People v. Johnson CA2/1

CourtListener 10357290Calctapp17.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/17/25 P. v. Johnson CA2/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B329386
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA509725)
v.

MARK ANTHONY JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
On the morning of August 2, 2022, defendant Mark
Anthony Johnson entered the lobby of an apartment building in
the Little Tokyo area of Los Angeles, forcibly took a bag
containing valuables from Mauricio C., and fled on a skateboard.
Surveillance video footage showed Johnson committing the
offense, and Mauricio identified Johnson in a photo lineup on the
basis of the prominent tattoos on his face. A jury convicted
Johnson of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and the trial
court sentenced him to six years in prison.
Johnson contends we must overturn his conviction because
the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror the record identifies as juror No. 40 from the
panel violated Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7,1 a law the
Legislature enacted “to put into place an effective procedure for
eliminating the unfair exclusion of potential jurors based on race
. . . through the exercise of peremptory challenges.” (Assem. Bill
No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1(a).) We
affirm on the ground that Johnson forfeited the claim.
The venire included two Black prospective jurors, jurors
No. 40 and No. 49. The prosecution exercised a peremptory
challenge on juror No. 40 without objection from Johnson’s
counsel; that juror then left the courtroom. Several challenges
later, the prosecutor sought to exercise a peremptory challenge to
juror No. 49. The defense objected based on section 231.7, and in
the course of arguing that objection referenced the dismissal of
juror No. 40 as showing the purported discriminatory intent in
the challenge to juror No. 49. The trial court issued a ruling

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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regarding the exclusion of juror No. 49 without referencing juror
No. 40; Johnson’s attorney did not follow up and request any
ruling from the court as to juror No. 40. On this record, where
there is no basis for concluding that Johnson’s attorney wanted
any further change to the composition of the jury, Johnson may
not now use the exclusion of juror No. 40 as a ground for
overturning his conviction.
BACKGROUND ON SECTION 231.7
Prior to the enactment of section 231.7, “trial courts
examined peremptory challenges under the three-step inquiry
established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [106 S.Ct.
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69] and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d
258 . . . .” (People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943.) The
Legislature designed section 231.7 to address “the limitations of
the Batson/Wheeler inquiry.” (People v. Jaime, supra, at p. 943.)
The author of Assembly Bill No. 3070, which enacted section
231.7, stated that the Batson/Wheeler approach “has failed”
because it polices only “acts of intentional discrimination.” The
bill’s author wrote, “Courts have acknowledged that it can be
difficult and often impossible for the trial judge to determine
whether the lawyer making the challenge actually intended to
discriminate. . . . Perhaps more important, the existing
procedure cannot address strikes exercised because of implicit
bias, that is, unconscious or automatic attitudes and stereotypes.”
(Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4, 2020, p. 6.)
The bill’s sponsors noted that several studies and
commentators had found the Batson/Wheeler approach
ineffective, including Justice Goodwin Liu of our Supreme Court,
who wrote that, “In adjudicating Batson claims in more than 100

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cases over the past two decades, this court has found unlawful
discrimination in jury selection only once . . . . [O]ne need not
question the overall excellence and integrity of our prosecutors
and trial courts in order to pause and wonder, in light of the
remarkable uniformity of this court’s Batson decisions over the
past 20 years, whether we have maintained the proper level of
vigilance.” (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 865 (conc.
opn. of Liu, J.).)
Section 231.7 was designed to address these concerns by
strengthening the review of peremptory strikes in several ways.
First, under the new law, “the party objecting to the peremptory
challenge is no longer required to make a prima facie showing of
racial discrimination.” (People v. Jaime, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 943.) Instead, when a party challenges the opponent’s use of
peremptory challenges under section 231.7, the opponent “shall
state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised”
(id., subd. (c)), and the court must “evaluate the reasons given to
justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the
circumstances” and must sustain the objection to the peremptory
challenge “[i]f the court determines there is a substantial
likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race
. . . as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge” (id., subd.
(d)(1); accord, People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 792-795
[explaining in detail how challenges under § 231.7 are litigated]).
Section 231.7 also instructs the court how to determine
whether race or another impermissible consideration was a factor
in the peremptory challenge. In particular, “[t]he court shall
consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate
on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the
use of the peremptory challenge.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) In addition,

