People v. Brissette CA5

CourtListener 10352233Calctapp07.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/7/25 P. v. Brissette CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088468
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SC072218A)
v.

THOMAS FLOYD BRISSETTE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David Wolf,
Judge.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Dina
Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and DeSantos, J.
Defendant and appellant Thomas Floyd Brissette (Brissette) is 67 years old and
serving an eight-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance by an inmate.
Brissette has stage IV liver cancer. As a result of his cancer, the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent the presiding judge of the Kern County
Superior Court notice that Brissette met the criteria for recall of sentence/compassionate
release under Penal Code section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1).1 The trial court denied
compassionate release. On appeal, Brissette argues the court erred by: (1) applying the
wrong standard of review when it denied release; (2) concluding the evidence of his
physical condition was sufficient to preclude relief under section 1172.2; and
(3) concluding there was sufficient evidence that he would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger if released. We affirm.
EXPANDED PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 1976, Brissette pled guilty in the Los Angeles County Superior Court to a
violation of former section 12031, subdivision (a) (carrying a loaded firearm).
In April 1980, Brissette was convicted in the Los Angeles County Superior Court
of a violation of section 220 (assault with the intent to commit rape).
In August 1985, Brissette was convicted in the Los Angeles County Superior
Court of a violation of section 187 (second degree murder) and sentenced to 15 years to
life plus seven years.
In April 1998, while still incarcerated for the 1985 murder conviction, Brissette
pled guilty in the Kern County Superior Court to a violation of section 4573.6
(possession of a controlled substance by an inmate) and was sentenced to eight years,
consecutive to the 1985 sentence for murder.
In July 2024, the CDCR notified the Kern County Superior Court that Brissette
met the clinical criteria for release under section 1172.2, subdivision (b).

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
In August 2024, after a contested hearing, the trial court denied a recall of
sentence/compassionate release under section 1172.2.2
GENERAL BACKGROUND
1976 Conviction for Violation of Former Section 12031
In July 1976, Brissette believed that the victim had broken into his (Brissette’s) car
and stolen stereo tapes. Brissette argued with the victim. Brissette later returned to the
victim’s house where he honked his horn. When the victim looked out his window, he
observed Brissette point and fire a shotgun at his house. The victim got a rifle and fired
back. Later that night, Brissette returned to the victim’s house and fired additional
shotgun shots into the house and the victim’s car.
1980 Conviction for Violation of Section 220
In July 1979, Brissette’s 14-year-old sister-in-law (the sister of Brissette’s wife)
was sleeping in Brissette’s home. The sister-in-law was awakened by Brissette as he was
choking her. Brissette was naked and had an erect penis. The sister-in-law began
screaming. Brissette told her to stop screaming because he was going to do what he
wanted anyway. Brissette’s wife asked him to leave her sister alone, but Brissette
refused.
1985 Conviction for Violation of Section 187
In September 1984, Brissette went to the residence of his girlfriend J.H. and said
that he had to talk to her. At the residence, he slapped her in the face. Later, J.H. went to
visit Q.A. On her way, she observed Brissette standing with his brother-in-law. J.H.
went inside Q.A.’s residence. J.H. and Q.A. later went outside and, as they were going
down the stairs, J.H. observed Brissette. J.H. started going back up the stairs, and

2 The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a section 1172.2 petition and
recalled Brissette’s life sentence for the 1985 murder conviction. This appeal concerns
only Brissette’s section 1172.2 petition with respect to the 1998 drug conviction in Kern
County.

