People v. Lara CA4/3

CourtListener 10352259Calctapp07.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/7/25 P. v. Lara CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063655

v. (Super. Ct. No. 95NF2384)

MANUEL LARA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
*
THE COURT:
Defendant Manuel Lara appeals the trial court’s denial of his
petition to recall his sentence and resentence him, pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.75.1 Defendant argues he is entitled to be resentenced on his
now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement.
The Attorney General argues defendant is not entitled to resentencing
because the trial court struck the section 667.5 enhancement. We agree with
defendant and reverse and remand for resentencing.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree burglary of
an inhabited dwelling (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 1) and extortion (§ 518;
count 2). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The trial court found
true the allegations that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), was a recidivist having suffered two prior
serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)),
and had served a prior prison term (§ 667, subd. (b)).

The trial court sentenced defendant as a third strike offender to
an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 1, plus a term of 5 years for
the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement, and one year for the section
12022, subdivision (b) enhancement. The court imposed but struck the

* Before O’Leary, P. J., Moore, J., Sanchez, J.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement for purposes of
sentencing only.
In 2023, defendant filed a petition for recall of sentence pursuant
to section 1172.75 and declared in his petition that his “name and case
number appear on the . . . list provided by the [Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation] to the Court, District Attorney, and Public Defender.”
The trial court declined to recall defendant’s sentence “because all related
enhancements were either stayed or stricken at time of sentencing.” The trial
court, relying on the reasoning in People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38,
42, review granted February 21, 2024, S283169, concluded, “[T]he ambiguous
[term] ‘imposed’ was shorthand for ‘imposed and executed’” because section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), which requires the sentence to be lessened, would
otherwise “not make sense . . . .”
DISCUSSION
I.
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RESENTENCING HEARING
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides, “Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a
prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” The
question before us is whether section 1172.75 entitles defendant to a
resentencing hearing where his prior prison terms were stricken for the
purposes of sentencing.
A. Standard of Review
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo, under well-settled standards. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 961.) In interpreting a statute, ‘“[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to

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determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences
the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than
one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’” (Sierra Club v.
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165–166.) “We must look to the
statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (People v.
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126.)
B. Analysis
Analysis of the statute and its legislative history leads us to
conclude that section 1172.75 applies to enhancements, like defendant’s,
which were stricken for purposes of sentencing, not just those that were
imposed and executed.
First, the plain language of section 1172.75 does not limit its
application solely to those defendants whose enhancements were executed.
Rather, the statute requires identification of “those persons in . . . custody
currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an [invalid]
enhancement . . . .” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Thus, the fact that the Legislature
did not require that section 1172.75 apply only to those defendants actually
serving a sentence for the enhancement indicates the Legislature did not
intend to restrict relief to those defendants whose sentences have been both
imposed and executed. This position is consistent with cases which have
concluded that section 1172.75 applies to enhancements which have been
imposed but stayed. (See, e.g., People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
300, 305, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189.) As the Christianson court

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noted, “[I]f the Legislature . . . intended to limit section 1172.75 only to those
individuals [who] were currently serving an additional term based on the
enhancement, it had the ability to do so.” (Id. at p. 313.)
Second, applying section 1172.75 to enhancements which were
stricken for purposes of sentencing comports with the Legislature’s express
intent in ‘“reducing sentences’” and ameliorating ‘“existing racial and socio-
economic disparities in our criminal justice system.’” (People v. Saldana
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1277, review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547.)
When an enhancement has been found true, it becomes part of the judgment
and must be addressed as part of the sentencing process. Even where the
court strikes the enhancement for purposes of sentencing, as here, it may
later be imposed and executed so that the defendant serves an additional
term of imprisonment, contrary to the Legislature’s intent in reducing
sentences.
Additionally, we agree with the sole published case to address
this issue, which concluded that section 1172.75 applies to enhancements
which were stricken at sentencing. (People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
188, 194, review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.) We agree with the Espino
majority that there is no articulable reason to differentiate between section
667.5 enhancements which have been executed, stayed, or stricken for
purposes of sentencing. In each of these cases, the judgment contains a now-
invalid enhancement for a prior prison term, regardless of how the court
originally addressed such enhancement.
Accordingly, the plain language of the statute, legislative intent,
and case law support the conclusion that defendants subject to now-invalid
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements are entitled to a resentencing
hearing, regardless of whether the enhancement was imposed and executed.

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We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s request for
resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying defendant’s petition for recall
and resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
resentencing pursuant to the terms of section 1172.75. Upon conclusion of the
new sentencing hearing, the trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.

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