CourtListener 10351355•People v. Connor CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/6/25 P. v. Connor CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B339273
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA209131-1)
v.
EDDIE BOYD CONNOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
Following a jury trial Eddie Connor was convicted of first
degree murder of Donald Randall (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1
with the use of a firearm (former § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and the
discharge of a firearm proximately causing death (former
§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), of arson of property (§ 451, subd. (d)), and
of torture (§ 206) with the use of a firearm (former § 12022.5,
subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true a torture-murder special
circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).) The trial court sentenced
Connor to life in prison without parole, enhanced by a term of
1 All statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
25 years to life for the discharge of a firearm proximately causing
death, plus a term of eight months for arson.2 This court
affirmed Connor’s conviction and prison sentence.3 Thereafter,
Connor filed at least six habeas corpus petitions, each of which
was denied.
On January 2, 2024, Connor filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6, alleging his conviction was
based on insufficient theories of robbery and torture-murder.
On February 16, 2024, the trial court appointed counsel to
represent Connor. After defense counsel appeared and the
prosecution filed written opposition to Connor’s petition, the
court denied the petition on the ground Connor had been tried
and convicted “as the sole and actual perpetrator who shot and
killed the victim,” and was therefore ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6. Connor filed a timely notice of appeal.
Connor’s appellate counsel filed a brief under the authority
of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, raising no
appealable issues. Thereafter, Connor timely filed a
supplemental brief addressing, inter alia, the sufficiency of
evidence that he tortured Randall and whether a confession
introduced in evidence at trial was voluntary, and requesting
“a new trial free of inadmissible evidence and [u]nauthorized
inflammatory theories by the state prosecutor.” We need not
address these issues. The record shows they were previously
raised and decided against Connor on direct appeal and in at
least one of his unsuccessful habeas corpus petitions.
2 The jury acquitted Connor of robbery (§ 211).
3 People v. Eddie Boyd Connor (Jan. 14, 2004, B157674)
[nonpub. opn.]. As this opinion recites in detail the facts and
procedural history of Connor’s criminal trial, we need not restate
them here.
2
Section 1172.6 does not “permit wholesale relitigation of findings
supporting murder convictions.” (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 715 (Strong); accord People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549 [“a section [1172.6] petition is not a
means by which a defendant can relitigate issues already
decided”].) We confine our review, then, to whether Connor’s
petition alleged a prima facie case for resentencing.
Section 1172.6 sets out a procedure whereby “[a] person
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime” may file a petition to have the
“conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “[T]he process begins with the
filing of a petition declaring that ‘[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189’ made by Senate Bill 1437.
[Citation.] The trial court then reviews the petition to determine
whether a prima facie showing has been made that the petitioner
is entitled to relief. [Citation.] ‘If the petition and record in the
case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.) On the other hand,
where a petition alleges a prima facie case for relief, the trial
court must issue an order to show cause (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and
thereafter hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner is
entitled to relief.
3
The court may appropriately deny a petition at the prima
facie stage if the record of conviction4 conclusively establishes the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970-971; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 708.) If Connor was the actual killer of Randall, as the trial
court found, he is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
(Strong, at p. 710 [Section 1172.6 “relief is unavailable if the
defendant was . . . the actual killer”]; People v. Bodely (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1201 [“As the sole and actual
killer . . . defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section
1172.6 as a matter of law”].) We independently review a trial
court’s order denying a petition under section 1172.6 on the
ground the petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for relief.
(People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238-1239;
People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 866.)
Our independent review of the record of conviction confirms
that the trial court correctly denied Connor’s petition because he
was convicted of murder as Randall’s actual killer. Looking first
at closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that “the
evidence is very clear that Eddie Connor was the killer in this
case” because “we don’t have anybody else. We have only the
defendant here. So – and the only evidence is that the defendant
did these actions.” Consistent with the prosecution’s theory that
Connor acted alone, the jury was not instructed on holding
Connor responsible for murder based on actions by an accomplice.
Where the jury is not instructed on a theory of implied or
imputed malice, the trial court can properly conclude the
defendant was convicted as the actual killer and is ineligible for
4 The record of conviction includes the charging document,
jury instructions, closing arguments and verdict forms. (People v.
Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.)
4
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (People v.
Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677, review granted Feb. 24,
2021, S266336, review dism. Dec. 1, 2021; People v. Offley (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599.)
Connor’s ineligibility for resentencing as the actual killer is
further established by the jury’s findings that he “personally used
a firearm,” “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,”
and “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm . . . which
proximately caused great bodily injury and death” to Randall.
These jury findings, too, establish that Connor is the “actual
killer” and thus ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
A relevant jury finding is generally preclusive in section
1172.6 proceedings, i.e., it “ordinarily establish[es] a defendant’s
ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437 and thus
preclude[s] the defendant from making a prima facie case for
relief.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710; see also People v.
Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 58, review granted Mar. 18,
2020, S260410, review dism. Oct. 27, 2021 [defendant ineligible
for resentencing where jury found defendant “personally and
intentionally used a firearm to commit the crime [and] [t]hus, the
jury implicitly found [defendant] was the ‘actual killer’ ”].)
Because the record of conviction – here, the prosecutor’s
closing argument, the jury instructions and the jury’s special
findings – “irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that the jury
determined [Connor] was the actual killer” (People v. Harden
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56), Connor was ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. The order
denying Connor’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J. RICHARDSON, J.
5
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