3.
Brissette ordered her to come down. Q.A. intervened and told Brissette to leave the
residence, but Brissette demanded to speak with J.H. Brissette and Q.A. began arguing
and yelling at each other. Brissette then pulled out a pistol and shot Q.A., who died from
the gunshot wound.
1998 Conviction for Violation of Section 4573.6
In March 1997, Brissette was incarcerated. A confidential informant told a
corrections officer that Brissette was in the main exercise yard and trying to sell heroin.
An officer approached Brissette and conducted a search. The officer looked inside
Brissett’s mouth and saw cellophane under his tongue. After pretending to swallow the
cellophane, Brissette spit the cellophane out. The cellophane contained two bindles. Lab
tests revealed that the bindles contained methamphetamine.
CDCR Section 1172.2 Notification
On July 15, 2024, the Kern County Superior Court received notification from
CDCR Director of Health Care Services Dr. Joseph Bick that Brissette met “the clinical
criteria for recall of the current prison commitment and sentence.” The notice stated that
documents from May 9, 2024, demonstrated that Brissette was 66 years old and had been
diagnosed with lymphoma (for which he received chemotherapy), cirrhosis of the liver
complicated by esophageal varices, and liver cancer. The liver cancer was diagnosed in
2021 but had recently spread beyond the liver. Although Brissette was receiving
treatment, the treatment would not be curative. The notice explained that Brissette was
ambulatory with the use of a cane and was able to feed, bathe, and dress himself.
However, “[d]ue to his advanced liver disease and liver cancer, physicians have
determined him to have an end-of-life trajectory and 12 months or less to live.” The
notice included a diagnostic study report (the Study). The Study included a discussion of
Brissette’s health, criminal history, prison disciplinary history, and other relevant
considerations for assessing whether to recall his sentence. The Study also noted that if
released, Brissette would live at an independent living facility operated by his sister.

4.
Trial Court’s Ruling
In denying a sentence recall, the trial court explained:

“All right. I did read the 84 page diagnostic study submitted by [the]
CDC[R] pursuant to [section] 1172.2. On page 6, it notes, ‘Here it is
undisputed that … Brissette has a serious criminal record including a
conviction for rape in 1979, a murder in 1984. He’s currently 68 years old.
And these serious offenses have occurred 45 and 40 years ago when he was
21 and 26 years old. Since the murder offense in 1984, he has sustained
one conviction for possession of drugs in prison.’ And then it is says
clearly ‘… Brissette does not presently possess an unreasonable risk that he
will commit a new super strike.’ And that’s pursuant to [the] CDCR’s note.
They summarize his job assignments including [p]orter, medical assistance,
maintenance mechanic, teacher’s aide, barber[,] laundry, clerk, kitchen
worker, electrical, PC repair, outside work crew, and RASP [(a recycling
and salvage program)]. He’s currently in a medium single cell and a work
group, privilege group presently unassigned. They reviewed his 115’s and
128’s which are lengthy.[3] Some of which [were] as recently as 2022 and
2023. Looking in the medical section, which is repeated more than once
including a second time on page 21, he was originally treated and had a
complete response to that treatment. On page 13, the medical opinion is he
has between months and years to live. He’s in current[ly] a stable condition
and responding to treatment. On page 16, Dr. Chakrabarty … quotes
Dr. Burgoyne … and notes again that [Brissette’s prognosis] is months to
years. They note that his cancer is responsive to treatment. They noticed
his weight is stable. They said that [Brissette] reports a loss of appetite.
However, his weight is stable. They note that [Brissette] does not have any
difficulty ambulating. They also note that he has [a] history of affiliation
with organized criminal activity. They note that his prior criminal history
includes a [section] 290 offense. On page 17 of the report, they note that
again his prognosis includes months to years. He’s currently stable, and the
cancer is responding to treatment. They note that he doesn’t have any
difficulty ambulating. He can take care of himself and takes care of his
own hygiene, bathing, et cetera. They note that he committed criminal acts
which indicate that he is a danger to the public if released. That is on
page 17. They note that [Brissette’s] documented institutional behavior

3 A CDCR form 115 documents misconduct that is believed to be a violation of law
or is not minor in nature. A CDCR form 128 documents incidents of minor misconduct.
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3312, subd. (a)(2), (3).)

