CourtListener 10356631•People v. Muro CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/14/25 P. v. Muro CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087896
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF197205A)
v.
JOSE MURO, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. Zulfa,
Judge.
Marcia Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Peña, Acting P. J., DeSantos, J. and Fain, J.†
† Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2022, appellant and defendant Jose Muro, Jr. (appellant) shot and
seriously wounded Hector Vasquez. At the time of the shooting, Vasquez was dating
appellant’s former girlfriend, Deja Parra, and appellant shot Vasquez when he discovered
Vasquez was at Parra’s house. Appellant was charged with premeditated attempted
murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter as a
lesser included offense, along with other offenses, with firearm and great bodily injury
enhancements. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 27 years in prison.
On appeal from the judgment, appellate counsel filed a brief that summarized the
facts with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to independently
review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) In response to this court’s
Wende letter, appellant filed a supplemental brief and argued Parra and Vasquez gave
false and contradictory testimony, he did not receive a fair trial, and his sentence was too
high. We review his contentions and affirm.
FACTS
Parra and appellant had been in a relationship, lived together in a house in
Bakersfield, and were the parents of one child, who was born in 2021. In or about
July 2022, appellant and Parra broke up, and appellant moved out of the house.
As of November 2022, Parra and the child continued to live in the same house.
Appellant regularly visited the child at Parra’s house. Vasquez was dating Parra.
Appellant and Vasquez had never met, and they did not know each other.
At appellant’s jury trial, Parra, Vasquez and appellant each testified about what
happened before, during, and after appellant shot Vasquez.
Parra’s Testimony About the Text Messages
Parra testified that in or about September 2022, after she broke up with appellant,
she sent the following messages to him: “ ‘You’re getting f[***]ed up. Mark’s going to
beat you’re a[**].’ ” She also told appellant, “ ‘He’s going to beat your f[***]ing
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a[**],’ ” and “ ‘That’s not threatening you. I’m letting you know it’s a promise. He’s
going to beat the f[***] out of you.’ ” Parra testified she was not joking when she made
these threats. She knew appellant was “just upset about me seeing Mark in the past.”
Parra was angry because appellant and his family made threats to her, and she “just said
whatever I could say that I knew would get under his skin.”1
On or about Tuesday, November 1, 2022, appellant and Parra exchanged text
messages. Appellant told Parra not to have other men around their child or he would kill
Parra. A couple of hours later, appellant texted Parra and asked whether she would be
dropping off their child that evening, and she agreed.2
Appellant and Vasquez Separately Arrive at Parra’s House
On November 2, 2022, Parra and the child were at their house. Around 3:30 p.m.,
Parra contacted appellant and asked him to come over so he could take their child to the
doctor. Appellant agreed to come after work. He was late and they exchanged several
calls and messages. Parra testified that she learned appellant was not at work anymore,
and appellant told her that he was drinking with friends. Parra told appellant not to come
because he was so late.3
Sometime after Parra exchanged the calls and texts with appellant, Vasquez
arrived at her house. Parra had not expected Vasquez to come over that day.
1 Parra initially denied she made any threats against appellant. On further
questioning, she eventually admitted doing so. The evidence established that Vasquez
was not “Mark,” and there was no further testimony to identify “Mark.”
2 As will be addressed below, appellant objected to the introduction of the texts with
the threats to Parra. The trial court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the issue, and
held the evidence was admissible.
3 As also will be discussed below, Parra testified that in her previous statements to the
police, she never disclosed that appellant said he was drinking with friends. She also
admitted she did not mention this fact when she testified at the preliminary hearing
because she was not asked about the subject.
3.
Parra testified that around 5:30 p.m., about five minutes after Vasquez arrived,
appellant also arrived at her house. Parra was getting ready to leave with Vasquez to take
the child to the doctor.
Appellant walked around the yard and tried to get in the house. Parra was on the
telephone with him, and told him to stay out of the house and leave. After about
10 minutes, Parra opened the solid front door and kept the metal screen door closed.
