CourtListener 10356278•People v. Radillo CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/13/25 P. v. Radillo CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F083848
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 15CR-06414)
v.
OSCAR RADILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Paul C. Lo,
Judge.
Lilliam Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Charlotte
Woodfork, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Smith, J.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before us on transfer from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), which resolved a split among
appellate courts regarding the proper standard for evaluating prejudice stemming from
noncompliance with the requirements of Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (b)(1),
(2), and (3) as modified by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No.
567). In accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court, we have vacated our earlier
decision and authorized supplemental briefing from the parties.
Following consideration of our Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch and the parties’
supplemental briefs, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to comply with Senate Bill
No. 567’s amendments to subdivision (b) of section 1170 was erroneous, and that the
error was prejudicial. Accordingly, we remand the case back to the lower court for either
a retrial on the aggravating factors used to impose the upper term, or resentencing to a
different term. To the extent that Radillo argued in his original appeal that the trial court
failed to consider evidence of his youth, mental health issues, and history of childhood
trauma as mitigating factors (see § 1170, subd. (b)(6)), we find this claim without merit,
as the record clearly shows the court did, in fact, consider these factors in its sentencing
decision.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 8, 2016, appellant Oscar Radillo was charged with arson of an
inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b), count 1); making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a),
count 2); and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, count 3). Radillo entered a plea of
no contest to counts 1 and 3. The trial court subsequently found Radillo mentally
incompetent, accepted his alternative plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and ordered
1 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2.
Radillo committed to the Department of State Hospitals “for a maximum period not to
exceed eight (8) years eight (8) months.”
On November 18, 2021, the trial court granted a motion filed by Radillo to
withdraw his plea of insanity. The trial court granted Radillo’s motion, finding that he
was not advised that his term of commitment may exceed the longest possible term of
imprisonment for the underlying crimes. (See People v. Lomboy (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d
67.) The court reinstated Radillo’s plea of no contest and indicated that it would impose
the upper term in state prison. Radillo reentered a plea of no contest to arson (§ 451,
subd. (b)) and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236).
On January 27, 2022, following argument by the parties, including a discussion of
mitigating and aggravating factors relevant to Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No.
124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 124), the trial court sentenced Radillo to
the upper term of eight years for arson, and one-third the middle term of eight months for
false imprisonment by violence, to run consecutively.
Radillo appealed, arguing in part, that the trial court failed to comply with Senate
Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124, and that he was entitled to a new sentencing
hearing. We affirmed his conviction on appeal in an unpublished decision, agreeing that
the trial court erred by failing to comply with Senate Bill No. 567’s amendments to
section 1170, but finding the error harmless. (See People v. Radillo (Apr. 17, 2023,
F083848) [nonpub. opn.].)
On June 28, 2023, a petition for review filed by Radillo in the California Supreme
Court was granted.
On December 11, 2024, our Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this
court for reconsideration in light of Lynch.
3.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Failure to Comply with Senate Bill No. 567
In Radillo’s original appeal, we determined that the trial court did not comply with
subdivision (b) of section 1170, observing that Radillo did not stipulate to all relevant
facts found true, nor did he waive his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors found
true by the trial court. (See People v. Radillo, supra, F083848.) Radillo was sentenced
after Senate Bill No. 567 went into effect, and the enactment was discussed at his
sentencing hearing. However, he did not waive his right to a jury trial on the presence of
the aggravating factors, nor did he enter a stipulation to all of the facts underlying those
circumstances.2
We originally found the error harmless in light of the strong evidence presented at
Radillo’s sentencing hearing supporting the aggravating factors on which the trial court
relied in imposing the upper term, including, some facts which Radillo had admitted.
However, following reconsideration of the issue in light of our Supreme Court’s decision
in Lynch, we conclude that the error was not harmless. We will therefore remand this
matter back to the lower court for further proceedings.
A. Background
The following recitation of facts is derived from this court’s unpublished opinion
in People v. Radillo, supra, F083848:
2 Subdivision (b)(2) of section 1170 provides, in part: “The court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.”
4.