5.
does reflect a history of offense[s] involving force, violence, assault[,] and
predatory sexual behavior. They also note that he does have the capacity to
influence others and commit acts that endanger public safety. They note he
does ambulate. He can feed, dress, [and] bathe himself. He doesn’t have
any problems going to the bathroom. He’s not on oxygen. Looking at his
criminal history that was attached. In 1976, he was arguing with a victim.
[Brissette] went outside. The victim looked out of his residence, and
[Brissette] pointed a shotgun at him and fired it. … Then in [19]79, the
victim was a 14-year-old sister of [Brissette’s] wife. She was awakened
because he was choking her. He was naked, and she began screaming. He
told her to shut up because he was going to do what he wanted to do
anyway. [Brissette’s] wife came in and asked him to leave the victim alone,
and he still refused. He was convicted of rape of a 14-year-old, which is
why he’s a [section] 290 registrant. Later that same year, he’s got another
assault and brandishing involving a knife. And then when he’s convicted of
the murder, the evaluation indicates that he’s an extremely dangerous
individual. His record, and … quoting from the memo filed by [the]
CDCR. The quote is and the evaluation, ‘Once again [Brissette] has clearly
established the fact that he’s an extremely dangerous individual. His record
is replete with incidents of assault types of behavior including the sexual
molestation of a 14-year-old girl. It was for this reason that he was
sentenced to [s]tate [p]rison a little more than four years ago. Now within a
matter of months after his release on parole, he’s been accused of a
cold-blooded murder of another human being. Circumstances in
aggravation were the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm,
threat of great bodily harm, and acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, [and] callousness.’ They note [Brissette] was armed with a
gun. That he has engaged in a pattern of violent conduct which indicates
he’s a serious danger to society. His prior convictions of adult were
previously an adjudications were of increasingly seriousness. [Sic.] He’s
been in prison before. He was on parole when he committed the murder,
and his prior performance on parole and probation were unsatisfactory.
With regards to the factors listed in mitigation, the Court found that there
were none. And his most recent [p]arole [b]oard hearing, the [p]arole
[b]oard instructed him to receive no more 115’s or 128’s. They denied him
for an additional five years. … His current release plan is to go into an
independent living residence that his [sister] operates, and she indicates that
they do have a room for potential [h]ospice. This court has significant
concerns about the other patients. What about a patient that is not
ambulatory[?] This one is. [Brissette] has already shown that he’s willing
to victimize a 14-year-old. I don’t think he has any trouble of taking
advantage of vulnerable people there. And at this point he’s fully
ambulatory. This is a terrible plan and would put everybody at risk of

6.
this—at this facility. … And frankly, having this fully ambulatory
murderer, a child molester roaming in a facility of [this] type is an
outrageously ridiculous plan. Because he’s fully ambulatory and has no
qualms of taking advantage of vulnerable victims, he is not a suitable
candidate for compassionate release. The motion is denied. We are
adjourned at this time.”
DISCUSSION
Parties’ Arguments
Brissette argues that the trial court erred by denying his section 1172.2 petition.
The CDCR notice from Bick established that Brissette met the clinical criteria for
compassionate release under section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1), which meant that
compassionate release could be denied only if there was an unreasonable risk that his
release would pose a danger to the public. However, the court prejudicially erred by
using the wrong standard and concluding that, because Brissette was ambulatory and had
the capacity to take advantage of vulnerable people, compassionate release was improper.
Brissette also argues substantial evidence does not support the conclusion that his
physical condition precluded release because he has serious and advanced medical
conditions. Finally, Brissette argues that the court erred by failing to consider and
explain why his current condition would make him an unreasonable danger if released,
and instead simply relied on old acts that significantly predated his liver cancer.
The People argue that the trial court did not err. The court found that Brissette was
ambulatory and stable and that his cancer was responsive to treatment. There was no
evidence that Brissette was actively progressing to death, and thus, there was insufficient
evidence that he was on an end-of-life trajectory. Further, the court recognized that
Brissette’s criminal history, prison disciplinary history, and current physical condition
constitute substantial evidence that Brissette would pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to the public if he were released.
We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying compassionate release.