Parra stood inside the doorway behind the screen. Appellant remained outside, and they
argued through the screen door for about five minutes. Parra repeatedly told appellant to
leave but he ignored her requests.
Parra testified appellant kept asking if Vasquez was in the house. Appellant told
Parra to either open the screen door or tell Vasquez to go outside, and Parra refused. On
cross-examination, Parra was asked whether appellant was calling, “ ‘Hey, Hector. Come
outside,’ was he?” Parra testified, “Not by name, no,” and clarified appellant and
Vasquez had never met, appellant did not know Vasquez’s name, and appellant did not
call him by name.
Parra testified that as she argued with appellant, their child stood in front of her in
the doorway. Vasquez was sitting in the living room.
Parra testified Vasquez eventually walked up to the front door and stood behind
her. The screen door remained closed. Vasquez wanted to leave, but Parra would not let
him go outside because she did not want appellant and Vasquez to fight.
Parra’s Testimony About the Shooting
Parra testified that about one minute after Vasquez appeared in the doorway,
appellant produced a gun from his pants. The gun was black, and it had an extended
magazine and a “laser” mounted on top.
Appellant fired a single shot through the metal screen door. When he fired, Parra
and the child were standing in the doorway, and Vasquez was standing behind Parra on
her right side.
4.
Parra testified that after appellant fired the single gunshot, he ran to the gate in her
front yard but turned around, returned to the front of Parra’s house, and looked through
the window. Appellant bent down, appeared to pick up a shell from the ground, and ran
away.
Vasquez’s Trial Testimony
Vasquez testified he went to Parra’s house around 5:30 p.m. Vasquez thought
appellant arrived at Parra’s house 30 minutes to one hour later, but he was not sure about
the time. Vasquez had never met appellant or had prior contact with him.
Vasquez testified appellant and Parra argued at the front door. Vasquez sat on the
couch, and he heard appellant ask to enter because he wanted to know who was there.
Parra refused to let appellant in, and appellant never got inside.
Vasquez thought about leaving so he could stay out of the “drama.” He tried to
“deescalate” the situation by telling Parra to ignore appellant and call the police, but she
did not do that.
Vasquez testified he walked to the open front door where Parra was standing. The
metal screen door was closed. Appellant told Vasquez to come outside, but Vasquez
stayed in the house. Appellant and Vasquez began to argue and called each other names.
Appellant challenged Vasquez to a fight, and Vasquez challenged appellant. Parra and
Vasquez kept telling appellant to leave.
Vasquez testified appellant finally left. Vasquez stayed at the front door to keep
his eyes on appellant. Appellant walked away and disappeared from sight. About
five minutes later, appellant returned to the house and knocked on the front door. Parra
opened the outer door but not the metal screen door. Vasquez again stood with Parra and
the child at the doorway.
Vasquez testified appellant pulled a gun, raised it, and fired one shot through the
metal screen door. The bullet hit Vasquez on the right side of his body in the rib cage
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area. Vasquez was shocked and fell backwards. Parra screamed, and appellant kept
telling Parra to open the door. Vasquez told her to close the door and call the police.
Parra’s Cell Phone Videos
Parra testified she recorded two separate videos on her cell phone that showed her
argument with appellant at the front door. The videos were played for the jury.
Parra testified she started recording the first video after appellant had been arguing
with her for somewhere between one to four minutes. When the first video started,
appellant told Parra, “You liked it.” Parra replied, “No, get the f[***] out. You can’t
come in.” Appellant asked why, and Parra said, “Because you can’t.” Appellant asked if
she had “somebody” there, and Parra said yes. Appellant asked if that was why her truck
was “here” and she said yes. Appellant said, “What a case,” and Parra responded, “All
right,” and the first video ended.
Parra testified she started recording the second video about 30 seconds after the
conclusion of the first video. In the second video, Vasquez asked appellant, “Bro, what’s
up?” Appellant told him to come outside. Parra said no, “we’re not doing that.”
Appellant told Vasquez, “Come outside, bro.” Vasquez said, “Bro, hurry up, I got to go.”