The Underlying Offense
The following statement of facts is derived from the reporter’s
transcript from Radillo’s preliminary hearing, which occurred on July 25,
2016:
On November 27, 2015, Radillo, schizophrenic and delusional,
accused his father, R.R., of poisoning his food. Radillo spilled food all
over his bed. When his father questioned him about it, Radillo began to get
angry. R.R. tried to leave the room, which further angered Radillo. Radillo
told his father, “ ‘You going nowhere.’ ” As R.R. tried to leave, Radillo
punched him in the mouth. When R.R. moved to another door, R.R.
punched him in the ribs. R.R. eventually managed to get out of the house
as Radillo said, “ ‘[T]his is a warning. Next time I kill you.’ ”
R.R. went into a nearby field and called the police. As he waited for
the police to arrive, he saw smoke coming from his home. R.R. tried to put
the fire out, but he was unsuccessful. The house burned down.
The Mental Health Report
A report prepared pursuant to section 1026, subdivision (f) was
made part of the record.3 The report, dated December 6, 2021, states that
since the last progress report, there were minimal changes to Radillo’s
status. According to the report, Radillo “continues to lack insight into his
mental illness and need for treatment.”
Under “Psychiatric status,” the report states that Radillo “has
remained psychiatrically unstable,” and that he “has primarily been
experiencing chronic delusional beliefs about women and religion.”
Radillo stated that he wanted “ ‘to sleep with 1000 women and save
them from going to hell’ ” and he had been exercising daily for this
purpose. Radillo commented that women “ ‘are she-devils who will make
[him] sacrifice animals, but [he] will have to do it because they will make
[him]. It says so in the Bible.’ ” He also stated that these women would
make him “ ‘burn incense to summon demons.’ ”
3 Section 1026, subdivision (f) provides: “If the defendant is confined in a state
hospital or other treatment facility as an inpatient, the medical director of the facility
shall, at six-month intervals, submit a report in writing to the court and the community
program director of the county of commitment, or a designee, setting forth the status and
progress of the defendant.”
5.
The report notes that Radillo has not engaged in any assaultive
behaviors and that he has generally been pleasant and followed directions.
However, while he has been willingly taking his medication, he was
refusing to participate in any program that he perceived to be treatment.
The report states that Radillo “does not believe he has a mental illness …
and he has not been motivated to attend groups.”
Under “VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT,” the forensic evaluator
concluded that “[i]f Mr. Radillo were to be moved to a different setting
(e.g., prison, CONREP, straight release, etc.), the severity of his symptoms
and his limited coping abilities would increase his risk for being a danger to
others, and it would also increase his risk for victimization (e.g., sexual
exploitation).”
The Sentencing Hearing
On January 27, 2022, the trial court held Radillo’s sentencing
hearing. The hearing occurred after Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill
No. 124 went into effect, and therefore, applied prospectively to Radillo’s
sentence.
At the hearing, Radillo’s family addressed his history of mental
health issues, and claimed that he had suffered mental and physical abuse
as a child. Radillo’s brother told the court that he would assume
responsibility for Radillo’s care if Radillo were to be released, with support
from other family members.
Trial counsel discussed Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No.
124, and the application of these newly enacted laws to Radillo’s sentence.
She explained that Senate Bill No. 567 “require[s] the Court to impose a
term of imprisonment not exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that have been either stipulated to by the
Defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or a
judge in a court trial.” Trial counsel added that the trial court would
presumably be able to base factors in aggravation and mitigation of
Radillo’s sentence upon the preliminary hearing transcript, and reports and
statements submitted by the defense or the victim (R.R.) and the victim’s
family. Trial counsel stated, “[n]othing at this point has been stipulated to
by the Defendant as to specific aggravating factors, but I believe the Court
has reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript. That included the
testimony of his father, who is essentially the victim or complaining
witness in this case.”
6.
Trial counsel observed that two factors in aggravation arguably
applied, including: Radillo’s threat to his father, which may constitute a
“threat of great bodily harm” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)), and
the destruction of R.R.’s home, which would likely qualify as damage of
“great monetary value” (rule 4.421(a)(9)). However, she emphasized that
there were multiple mitigating factors applicable, including: the fact that
Radillo had no prior criminal record (rule 4.423(b)(1)); he was suffering
from schizophrenia, which was documented by family members and mental
health reports (rule 4.423(b)(2) & (4)); he voluntarily acknowledged
wrongdoing at an early stage (rule 4.423(b)(8)); and that he is ineligible for
probation, and but for his ineligibility, probation would likely have been
granted (rule 4.423(b)(9)).
