CourtListener 10352200•People v. Fuller CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/7/25 P. v. Fuller CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C099595
v. (Super. Ct. No.
STKCRFECOD20200010153)
AHMAD FULLER, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Ahmad Fuller, Sr., of robbery, kidnapping, making a
criminal threat, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of ammunition
by a convicted felon, carrying a loaded unregistered firearm in public, inflicting corporal
injury upon the mother of his child, unlawful taking of a vehicle, contempt of court,
possession of methamphetamine and a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of
1
methamphetamine for sale, and acquiring personal identifying information with the intent
to defraud. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate determinate prison term of
13 years eight months.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court committed evidentiary error
and violated defendant’s constitutional rights when it inadvertently sent his rap sheet
into the jury deliberation room, (2) the foregoing error also violated the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020 (Racial Justice Act), (3) the statutes prohibiting convicted felons from
possessing firearms and ammunition violate the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution, (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 850 on
the use of expert testimony regarding intimate partner battering, and (5) cumulative
prejudice requires reversal.
We conclude (1) defendant’s evidentiary and constitutional challenges pertaining
to the rap sheet were not forfeited but he has not established reversible error on those
grounds; (2) his Racial Justice Act claim is forfeited and his alternative assertion of
ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of prejudice; (3) the Second Amendment
does not prevent a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition by a
convicted felon; (4) the trial court did not err in instructing with CALCRIM No. 850;
and (5) there is no cumulative prejudice to assess.
We will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Defendant and S.B. were involved in a romantic relationship for about seven
years. They had one child together. The relationship ended about a year before the
events giving rise to defendant’s convictions.
In September 2020, in violation of a domestic violence restraining order,
defendant followed S.B. through Stockton, tailgating her until she pulled over to see what
he wanted. Defendant got out of his car and got into S.B.’s front passenger seat. He then
placed a handgun under the passenger seat, adjusted another handgun that was in his
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waist band, and told S.B. to drive. S.B. was afraid and followed his directions.
Their first stop was a Bank of America in Stockton. At the bank, defendant asked S.B.
how many debit or credit cards she had. S.B. said she had only one, even though she
had several others in her back pocket. Defendant did not believe her and reached into her
pocket to retrieve the other cards. S.B. tried to stop him, but he grabbed her by the neck,
struck her multiple times, and took the cards and her car keys. He used one of the cards
to withdraw money from the ATM.
At defendant’s direction, S.B. drove him to several other locations, including
another Bank of America in Manteca. At some point defendant told S.B. he was going to
have her killed because she was the reason he had been locked up and was on probation.
Eventually, S.B. said she needed to use a restroom. They drove to Walmart where S.B.
locked herself in the restroom. Defendant left the store and drove away in S.B.’s car.
Police arrested defendant about a week later.
During defendant’s arrest, officers removed a loaded and operational 9-millimeter
gun from his waistband. The gun had a polymer frame with no serial number, although
the Glock 17 slide did have a serial number. Defendant also had four $200 Visa gift cards
in his possession. When officers searched defendant’s motel room, they found various
items of merchandise, including power tools still in their packaging that defendant had
purchased from Home Depot using an Employment Development Department (EDD)
debit card that did not belong to him. The room also contained driver’s licenses, social
security cards, and EDD debit cards in the names of various people, as well as notebooks
containing credit card numbers and personal identifying information. Defendant’s motel
room also contained a digital scale and methamphetamine packaged for sale.
Three jailhouse phone calls between defendant and S.B. indicated that defendant
had dissuaded S.B. from testifying at trial, and S.B.’s prior statements were admitted into
evidence for their truth. The statements were admitted through officer testimony and the
admission of bodycam footage from the officer who spoke to S.B. in the Walmart
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restroom. The jailhouse phone calls were also admitted into evidence to show
consciousness of guilt.
Additional background will be set forth in the discussion portion of this opinion as
relevant to the contentions on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends we must reverse each of his convictions because the trial court
committed evidentiary error and violated his constitutional rights by inadvertently
sending his rap sheet into the jury deliberation room. The People argue defendant
forfeited these claims and, in any event, the error does not require reversal. We decline
to find forfeiture, but defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated by the error,
and reversal is not required because defendant has not shown a reasonable probability
of a more favorable result had the error not occurred.
