v. Superior Court (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 262, 267, citing Dyna–Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing
Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1389.) And while unnecessary and harassing
filings may constitute one form of sanctionable conduct, we decline to adopt
Razuki’s interpretation and construe section 128.5 so narrowly as to make
the phrase “but are not limited to” into surplusage.
Our conclusion is also supported by the fact that section 128.5,
subdivision (e), expressly excludes “disclosures and discovery requests,
responses, objections, and motions” from categories of behavior that are
sanctionable under the statute. If the Legislature intended to exclude
criminal behavior from section 128.5’s application, it could have done so. “A
cardinal rule of statutory construction is that it is not a judicial function to
read into statutes language the Legislature might have used or might have
intended. In other words, courts do not rewrite statutes.” (Shiheiber v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 688, 702 [cleaned up].)
We find no basis for reading an exclusion of criminal acts into section 128.5.
Lastly, sanctioning misconduct that could also constitute criminal
behavior does not require the court to “make criminal findings” or allow a
party “to bring quasi-criminal charges” as Razuki contends. Section 128.5
does not independently authorize criminal charges, nor does it bestow the
trial court with authority to find a party to civil litigation criminally liable.
Rather, section 128.5 merely “broaden[s] the powers of trial courts to manage
their calendars and provide[s] for expeditious processing of civil actions[.]”
(Stats. 1981, ch. 762, § 2, p. 2968; see County of Imperial v. Farmer (1988)

10
205 Cal.App.3d 479, 485.) Accordingly, we reject Razuki’s argument that
criminal conduct is not sanctionable under section 128.5.
II
Razuki next argues that there was insufficient admissible evidence to
support the court’s finding that he acted in subjective bad faith because the
criminal case documents were inadmissible hearsay and Malan’s declaration
statements were “irrelevant, insufficient, hearsay, and/or otherwise

objectionable.”4 We disagree.
A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 409.) A ruling on a request for
sanctions under section 128.5 is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage & Investment Corp. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337,
1345.) “To the extent the trial court’s decision to issue sanctions depends on
factual determinations, we review the record for substantial evidence to
support those determinations. Thus, our review begins and ends with the
determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination” of the trial court. (Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v.
Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 192 (Howell) [cleaned up].)
Razuki is correct that the criminal complaint, probable cause
statement, and sentencing memorandum contained or constituted hearsay

4 In the trial court, Razuki submitted 41 pages of unnumbered
evidentiary objections. On appeal, he does not specify which of these specific
objections he is claiming the trial court erroneously overruled.
11
evidence.5 (Evid. Code, § 1200.) But Razuki ignores the fact that the trial
court admitted this evidence for the non-hearsay purpose of showing its effect
on the listener. On appeal, Razuki does not mention this fact or make any
effort to explain why the trial court erred by admitting the evidence for this
non-hearsay purpose. He has therefore forfeited any objection to the trial
court’s consideration of the evidence for this limited purpose. We are not
bound to develop an appellant’s argument for him. (Cahill v. San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill).) Absent any
contrary indication in the record, we must presume the trial court considered
this evidence solely for the non-hearsay purpose for which it was admitted,
not for the truth of the matter asserted.
Even disregarding the hearsay contained in the criminal complaint,
probable cause statement, and sentencing memorandum, there was still
sufficient admissible evidence in Malan’s and Demergian’s declarations to
support the court’s finding that Razuki acted in bad faith under section 128.5.
To start, the court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Razuki’s
objections to the portions of Malan’s declaration describing his experience in
protective custody and how the criminal proceedings affected him physically
and mentally. Specifically, Malan’s declaration stated that on November 14,
2018, he and his girlfriend “awoke to a ringing doorbell and 7 FBI agents”
who gagged him, duct-taped him to a chair, tore his clothes, and made it “look
like [he] had been beaten bloody.” Malan attested that the agents staged a
photoshoot to create false proof of a violent crime scene, then sequestered him

