Delaney v. Delaney CA2/6

CourtListener 10357669Calctapp18.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/18/25 Delaney v. Delaney CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

TIMOTHY DELANEY, 2d Civil No. B331423
(Super. Ct. No. 16FL02229)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

VIVIANE DELANEY,

Defendant and Respondent.

Timothy Delaney1 appeals from a dissolution judgment
challenging the trial court’s characterization of certain real
property as community assets. We will affirm.
FACTS
Timothy owned two pieces of real property when he and
Viviane married in 2004.2 One property was a residence located

1 We refer to Timothy Delaney and Viviane Delaney by

their first names for clarity and convenience. No disrespect is
intended.
on Foothill Road, the other a residence on St. Ann Drive. Both
properties generated rental income. On the date of their
marriage, both properties were encumbered by mortgages.
During the marriage, Timothy refinanced the existing loans on
both properties.
For each of these properties, Timothy opened and
maintained a bank account into which he deposited rental income
and out of which he paid all of the properties’ expenses. At trial
he testified he never deposited any community assets into these
bank accounts and never used community assets to pay any of
the properties’ mortgages or expenses. At his deposition he
testified “I have not thrown one piece of paper away of any
separate property or community property intentionally to keep
those accounts separate and to prove it.” Timothy also said he
would provide more documents to correct his expert’s deposition
statement that the expert could not perform a direct tracing due
to an absence of records. Timothy explained, “Because there’s
some tracing that can be done that hasn’t been done. . . . I have
tracing from separate property funds that I’m going to show have
been deposited into separate property checking accounts.” He
was asked to confirm that he “actually ha[s] those documents”
and he responded “that’s correct.”
Timothy’s forensic accounting expert, Gary Gray, testified
at trial that due to limited records he could not directly trace the
source of the deposits into the two bank accounts. But he
concluded there was no community interest in either property
because Timothy said there was not and because Timothy’s

2 Timothy does not challenge any aspect of the judgment

except with respect to characterization of the two properties. We,
therefore, limit recitation of the facts.

2
separate property assets, including income earned on the
properties, were sufficient to cover any loan payment and other
expenses incurred on both St. Ann and Foothill. Therefore, it
was “certainly possible for [Timothy] to do financially what he
said he was doing.”
Viviane’s expert, Patrick Greene, disagreed. In 2010,
Timothy had applied for and obtained a loan secured by St. Ann.
By then the St. Ann property had become the family’s primary
residence. In the loan application, Timothy reported both
community and separate property assets. Timothy used the loan
proceeds to pay off the existing mortgage on St. Ann and all
outstanding debt secured by Foothill. Based upon this evidence,
and the presumption that loans obtained during a marriage were
community property, Greene concluded the loan was community
property and the community gained an interest in both
properties. Greene also testified because he, like Gray, could not
trace the source of all deposits into the two bank accounts and
because income earned on the properties was insufficient to cover
all of their expenses, augmentation from some other source would
have been required, supporting his conclusion that community
assets were commingled with separate property.
The trial court found Greene more persuasive, noting that
“[t]here is a credibility issue here[ because] Timothy testified he
gave 100% complete records to Mr. Gr[a]y – that is records that
would have allowed identification of the source of all deposits.
But it does not appear that Mr. Gr[a]y reviewed complete
records” and “[t]he complete records were not entered as
Exhibits. . . . Mr. Green[e] had no access to such records for
review.” The lack of these records made “detailed tracing
essentially impossible.” The court found “[p]articularly troubling

3
. . . what appears to be a deliberate choice to withhold available
records” citing to Evidence Code section 412.3
On the issue of the characterization of the loan proceeds,
the court “held that lenders clearly looked to Timothy’s
community property earnings during marriage as sources of
potential repayment.”
Although the trial court stated Timothy “testified credibly
that it was his intention to maintain these properties as
separate” it ruled St. Ann and Foothill were community assets
and that Timothy was entitled to reimbursement for his separate
property contribution per the Moore/Marsden rule.4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We begin our analysis mindful that an ‘order of a lower
court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments
and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.’
[Citation] Further, ‘“‘[t]he finding of a trial court that property is

3 Evidence Code, section 412 states: “If weaker and less
satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of
the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the
evidence offered should be viewed with distrust.”