A
S.B. did not testify at trial because defendant procured her unavailability as a
witness. He did so by threatening her during three jailhouse phone calls. The People
moved to admit her prior statements about defendant’s crimes under the doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing. During a hearing on the matter, which was held outside the
presence of the jury, the People adduced testimony from the District Attorney’s
investigator regarding the investigator’s efforts to obtain S.B.’s presence as a witness.
Among other things, the investigator testified she obtained defendant’s rap sheet to show
there was a pending case against him with the same victim. The rap sheet was marked as
People’s Exhibit No. 66 (Exhibit 66) during the hearing. At the conclusion of the
People’s case, Exhibit 66 was admitted into evidence. However, that exhibit was never
intended to be given to the jury during deliberations.
The jury began deliberations on June 1, 2021. Near the end of the next day, the
jury sent the trial court a note indicating that it had reached a verdict on all but one count
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and asking for guidance. The following morning, the trial court consulted with counsel
regarding a response and also stated that the prosecutor had brought an issue to the trial
court’s attention: Exhibit 66 had inadvertently been included in the exhibits given to the
jury.
The trial court indicated it would not remove Exhibit 66 from the deliberation
room after the jury had indicated it had reached a verdict on 12 of the 13 counts, but it
asked for defense counsel’s thoughts. Defense counsel stated that he “would like to find
out if they even looked at it,” but added: “That’s an issue that can be addressed on
appeal. I would like to find out if they ever looked at it. . . . If they had, if it had any
impact on them. [¶] On the other hand, that is something that I can raise with the
attorney on appeal, . . . let them figure out how they want to handle it. That means
somebody will have to contact jurors.” The trial court responded: “I will leave it to
them. There’s a lot of prohibitions about contacting jurors about their mental process and
all.” Defense counsel agreed there were prohibitions and added: “I don’t think that you
could destroy a verdict unnecessarily because they said I saw it, and it had – I don’t think
you can get to what impact did it have. I don’t think you can ask that question at all.”
The trial court agreed. Defense counsel then stated he believed the jury could be asked
whether they saw it. The trial court responded: “Well, that’s part of the evidence.”
Defense counsel added he was “willing to let an appellate court speculate.”
The trial court then stated: “As I indicated, we will let the issue lay. It’s evidence.
It’s in there, good or bad. You have to put it in context. There’s voluminous evidence in
this case. There’s jail tapes. There’s body cam. There’s ATM stuff. There’s a ton of
evidence. So to say one small piece here will screw up the whole thing, it’s extremely
unlikely. That’s based on my experience, cases that have some kind of evidentiary issues
later. They said they decided; we will go over the counts. We will just wait to hear from
them.” A short time later, the jury returned a verdict on all counts.
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B
“When, as in this case, a jury innocently considers evidence it was inadvertently
given, there is no misconduct. The situation is the same as any in which the court
erroneously admits evidence. . . . There has been merely ‘an error of law . . . such
as . . . an incorrect evidentiary ruling.’ [Citation.] Such error is reversible only if it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been
reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836
(Cooper); People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 421.)
For example, in Cooper, “a transcript never intended for the jury’s eyes was
inadvertently marked as an exhibit, admitted, and sent to the jury room.” (People v.
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 397-398.) This was deemed “ordinary error” (id.
at p. 398) and did not require reversal under the reasonable probability standard for
assessing prejudice because “[t]he result of the exhibit’s inadvertent admission was
relatively minor” and “the evidence established [the] defendant’s guilt overwhelmingly.”
(Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 836.) Similarly, in People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629
(Clair), “a court clerk inadvertently supplied jurors with an unredacted audiotape and
transcript of statements by the defendant to the police,” portions of which “had been
excluded by the court as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.” (Gamache, at p. 398.)
Relying on Cooper, the court concluded “all that appears is ordinary error” and reversal
was not required because there was no “reasonable probability that an outcome more
favorable to the defendant would have resulted” in the absence of the error. (Clair,
at p. 668.)
Here, as in Cooper and Clair, the jury was inadvertently given defendant’s rap
sheet. The error is conceded. Defendant, however, argues it amounted to more than
ordinary error. Relying on several federal cases, defendant claims he “has effectively lost
the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and the assistance of counsel with regard
to the extraneous information” considered by the jury. (Dickson v. Sullivan (9th Cir.
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1988) 849 F.2d 403, 406; see also Marino v. Vasquez (9th Cir. 1987) 812 F.2d 499, 504-
505; United States v. Littlefield (9th Cir. 1985) 752 F.2d 1429, 1432; United States v.