Trial counsel further observed that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
added by the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 124, required the court to
impose the low term of incarceration if Radillo’s youth was a contributing
factor to the offense. Under the statute, “youth” is defined as being under
the age of 26 at the time of the offense. (See § 1016.7.) Radillo was 20
years old when the crime occurred.
With respect to Radillo’s mental health issue, trial counsel stated that
the court was permitted to consider the mental health report from the
Department of State Hospitals in its sentencing decision and she referred to
findings within the report throughout her argument. Trial counsel
acknowledged that Radillo had made statements that were “delusional and
concerning,” and admitted that “he’s not in remission at this time.”
However, she opined that he did “not appear to be acting on these
[delusions] in any way that creates a risk to himself or others.” Trial
counsel remarked, “[Radillo] is medication compliant and these delusions
don’t seem to have led to any actual issues.”
According to trial counsel, “[t]he big concern here really is, if he
gets upper term, he will still have time left in prison and he will go to [the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation].” Trial counsel
added that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) lacks significant mental health treatment. Alternatively, if Radillo
were to be released, she asserted that Radillo could participate in an
outpatient treatment program, which his family was committed to.
The prosecutor agreed that the trial court could take the mental
health report into consideration in its sentencing decision. He explained the
report could be considered under factors that reasonably relate to the
defendant. (See rule 4.421(c) [the court can consider “[a]ny other factors
statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation or which reasonably
7.
relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was
committed”].)
The prosecutor characterized the hospital report as “concerning.”
The hospital report stated that if Radillo were moved into a different
setting, “ ‘the severity of his symptoms and his limited coping skills would
increase his risk for being a danger to others, and it would also increase his
risk for possible victimization.’ ” According to the prosecutor, the hospital
report demonstrated that if Radillo were to be released, he would be a
danger to his family and to the community.
Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court concluded that
imposition of the upper term of eight years was warranted, finding the
factors in aggravation outweighed the factors in mitigation. The trial court
found that the threat of harm to R.R. had been significant, and the court
expressed concern about releasing Radillo to his family and into the
community. The trial court explained, “the Defendant does not have any
insight and appreciation that he has a mental health issue and he does not
acknowledge that.” Further, “although he does take medication, he does
not participate in any therapy.” The trial court stated that Radillo’s
expressed desire to be released so that he could “sleep with a thousand
women” was “very concerning.” The court observed that Radillo had been
taking active steps to carry out that delusion, including working out every
day.
B. The Trial Court’s Error in Failing to Comply with Subdivision (b)(2)
of Section 1170 Was Not Harmless
In Lynch, our Supreme Court recently held that if a trial court imposes an
aggravated term based on facts not proven in accordance with section 1170, subdivision
(b), the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded unless we can conclude, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that a jury would have necessarily found all aggravating factors relied
upon by the trial court to be true. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742-743, 761.) “In
making this determination, we may ‘ “examine[ ] what the jury necessarily did find and
ask[ ] whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that without
also finding the missing fact as well.” [Citation.]’ ... We may also find the omission
8.
harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the omitted [fact] was
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 775.)4
Here, the trial court found that the upper term was justified based upon the
presence of two aggravating factors: First, the crime involved a threat of great bodily
harm (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); and second, that Radillo poses a significant
risk of harm to the community and his family (rule 4.421(b)(1)).
Regarding the first aggravating factor, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates
that Radillo’s commitment offense involved a threat of great bodily harm (see Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)). During the commitment offense, Radillo punched his father
in the mouth and ribs, told him that “ ‘[t]his is a warning. Next time I kill you,’ ” and
started a fire inside of the family’s home, causing the home to burn down. Although
Radillo observes that his father had fled the home before it burned down and that he did
not actually inflict great bodily injury upon him, that does not diminish the gravity of his
offenses, or the fact that they involved a threat of great bodily injury. We conclude that
this evidence, which was uncontested, supports the court’s true finding on this factor.
(See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.)
With respect to the second aggravating factor, the record contains strong evidence
demonstrating that Radillo “has engaged in violent conduct that indicates [he represents]
a serious danger to society” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1)). However, our
primary concern with respect to this factor is that the most compelling evidence of
Radillo’s risk of danger—the forensic evaluator’s opinion that Radillo’s risk of danger to
4 Lynch also held that for sentences imposed under the former version of section
1170, subdivision (b), “the record must clearly indicate that the court would have found
an upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited discretion.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 743.) Radillo was sentenced after amended section 1170, subdivision (b)
had already gone into effect. Because the sentencing court here was aware of its limited
discretion, this factor is not relevant here.