4 The rule arises from two cases: In re Marriage of Moore
(1980) 28 Cal.3d 366, and In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d 426. “When an individual enters a marriage owning
a piece of real property, and the marital community pays the
property’s mortgage during the marriage, California law provides
a formula through which to apportion the property’s value upon
the marriage’s end. Known as the Moore/Marsden rule, the
formula awards the marital community a growing interest in the
otherwise separate property as community funds are used to
increase the property’s equity.” (In re Marriage of Mohler (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 788, 790.)

4
either separate or community in character is binding and
conclusive on the appellate court if it is supported by sufficient
evidence, or if it is based on conflicting evidence or upon evidence
that is subject to different inferences . . . .’”’ [Citation] In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘“[t]he power of the
appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s findings. [Citations.]
“We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, giving [that party] the benefit of every
reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in [that party’s]
favor . . . .”’ . . . ‘All issues of credibility are . . . within the
province of the trier of fact.’ [Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial
evidence is not any evidence—it must be reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value.’” (In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 421.)
DISCUSSION
Timothy challenges both the trial court’s finding that the
St. Ann loan was community property and that comingled
separate property and community property funds were used to
pay the mortgages on the St. Ann and Foothill properties.
St. Ann Loan
“Loan proceeds acquired during marriage are
presumptively community property; however, this presumption
may be overcome by showing the lender intended to rely solely
upon a spouse’s separate property and did in fact do so. Without
satisfactory evidence of the lender's intent, the general
presumption prevails.” (In re Marriage of Grinius (1985) 166
Cal.App.3d 1179, 1187.) “[V]irtually any credible evidence may

5
be used to overcome [the presumption].” (In re Marriage of
Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 91.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that
the 2010 St. Ann loan proceeds were community property. We
start with the presumption that the loan proceeds were
community property. Timothy had the burden of proof to rebut
that presumption. (In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 1411, 1424 (Bonvino).) Timothy did not proffer any
direct evidence of the lender’s intent. Instead, he relies upon the
trial court’s finding that he intended to keep his property
separate, that he alone signed the note, and that his separate
property secured the loan. He argues this evidence was sufficient
to rebut the presumption.
Other evidence, however, supports the presumption. For
example, the loan application revealed that the income earned on
both St. Ann and Foothill was insufficient to cover the properties’
combined debt and expenses. The application also listed
undisputed community property assets, and in particular,
Timothy’s income as a realtor. A reasonable lender would look to
Timothy’s community property income as a likely source to cover
the debt. (Bonvino, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424 [upholding
“finding that . . . loan proceeds were community property,
because [the] husband’s salary [was] the primary source of
income listed on the loan application”].) While we agree with
Timothy that he was not necessarily required to present
“testimony from the lender” to rebut the presumption, the trial
court reasonably found Timothy’s circumstantial evidence of the
lender’s intent was insufficient to rebut the presumption. “There
being no satisfactory evidence to contradict the presumption, it
must prevail.” (Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 211.)

6
Timothy laments that because he was required to list
community assets on the loan application, the trial court’s finding
the lender relied upon those assets “would make it impossible for
any married person to refinance separate property without
creating a community property presumption.” He may be correct,
but he neglects to add that the presumption can be rebutted by
satisfactory evidence of the lender’s intent. Timothy did not
submit that evidence.5
Commingling
It is presumed that property acquired during the marriage
is community. (Fam. Code § 760.) “[T]he mere commingling of
separate property and community property funds does not alter
the status of the respective property interests, provided that the
components of the commingled mass can be adequately traced to
their separate property and community property sources.
[Citation.] But if the separate property and community property
interests have been commingled in such a manner that the
respective contributions cannot be traced and identified, the
entire commingled fund will be deemed community property
pursuant to the general community property presumption of
section 760. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 797, 822-823.) The burden to trace the source of
commingled funds falls to the party challenging the presumption.
(Buehler v. Buehler (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 472, 474.)