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the law establishes a presumption against the reliance on
justifications for peremptory strikes that appear facially neutral
but are “commonly associated with racial and ethnic groups and
women.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill
No. 3070, supra, p. 10.) These factors include “[e]xpressing a
distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement
or the criminal legal system” (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(1)) and “[h]aving
a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested,
or convicted of a crime” (id., subd. (e)(3)), among several others.
These factors are “presumed to be invalid unless the party
exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and
convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would
view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, . . .
and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Id., subd. (e).)
Similarly, a peremptory challenge is presumptively invalid if
based on the prospective juror’s conduct during voir dire, such as
being “inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact” (id.,
subd. (g)(1)(A)), “exhibit[ing] either a lack of rapport or
problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor” (id., subd.
(g)(1)(B)), or “provid[ing] unintelligent or confused answers” (id.,
subd. (g)(1)(C)) “unless the trial court is able to confirm that the
asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations
or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with
that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain
why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the
prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be
tried.” (Id., subd. (g)(2).)
Section 231.7 directs that we are to review the denial of an
objection to a peremptory challenge “de novo, with the trial

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court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.
The appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any
findings, including findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor,
that the trial court did not expressly state on the record. The
reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given under
subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons
that were not given to explain either the party’s use of the
peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly
situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable
group as the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving
party made a comparative analysis argument in the trial court.
Should the appellate court determine that the objection was
erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the
judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new
trial.” (Id., subd. (j).)
RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS BELOW
At issue in this case is the prosecution’s peremptory
challenge to juror No. 40; although the prosecution also used a
preemptory against the other Black juror in the venire (No. 49),
Johnson claims no error in the exclusion of juror No. 49.
Nevertheless, we set forth the proceedings as to juror No. 49 as
well as juror No. 40 for context.
Voir dire took place in February 2023, more than a year
after section 231.7 became effective. Both the court and the
prosecution questioned the prospective jurors. The court asked
the members of the venire to describe their occupation, living
situation, and experience serving on juries. Juror No. 40 and
juror No. 49 both answered these questions. The court asked the
potential jurors additional questions regarding their experiences
with crime and the criminal justice system. Juror No. 40 did not

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raise his hand to respond to any of these questions, but juror
No. 49 did. In response to the court’s question whether the
prospective jurors “personally or a close friend or family member
[had] ever been arrested for a charge like” robbery, juror No. 49
stated that she had a cousin who was currently incarcerated in
Texas. She initially expressed concern that her cousin’s
experience would make it difficult for her to be fair and impartial,
but she later clarified that she believed she could “put that
aside.” In addition, juror No. 49 stated that she “believe[d that as
a] person in my . . . demographic, it’s my duty to be on juries
when possible.” The trial court interpreted this latter statement
as a reference to juror No. 49’s race, as “there don’t appear to be
very many people in this panel who are African-American.” In
response to another question from the court, juror No. 49 stated
that she had once been the victim of a car break-in, though she
did not believe this would affect her ability to be fair and
impartial.
The prosecutor questioned the prospective jurors as a
group. The Super Bowl had been played the previous weekend,
and the prosecutor used the outcome of that game as an example
of a fact that could be proved based on testimony from one
individual. The prosecutor asked several of the jurors, “Do we all
agree with the principle that someone who watches something
can tell you what happened even if they weren’t personally there?
Anyone disagree with that?” Juror No. 49 responded, “I don’t—
that’s a long analogy.” The prosecutor replied, “We are going to
get longer” and then proceeded to speak with other jurors.
The prosecutor returned to juror No. 49 with the following
colloquy:
Prosecutor: “How do you feel about the Super Bowl?”

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Juror No. 49: “I don’t really care.”
Prosecutor: “Did you watch the Super Bowl?”
Juror No. 49: “I sat there in front of it. I watched the
commercials.”
Prosecutor: “Do you have one you liked?”
Juror No. 49: “There were drinks happening.”
Prosecutor: “I would not call her as a witness.”2
Still later, the prosecutor continued on the same subject
and addressed juror No. 40: “Sometimes people can tell you what
happened even if they didn’t see every second . . . of the Super
Bowl they can tell who won. Anyone disagree with that? . . . So
juror [number] 40 you are cringing. You did not watch the Super
Bowl?”
Juror No. 40: “I did.”
Prosecutor: “You are over it. . . . [You’re] sick of hearing
about it; is that right?”
Juror No. 40: “Yeah.”
Prosecutor: “Okay, we’ll move on.”
With voir dire complete, the court struck several potential
jurors from the panel, and then invited the parties to take turns
making peremptory challenges. After several challenges from
each side, juror No. 40 took a seat in the jury box, and the
prosecution immediately asked the court to thank and excuse
him from the panel. As with other excused jurors, the court
ordered juror No. 40 to leave the courtroom and “report back to

2 The context suggests that the prosecutor made this
comment in a joking manner to suggest he would not call a
witness who had been drinking to testify about what they
observed.