Parra said they were not doing that. Appellant again said to come outside and used a
racial epithet. Parra replied, “What the f[***]!” Appellant said, “What’s up,” and used
the same racial epithet. Parra again replied, “What the fuck!”
The second video had the sound of appellant firing the single gunshot. After he
fired, appellant said, “Yeah, you going to die,” and again used the same racial epithet.”
The Neighbor’s Video
Nancy Valles lived across the street from Parra. She had a security camera affixed
to the outside of her residence. The camera recorded video and audio of the events at
Parra’s front door before and after the shooting. The video showed appellant at the front
door. Parra swore at him, and appellant repeatedly asked Parra to give their child to him.
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Valles testified she recognized appellant, and saw him drive away very fast from Parra’s
house.
The Investigation and Vasquez’s Gunshot Wound
Kern County Deputies Max Mendoza and Nathan Pucilowski were the
first officers to respond to Parra’s house on the shooting dispatch. Parra was visibly
upset, and reported her boyfriend had been shot. She said appellant was the gunman, he
drove away in a grey Infiniti, and provided the license plate number. There was a bullet
hole in the screen door. An expended round was not found.
Vasquez was lying on the kitchen floor, holding a towel to his chest. Vasquez had
a gunshot entry wound to his right chest area, and an exit wound in the same area on his
back. Vasquez was transported to the hospital by the paramedics.
Mendoza followed Vasquez to the hospital, and briefly spoke to him before he was
taken into surgery. Vasquez said he had been trying to leave Parra’s house, and that
appellant kept calling him outside.
At trial, Vasquez testified the bullet entered the right side of his stomach and hit
his liver, and staples were placed in his stomach. He was in the hospital for two months.
He had to return to the hospital because of a liver infection in the wound area and
remained there for another month. When he was discharged, he needed help from his
family before he fully recovered.4
Parra’s Injury
Parra’s child was not injured. Parra had a circular injury under her right collar
bone. She thought the bullet went through the metal screen door, dislodged a piece of
metal from the door, the piece hit her body, and the bullet continued into Vasquez’s body.
Parra testified nothing else happened that could have caused this injury. Parra did not
4 By the time of trial, Parra and Vasquez were no longer in a relationship.
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initially feel or notice the injury, she was not bleeding, and she did not find shrapnel on
her body. She was not treated at the scene by paramedics and did not go to the hospital.
Parra testified the injury was “fleshy” and “just stung” her. She had some pain
that was a “four” out of 10, and the metal left a mark near her shoulder for about
two weeks.
Pucilowski testified that when the deputies arrived on the dispatch, Parra showed
them a wound on her upper right chest area. Pucilowski determined it was not caused by
a gunshot. There were no holes in Parra’s clothing, she did not complain of pain, and she
was not bleeding. Pucilowski described the injury as a flesh wound, and believed it could
have been caused by shrapnel from either the bullet or the metal screen door. Pucilowski
acknowledged that Parra’s wound could have been consistent with a nonshrapnel injury,
such as a scab wound. Pucilowski did not mention Parra’s wound in his report because
another officer took her statement at the scene.
On November 3, 2022, Deputy Rebekah Karr conducted a follow-up investigation
at Parra’s house, and took photographs of the bullet hole through the screen door and
Parra’s injury. Karr testified the injury appeared to be fresh, and consistent with being
caused by some type of debris. Karr testified the photographs of Parra’s wound also
showed acne type marks in the same area on her body. The injury could have been
consistent with a “popped acne pimple,” but Karr could not be sure.
Search of Appellant’s Residence
On November 3, 2022, deputies searched appellant’s residence pursuant to a
warrant. Appellant was present and arrested. His car was parked near the residence.
In the house, the deputies found a Glock 19 nine-millimeter handgun under a sofa
cushion. A magazine loaded with nine-millimeter ammunition was next to the gun. The
Glock had a flashlight mounted on top of it, and the gun was registered to appellant.
A backpack was found in a bedroom. It contained two high-capacity magazines
loaded with nine-millimeter rounds, which would have fit the Glock firearm.
8.