5 In his reply brief, Timothy’s argued federal law precluded

the lender from treating his loan application as one for
community debt. Because he raised this argument for the first
time in his reply brief, we conclude he has waived the claim on
appeal. (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.)

7
Timothy contends there is no substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that community funds were
commingled with separate property funds in paying the St. Ann
and Foothill mortgages. He argues the trial court improperly
relied upon Greene’s “assumption” that community funds were
deposited into the properties’ bank accounts. Greene made that
assumption, in part, because income earned by the properties
was not sufficient to account for all of the deposits into the two
accounts and there were no documents showing the source of the
deposits.
The trial court noted “[t]here is a credibility issue here.”
Neither party’s expert could trace the source of the funds
deposited into the St. Ann and Foothill bank accounts because
they did not have the necessary documentation. Timothy
testified during his deposition that he had these documents and
that he would produce them. He did not and they were not
offered at trial. As a result the trial court found it was
“[p]articularly troubling” that Timothy made a “deliberate choice
to withhold available records,” and cited Evidence Code section
412 which allows a negative inference to be drawn under such
circumstances. The court concluded that community funds were
commingled with separate property funds.
Timothy argues even if the court doubted his credibility due
to his failure to produce the documents, there is no “affirmative
evidence” that the documents would have shown commingling
and therefore their absence does not “fill the evidence gap for
establishing commingling.” He cites several cases that hold it is
impermissible to infer a fact solely because contrary evidence is
rejected. (See, e.g., California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins.
Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1, 48 [“If a witness testifies, for

8
instance, that it was not raining at the time of the collision, and if
the jury disbelieves that testimony, such disbelief does not
provide evidence that it was raining at the time of the collision”];
Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1205 [“The rejection of a witness’s
testimony by the trier of fact has only the effect of removing that
testimony from the evidentiary mix. Without more, the disregard
or disbelief of the testimony of a witness is not affirmative
evidence of a contrary conclusion.”]; People v. Samarjian (1966)
240 Cal.App.2d 13, 18 [“The People must prevail on their own
evidence, not on a vacuum created by rejection of a defense”].)
Here, unlike the cases Timothy relies upon, the trial court
did not merely disbelieve Timothy. It also found he failed to
present evidence under his control that was relevant to the issue
of commingling. Under Evidence Code section 412 the court was
permitted to draw a “negative inference” and under section 4136
it could determine what inferences to be drawn by considering
Timothy’s willful suppression of related evidence. Thus, the
court could properly infer that the withheld documents would
have shown commingling. (Estate of Moore (1923) 65 Cal.App.
29, 34 [if “weaker and less satisfactory evidence” is produced the
trial court is “entitled to presume that the omitted evidence
would be unfavorable and, for that reason, was not offered”].)
Once there is commingling, to overcome the presumption
that community property funds paid the mortgage, Timothy had

6 Evidence Code section 413 states: “In determining what
inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case against a
party, the trier of fact may consider, among other things, the
party’s failure to explain or to deny by his testimony such
evidence or facts in the case against him, or his willful
suppression of evidence relating thereto, if such be the case.”

9
the burden to trace the funds deposited into the properties’
accounts. The trial court found he failed to carry that burden.
Timothy does not challenge that finding on appeal because he
continues to maintain there was no commingling.
Finally, Timothy contends that even if there was a
community interest in the properties, the court miscalculated the
amount due the community because the community could not
have gained an interest in these properties until the 2010 loan
was funded and because in making his Moore/Marsden
calculations, Greene did not account for Timothy’s post
separation payments on the properties. There is no indication
that Timothy raised these claims below and therefore they are
forfeited. (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

BALTODANO, J.

10
Colleen K. Sterne, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________

Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Dennis G. Temko, Edward S. Temko, for Defendant and
Respondent.

11

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.