Vasquez (9th Cir. 1979) 597 F.2d 192, 193.) But those federal cases involved jury
misconduct and applied a heightened standard for assessing harmless error, i.e., whether
there was “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material could have affected the
verdict.’ [Citation.]” (Marino, at p. 504.) They did not draw a distinction between actual
jury misconduct, such as intentionally bringing outside information into their
deliberations (Littlefield, at p. 1430), and innocent consideration of evidence
inadvertently given to the jury by the court (Vasquez, at p. 193 [clerk-bailiff inadvertently
left the court’s file in the deliberation room]).
Decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on this court. (People v. Palmer
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 724, 729.) Decisions of the California Supreme Court are
binding authority. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Under Cooper, Clair, and Anderson, the jury’s inadvertent receipt of defendant’s rap
sheet in this case was not misconduct, but rather ordinary error akin to the erroneous
admission of evidence. Thus, in order to reverse for this error, defendant must show
a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. We turn to that analysis now.
D
The case against defendant was very strong. With respect to the crimes committed
against S.B., although she did not testify, her statements to police were admitted into
evidence through officer testimony and the bodycam recording. S.B. described a series
of events in which defendant chased her through Stockton, got into her car with two
handguns, forced her to drive to a bank, assaulted her, threatened her life, took her debit
and credit cards, used one of those cards to withdraw money from the ATM, and forced
her to drive to other locations. Her presence inside a locked restroom when police
arrived, as well as the fear she exhibited while talking to an officer, generally
corroborated her statements during that interview. The swelling to her left eye socket
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more specifically corroborated her claim that defendant struck her several times while
they were at the bank in Stockton. Surveillance footage from the bank also corroborated
her claim that defendant used one of her cards to withdraw money from the ATM. S.B.
also stated that defendant withdrew about $3,000 and placed it in his sock. The fact that
$3,980 was found on defendant at the time of his arrest further corroborated S.B.’s
account of events.
Other surveillance footage further corroborated portions of S.B.’s statement to
police, including footage from the auto parts store where she said she initially attempted
to use the restroom to get away from defendant. Surveillance footage from Walmart also
showed S.B. going into the restroom, after which defendant yelled something toward the
restroom, adjusted his waistband, and quickly left the store. Two Walmart employees
also testified, further corroborating the circumstances.
In addition to the foregoing compelling evidence, the prosecution adduced
evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt in the form of the jailhouse phone calls
that dissuaded S.B. from testifying against him. S.B.’s statements also established their
former romantic relationship, including defendant’s status as the father of her child.
The abusive nature of that relationship was further established by defendant’s prior
assault conviction and the existence of a domestic violence restraining order that he
violated while committing the foregoing crimes.
The foregoing evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant committed the
crimes of robbery, kidnapping, making a criminal threat, two counts of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, infliction of corporal injury upon the mother of his child,
unlawful taking of a vehicle, and contempt of court.
There was also strong evidence regarding the crimes committed about a week
later. Defendant was arrested when he came out of his motel room and got into a car.
Defendant was in possession of $800 in gift cards along with a loaded and operational
unregistered firearm. His motel room contained various items of merchandise, including
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power tools still in their packaging that defendant purchased from Home Depot using an
EDD debit card that did not belong to him. The room also contained driver’s licenses,
social security cards, and EDD debit cards in the names of various people, as well as
notebooks containing credit card numbers and personal identifying information.
In addition, the motel room contained a digital scale and methamphetamine packaged
for sale.
The evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant committed the crimes of
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, carrying a loaded
unregistered firearm in a vehicle, possession of methamphetamine and a firearm by a
convicted felon, possession of methamphetamine for sale, and acquiring personal
identifying information with the intent to defraud.
Defendant accurately observes that his rap sheet is lengthy and contains numerous
offenses that are similar to the crimes he committed in this case. However, in light of the
overwhelming evidence adduced against defendant in this case, we conclude there is no
reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome had the jury not received his rap
sheet as an exhibit during their deliberations.
II
Defendant further asserts the inadvertent delivery of the rap sheet to the jury
violated the Racial Justice Act. The contention is forfeited.
“In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (Stats. 2020,
ch. 317, § 3.5), which went into effect on January 1, 2021. Its declared intent is ‘to
eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system because racism in any form
or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair criminal justice
system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article VI of the California Constitution, and
violates the laws and Constitution of the State of California. Implicit bias, although often
unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar
9
to intentional bias.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 109
(Singh).)