7.
Legal Standards
1. Section 1172.2
California law provides that if the statewide chief medical executive, after
consultation with other clinical executives, determines that an incarcerated person meets
either of two sets of statutorily established medical criteria, the CDCR “must recommend
to the court that the incarcerated person’s sentence be recalled.” (§ 1172.2, subd. (a);
People v. Multani (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1342 (Multani).) One of the medical
criteria provides that the “incarcerated person has a serious and advanced illness with an
end-of-life trajectory.” (§ 1172.2, subd. (b)(1); Multani, at p. 1342; People v. Lewis
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 408.) If the trial court finds that the incarcerated person is
in fact suffering from a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory, then a
presumption in favor of recall and resentencing arises. (§ 1172.2, subd. (b); Multani, at
p. 1342; Lewis, at pp. 408–409.) The presumption “may only be overcome” if the court
finds, “based on the incarcerated person’s current physical and mental condition,” that the
incarcerated person would pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” if the
sentence is recalled. (§ 1172.2, subd. (b); Multani, at p. 1343; Lewis, at pp. 408–409.)
An “unreasonable risk of danger” is statutorily defined through incorporation of
section 1170.18 (§ 1172.2, subd. (b)) to mean “an unreasonable risk that the [incarcerated
person] will commit a new violent felony under [section 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)].”
(§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) These violent felonies are known as “ ‘super strikes,’ ” and
include murder, attempted murder, sexually violent offenses, and sexual offenses against
minors under the age of 14. (Multani, at p. 1343; see also § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv);
People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351, fn. 3; Lewis, at p. 409.)
A trial court’s factual findings under section 1172.2 are reviewed for substantial
evidence. (Multani, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1343.) “Substantial evidence” is
evidence that is “ ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value,’ ” such that it “ ‘ “ ‘reasonably
inspires confidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307.) A court’s

8.
section 1172.2 rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Lewis, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 409; Nijmeddin v. Superior Court (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 77, 83.)
A court may abuse its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard, bases its
decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449), or makes a ruling that is so
erroneous that it falls outside the bounds of reason in light of the applicable law and
relevant facts. (See People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605; People v. Garcia
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 503.)
2. General Appellate Review
“[W]e presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, ‘ “[a]ll
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 666; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1139.) As a result,
any ambiguity or uncertainty in the record will be resolved against the appellant. (See
People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 866; People v. Clifton (1969) 270
Cal.App.2d 860, 862.) Further, because we examine a trial court’s legal ruling, not its
reasoning, if the ruling was correct on any theory or ground applicable to the case, then
the ruling will be affirmed. (See People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123–124;
People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.) Finally, we will “ ‘ “ ‘imply all findings
necessary to support the judgment [or order],’ ” ’ ” so long as the implied findings are
supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 211, 217;
People v. Therman (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1279 (Therman).)
Analysis
The trial court’s order is somewhat ambiguous because it does not clearly make
findings envisioned by section 1172.2. Instead, the court noted specific aspects of the
Study and then denied release because of the danger that Brissette would pose to the
other residents of and visitors to his sister’s facility. Subject to some exceptions, we

9.
believe that the particular aspects of the Study identified by the court represent the court’s
findings. So viewing the order, the court made the following relevant findings: (1) in
1979, Brissette raped or molested his 14-year-old sister-in-law, despite his wife telling
him to stop;4 (2) also in 1979, Brissette assaulted someone while brandishing a knife;
(3) in 1976, Brissette argued with someone and then fired a shotgun at that person; (4) in
1984, Brissette murdered someone with a gun and there were numerous aggravating
circumstances associated with the crime;5 (5) Brissette has a lengthy disciplinary record
in prison, which includes violations as recently as 2022 and 2023; (6) Brissette’s prison
disciplinary record includes violations involving force, violence, and assault;6