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the jury assembly room.” Following the exercise of three
additional challenges, the court added juror No. 49 to the jury
box, and the prosecution sought to use a peremptory challenge to
strike her.
Johnson’s attorney then made “a Batson-Wheeler[3] motion.
There were only two African-Americans [among the potential
jurors], numbers 40 and 49. [Number] 40 was dismissed by the
People. I understand it’s a peremptory challenge but I didn’t see
a single thing about that person that would have been good, bad,
[or] neutral for either side.
“[Number] 49 has a cousin who was arrested but she gave
no indication that would affect her ability to be a juror. I’m
seeing nothing apart from the only two Black people being kicked
[off] and my client, of course, is African-American.”
The prosecutor responded, “So, with respect to juror
number 40 and juror number 49, who I just kicked, both were not
seemingly not [sic] happy with my [Super Bowl] hypothetical. In
fact, I specifically said, ‘juror [number] 40 you are cringing.’
“He was over the reference to football. I specifically said,
you know you are tired of talking about football. But juror
Number 49—what she specifically said that concerned me was,
initially, before the challenge for cause was denied, she said she
had contact with her cousin monthly and that experience [would]
bias her. She explicitly said it would bias her. She also did not

3 We assume Johnson’s attorney misspoke and intended to
challenge the peremptory strike under section 231.7, not
Batson/Wheeler. The record indicates that both parties and the
trial court interpreted the motion in this manner.

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seem to like my football example. She said, ‘I’m not following
anything you’re saying.’ ”
The court responded, “The football analogy and anybody’s
reaction to the football analogy is not a valid basis to overcome
any presumption in this matter as far as I am concerned.”
From that point forward, the prosecutor, defense attorney,
and trial court discussed juror No. 49 alone, with no further
reference to juror No. 40. The prosecutor justified his decision to
strike juror No. 49 based on the prosecutor’s initial concern that
juror No. 49 might be biased as a result of her cousin’s experience
with the criminal justice system. In addition, the prosecutor
stated that juror No. 49 appeared to be too eager to serve on the
jury. The prosecutor also expressed concern that juror No. 49
“didn’t really seem to care” about her experience as a victim of a
car break-in, and that her statement “I think it’s important for
me to participate” suggested that “she’s going to factor Mr.
Johnson’s race improperly” in deciding the case. Johnson’s
attorney took issue with these claims.
The trial court ruled as follows: “What I need to find in
order to overrule the objection is that there is not a substantial
likelihood that race is a factor in the use of the objection. . . . I
think there are valid reasons that the People have given for
excusing her, particularly her initial reaction when it came to
discussion about her cousin. But I also think that she was
clearer at the end that she could be fair. All that being said, I
don’t think that it’s racially motivated. I think it is unfortunate
there aren’t more African-Americans on the panel, but with
regard to excusing her, I don’t think race is a factor. I don’t think
there is a substantial likelihood that race is a factor in the
challenge. I’m going to allow the challenge.” The court did not

10
mention juror No. 40 in this ruling, and Johnson’s attorney did
not ask the court to make any ruling regarding the prosecutor’s
exercise of a peremptory challenge with respect to juror No. 40.
DISCUSSION
Johnson contends that the use of a peremptory challenge
on juror No. 40 violated section 231.7, and that we must therefore
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial. (See
id., subd. (j).) The Attorney General argues that Johnson
forfeited the issue by failing to secure a ruling from the trial court
as to juror No. 40. We agree with the Attorney General.
Our Supreme Court has long held that “[t]he failure to
articulate clearly a Wheeler/Batson objection forfeits the issue for
appeal. (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 481, citing People
v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 166.) The rule that a party that
fails to raise a claim before the trial court may forfeit “ ‘ “a
constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort’ ” serves “ ‘to
encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial
court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In
re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880, 881.) That rationale
applies with particular force in the context of jury selection,
where a court may address a potential error easily before trial
begins, rather than waste time and judicial resources on a trial
before the defendant seeks for the first time to overturn the jury’s
verdict on appeal. In the absence of a clear signal to the
contrary, we assume the Legislature intended for the forfeiture
rule to apply to challenges under section 231.7 in situations such
as this one before us.
We question in the first instance whether Johnson’s trial
counsel ever objected to the use of a peremptory challenge
against juror No. 40. No objection was made at the time of the