Defendant argues the following provision of the Racial Justice Act was violated
when his rap sheet was accidentally sent into the deliberation room: “The state shall not
seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of
race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence, any of the following: [¶] (1) The judge, an attorney in
the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror
exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity,
or national origin.” (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a)(1).)1 According to defendant, although
giving the jury his rap sheet was unintentional, prohibited bias was nevertheless used to
obtain his convictions because his rap sheet was considerably longer than it would have
been if he were a White man rather than a Black man. As defendant puts the argument:
“Because [he] is a Black man, he was exposed to police contacts at a rate four times
higher. Because he was accosted at a higher rate compared to Whites, his arrest rate is
higher. Because his arrest rate is higher, his [rap] sheet is far lengthier. Because his [rap]
sheet is lengthier than if he were born White, the introduction of this sheet led to a
conviction partially based on race.”
Section 745, subdivision (b) governs the means by which a defendant may allege
a violation of subdivision (a). The portion of the provision allowing a defendant to allege
a violation of subdivision (a) by filing a motion in the trial court was in effect at the time
of defendant’s trial. Thus, defendant could have filed such a motion in the trial court, but
he did not do so. Effective January 1, 2024, Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023-2024 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1118) amended section 745, subdivision (b) to allow “such a claim
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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to be raised on direct appeal and authorizing a defendant to move to stay the appeal
and request remand to the superior court to file a motion.” (Singh, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 110; see Stats. 2023, ch. 464, § 1.) However, in that amendment,
“the Legislature did not include any language indicating a section 745 claim could be
presented on direct appeal for the first time.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
804, 812.) In Singh and Lashon, the appellate courts concluded “that where, as here, the
defendant could have but failed to raise his Racial Justice Act claim below, he forfeited
the claim and could not raise it for the first time on direct appeal despite Assembly Bill
1118’s amendment to section 745 . . . .” (Singh, at p. 113; see also Lashon, at pp. 811-
813.) We adopt their reasoning and reach the same conclusion. Defendant’s Racial
Justice Act claim is forfeited.
Anticipating this conclusion, defendant argues in the alternative that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve this claim for review.
However, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.) We may “begin an ineffective
assistance of counsel inquiry with either element and need not address both elements if
one is not satisfied.” (Ibid.) For reasons already expressed, defendant has not shown a
reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome had his rap sheet not been
accidentally sent into the deliberation room. His assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel therefore fails for lack of prejudice.
III
Defendant also claims we must reverse his convictions for possession of
a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon and his conviction for carrying a
loaded unregistered firearm in public because the statutes criminalizing such
possession violate the Second Amendment in light of the United States Supreme
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Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1
(Bruen).
In People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, the court applied the analytical
framework set forth in Bruen and held that the laws prohibiting felons from possessing
firearms and ammunition are facially valid. (Id. at pp. 473-474.) The court explained
that Bruen rejected the two-step analytical framework used in District of Columbia v.
Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 and McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742,
replacing it with the following test: “ ‘When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The
government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with
the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude
that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified
command.” ’ [Citation.] Bruen further explained that in assessing whether a modern
firearm regulation has a ‘ “relevantly similar” ’ historical analogue [citation], courts
should consider ‘at least two metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding
citizen’s right to armed self-defense’ [citation].” (Alexander, at p. 476, italics added.)
Alexander also noted that the Supreme Court expressly stated in Bruen that the decision
was “ ‘consistent with Heller and McDonald’ [citation], which had recognized that the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen
to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 477.)
Alexander concluded that prohibiting a felon from possessing firearms and ammunition
did not violate the Second Amendment “because according to Heller and Bruen, only
law-abiding citizens are included among ‘the people’ whose right to bear arms is
protected by the Second Amendment.” (Id. at p. 478.)
The court in People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307 reached the same
conclusion, adding: “It was no accident the Bruen majority repeated the qualifier ‘law-
abiding’ some 13 times. [Citation.] People who have been convicted of a felony are not
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‘law-abiding.’ ” (Id. at p. 317.) We adopt the reasoning of Alexander and Odell. The
statutes prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms and ammunition remain
constitutional after Bruen.