4 Brissette argues it was not established that he assaulted a 14-year-old with the
intent to commit rape. Brissette also argues that there is no indication that he was
convicted for violating section 220, subdivision (a)(2), which deals with crimes against
individuals under the age of 18. However, in 1979, former section 220 did not have a
subdivision (a)(2) or any subdivision. Moreover, a 1984 probation report and the Study
both show Brissette was convicted of a section 220 offense against his 14-year-
old sister-in-law. Brissette never objected in the trial court to this aspect of the Study or
contended that his victim was not 14 years old. Thus, Brissette is precluded from now
raising the issue in this appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.)
5 Brissette’s opening brief states that the Study contained information from his
criminal history and a 40-year-old probation report, and that the information was
“unreliable hearsay.” However, Brissette never made any hearsay objections to the trial
court. Further, Brissette’s argument on appeal is a five-word sentence that is unsupported
by citation to any authority. The failure to cite authority is noteworthy because some
hearsay evidence may be considered at sentencing hearings. (People v. Del Rio (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 47, 56–57.) Given the failure to object below, and the failure to adequately
develop and support the argument here, we conclude Brissette has forfeited any hearsay
issues associated with the Study. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1318
[“Defendant forfeited his hearsay claim because he failed to object on that ground.”];
People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 186 [unsupported and undeveloped
arguments are forfeited on appeal].)
6 The trial court stated that the Study concluded Brissette’s prison history involved
“force, violence, assault, and predatory sexual behavior.” However, the Study actually
stated that Brissette’s prison history involved “force, violence, assault, or predatory
sexual behavior.” (Italics added.) Further, while a review of Brissette’s prison
disciplinary record includes instances of combat with other inmates, stabbing other

10.
(7) Brissette’s record is “replete” with incidents of assaultive behavior; (8) Brissette has
the capacity to influence others;7 (9) Brissette has the capacity to commit acts that
endanger public safety; (10) Brissette has committed acts which indicate that he would be
a danger to the public if released;8 (11) Brissette has cancer; (12) the cancer is responsive
to treatment; (13) Brissette is medically stable; (14) Brissette’s prognosis is that he has
months to years to live;9 (15) Brissette can bathe, feed, and dress himself; (16) Brissette
is ambulatory; and (17) Brissette has no problems taking advantage of vulnerable victims.
In light of Brissette’s plan to live at his sister’s facility, and because he was fully
ambulatory and had no qualms of taking advantage of vulnerable victims, the court
concluded that Brissette was not a candidate for compassionate release. For
two independent reasons, we conclude that these findings support the conclusion that
Brissette is not entitled to compassionate release under section 1172.2.

inmates, and possession of weapons, it does not include any violations involving sexual
behavior. Therefore, substantial evidence does not support a finding that Brissette’s
prison disciplinary record involves instances of predatory sexual behavior.
7 We note that this finding is supported by a serious rule violation in which he
“incited another inmate to disobey orders.”
8 The Study specifically states: “The inmate has committed other criminal acts,
either before or during the current incarceration period, which indicates he would be a
danger to the public if released ([r]efer to in-custody disciplinary history).”
9 Brissette points out that Bick concluded Brissette had less than a year to live. This
is true. However, the basis for Bick’s prognosis is unclear and appears inconsistent with
the study. The Study shows that Brissette’s treating physician, Burgoyne, opined that
Brissette had “months to years” to live. Reviewing physician Chakrabarty repeated
Burgoyne’s prognosis without limitation, which indicated agreement with that prognosis.
The trial court clearly found Burgoyne and Chakrabarty’s opinions to be more accurate
because it repeated the “months to years” prognosis multiple times in its ruling, but did
not once mention Bick’s prognosis. Considering the opinions of Burgoyne and
Chakrabarty, and the unknown reason for disagreement between Bick, Bourgoyne, and
Chakrabarty, the court had ample basis to accept that Brissette had “months to years” to
live.

