People v. Smith CA4/3

CourtListener 10356628Calctapp14.03.2025

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Filed 3/14/25 P. v. Smith CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062972

v. (Super. Ct. No. 06ZF0138)

BERNARD SMITH, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Gary S. Paer, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew Mestman
and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Bernard Smith was convicted of one count of first
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degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) , one count of second degree
robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), one count of possession of a firearm by a
felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of sale or transportation of
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a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). The jury also
found true the allegation that defendant committed the murder during a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). The court sentenced defendant to life in
state prison without the possibility of parole plus three years.
In April 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).3 The court found defendant’s petition
set forth a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to show cause. After
an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, and defendant
appealed.
Defendant argues the court erred by denying his petition because
there was no substantial evidence he was a major participant in the robbery
acting with reckless indifference to human life or aided and abetted the
murder. For the reasons below, substantial evidence supported the court’s

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Defendant was tried twice on the murder and robbery charges.
Another panel of this court reversed the original convictions due to
prejudicial Aranda-Bruton error. (People v. Smith (June 28, 2011, G041645)
[nonpub. opn.]; see Bruton v. U.S. (1968) 391 U.S. 123; People v. Aranda
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, superseded in part by constitutional amendment as
stated in People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465.)

3
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

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finding that defendant was a major participant in the robbery and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. We accordingly affirm the order.
FACTS
I.
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THE UNDERLYING INCIDENT
In February 2006, defendant, Stephen Bennett, Brandon Turner,
and Turner’s younger brother, Deshawn Turner, were at Reuben Avery’s
home in Oceanside. They talked about having no money. At one point,
defendant said he wanted to get drugs and asked Bennett where they could
get some. Bennett called a drug dealer in Irvine and ordered cocaine. They
planned to rob the drug dealer. Avery refused to participate, but defendant,
Bennett, and the Turner brothers left Avery’s house.
Later that evening, the drug dealer was shot and killed outside of
his apartment in Irvine. One witness heard two shots and then observed two
“dark skinned” men running. One man was chasing the other and was
shooting a gun. The man who was being chased yelled for security and fell to
the ground. The witness told his wife to call the police and then observed the
shooter walking away with another man who the witness described as
shorter and thinner than the shooter.
According to another witness, two slender men were running
with one in the front and the second close behind. The witness also observed
a third man who appeared to be catching his breath after running. The third
man “grabbed and hitched up his pants and said ‘Get him, Get him, Get
him.’” The witness described the third man’s tone as “very insistent.” The

4
We summarize the facts from defendant’s second jury trial.

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witness also described the third man as “heavy-set” and “chubbier” than the
other two men.
A third witness heard a male voice ask, “Did you pick him, did
you pick that fool?” Another male voice answered, “The mother fucker is
down.” The witness observed two people walking away. She described one of
them as taller and wearing a puffy jacket while the other person was shorter
and “stockier.”
Later, Bennett spoke to Avery on the phone and told him they got
the drugs. Bennett also told Avery they had run out of gas. After their phone
call, three other individuals took gas to Bennett’s vehicle where it was
stopped on the side of the freeway.
Sometime after midnight, Avery saw defendant, Bennett, and the
Turner brothers at someone else’s home. Defendant asked Avery for his pipe,
and they both smoked crack cocaine. Avery later saw Brandon Turner had
crack cocaine, a .22 caliber handgun, and bullets.
At the scene of the shooting, police found .22 caliber shell casings.
The drug dealer suffered gunshot wounds from a small caliber bullet and also
had “birdshot” or small pellets in the back of his calf. Police obtained video
footage from a nearby security camera, which depicted a vehicle driven by
Bennett.
Police later questioned defendant and Bennett. After their
interviews, the police put them in the back of a patrol car together and
recorded their conversation, which was admitted into evidence. Defendant
and Bennett talked about what they had told the police and who might be
giving information to the police. At one point, defendant said, “[T]he only
thing they got is us in that parking lot.” Defendant added, “I said yeah I got
out of the car to piss.” Bennett responded, “Oh but they didn’t see you.”

