CourtListener 10357297•Hartman v. Hartman CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/17/25 Hartman v. Hartman CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
ELENA HARTMAN,
Petitioner and Appellant, A169243
v.
MICHAEL HARTMAN, (San Mateo County Super.
Respondent and Appellee. Ct. No. 19-FAM-02147)
Elena Hartman appeals from the trial court’s statement of decision
resolving financial matters arising from her divorce with Michael Hartman.1
Elena argues that the trial court’s decision does not account for Michael’s
stocks and stock options as income in its calculations for spousal and child
support, and that, notwithstanding her failure to object, the trial court should
have excluded portions of Michael’s trial testimony on hearsay and other
grounds. Michael did not file a brief on appeal.
The trial court relied on the parties’ premarital agreement and the
formula it contains to calculate spousal support. It concluded that a
guideline child support award was appropriate, but that Michael’s current
income—in the form of stocks—could not, at the time of the trial, be deemed
actual income for purposes of calculating child support. The court deferred
1 The parties share a surname, so we refer to them by their first names.
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inclusion of any stock, stock options, or similar forms of compensation in the
income calculation until such assets could be valued more precisely, at which
point they would be deemed actual income subject to the guideline support
calculation.
We affirm, concluding that Elena has not demonstrated that the trial
court abused its discretion.
BACKGROUND
Elena and Michael were married in 2010 and separated in 2019.
In 2023, the court held a five-day trial on all financial matters arising from
the parties’ 2020 divorce. The parties had a valid and binding premarital
agreement, and after trial they entered into a partial settlement agreement.
The premarital agreement set forth a formula for calculating spousal support,
which the court applied to determine that Elena owed Michael $33,627 in
support annually for two years.
The trial court also ordered child support using the standard guideline,
along with an annual “true-up” process requiring the parties to exchange
actual income information and to make equalizing payments accordingly.
The court denied Elena’s request to impute income to Michael, citing the
evidence regarding his ability and opportunity to work, his earning capacity
as compared to his actual income, and the specific circumstances set forth in
Family Code section 4058, subdivision (b)(2). The court explained that Elena
bore the burden to present evidence regarding Michael’s earning capacity,
but that it had insufficient information to impute income to him.
The court considered the testimony provided by the parties’ experts
regarding Michael’s work and noted Michael’s unpaid role as a consultant to
a company that offered him stock as compensation, rather than cash.
“Whenever [cash] compensation is received,” the court explained, “that
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compensation shall be income available for the purposes of the [preceding]
child support calculation.” Further, if “compensation is received in the form
of stock, stock options, or other similar forms and there are restrictions on
[Michael’s] ability to sell, income available for support shall be deemed to be
available once restrictions on the exercise and sale have been lifted.”
The court also denied Michael’s request to impute further income to
Elena, explaining that it was using the parties’ actual income to calculate
child support. The court denied Elena’s further child support requests for
lack of supporting evidence, and then discussed the division of the parties’
assets. Relying on the premarital agreement, the court confirmed that two
companies were Michael’s sole and separate property. Although Elena
claimed income from these businesses, she had already agreed that they were
Michael’s separate property. As to both businesses, there was no evidence of
ongoing material value except as earned through Michael’s “post-separation
efforts,” and the premarital agreement established that any business goodwill
was Michael’s separate property. The court found Michael’s testimony on
these points credible.
The court discussed the allocation of other disputed assets and in
particular addressed Elena’s challenge to Michael’s use of certain funds from
their joint bank account. As to those expenditures, the court explained,
Michael provided a spreadsheet tracing the funds, most of which were spent
for joint purposes, with the remainder split between the parties. The court
found Michael’s testimony regarding the joint account credible and denied
Elena’s further requests as unsupported by the evidence.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion.
(In re Marriage of Sawyer (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 724, 732.) We review the
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court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo.
(Ibid.)
II. Challenges to the Statement of Decision
Elena challenges the trial court’s rulings on several grounds. First, she
contends, the trial court’s child and spousal support2 rulings did not account
for deferred income that Michael received as stock and stock options.
Relatedly, she contends that stock options are income whether or not they are
exercised and that Michael’s stock options should have been treated as
income for purposes of his support obligations. She next argues that the trial
court should have considered as income the significant, recurrent gifts
Michael received in 2023 from his mother’s trust.
In her brief, Elena does not acknowledge the premarital agreement or
the spreadsheet Michael produced tracing expenditures from the parties’
joint bank account. She mentions the parties’ partial settlement agreement
only once, in passing, to say that she executed it under duress. Instead of
acknowledging these material evidentiary bases for the trial court’s rulings,
Elena’s presentation of the facts is one-sided. It includes legal argument and
assertions that she was the victim of abuse, coercion, and misconduct by
Michael and that there was “an undercurrent of prejudice by the [t]rial
[c]ourt against Elena from the first day of trial through judgment,” without
mentioning the trial court’s reasoning or its findings that Elena failed to
meet her evidentiary burden as to her related requests for spousal and child
support and the division of the parties’ assets. Because Elena did not comply
with her duty to present a fair summary of the facts, we could deem her
2 Elena does not distinguish in her brief between the court’s rulings as
to child and spousal support. Neither do we, except when necessary.