11.
First, the trial court did not make an express finding as to whether Brissette met
the clinical criteria of section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1). The record clearly shows that
Brissette has stage IV liver cancer that has metastasized, and the current treatment is not
curative. Therefore, Brissette has a serious and advanced illness. However, an
“ ‘end-of-life trajectory’ requires, at a minimum, an illness that is progressing toward
death at the time the petition is filed .…” (Multani, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1350.)
Here, the court found that Brissette’s condition was stable and that the treatment,
although not curative, was effective. In other words, although Brissette has a serious
illness that cannot be cured by known treatments, the illness was responding to the
treatment and not progressing. This is consistent with a prognosis that Brissette is stable
and may have years to live. Therefore, the court’s findings, which were supported by the
Study, demonstrate that Brissette was not on an end-of-life trajectory at the time the
section 1172.2 notice was filed. (See Multani, at p. 1350.) Because Brissette does not
meet the clinical criteria of section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1), he is not entitled to
relief.10 (See Multani, at pp. 1350–1351 [holding that an inmate who had an incurable
solid-tumor cancer that was “ ‘suppressed’ ” by treatment was not on an end-of-life
trajectory and thus, not entitled to release under section 1172.2]; see also People v.
Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 976 [appellate courts may affirm a lower court on any legal
ground supported by the record].)
Second, and alternatively, the trial court did not expressly hold that Brissette posed
an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike if released. However, that is the clear
implied finding that the court made.11 In finding Brissette unsuitable for release, the

10 As in Multani, nothing forecloses the possibility that Brissette may obtain
compassionate release in the future if his circumstances change. (Multani, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 1351.)
11 Brissette states without argument or citation to authority that the court made no
implied findings. We decline to accept this unsupported assertion. (People v. Davis
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 694, 721 [unsupported and undeveloped arguments are forfeited];

12.
court heavily considered Brissette’s criminal history, which included the molestation of
his 14-year-old sister-in-law, the murder of someone with whom he was arguing,12 and
the assault with a shotgun of another individual with whom he was arguing. The court
also made note of Brissette’s extensive prison disciplinary history, which included a
number of violent infractions (some of which involved weapons) and included serious
(though nonviolent) infractions as recently as 2023. Brissette’s prison disciplinary
history reflects an inability to satisfactorily follow appropriate rules. Indeed, the court
noted that the Study itself stated that Brissette’s behavior suggested that he would pose a
danger to the public if released. The court also highlighted Brissette’s proposed living
arrangement if released. Brissette would go to a facility run by his sister, where he could
interact with other residents, some of whom may be non-ambulatory, and young visitors.
Finally, the court found that Brissette was ambulatory and willing to take advantage of
vulnerable people. The record shows that Brissette is 6 feet 5 inches tall. As a large and
ambulatory individual, Brissette has the ability to physically harm non-ambulatory or
limited-ambulatory residents, as well as young visiting children, particularly if significant
disagreements arise. We conclude that these considerations, that is Brissette’s criminal
history, disciplinary history, and current physical condition (stable and ambulatory),
constitute substantial evidence that support the implied finding that Brissette would pose
an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike against vulnerable fellow residents of,
or young visitors to, his sister’s facility if released. (§ 1172.2, subd. (b); Therman, supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.) This implied finding is not so erroneous that it exceeds the

People v. Holford, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 [same]; People v. Watkins (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 [same]; see also People v. Race, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 217
[appellate courts presume implied findings]; Therman, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279
[same].)
12 We note that there is nothing in the record to suggest that the victim was armed.

13.
bounds of reason. (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 605.) Therefore, the court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Brissette’s section 1172.2 petition.
Brissette argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard because being fully
ambulatory and having no qualms about taking advantage of vulnerable victims does not
meet the requirements of section 1172.2, subdivision (b) for overcoming the presumption
in favor of release. However, Brissette is taking a much too narrow view of the court’s
ruling and findings. While the court could have made its rulings clearer, the court
identified Brissette’s criminal and prison disciplinary histories, his existing physical
condition, and his proposed living arrangements. The court then held that these
considerations made him an unreasonable danger to the residents of and visitors to his
sister’s facility. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court
knows and correctly follows the law. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.)
Given the nature of the court’s rulings and its conclusion to deny compassionate release,
there is clearly an implied finding that Brissette posed an unreasonable risk of
committing a super strike against the residents of or visitors to his sister’s facility.
(Therman, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.) That is consistent with the requirements
of section 1172.2, subdivision (b). Therefore, the record does not sufficiently
demonstrate that the court applied the wrong standard in evaluating compassionate
release under section 1172.2.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

14.

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