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Defendant then said, “Na, na listen they see me run they see me running.”
Defendant also said, “[F]irst of all he showed me a picture I don’t know I’m
telling you what’s happening, I was high, I’m the only witness I told you I
was pissing and I heard somebody say ‘hey cuz, don’t run,’ they got the
shooting, I doved over in the bushes, and I’ve seen, see RED [Bennett] coming
across I took off running say hey man they already shooting.”
A few days later, police arrested Brandon Turner who confessed
to shooting the drug dealer and taking his drugs. In 2008, a jury convicted
Brandon Turner of first degree murder and robbery and further found true
allegations that he committed the murder in the course of a robbery and
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm resulting in death. In 2012,
a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, among other things.
II.
DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
In his petition for resentencing, defendant averred, among other
things: “1. A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] 2a. At trial, I was
convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or
the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . . [¶] 3. I could not now be
convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code
§§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
The court found defendant’s petition set forth a prima facie case
for relief and issued an order to show cause. At the hearing, the court noted it
had presided over defendant’s second jury trial and agreed to consider the
trial transcript, information, jury instructions, and verdict forms from the
second trial. As to the trial transcript, the trial court emphasized it would not

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consider a statement made by Bennett to Avery because another panel of this
court previously held the statement was inadmissible hearsay.
After hearing from the parties, the court denied the petition and
found the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
would be guilty of murder under current law. According to the court,
defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The court relied on the following facts. First, defendant was
actively and substantially involved in the events leading up to the murder.
He and his cohorts were in Oceanside and wanted to get drugs but had no
money. After Bennett proposed to “go jack . . . up” a drug dealer in Irvine,
defendant and his cohorts drove to Orange County to rob the drug dealer.
Second, despite defendant’s argument to the contrary, the court
found defendant was one of the two men who pursued the victim. According
to the court, “there [was] no doubt” defendant got out of the vehicle in Irvine.
Based on videos it reviewed of the incident, the court concluded a person
matching defendant’s description exited the vehicle and left the area with
Brandon Turner. The court believed defendant stood “out like a sore thumb”
because he was short with a “stocky husky build.” The court added that
witnesses described one of the males as having a husky or stocky build. The
court further noted the jury found defendant was guilty of possessing a gun
as a convicted felon and the victim had “birdshot” or “snake shot” in his calf.5

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The jury from defendant’s first trial convicted him of one count
of possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury
from defendant’s second trial found the allegation that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) to be
not true.

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The court concluded: “[C]ircumstantially it could be argued that if [defendant
is] the second guy chasing, he fired a round too.”
Third, the court noted the second person pursuing the victim and
who the court believed was defendant yelled: “‘get him, get him, get him.’”
The same person later jumped into the bushes and said: “‘[T]hey see me
jumping in the bushes. They see me running.’” Finally, the court stressed
defendant never rendered aid, tried to stop the killing, or expressed any
remorse or concern. To the contrary, the court believed defendant was
involved in the plan to use force to rob the drug dealer. The court also
concluded defendant was in a position to facilitate or prevent the murder and
played a role in the murder because he chased the victim.
For the same reasons above, the court held the evidence also
showed defendant aided and abetted the murder. Defendant timely filed a
notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the court erred by denying his petition because
there was insufficient evidence, proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that he
was one of the two men who chased the victim. Instead, he suggests Deshawn
Turner could have been the second pursuer. We disagree. Substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that defendant was a major participant
in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
I.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill
1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the

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intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 959.) Relief under section 1172.6 is accordingly restricted to
those convicted of murder “under a theory of felony murder, murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
The burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).) To determine if a trial court properly denied a section 1172.6 petition
after an evidentiary hearing, we review the factual findings for substantial
evidence. (People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383.) “We view the
facts in the light most favorable to the People. In this process, we presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact that can be reasonably
deduced from the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial. [Citations.] We
must accept factual inferences in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591.)
II.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A major participant in a robbery is someone whose “personal
involvement [is] substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary aider
and abettor.” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 802.) Factors bearing on
the major participation requirement include the defendant’s (1) role in
planning the crime that led to one or more deaths; (2) role in supplying or
using lethal weapons; (3) awareness of the particular dangers created by the
nature of the crime, the weapons used, or the other participants; (4) presence
at the scene, including whether he could have facilitated or prevented the

8
murder, and whether his actions played a role in the murder; and (5) actions
after lethal force was used. (Id. at p. 803.) “No one of these considerations is
necessary, nor is any of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining . . . whether the defendant’s participation . . . was sufficiently
significant to be considered ‘major.’” (Ibid.)
Whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life depends on whether the defendant was “‘aware of and willingly involved
in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed’ [and]
consciously disregard[ed] ‘the significant risk of death’” created by his
actions. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677.) “‘“The risk [of death] must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’” (Ibid.) The factors for
determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life overlap with the major participant factors and include: (1) defendant’s
knowledge that weapons would be used; (2) how the weapons were used and
the number of weapons; (3) defendant’s proximity to the crime; (4)
defendant’s opportunity to stop the killing or aid the victim; (5) duration of
the crime; (6) defendant’s knowledge of the killer’s propensity to kill; and (7)
defendant’s efforts to minimize the possibility of violence during the crime.
(People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1023–1024.)
Here, substantial evidence and the totality of the circumstances
supported the court’s findings that defendant was a major participant in the
robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. This was not a
spur of the moment robbery. Earlier in the evening, defendant told his
cohorts he wanted to get drugs even though they did not have any money and