Appellant’s Trial Testimony
Appellant testified that on November 2, 2022, he went to Parra’s house directly
from work because they were going to take their child to the doctor. Appellant did not go
drinking with friends. Parra never told him not to come over. When he arrived at the
house, appellant became concerned because there was an unfamiliar truck parked in front,
and the front gate was unlocked.
Appellant stayed outside and tried calling and texting Parra. She did not answer.
Appellant testified he used his cell phone’s speaker as he tried to contact Parra, and he
was not holding the cell phone up to his ear. Appellant walked inside the house’s front
gate, knocked on the front door, and no one answered. He walked around the house and
looked in the windows, and did not see anyone. Appellant was confused because Parra
and their child were supposed to be home.
Appellant again tried to contact Parra. She finally replied by text message, and
said they took a Lyft to the doctor. Appellant was still concerned something was wrong,
tried to call her again, and she did not respond.
Appellant testified he retrieved his handgun from the lockbox in the glove box of
his car because he was concerned for the safety of Parra and their child. Appellant did
not plan to shoot anyone. He did not put the gun in his car because he was going to take
his child to the doctor; it was already in his car. The gun was registered to him, and it did
not have an extended magazine.
Appellant walked back to the house, called Parra again, and she did not answer.
He looked through the windows and was about to leave, when Parra opened the front
door, and kept the metal screen door closed.
Appellant and Parra talked and argued through the screen door. Parra said
appellant could not enter the house but never told him to leave the property.
Appellant testified that after about three minutes, a man appeared at the front door
with Parra. Appellant had never seen this man and later learned his name was Vasquez.
9.
Vasquez said to appellant, “ ‘Bro, what’s up’ ” in an aggressive manner and they began to
argue. Parra told him to leave, but appellant was not sure whether she was referring to
Vasquez or himself.
Appellant was frightened because Parra previously threatened to have someone
named “Mark” hurt him. Appellant testified Parra’s cell phone videos did not show the
entire exchange with Vasquez, and that Vasquez told him, “[D]o you want me to go out
there and beat your ass.” Appellant testified things went very fast and he did not think he
had time to call the police for help. Appellant knew his child was also standing in the
doorway, but he was only focused on Vasquez and his threats.
Appellant admitted he told Vasquez to come outside, but he only did so because
Parra said Vasquez wanted to leave. Appellant did not intend to assault him.
Appellant admitted he shot Vasquez because he was frightened by Vasquez’s
aggressive behavior, and thought he was “Mark” who Parra identified in her prior threats.
Appellant denied he previously threatened Parra. Appellant admitted he told
Vasquez that he was going to die when he fired the gunshot. Appellant also admitted he
picked up the spent casing when he left Parra’s house. He did not know why he said or
did these things because he was not thinking straight.
Appellant acknowledged that after he was arrested, he falsely told officers that
Parra called him that day to deal with a man who was about to beat her. Appellant
eventually told them the truth.
Rebuttal Evidence
Mendoza testified he conducted appellant’s postarrest interview with
Deputy Nathaniel Inman on November 3, 2022. Appellant was advised of the warnings
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 and he agreed to answer questions.
The recorded interview was played for the jury.
During the interview, appellant was asked about the shooting the previous day.
Appellant said he did not know anything about it, he had not seen Parra for a few days,
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and she blamed him because he was trying to get visitation rights for their child.
Appellant said Parra called him the day of the incident and said she was fighting with a
man at her house, and the man was “beating her a[**].” Parra had previously called him
for help when they were together. This time, appellant told Parra they were no longer
together and she should call the police, and he did not go to her house.
The deputies advised appellant that Parra recorded videos on her cell phone that
showed someone at the front door. Appellant said he knew about the videos because
Parra was telling everyone that she filmed him, but he was not there. The deputies
further advised appellant that one video recorded the sound of a gunshot, showed
appellant running away and driving off, and his car’s license plate was captured by
license plate readers as it left the scene. There was also a neighbor’s surveillance video
that showed him arguing at Parra’s front door. Appellant denied that he was on the
videos.