9.
others would increase if he were placed in a different setting—was neither stipulated to
nor admitted by trial counsel.
The mental health report contains evidence showing that despite being compliant
with his medication, Radillo is chronically delusional, he lacks any insight into his mental
health disorder, and he refuses to participate in group therapy. Radillo correctly observes
that he does not have prior convictions for violent crimes, and that he has not engaged in
any assaultive behaviors during his commitment to the Department of State Hospitals.
However, the mental health report contains an opinion by the forensic evaluator opining
that “[i]f Mr. Radillo were to be moved to a different setting (e.g., prison, CONREP,
straight release, etc.), the severity of his symptoms and his limited coping abilities would
increase his risk for being a danger to others, and it would also increase his risk for
victimization (e.g., sexual exploitation).”
While trial counsel acknowledged that Radillo remained delusional and refused to
participate in therapy, they did not concede or agree to the accuracy of the forensic
evaluator’s assessment. We do not interpret counsel’s failure to address the forensic
evaluator’s opinion as an implicit admission of its validity. Given the facts expressly
admitted by trial counsel and the absence of any demonstrated violent behavior despite
Radillo’s chronic hallucinations, a rational trier of fact could reasonably disagree as to
whether this factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, our Supreme Court has cautioned against attempting to determine whether
a jury would have found true aggravating circumstances that require “ ‘ “an imprecise
quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts.” ’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp.
775-776.) The Court explained, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance
... rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing
court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury
would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” ’ ” (Id. at p.
775.)
10.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude remand for a trial on the aggravating facts,
or sentencing to a different term is warranted. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776
[“ ‘ “The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof — where ... [aggravating facts]
were ‘never tried’ to the jury — is to remand and give the People an opportunity to
retry” ’ ” the aggravating facts].)5 We will therefore remand this matter back to the lower
court for that purpose.
II. The Trial Court Complied with Assembly Bill No. 124
In his original appeal, Radillo asserted that the trial court failed to consider that
certain factors contributed to the commission of the offense (see § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B)),
including the fact that he was 20 years old when the crime occurred, that he has a mental
illness, and that he suffered physical and emotional abuse throughout his childhood. We
conclude that the record shows the trial court considered the presence of mitigating
factors under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B), but determined that “the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (Ibid.)
A. Relevant Legal Principles
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 124 amended section 1170 by
adding paragraph (6) to subdivision (b), which provides: “Notwithstanding paragraph
(1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth, or was a youth as
defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the
5 Radillo may also stipulate to the presence of the aggravating factors on remand.
11.
offense. [¶] (C) Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the
offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Section 1016.7, subdivision (b), defines a “ ‘youth’ ” as “any
person under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed.”6
B. Analysis
At the sentencing hearing, Radillo’s family stated that he had been physically and
psychologically abused as a child and they offered testimony describing his history of
mental health issues. Further, trial counsel explained how Radillo’s schizophrenia-
related delusions contributed to his commitment offense. She also advised the trial court
that under amended section 1170, it was required to impose the low term of incarceration
if certain circumstances were contributing factors to the commission of the offense,
including the fact that Radillo was under the age of 26 at the time of the offense. The
amendments to which trial counsel was referring were subdivision (b)(6) of section 1170
and section 1016.7, which were added by the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 124.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5, adding § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B); Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 4,
adding § 1016.7.)
The trial court acknowledged that Radillo’s mental health issue had precipitated
the crime and found that it was “a significant factor in mitigation.” Nonetheless, the trial
court imposed the upper term sentence. The fact that the trial court did not expressly
state all of the factors it had considered in concluding “the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) does not mean that it failed to
consider Radillo’s age at the time of the offense and the fact that he suffered abuse as a
child.
6 The Attorney General observes that the amendments to section 1170 making the
lower term the presumptive sentence were initially made by Assembly Bill No. 124, but
were incorporated into Senate Bill No. 567, which was later enacted.
12.
We do not presume error upon a silent record. To the contrary, “ ‘[a] judgment or
order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an
ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To prevail, appellants must overcome this presumption
by affirmatively establishing prejudicial error. We conclude that upon this record,
Radillo has failed to meet his burden.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The matter is remanded back to the lower
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
13.
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