People v. Robinson CA2/4

CourtListener 10357633Calctapp18.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/18/25 P. v. Robinson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B334692
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA461666)

v.

JAQUAN ROBINSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
Maria Leftwich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Blythe J. Leszkay and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
The Racial Justice Act (RJA) was enacted to prohibit the state from
seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction on the basis of race. As relevant
here, a violation occurs when a defendant is charged with a more serious
offense than defendants of other races who engage in similar conduct and are
similarly situated, and the prosecution more frequently sought convictions for
more serious offenses against people of the defendant’s race. (Pen. Code,
§ 745, subd. (a)(3).)1
Defendant Jaquan Robinson, an African American, was charged with
two counts of human trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act by force
or fear, among other charges. Robinson filed a motion asserting that the
decision to charge him with human trafficking violated the RJA. The motion
included statistical analysis, aggregate data, and an expert’s opinion alleging
racial disparities by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
(District Attorney) in filing human trafficking charges. The trial court denied
the motion, finding Robinson did not satisfy the prima facie showing that he
was similarly situated with defendants of other races who engaged in similar
conduct yet were not charged with human trafficking. Shortly thereafter,
Robinson entered a plea of no contest and appealed from the court’s order
denying his motion.
We agree with the trial court that Robinson did not meet his prima
facie burden establishing a violation under section 745, subdivision (a)(3).
Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Information
In February 2018, the District Attorney filed an information charging
Robinson with two counts of human trafficking of a minor for a commercial
sex act by force or fear (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2), counts 1 and 5), two counts of
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), counts 2 and 6), two counts of forcible rape of a
child over 14 years old (§ 261, subd. (a)(2), counts 3 and 9), two counts of
forcible oral copulation of a child over 14 years old (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(C),
counts 4 and 10), and two counts of kidnapping to commit another crime
(§ 209, subd. (b)(1), counts 11 and 12).2 As to counts 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, and 12, it
was further alleged Robinson personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon
or a firearm in the commission of the offense and committed the offense
against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c), (e)(3) & (4).)

II. The RJA Motion
On May 10, 2021, Robinson filed a motion to compel discovery under
the RJA (§ 745, subd. (d)). The request was based on an alleged “pattern of
overcharging [African American] men for human trafficking offenses carrying
a life sentence, when the conduct amounts to pimping and pandering.”
On August 11, 2021, the District Attorney produced a disk containing
data of all cases during a 10-year period (July 1, 2011 through June 30,
2021), in which the District Attorney filed charges for human trafficking
(§ 236.1). While the data consisted of 1,001 human trafficking cases, the race
of the defendant was only available for 50 cases predating 2014. Pursuant to

2 The information also charged codefendant Denzel Everett with
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), count 7) and human trafficking of a minor for a
commercial sex act by force or fear (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2), count 8). He is not a
party to this appeal.
3
a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request, the District Attorney
subsequently produced 7,100 cases charging pimping and pandering (§ 266),
prostitution (§ 647, subd. (b)), and human trafficking (§ 236.1) over a 10-year
period (June 2, 2012 through June 1, 2022). In that data set, the defendant’s
race was present in 90 percent of the cases.
On June 12, 2023, defendant filed a motion for relief under the RJA.
(§ 745, subd. (c).) As relevant here, the motion referred to subdivision (a)(3)
of section 745 as a potential violation. This subdivision provides: “The
defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants
of other races . . . who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly
situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently
sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who
share the defendant’s race . . . in the county where the convictions were
sought or obtained.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(3).) Robinson primarily relied on a
report produced by Dr. Bryan L. Sykes, a court appointed expert, who
reviewed and analyzed the data received pursuant to the CPRA request. In
his report, Dr. Sykes “found racial disparities across the data, [and] the
evidence is most disparate with human trafficking charges.” African
American defendants “are twice as likely to have a felony human trafficking
case filed against them than [Caucasians],” and over 82.2 percent of African
American defendants “have had a felony case filed against them for human
trafficking,” compared to roughly 40.1 percent of Caucasian defendants. As
to human trafficking charges under section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2), African
American defendants comprised 85.7 percent of those cases, compared with
zero percent of Caucasian defendants. While African Americans comprise
only nine percent of Los Angeles County, “[n]early half of all cases in the data

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provided have African American defendants.” The District Attorney filed an
opposition.
On September 18, 2023, the trial court denied the motion without
holding an evidentiary hearing. The court reasoned Robinson did not satisfy
a prima facie showing that he was charged with a more serious offense than
defendants of other races who are similarly situated and have engaged in
similar conduct. The court concluded that the evidence of racial disparity
alone was not sufficient to meet his burden.

III. Plea
On October 2, 2023, the information was amended by interlineation to
add count 14 alleging another human trafficking charge (§ 236.1, subd.
(c)(1)).3 Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to forcible
rape of a child over 14 years old (§ 261, subd. (a)(2), count 3), kidnapping
(§ 207, subd. (a), count 6), and human trafficking of a minor for a commercial
sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1), count 14). As to the forcible rape, Robinson
admitted to the aggravating circumstance that the crime involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).) As to both the forcible rape and kidnapping,
defendant also admitted to the allegation that the crimes involved the same
victim on the same occasion. (667.6, subd. (c).) Robinson was sentenced to 19
years in state prison pursuant to the plea agreement. The court dismissed
the remaining counts and allegations pursuant to that agreement.

3 It is unclear from the record why this charge was added as count 14
instead of count 13.
5
Robinson timely appealed and was granted a certificate of probable
cause.

DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law
The Legislature enacted the RJA with the intent “to eliminate racial
bias from California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure that race plays
no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” (Stats.
2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i); see Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 138, 149–150.) “To further the goal of eliminating racial bias in
criminal proceedings, subdivision (a) of section 745, provides that ‘[t]he state
shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a
sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.’” (People v. Lashon
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 809.) The RJA “sets forth four categories of
conduct, any of which, if proved, is enough to ‘establish’ a violation of section
745, subdivision (a).” (Young v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 147.) The
category relevant here is section 745, subdivision (a)(3).
Under section 745, subdivision (a)(3), a RJA violation occurs when
“[t]he defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than
defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged
in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes
that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more
serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or
national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(3).)
The RJA statute describes “similarly situated” as “factors that are
relevant in charging and sentencing are similar and do not require that all

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individuals in the comparison group are identical. A defendant’s conviction
history may be a relevant factor to the severity of the charges, convictions, or
sentences. If it is a relevant factor and the defense produces evidence that
the conviction history may have been impacted by racial profiling or
historical patterns of racially biased policing, the court shall consider the
evidence.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(6).)
The statute also defines “more frequently sought or obtained” or “more
frequently imposed” as “the totality of the evidence demonstrates a
significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions . . . comparing
individuals who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated,
and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.
The evidence may include statistical evidence, aggregate data, or
nonstatistical evidence.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(1).)
A defendant may seek relief under the RJA by way of motion prior to
the entry of judgment. “If a motion is filed in the trial court and the
defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation . . . , the trial court
shall hold a hearing.” (§ 745, subd. (c).) A prima facie showing means “that
the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial
likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred. For purposes of this
section, a ‘substantial likelihood’ requires more than a mere possibility, but
less than a standard of more likely than not.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(2).) In other
words, “a defendant seeking relief under the [RJA] must state fully and with
particularity the facts on which relief is sought, and include copies of
reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim. The court
should accept the truth of the defendant’s allegations, including expert
evidence and statistics, unless the allegations are conclusory, unsupported by
the evidence presented in support of the claim, or demonstrably contradicted

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by the court’s own records. [Citation.] And . . . the court should not make
credibility determinations at the prima facie stage.” (Finley v. Superior Court
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23 (Finley), fn. omitted; see also Mosby v. Superior
Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106, 131 (Mosby) [“Finley’s analysis provides a
reasonable standard [for the prima facie case] based on long-standing habeas
corpus law”].)
We agree with the parties that the de novo standard of review applies
to the trial court’s legal conclusion that Robinson failed to carry his burden of
making a prima facie showing. (See People v. Howard (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 625, 650.)

II. Analysis
Robinson contends the trial court erred in finding that he failed to
make a prima facie showing of a RJA violation under section 745, subdivision
(a)(3). He asserts the statistical evidence of racial disparity by the District
Attorney in filing human trafficking charges was sufficient to meet his
burden at the prima facie stage.
Mosby is instructive. In that case, the petitioner filed successive
motions for relief under subdivision (a)(3) of section 745 based on the district
attorney’s decision to seek the death penalty for special circumstance murder.
(99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–112.) The trial court denied both motions without
holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of
mandate, contending that the plain language of the statute supports “only
aggregate and statistical evidence is required to make a prima facie case.”
(Id. at p. 122.) At the outset, the appellate court noted that the parties’
briefing focused on the “similarly situated” language of the statute and failed
to address the importance of the language that the petitioner must show that

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he was “engaged in similar conduct” as defendants of other races. (Id. at p.
128.) However, at oral argument, the petitioner acknowledged that there is a
requirement that the evidence must establish similar conduct, which “could
be shown by statistics alone, factual evidence, or a combination of both types
of evidence.” (Ibid.)
The Mosby court held that “[t]he plain language of the statute supports
that as part of the prima facie showing, a defendant must show that . . .
defendants [of other races] are engaged in similar conduct.” (Mosby, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 128–129, italics added.) The court explained that
because “the Legislature did not provide a definition of ‘similar conduct,’ we
rely on the plain meaning, which refers to ‘behavior’ of a person on a
particular occasion that logically refers to the underlying facts of the crimes
rather than just a recitation of the charged crime, and as the term has
traditionally been defined in other criminal cases.” (Id. at p. 129.) The court
ultimately granted the writ petition, concluding that the petitioner presented
evidence to establish a prima facie case. (Id. at pp. 129, 132–133.) The
petitioner presented statistical evidence that the district attorney more
frequently sought the death penalty against African Americans. He also
presented underlying facts of several cases in which the district attorney did
not seek the death penalty for defendants of other races.4
Robinson failed to make the necessary prima facie showing under the
RJA. He solely relied on the statistical evidence of racial disparity by the
District Attorney in charging human trafficking. The statistics provide no
information showing defendants of other races were charged with lesser

4 The court did not determine if statistics alone could meet the prima
facie case. (Mosby, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 129.) However, it made clear
that the statistics would need to include a showing of “similar conduct.”
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crimes, such as pimping and pandering, despite being engaged in similar
conduct. While the Mosby court did not “establish a bright-line rule of what
constitutes sufficient evidence of ‘similar conduct’ in all cases,” here Robinson
did not attempt to compare even one case involving a defendant of a different
race with his own. (Mosby, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.) On appeal,
Robinson argues that Mosby was wrongly decided and directs us to broadly
construe “similar conduct,” for purposes of the prima facie stage, to be
evidence of racial disparity by the district attorney in charging a particular
crime. We decline Robinson’s invitation to depart from Mosby. We find the
Mosby court’s reasoning persuasive as it gives effect to the plain meaning of
section 745, subdivision (a)(3). (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 244
[“If the statutory language contains no ambiguity, the Legislature is
presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute
governs”].) The RJA statute requires a defendant show that defendants of
other races are engaged in similar conduct. Therefore, a defendant must
present the underlying facts of the crimes. Robinson did not do that here.
We conclude Robinson did not establish a substantial likelihood that a
violation of the RJA occurred.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

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