Appellant eventually admitted Parra called him that day, and she asked him to
come to the house and take their child to the doctor. Appellant was late because he
worked overtime. Just as he drove up to Parra’s house, she called and complained he was
late, and said they already took a Lyft to the doctor.
Appellant said he saw an unfamiliar truck parked in front of Parra’s house and
thought that was strange. Appellant had to use the restroom and tried to enter the house
because Parra usually left the door unlocked. Vasquez appeared at the front door just as
appellant was about to open it. The screen door remained closed.
Appellant said he was surprised and asked if Parra was there. Vasquez said no and
told appellant to leave. Appellant said he was there to take his child to the doctor. Parra
appeared and said she would take care of it. Vasquez threatened to beat him up. Vasquez
asked appellant if Parra told him to come over so he could beat up Vasquez. Appellant
said no. They began to argue. Vasquez put his hand on the door and called him a b****.
11.
The deputies asked appellant what he did next. Appellant said he fired one shot
because he was scared, and noted that “you guys heard the popping noise” on the video.
Appellant was afraid because Vasquez was bigger than him, he did not want to fight him,
and he did not know if Vasquez had a knife. Appellant did not try to run away because he
thought there was not enough time.
Appellant admitted that after he fired the gunshot, he told Vasquez he was going to
die. Appellant said he was not in his right mind when he said that. Appellant was angry
that Vasquez was in the house because Parra said she would not allow other men around
their child. Appellant admitted he picked up the shell casing after he fired the gunshot,
but could not explain why. He thought he threw the casing out the car window.
Appellant later told his sister what happened. His sister said he was stupid and he should
have left, and she took his gun from him. He thought his sister threw away his gun.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 8, 2024, an amended information was filed that charged appellant
with several counts, including count 1, premeditated attempted murder of Vasquez (Pen.
Code,5 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 189, 1192.7, subd. (c)(9)), and that he personally and
intentionally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury in the commission
of that crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and other offenses with firearm and great bodily
injury enhancements, with multiple aggravating factors alleged pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421.6
Verdicts
On March 15, 2024, the jury found appellant not guilty of count 1, premeditated
attempted murder of Vasquez, and guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted
voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664/192, subd. (a)), and found true the enhancements for
5 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
6 All further citations to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
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personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and infliction of great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7).
The jury also found appellant guilty as charged of count 2, assault with a
semiautomatic firearm on Vasquez (§ 245, subd. (b)), with enhancements for personal use
of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and infliction of great bodily injury; count 3, discharge
of a firearm into an inhabited dwelling (§ 246), with an enhancement for personal and
intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d));
count 4, child endangerment under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 273a, subd. (a)) with the personal use enhancement; count 5, misdemeanor destruction
of evidence (§ 135); count 6, assault with a firearm on Parra (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), with
the personal use enhancement; and count 7, assault with a firearm on the child (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)) with the personal use enhancement.7
Trial on Aggravating Factors
Appellant waived a jury trial on the aggravating factor allegations in the amended
information. The court granted the People’s motion to consider the trial evidence for the
truth of the allegations, and appellant’s request to take judicial notice that appellant did
not have a criminal record.
The trial court found the following aggravating factors alleged in the amended
information were true beyond a reasonable doubt: the offenses involved great violence,
great bodily injury, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness or
callousness pursuant to rule 4.421(a)(1); appellant was armed with or used a weapon in
the commission of the crime pursuant to rule 4.421(a)(2); he engaged in violent conduct
indicating a serious danger to society pursuant to rule 4.421(b)(1); and circumstances in
7 As to count 2, the jury returned guilty verdicts for both the charged offense of
assault with a semiautomatic firearm on Vasquez and the lesser included offense of
assault with a firearm. The court suggested, and the parties agreed, to strike the guilty
verdict for the lesser offense.
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aggravation included any other factors that reasonably relate to the defendant or the
circumstances under which the crime was committed pursuant to rule 4.421(c).