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challenge to juror No. 40. When juror No. 49 was challenged,
Johnson’s counsel brought up the challenge as to juror No. 40
seemingly as context for why he believed the challenge to juror
No. 49 was racially based, but he did not make a similar claim as
to juror No. 40. This would appear to explain why the court made
no ruling regarding section 231.7 as to juror No. 40, and why
defense counsel did not follow up to obtain such a ruling.
Further bolstering the conclusion that Johnson’s attorney
did not object to the use of the peremptory strike on juror No. 40
is that he did not seek any of the remedies available under
section 231.7 for the use of that strike. These ranged from
seeking to reseat juror No. 40 (id., subd. (h)(3))4 to quashing the
venire and restarting jury selection (id., subd. (h)(1)). Because
the prosecutor exercised the peremptory strike the moment juror
No. 40 sat down, Johnson’s attorney never had an opportunity to
state whether he was satisfied with the panel that included juror
No. 40. Indeed, the only statement by defense counsel regarding
juror No. 40 was one of indifference: “I didn’t see a single thing
about [juror No. 40] that would have been good, bad, [or] neutral
for either side.” Johnson’s attorney might have decided not to
request to quash the venire and restart jury selection or seek
other relief because he was satisfied with the existing panel, or at
most that he saw no likely advantage in seeking a change. After
the court overruled his objection to the People’s challenge to juror
No. 49, Johnson’s attorney exercised a peremptory challenge to

4 The trial court had ordered juror No. 40 to return to the
jury assembly room shortly before it made its ruling on juror
No. 49, and nothing in the record suggests that Johnson’s
attorney was prevented from requesting the juror return.

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one of the other jurors. Although both the prosecution and
defense had peremptory challenges still available, both sides then
accepted the panel as constituted and jury selection concluded. It
is far less likely that, having just challenged juror No. 49,
Johnson’s counsel simply forgot to ask the court to rule on juror
No. 40.5
Even if we construe defense counsel’s statement that “I
understand it’s a peremptory challenge but I didn’t see a single
thing about [juror number 40] that would have been good, bad,
[or] neutral for either side” as a section 231.7 challenge to the
peremptory challenge to juror No. 40, Johnson concedes that his
trial counsel failed to secure a ruling on such an objection.
Johnson argues that the forfeiture rule should not apply “because
the record here shows how the court would have ruled.” He notes
that the only justification the prosecutor expressed for excluding
juror No. 40 was the juror’s apparent dislike of the prosecutor’s
Super Bowl analogy, which the court described as “not a valid
basis to overcome any presumption in this matter as far as I am
concerned.” Thus, in Johnson’s view, the record shows that the
court would have rejected the use of a peremptory challenge as to
juror No. 40 if asked to rule on the issue.
We are not persuaded. Because the parties discussed juror
No. 40 only briefly, and in the context of a challenge to juror
No. 49, the record does not provide a full account of the
prosecutor’s reasoning for using the peremptory strike against

5 Because Johnson’s attorney appears to have elected for
tactical reasons not to challenge the exclusion of juror No. 40, we
reject Johnson’s argument that the failure to do so constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.

13
juror No. 40. Although juror No. 40 said nothing during voir dire
apart from stating his occupation, lack of prior jury experience,
and his dislike of the prosecutor’s extensive use of Super Bowl
analogies, factors not reflected in the reporter’s transcript may
have justified the use of the peremptory strike. We can only
speculate as to how the trial court would have ruled on the use of
the peremptory strike as to juror No. 40 if, once defense counsel
requested a ruling, the prosecutor had stated his full reasons for
using the strike and both parties had argued the matter. Section
231.7 forbids us from “imput[ing] to the trial court any findings,
including findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the
trial court did not expressly state on the record,” and requires us
to “consider only reasons actually given” by the prosecutor “and
. . . not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to
explain . . . the [prosecutor]’s use of the peremptory challenge.”
(Id., subd. (j).) In this context, where a ruling was not requested,
the prosecutor did not explain his reasoning fully, and the trial
court did not make formal findings as to juror No. 40, to analyze
Johnson’s challenge as if these things had occurred would
unfairly tilt the analysis in Johnson’s favor.
Our decision today does not compromise the Legislature’s
purpose in enacting section 231.7 to address lingering problems
with the use of peremptory strikes against members of minority
groups. We merely require that an attorney who wishes to
invoke the protection of section 231.7 do so before the trial court.
In the absence of a clear challenge and request for a ruling on
juror No. 40, that juror’s presence or absence from the jury does
not call into question the validity of Johnson’s conviction.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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