5 The criminal complaint was admissible under the official records
exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1280) and it was relevant to give
context to Razuki’s guilty plea by showing what crime he was charged with
committing. The factual allegations of the criminal complaint were not
admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, except to the extent Razuki
admitted them as part of his guilty plea.
12
in a hotel room where he was not allowed to contact friends or family.
According to other statements in Malan’s declaration, he “suffered, and
continue[s] to suffer, from extreme emotional distress” and fears for his own
and his loved ones’ safety “every single day.” He further stated that
“[n]ightmares and insomnia are common,” and he suffers from “medical and
domestic issues from the anxiety associated” with Razuki’s acts.
Malan asserts that he had personal knowledge of these matters, and
Razuki makes no argument as to why those statements would constitute
inadmissible hearsay or lack foundation. We consider waived mere
conclusory assertions, like Razuki’s, without reasoned arguments to support
them. (Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) We must indulge all
“intendments and presumptions” to support the court’s order “on matters to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” (Ellis v.
Roshei Corp. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 642, 645, fn. 2; see also Friends of South
Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1180, 1202 [“ ‘[w]e review the result the trial court reached, not
its legal reasoning, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, unconstrained by the route the trial court took in getting there[]’ ”].)
Razuki has shown no error as to these portions of Malan’s declaration.
The court also did not abuse its discretion in overruling objections to
the portions of Demergian’s declaration describing Razuki’s plea hearing
admissions. Demergian attested that he was present at the hearing in
November 2022, and that Razuki admitted to the elements and factual basis
of conspiring to kidnap Malan. Although such statements are hearsay, the
trial court correctly found that Razuki’s guilty plea fell under the hearsay
exception for statements against penal interest. (Evid. Code, § 1230; see
Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th

13
931, 946, fn. 10 [“Detailed explanations of one’s own criminal misconduct in a
formal legal proceeding would surely seem to satisfy the exception[]” to the
hearsay rule for declarations against penal interest.].)
When considering these admissible statements from Malan’s and
Demergian’s declarations together, we conclude that they are sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding of bad faith conduct “for the sole purpose of
harassing (e.g., kidnapping and intimidating) an opposing party.” The bulk
of Razuki’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence have to do with
admissibility. The only substantive argument he makes about the sufficiency
of the evidence appears to be that there was not enough evidence to show a
relationship between his bad faith acts and the civil case. We disagree. Even
without considering the criminal charging documents and sentencing
memorandum, the timing and context of the misconduct supports the court’s
finding that Razuki’s acts were meant to delay the civil proceedings and
harass Malan for his role in them. Razuki sued Malan in July 2018 after
their business relationship had already soured. In his opening brief, Razuki
cites a report in the record confirming that he had invested approximately
$3.7 million in the marijuana operations at issue in the civil litigation.
Although no permanent restraining order was entered against Razuki, his
attorney acknowledged that Malan sought one against him in August 2018.
These facts reflect the highly contentious nature of the litigation, even at its
outset.
According to Malan’s unrefuted admissible statements, federal agents
took him into protective custody in November 2018—just a few months after
the litigation started—and Razuki was arrested shortly thereafter. Razuki
admitted, under penalty of perjury, to conspiring to kidnap Malan between
September and November 2018. Malan’s own description of his experience in

14
protective custody, and the effects the ordeal had on his mental and physical
health, support a finding that he experienced Razuki’s conduct as
harassment even though the kidnapping conspiracy was aborted by law
enforcement. The totality of the evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that Razuki engaged in bad faith actions or tactics for the sole
purpose of harassing an opposing party. (§ 128.5, subds. (a), (b)(1), (b)(2).)
Even if a different trial court could reach the opposite conclusion and decide
that Razuki’s bad faith acts were somehow unconnected to the civil dispute,
“ ‘we are not authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge;
the trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse.’ ” (Jensen v. Superior Court (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th
1003, 1012.) We conclude that the trial court’s factual determinations were
supported by substantial evidence.
III
Razuki argues that Malan’s motion for sanctions was procedurally
defective because his notice was untimely. The motion was noticed for a
hearing date of April 14, 2023, which meant the motion (if served
electronically) was due by March 20, 2023. (See §§ 1005, subd. (b) & 1010.6,
subd. (a)(3)(B).) Malan does not dispute that he served his notice of motion
one day late. Absent any showing of prejudice to Razuki, however, we find no
error in the trial court’s discretionary decision to hear the motion on the
merits.
Section 1005 by its terms gives a trial court discretion to shorten the
notice periods prescribed by the statute. (§ 1005, subd. (b) [“The court, or a
judge thereof, may prescribe a shorter time.”]; Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit
Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 766, fn. 5 [referring to “the authority
granted trial courts in . . . section 1005 to shorten the notice period”]; Cal.