Sentencing
On April 15, 2024, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing, and found
appellant did not have a criminal record, and the jury did not find him guilty of
premeditated attempted murder. The court also found appellant shot the victim in the
presence of his young child, the gunshot hit Vasquez in his “center mass torso through
and through with significant internal injuries,” and the wound could have been fatal.
The court found mitigating circumstances that appellant did not have a prior
criminal record, there were multiple enhancements, and application of an enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years.
The court found the aggravating circumstances that were pleaded and proved true
pursuant to rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(1) were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating
factors to permit imposition of upper terms.8
In determining appellant’s aggregate sentence, the trial court considered “not only
the conduct and the individuals involved but also [appellant’s] individualized background
and history as well as his conduct in this situation.” The court dismissed the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement that carried the potential life term.
8 In Lovelace v. Superior Court 108 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1089, the First District,
Division Four recently held the aggravating factor stated in rule 4.421(c)’s “residual
clause” was “so vacuous as to be devoid of meaning” in violation of the separation of
powers clause in the California Constitution, because “by granting prosecutors—and
ultimately juries—an open-ended power to define sentencing criteria on an ad hoc basis,
the residual clause exceeds the Judicial Council’s delegated authority to adopt rules
designed to ‘promote uniformity in sentencing’ under section 1170.3.”
Lovelace’s ruling does not affect this case. At appellant’s bifurcated trial on the
aggravating factors, the court found true the aggravating factor alleged as to
rule 4.421(c). At the sentencing hearing, however, the court found the aggravating
circumstances found true under rule 4.421(a) and (b) outweighed the mitigating
circumstances to impose the upper terms, and it did not rely on rule 4.421(c).
14.
The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 27 years as follows: count 2, assault
with a semiautomatic firearm on Vasquez, the upper term of nine years, plus 10 years for
the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) personal use enhancement and three years for the
great bodily injury enhancement; a consecutive term of 16 months for count 4, child
endangerment under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury, plus 16 months
for the personal use enhancement (one-third the midterms); and a consecutive term of
one year for count 6, assault with a firearm on Parra, plus 16 months for the personal use
enhancement (one-third the midterm). The court stayed the sentences and enhancements
imposed for counts 1, 3, 5, and 7.
After imposing sentence, the trial court stated: “I know I just imposed a
significant sentence. That is not lost on the court. But you must understand your conduct
is also not lost on the court and I did my best to do what I think was the appropriate
sentence balancing what you did with who you are,” the aggregate sentence “could have
been much worse,” and the court wanted appellant to understand the sentence was
“reflective of your conduct but also reflective of who you were prior to that day.”
On April 16, 2024, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, appellant’s counsel filed a Wende brief with this court. The brief
also included counsel’s declaration indicating appellant was advised he could file his own
brief with this court.
In response to this court’s Wende letter, appellant filed a supplemental brief and
requested this court “to look over” the testimony of Parra and Vasquez because their
statements were false and contradictory. Appellant raises several specific claims about
the alleged falsity of Parra’s testimony, and asserts her statements should have been
excluded because she was unreliable and dishonest. Appellant further asserts he did not
receive a fair trial because the alleged false testimony and exhibits were admitted into
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evidence “just to make me … look bad in front of the jury .…” Appellant also argues he
was “oversentenced.”
A. Substantial Evidence and Evidence Code Section 352
Appellant’s arguments raise the question about whether there is substantial
evidence to support his convictions. “In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the
evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime or special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence.” (People v.
Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638–639.)
“ ‘It is for the trier of fact to consider internal inconsistencies in testimony’
[citation], and it is for [the appellate court] when reviewing for substantial evidence to
resolve the inconsistencies in favor of the verdict.” (People v. Collins (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 333, 345.) “Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is
the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is
physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient
to support a conviction.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Reversal is
“unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conviction.]’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th
297, 331.)
Appellant’s arguments that the testimony of Parra and Vasquez was introduced to
make him look “bad” also implicate the provisions of Evidence Code section 352, that
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provides evidence is subject to exclusion “if the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed by a danger of undue prejudice. [Citation.] ‘ “The ‘prejudice’ referred to in
… section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias
against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In
applying section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Megown (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 157, 164.) We review the court’s evidentiary decisions
for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
B. Parra’s Testimony that Appellant Said He Was Drinking with Friends
We turn to appellant’s specific contentions about why Parra’s testimony was false
and unreliable. First, appellant asserts Parra lied when she falsely testified that he was
late to her house because he was drinking with friends.