Defendant’s challenge to his conviction for carrying a loaded unregistered firearm
in public is forfeited for failure to adequately brief the issue. (See People v. Caro (2019)
7 Cal.5th 463, 512.) As the People accurately observe, defendant’s opening brief “offers
no argument on how Bruen altered the constitutionality of California’s law criminalizing
the carrying of a loaded, unregistered firearm in public.” In any event, although certain
portions of California’s licensing regime are unconstitutional after Bruen, those aspects
of the regime are severable (see People v. Mosqueda (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 409-
411, 414), and the specific statute defendant challenges in this appeal, section 25850,
is not facially unconstitutional because it is not “unconstitutional in all or at least the
generality or great majority of cases.” (In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 915-
916.)
Nothing in Bruen requires this court to reverse defendant’s convictions
for possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon or his conviction
for carrying a loaded unregistered firearm in public.
IV
Defendant further asserts that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 850 on the use of expert testimony regarding intimate partner battering.
Defendant did not object to this instruction in the trial court. His instructional error claim
is therefore forfeited unless there was an error that affected his substantial rights,
resulting in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
(People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927.) We conclude there was no error,
much less a miscarriage of justice.
As read to the jury in this case, CALCRIM No. 850 stated: “You heard [expert]
testimony . . . regarding intimate partner battering. [The expert’s] testimony about
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intimate battery is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes alleged
against him. [¶] You may consider this evidence only as follows: [¶] One, in deciding
whether or not the alleged victim’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of
someone who has been abused. Two, in evaluating the believability of the alleged
victim’s testimony.”2
Defendant argues the instruction “ran afoul of Evidence Code section 1107,”
which provides in relevant part: “In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible
by either the prosecution or the defense regarding intimate partner battering and its
effects, including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse on
the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence, except when
offered against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse
which form the basis of the criminal charge.” (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (a).)
According to defendant, CALCRIM No. 850 incorrectly “told the jury to rely on [the
expert’s] testimony . . . to evaluate [S.B.’s] believability and conclude the charges were
true.”
This same argument was rejected in People v. Brackins (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 56,
in which the appellate court stated: “Defendant’s argument is premised on his claim that
the use of [the expert’s] testimony to evaluate [the alleged victim’s] ‘believability’
amounted to the use of his testimony to ‘prove the occurrence’ of the abuse. We reject
this premise because it presumes that expert testimony that may be used by the jury to
assist it in evaluating the credibility of an alleged abuse victim is prohibited evidence of
whether the abuse occurred. If the expert testimony was not related in some way to
whether the abuse occurred, it would be irrelevant. Expert testimony may not be
2 Although S.B. did not testify at trial, the trial court informed the jury that “[h]er
testimony came in through others,” i.e., the officers who testified about her prior
statements.
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improperly used to directly determine whether the abuse occurred. But like much
of the other evidence that comes in at a trial, it may be used indirectly to assist the jury
in evaluating whether the alleged victim’s statements are believable.” (Id. at p. 71.)
As in Brackins, the expert testimony in this case “did not stray into a direct determination
as to whether the abuse itself occurred” and “[t]he trial court did not err in instructing the
jury that it could use [this] testimony to evaluate [S.B.’s] ‘believability.’ ” (Id. at p. 72;
see also People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1087 [expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome relevant to credibility].)
Defendant also claims that CALCRIM No. 850 “unconstitutionally lowered the
prosecution’s burden” of proof in violation of his right to due process under the state and
federal Constitutions “because it allowed the jury to make the unreasonable inference that
because S.B. acted in ways that victims of abuse . . . would act, she was a credible
witness, despite evidence to the contrary.” Not so. The jury was properly instructed
regarding the burden of proof in this case. Moreover, the challenged instruction takes no
position on the alleged victim’s credibility. It simply tells the jury it may use the expert
testimony in deciding “whether or not” the alleged victim’s actions were consistent with
an abused person and in evaluating her believability. “Reasonable jurors would not
understand the instruction to mean that if they find the characteristics of intimate partner
battering to be satisfied, this indicates that [the alleged victim] was necessarily telling the
truth.” (People v. Sexton (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 457, 468.) The challenged instruction
did not tell the jury to find S.B. credible and accordingly did not lower the prosecution’s
burden of proof.
V
Finally, having rejected each of defendant’s claims of error except for
the conceded error that the trial court should not have included his rap sheet as part
of the exhibits sent into the jury deliberation room, defendant’s assertion of
15
cumulative prejudice must also fail. Stated simply, there is no cumulative prejudice
to assess.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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