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Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(b) [“The court, on its own motion or on
application . . . may prescribe shorter times for the filing and service of
papers than the times specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1005”].) By
deciding Malan’s sanctions motion on the merits, notwithstanding that the
notice was filed one day late, the trial court impliedly exercised its discretion
to allow the motion to be heard on shortened notice.
Razuki has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion in making this ruling. “The principal purpose of the requirement
to file and serve a notice of motion a specified number of days before the
hearing [citation] is to provide the opposing party adequate time to prepare
an opposition. That purpose is served if the party appears at the hearing,
opposes the motion on the merits, and was not prejudiced in preparing an
opposition by the untimely notice.” (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 333, 343.) For due process purposes, moreover, the question
whether notice is adequate does not depend on “an arbitrary number of days
notice but should be determined on a case-by-case basis to satisfy basic due
process requirements.” (In re Marriage of Quinlan (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d
1417, 1422.)
On this record, the purposes of the statutory notice requirement and
the requirements of due process were fully satisfied. Razuki never requested
additional time to respond to the sanctions motion. Rather, Razuki filed a
brief opposing Malan’s motion, attached his attorney’s declaration, and also
objected to Malan’s and Demergian’s declarations. The grounds for the
motion were the same as the grounds for Malan’s earlier 2019 motion, which
was fully briefed and was based on the same criminal conduct. Not only did
Razuki’s attorney appear at the noticed hearing and address the merits of
Malan’s second motion, but he also chose not to argue about the motion’s

16
timeliness at the hearing and never explained how he had been prejudiced by
the one-day delay. Even on appeal, Razuki still makes no argument as to
how he was prejudiced by the one-day delay, and there is no indication in the
record that he lacked a sufficient opportunity to prepare his opposing papers
or be heard before the imposition of sanctions. (See Century Surety Co. v.
Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 [“we cannot presume prejudice and
will not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative showing there
was a miscarriage of justice”]; cf. Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994)
29 Cal.App.4th 982, 996 [“section 128.5 requires notice and opportunity to be
heard prior to imposition of sanctions[]”.) We therefore conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Malan’s motion on the
merits.
IV
Razuki next argues that Malan failed to adequately state and justify
the amount of sanctions requested. As an initial matter, we disagree with
Razuki’s contention that section 2023.040 required that Malan’s notice of
motion state the specific dollar amount of the sanctions sought. Section
2023.040 addresses sanctions for discovery abuses, which are not at issue
here because Malan requested sanctions under section 128.5 for bad faith
actions or tactics. (See Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 194–195
[differentiating between discovery sanctions under section 2023 and
sanctions under section 128.5].) As noted, section 128.5 expressly excludes
from its purview “disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections,
and motions,” and only requires that a movant “describe the specific alleged
action or tactic, made in bad faith, that is frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.” (§ 128.5, subds. (e), (f)(1)(A) (italics added).) The statute