Parra testified that when appellant was late, she contacted him and appellant said
he was drinking with friends. Parra’s testimony was impeached on this point because she
admitted she failed to disclose appellant’s statements about drinking in her prior
interviews with officers or at the preliminary hearing.
The jury heard appellant’s trial testimony, that he was not drinking with friends,
and he went to Parra’s house after he finished work. In addition, the jury heard the
recording of appellant’s postarrest interview, where he said that he was late because he
had to work overtime.
Parra’s testimony about appellant’s statements about drinking was admissible
because the conflicts with appellant’s testimony, and her own failure to previously
disclose this information, raised factual and credibility disputes for the jury to resolve.
The evidence may have been damaging but was not prejudicial, and her testimony was
not physically impossible nor inherently improbable.
17.
C. Parra’s Testimony That Appellant Was on His Cell Phone
Appellant next asserts Parra falsely testified he was on his cell phone with her the
entire time he was outside the house, and she was lying because the videos showed he
never had the phone at his ear.
Appellant’s claim is refuted by his own trial testimony. Appellant testified that
when he arrived at Parra’s house, he was outside and tried calling and texting her on his
cell phone. Appellant was asked, “When you were calling her, was that to your ear or
was that on speaker?” Appellant replied, “On speaker.” Appellant’s testimony thus
explained why the video may have shown that he was not holding the cell phone to his
ear, and raised another factual issue for the jury to resolve.
D. Parra’s Injury
Appellant’s next allegation is Parra’s testimony was false and unreliable because
she claimed the bullet hit the metal screen door and caused shrapnel to hit her in the
chest, and she was lying because Parra also agreed her wound could have been a pimple.
The existence and nature of Parra’s injury were extensively addressed before the
jury. Parra thought the bullet dislodged a piece of metal from the screen door, and the
metal hit her body under her right collar bone. Parra acknowledged that she did not
initially feel or notice her wound.
Pucilowski described Parra’s injury as a flesh wound, and believed it could have
been caused by shrapnel from either the bullet or the metal screen door. Pucilowski
acknowledged that Parra’s wound could have been consistent with a nonshrapnel injury,
such as a scab wound.
Karr testified the wound appeared to be fresh, and it was consistent with being
caused by some type of debris. Karr acknowledged the photographs showed acne marks
on the same area of Parra’s body, one of which could be consistent with a “popped acne
pimple,” but Karr could not be sure.
18.
As with appellant’s other objections to Parra’s testimony, the jury was well aware
of different descriptions about her injury and could examine the photographs. These
conflicts again raised factual and credibility issues for the jury to resolve. Parra’s
testimony was not prejudicial, physically impossible, or inherently improbable.
E. Appellant’s Use of Vasquez’s Name
Appellant argues Parra lied when she testified appellant and Vasquez had never
met, and falsely claimed he called Vasquez by his name when they argued at the front
door.
This issue was also raised before the jury. On direct examination, Parra testified
appellant repeatedly told Vasquez to come outside. On cross-examination, Parra was
asked if appellant was calling him out by name. Parra testified, “Not by name, no,” and
she acknowledged appellant and Vasquez had never met, and appellant did not know
Vasquez’s name.
Vasquez testified he had never met appellant. Appellant also testified that when
Vasquez stepped into the doorway, he had never seen this man and later learned the man
was Vasquez.
To the extent there was a conflict on this issue, it was addressed by additional
testimony and again raised factual and credibility issues for the jury’s resolution.
F. Appellant’s Text Messages to Parra
At trial, Parra testified that on or about Tuesday, November 1, 2022, the day before
the shooting, appellant sent a text message telling Parra not to have other men around
their child or he would kill Parra. Appellant argues Parra was improperly allowed to
testify about these messages because she could not prove who sent them or when they
were sent, and the messages could have been made up by someone else.