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asked Bennett where they could get some. This prompted Bennett to order
cocaine from the drug dealer in Irvine. Defendant, Bennett, and the Turner
brothers then drove from Oceanside to Irvine. After the murder, Avery made
several statements to law enforcement indicating there was a plan to rob the
drug dealer. Law enforcement asked Avery if there was a plan to buy
something, and Avery disclosed the plan was “to just take it.” Avery also said,
“[T]here was two zips getting set up to be taken” and “I’m talking to
RHONDA, talking about, yeah, this dumb ass, you know, uh, going down
there to, uh, to rob PC.”
There also was evidence defendant chased the victim along with
Brandon Turner. Two witnesses described a man who matched defendant’s
physique. The witnesses said the man was shorter, stockier, “heavy-set,” and
“chubbier.” Defendant was approximately 5’6” tall and 180 pounds. By
contrast, Bennett was approximately 5’10” tall and 190 pounds while
Deshawn Turner was approximately 5’9” and 150 pounds. The trial court also
indicated a video showed one of the men who chased the victim jump into the
bushes. In the patrol car, defendant told Bennett, “I told them I jump a [sic]
the bushes” and “they see me run they see me running.” There was further
evidence defendant yelled “get him” to Brandon Turner as they were chasing
the victim. Defendant does not dispute armed robbery of a drug dealer is
particularly dangerous. Finally, defendant did not try to stop the killing or
render any aid to the victim. Instead, he and his cohorts left with the cocaine
and went back to Oceanside.
To argue there was insufficient evidence he was one of the men
who chased the victim, defendant relies on statements made by another panel
of this court in resolving defendant’s first appeal. (People v. Smith (June 28,
2011, G041645) [nonpub. opn.].) In that case, another panel of this court

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noted the jury viewed a taped interview of Bennett where he clearly stated
Deshawn Turner never left the vehicle. (Ibid.) By process of elimination, it
was obvious defendant was the second pursuer. (Ibid.) But the court
“[r]eluctantly” reversed the murder and robbery convictions because
admission of the taped statement by a nontestifying codefendant violated
defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. (Ibid.)
In finding the error was not harmless, the court said: “[T]here is
no evidence in the record which establishes that the younger brother
DeShawn was in the car at the time the drug dealer was shot except for
Bennett’s statement to the Irvine police sergeant. Nor, as we explain below,
was the evidence of the eyewitness neighbors who saw the chase and the
shooting sufficient to identify [defendant], as distinct from DeShawn, as the
second male chasing the drug dealer. The physical differences between
[defendant] and DeShawn in height and weight were just too close,
particularly under the reasonable doubt standard required by Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . . . .” (Ibid.) The court further said:
“Approximately three inches and thirty pounds is just not enough to send a
man to prison for the rest of his life when none of the eyewitnesses could give
a positive identification, particularly given the late night hour. As for the
identification of ‘men,’ as distinct from ‘one man and one juvenile,’ that
evidence again hardly establishes [defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. A young man of 16, like DeShawn, who is approximately five feet nine,
can easily look like a man in the dark.” (Ibid.) The court also found
defendant’s statements to Bennett in the patrol car showed some guilt but
were only about what they told the police. (Ibid.)
The appellate decision above does not require reversal of the trial
court’s finding that defendant was the second pursuer. The appellate decision

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concerned the first trial and first trial evidence. Here, the trial court presided
over the second trial and considered evidence from the second trial. The trial
court reviewed videos of the incident and said “[t]here [was] no doubt”
defendant was the other person who exited the vehicle with Brandon Turner.
On appeal, “‘[c]onflicts [in the evidence] . . . subject to justifiable suspicion do
not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge . . . to determine the . . . truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends.”’” (People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652,
663.) “Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314), reversal is not
warranted unless “‘“upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the trial court’ ruling].”’” (People v. Cravens
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.) Assessing the record from that deferential
perspective, we are convinced there was substantial evidence defendant was
a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. We therefore need not address the alternative aiding and
abetting theory.

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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying defendant’s resentencing
petition is affirmed.

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

DELANEY, J.

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