17
contains no requirement that the notice of motion set forth the specific dollar
amount of sanctions requested.
Even if section 2023.040 applied here, it only requires that a notice of
motion for sanctions “identify every person, party, and attorney against
whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.”
(§ 2023.040 (italics added).) Malan’s notice of motion stated that he was
seeking “terminating, or in the alternative monetary” sanctions against
Razuki “for attempting to have MALAN executed[.]” The notice thus would
have satisfied both section 128.5’s and section 2023.040’s requirements, even
if applicable. Moreover, Malan’s declaration in support of the motion
indicated he was seeking sanctions of at least $200,000. For these reasons,
we disagree with Razuki’s contention that Malan’s motion was procedurally
defective on that ground.
We conclude, however, that the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding $200,000 in sanctions payable to Malan for “reasonable litigation
expenses for [] Razuki’s bad faith actions and tactics” without any evidence
that the amount bore any connection to Razuki’s misconduct. We requested
supplemental briefing from the parties on whether the award reflected an
amount incurred “as a direct result” of Razuki’s sanctionable conduct, as
required by section 128.5, subdivision (f)(2). Our order quoted and italicized
the relevant portion of subdivision (f)(2), which provides that the sanctions
imposed “may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all
of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result
of the action or tactic described in subdivision (a).” (§ 128.5, subd. (f)(2)
(italics added).)

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In his letter brief, Razuki asserted that Malan had failed to
demonstrate that the $200,000 sanctions awarded by the trial court were for
fees and expenses incurred “as a direct result” of his sanctionable conduct
within the meaning of section 128.5, subdivision (f)(2). By contrast, Malan’s
letter brief did not discuss subdivision (f)(2) and made no attempt to show
that the $200,000 was incurred “as a direct result” of Razuki’s conspiracy to
kidnap him. Instead, Malan cited Kravitz to argue that section 128.5
sanctions need not be “related to the size of the recovery or the amount of
time billed by the attorney.” (Kravitz, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1019.)
But Kravitz and Abandonato, which is cited in Kravitz, merely make
the point that sanctions are not limited to attorney fees, and may include
other “reasonable expenses,” such as “compensation for time spent by the
party’s employees or as compensation for airfare and reimbursement for lost
vacation time[.]” (Kravitz, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1019, citing
Abandonato v. Coldren (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 264, 268–269 (Abandonato).)
For those expenses to be awarded as sanctions under section 128.5,
subdivision (f)(2), they must still be “ ‘incurred as a result of bad faith
actions.’ ” (Abandonato, at p. 268 (italics added).) The Court of Appeal in
Abandonato explained that a judgment for sanctions under section 128.5
“could be greater than the amount of attorney time actually billed” and “is
more like a money judgment compensating a party for harmful conduct than
it is like an award of fees as part of the costs of the lawsuit.” (Abandonato, at
pp. 268–269; see also Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. v. Sparks (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 299, 307–308 [“expenditure and loss proximately resulting from
the frivolous acts or tactics of appellant[,]” including airfare and lost vacation
time, “constituted reasonable expenses within the statutory definition and
were properly awarded as sanctions under section 128.5”].) Therefore,

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contrary to what Razuki argues, Kravitz and Abandonato do not support the
conclusion that an award of attorney fees and expenses under section 128.5,
subdivision (f)(2), need not bear any causal relationship to the “action or
tactic” being sanctioned. (§ 128.5, subd. (f)(2).) Such an interpretation would
contradict the plain language of subdivision (f)(2).
Here, there is no evidence that the $200,000 award was in any way
related to Razuki’s bad faith acts. Indeed, exchanges between the trial court
and Malan’s counsel at the motion hearing indicate that the amount was
arbitrarily chosen based on what was “sitting in trust.” While Malan and his
counsel both claimed that their fees and expenses ranged from $100,000 to
more than $300,000 at various times, neither explained where those amounts
came from or how they were attributable to the conspiracy to kidnap Malan.
Unlike with Malan’s first motion for sanctions, Malan and Demergian failed
to show whether the fees and expenses were incurred, for example, because of
additional legal tasks or missed workdays necessitated by Razuki’s plot to
kidnap and murder or intimidate Malan. Demergian even disclaimed
responsibility for having to provide such an account of his fees at the hearing,
dismissing the idea as “ridiculous.” While we recognize the trial court’s broad
discretion in awarding sanctions, sanctions purportedly awarded to a party
for “reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses” under section 128.5,
subdivision (f)(2), cannot be wholly untethered to the behavior the sanctions
are meant to deter. In the absence of evidence connecting the $200,000
award to Razuki’s sanctionable conduct, we conclude the court abused its
discretion and the award to Malan must be vacated.
We note, however, that the statute does alternatively allow “an order to
pay a penalty into court” in an amount “sufficient to deter repetition of the
action or tactic or comparable action or tactic by others similarly