These issues were fully addressed by the court because prior to trial, appellant
objected to the text messages as inadmissible and vague, and the court conducted a
pretrial evidentiary hearing (Evid. Code, § 402) on the admissibility of this evidence.
19.
The prosecutor made an offer of proof based on screenshots from Parra’s cell phone of
the threatening messages. Parra was called as a witness at the hearing, and testified
appellant sent the messages to her “[m]aybe a few days prior” to the shooting, “[i]t was
within the week,” and “[m]aybe three days at most. It was very recent to that day of the
shooting.”
Also at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court took judicial notice the shooting
occurred on Wednesday, November 2, 2022. The prosecutor and defense counsel agreed
there were no time/date stamps on the screenshots or messages. The court found that “it
appears as though this text threat occurred perhaps one to two days prior to the incident in
the case but certainly within the three-day window to which she testified to and I will
allow if proper foundation is laid with the jury [the exhibit] to be admitted. I do find that
there is probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effects [sic]
and you’ll be allowed to cross-examine as you see fit … as to the issues that you’ve
raised.”
At trial, Parra testified as set forth above about appellant’s threats in the text
messages. Parra further testified she saved screenshots of the messages. The screenshots
showed the messages were exchanged on “Tuesday,” which was the day before the
shooting, and it was too recent to have a date stamp.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Parra’s testimony
about the text messages, because the context of the messages was consistent with being
sent close in time to the shooting. Moreover, the jury was aware that there were no
time/date stamps on the messages, and Parra’s credibility about when she received the
messages raised another factual issue for the jury’s determination.
G. Appellant’s Convictions Are Supported by Substantial Evidence
Appellant did not raise similar specific claims about alleged false statements in
Vasquez’s trial testimony. Instead, he asked this court to “look over” Vasquez’s testimony
because his evidence was false and made him look bad, and he did not receive a fair trial.
20.
As set forth in the factual statement, we have reviewed the entirety of Vasquez’s
trial testimony, and there was nothing physically impossible or inherently improbable
about his statements. Moreover, Vasquez’s testimony was not unduly prejudicial in light
of the probative value of his description of his encounter with appellant at the front door,
and appellant’s firing of the gunshot through the metal screen door. “ ‘ “ ‘[P]rejudicial’ is
not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Megown, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th 157,
164.) Moreover, the jury’s verdicts indicate that it carefully reviewed the evidence since
it found appellant not guilty of the charged offense of premeditated attempted murder,
and instead convicted him of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary
manslaughter.
We thus conclude that the testimony of Parra and Vasquez was properly admitted,
any factual and credibility conflicts presented questions for the jury to resolve, and
appellant’s convictions are supported by substantial evidence.
H. Appellant’s Aggregate Sentence
Appellant’s final claim is that he was “oversentenced” to an aggregate term of
27 years. The trial court’s sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.)
As set forth above, the trial court made extensive findings to determine appellant’s
sentence. It had already found the aggravating factors were true beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court found there were several mitigating circumstances, including
appellant’s lack of a criminal record.
The court had discretion to strike the enhancements in the interests of justice
pursuant to section 1385. (People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c) enumerates nine mitigating circumstances the court must
consider and afford great weight in determining whether to dismiss an enhancement,
including when multiple enhancements are imposed in a single case, and when
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. (§ 1385,
21.
subds. (c)(2)(B), (C).) “[I]f the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public
safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight
of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029–1030.)
The trial court was aware that multiple enhancements had been found true, and it
exercised its discretion to dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement and the potential term of 25 years to life. However, the court did not abuse
its discretion when it further concluded it could not ignore the seriousness of appellant’s
crimes because he inflicted a gunshot wound that could have been fatal, he fired the shot
in the presence of his young child, and upper terms were appropriate because the
aggravating circumstances pleaded and proved under rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(1),
were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. Appellant’s sentencing contentions are
meritless.
After independent review of the record, we find that no reasonably arguable
factual or legal issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
22.
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