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arguments relating to those facts forfeited. (Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada
Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, 75, fn. 3.)
Elena’s argument that the trial court failed to account for Michael’s
monthly income of $12,000 is belied by the record. First, without a record
citation to any particular tax return, Elena asserts that tax returns must be
deemed presumptively correct as to a parties’ income. That argument does
not help her: Michael’s tax return for the relevant time period reflects a net
loss of $88,671. Second, the cited income was not paid as cash, or “actual”
income. As Elena acknowledges and the trial court explained,
Michael’s $12,000 monthly income was converted to debt in the form of stock.
The trial court specified that, as to both parents, it would rely on actual
income to determine the appropriate child support amount, and that if and
when Michael’s stocks were sold, they would then be treated as income for
purposes of the formula already provided to calculate the parents’ support
obligations.
The cases Elena cites support the trial court’s reasoning. (See
In re Marriage of Pearlstein (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1375–1376
(Pearlstein); In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 287–288.)
In determining proper support awards, California courts recognize that
valuing stock and stock options may be difficult, and in particular that it can
be difficult to determine when such assets may be treated as income.
(Cheriton, at pp. 287–288.) For example, case law has established that the
latest point at which stock options may be valued and treated as income is
when the underlying stock is sold for a gain. (Id. at p. 288; see also
In re Marriage of Macilwaine (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 514, 518, 532, 535
(Macilwaine) [once all legal restrictions on sale of stock options are removed,
the options must be treated as income for purposes of support calculation];
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Pearlstein, at pp. 1375–1376 [court erred in treating father’s stock as income
before it was liquidated by sale].) Here, the trial court expressly
acknowledged the potential value of any stock and stock options that Michael
received. It explained, however, that it would reserve the valuation of those
assets for a time when they had been liquidated or all restrictions on their
sale were lifted, respectively, and once a value could be assigned to them, the
stock and stock options would be treated as actual income for child support
purposes. Under Cheriton, Pearlstein, and Macilwaine, that approach is not
error.
As to the gifts Michael received from his mother in 2023, “the principal
amount of a gift[ or] inheritance . . . need not be treated as income for child
support purposes, at least where, as here, the child is not receiving public
assistance.” (Pearlstein, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) Elena has not
cited a case that stands for the proposition that the trial court’s failure to
impute these gifts to Michael as income was error. She relies primarily on
In re Marriage of Alter, where the court concluded that gifts may, in a court’s
discretion and depending on the circumstances and nature of the gift, be
considered income, but that the question “whether gifts should be considered
income for purposes of the child support calculation is one that must be left to
the discretion of the trial court.” (In re Marriage of Alter (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 718, 737.) Here, although the trial court did not directly
address the gifts from Michael’s mother in its statement of decision, the issue
was raised at trial as a matter of whether the gifts (or loans, as Elena at
times characterized them) should be imputed to him as income for purposes
of child support. Elena acknowledges here that the gifts (or loans) ranged in
amount from $3,000 to $15,000. Consequently, it was within the court’s
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discretion not to impute them to Michael as income because they were not
“periodic and regular” like traditional forms of income. (Ibid.)
In a last effort, Elena argues that although she failed to object at trial
to the admission of certain evidence, the admission resulted in a miscarriage
of justice and is therefore reversible. She fails to support this assertion
adequately, citing only Michael’s “statements regarding medical diagnosis or
tax law that were blatant hearsay, lacked foundation, or strayed into expert
testimony,” and subdivision (b) of Evidence Code section 353. She suggests
that these statements were aspersions on her that impacted her credibility.
But section 353 of the Evidence Code sets forth a conjunctive test, whereby
under subdivision (a) a trial objection is required, and in subdivision (b) the
court evaluates prejudice. Because she has not met the requirement in
subdivision (a) that she objected to Michael’s testimony, she cannot invoke
subdivision (b) to establish error. Elena’s citation to Cassim v. Allstate Ins.
Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 similarly does not establish that we should
excuse her failure to object. Instead, after assuming error, the court in
Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. applied a prejudice analysis to conclude that any
error was harmless. (Ibid.) Even if we were to deem the objections not
forfeited, and we were to conclude now that her belated and non-specific
objections are meritorious, Elena has not established how they prejudiced
her.
Elena presents significant argument regarding the standard of review,
contending essentially that even though the abuse of discretion standard is
deferential, we may not abdicate our responsibility to provide reasoned
review. We agree with that general premise. We “ ‘do not[, however,]
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but confine ourselves to
determining whether any judge could have reasonably made the challenged
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order.’ ” (Macilwaine, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 527.) We do not reweigh
evidence or make credibility determinations in the first instance.
(In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481, 500.) In
sum, although Elena disputes the trial court’s rulings, and views the evidence
differently than the trial court did, she has not identified error. We therefore
cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Michael is entitled to recover his costs, if
any, on appeal.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
SIMONDS, J. *
* Judge of the Superior Court of Sonoma County, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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