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situated . . . .” (§ 128.5, subd. (f)(2).) The plain language of the statute does
not require that such a penalty payable to the court be tethered to the costs
incurred by the opposing party as a result of the sanctionable conduct. On
remand, therefore, the court must be given the opportunity to decide whether
to impose sanctions payable to the court as a penalty and/or permit the
parties to present additional evidence justifying a sanctions award payable to
Malan based on “the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred
as a direct result” of sanctionable acts under section 128.5, subdivision (f)(2).
We express no view on how the court should exercise its discretion on these
matters on remand.
V
Lastly, we are not persuaded by Razuki’s argument that the trial court
violated his Fifth Amendment rights by granting Malan’s motion while his
criminal appeal was still pending.
A civil defendant facing related criminal charges has no constitutional
right to avoid prosecution of the civil case or the imposition of civil penalties
pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution. “The self-incrimination
privilege is not applicable to matters that will subject a witness to civil
liability.” (Blackburn v. Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 414, 426.)
“Whatever their response to requests for accommodation of the conflicting
constitutional rights of a defendant in concurrent civil and criminal
proceedings, courts have consistently refrained from recognizing any
constitutional need for such accommodation.” (People v. Coleman (1975) 13
Cal.3d 867, 885, italics omitted (Coleman); see also Avant! Corp. v. Superior
Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 882 [“It is clear . . . that staying a civil
discovery process to await the outcome of a related criminal case does not
implicate constitutional issues, even when the defendant raising the question

21
is an individual defendant . . . .”].) In some circumstances, a defendant in a
civil proceeding “may be required either to waive the [Fifth Amendment]
privilege or accept the civil consequences of silence if he or she does exercise
it.” (Alvarez v. Sanchez (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 709, 712.) “[T]he fact that a
man is indicted cannot give him a blank check to block all civil litigation on
the same or related underlying subject matter. Justice is meted out in both
civil and criminal litigation. The overall interest of the courts that justice be
done may very well require that the compensation and remedy due a civil
plaintiff should not be delayed (and possibly denied).” (Coleman, at p. 885.)

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Here, Razuki has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion in deciding to rule on the motion for sanctions rather than stay the
sanctions proceedings while his criminal appeal was pending. In such
circumstances, the court must make a discretionary judgment weighing a
variety of factors, including the plaintiff’s and the court’s interests in fair and
expeditious resolution of the case and efficient use of judicial resources.
(Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 306; see also People ex
rel. Harris v. Rizzo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 921, 951–952; Alpha Media Resort
Investment Cases (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1132.) Razuki has failed to
address these factors and made no effort to demonstrate that they compelled
a discretionary stay. He also did not provide the trial court, or our court,
with any specific bases for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination.
(See Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1045 [“The reason for
the requirement that the person claiming the privilege must object with
specificity to the information sought from him is that only where this is done
is the trial court enabled to make a particularized inquiry required of it.”].)
He has only made blanket assertions that providing evidence in opposition to
the motion for sanctions would somehow implicate the privilege.
Furthermore, several factors support the court’s decision to rule on the
motion. Malan’s first motion for sanctions had already been denied as
premature, considering the nascency of the criminal proceedings. In contrast,
by the time Malan filed his second motion for sanctions, Razuki had already
pled guilty and had been sentenced to seven years in federal prison. Razuki
did not dispute that, with only narrow exceptions, he generally waived his
right to appeal when he pled guilty. Razuki’s attorney also admitted at the
motion hearing that he did not know the basis for the criminal appeal—and
he did not assert that the guilty plea was involuntary or coerced. Under

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these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to allow
Malan’s second motion for sanctions to proceed was not an abuse of
discretion.
DISPOSITION
The finding of sanctionable bad faith conduct is affirmed, but the award
of $200,000 in sanctions payable to Malan is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to impose
sanctions as a penalty payable to the court under section 128.5, subdivision
(f)(2) and/or permit the parties to present additional evidence justifying a
sanctions award payable to Malan. The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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