CourtListener 10350532•People v. Quistian CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/5/25 P. v. Quistian CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051240
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 204405)
v.
DOMINGO QUISTIAN, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Domingo Quistian, Jr. was convicted by jury on three counts of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder including gang and firearm allegations in
1999. He later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly
Pen. Code, § 1170.95; unspecified statutory references are to this Code). The trial court
denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing after concluding defendant was
ineligible for relief under that statute as a matter of law. Defendant argues on appeal that
the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing because ambiguities in the
jury instructions at defendant’s trial allowed the jury to find him guilty of attempted
murder with malice imputed based solely on his participation in a crime. We disagree
and will affirm the order denying defendant’s petition.
I. BACKGROUND
According to this court’s unpublished opinion in defendant’s direct appeal,
defendant was a passenger in a car occupied by three other people. They drove past three
rival gang members and “some sort of interaction occurred between the two groups, such
as staring and making various hand gestures.” The occupants of the car picked up
another person and returned to the area where they had seen the rival gang members.
“Although there is some discrepancy as to the precise sequence of events” after the car
returned to the area, at some point the rival gang members threw objects at the car. A
man then got out of the car and shot at the rival gang members multiple times with a
semiautomatic firearm while they fled, hitting and injuring two of them.
Multiple witnesses identified defendant as the shooter. When an officer at the
scene asked one of the victims who had shot him, he named two people: defendant and
defendant’s cousin. The same victim later told a friend that defendant had shot him.
Defendant’s cousin was also charged with three counts of attempted murder; only
defendant was alleged to have personally used a firearm, inflicted great bodily injury, and
acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. Defendant presented an alibi
defense at trial, with his mother and sister testifying that he was with them in another city
on the day of the shooting.
Relevant to defendant’s arguments in this appeal, the jury was instructed as
follows: “Persons who are involved in committing or attempting to commit a crime are
referred to as principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner
of participation, is equally guilty. Principals include, one, those who actively and directly
commit or attempt to commit the act constituting the crime, or, two, those who aid and
abet the commission or attempted commission of the crime. [¶] A person aids and abets
the commission or attempted commission of the crime when he or she, one, with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and, two, with the intent or
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and,
three, by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates the commission of the
crime.” The jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The jury was instructed on the elements of attempted murder: “In order to prove
attempted murder, each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] One, a direct but
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ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another human being; and [¶]
Two, the person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a
specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” With respect to the allegations
that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, the jury was
instructed in relevant part: “ ‘Willful’ means intentional. ‘Deliberate’ means formed or
arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
considerations for and against the proposed course of action. ‘Premeditated’ means
beforehand. [¶] If you find that the attempted murder was preceded and accompanied by
a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so
that it must have been formed upon preexisting reflection and not under a sudden heat of
passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is attempt to commit
willful, deliberate and premeditated murder.” The jury was further instructed: “To
constitute willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder, the would-be slayer
must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a
choice, and having in mind the consequences, decides to kill and makes a direct but
ineffectual act to kill another human being.”
The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found true all special allegations.
Among other things, with respect to all three counts the jury found that defendant acted
“willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation” and “intentionally and personally
discharged a firearm” (proximately causing great bodily injury to two of the victims).
The trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive life terms for the attempted
murders, consecutive to terms for the sentencing enhancements. In defendant’s direct
appeal, a different panel of this court struck the three two-year gang enhancements, but
otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Quistian (August 28, 2001, H021327)
[nonpub. opn.].)
Representing himself, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6
in October 2022. (Although defendant’s petition references former section 1170.95, we
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refer to the current version of the statute for clarity.) The prosecution filed written
opposition to the petition and asked the court to take judicial notice of the abstract of
judgment, verdict forms, jury instructions, and this court’s opinion in defendant’s direct
appeal. In a written decision, the trial court granted the request for judicial notice and
concluded the noticed documents showed defendant was not convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, such that defendant was
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The court denied the resentencing petition
without issuing an order to show cause.
II. DISCUSSION
A person convicted of “felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime,” or “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine,” may petition under section 1172.6 to have those
convictions vacated when certain conditions are satisfied. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) An
order to show cause must issue if a petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The court must take the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
make a preliminary assessment about whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if
his or her factual allegations were proved. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.)
The “parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably
assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case” and if the record contains
facts refuting the allegations in the petition, the court may deny the petition at the prima
facie stage. (Id. at p. 972.) We review de novo the trial court’s determination of whether
the required showing under section 1172.6 has been made. (People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
Defendant analogizes this case to People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972.
Langi was convicted of second degree murder for participating in a fistfight where
someone in his group punched the victim who fell and hit his head, resulting in death.
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(Id. at p. 975.) Langi’s jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, but Langi argued that the pattern aiding and abetting and second degree murder
instructions “permitted the jury to find him guilty on a theory under which malice was
imputed to him based solely on his participation in the crime.” (Id. at p. 980.) The Langi
court reasoned that the “instructions permitted the jury to find [Langi] guilty of murder if
it found that (1) the killing resulted from the actual killer’s intentional act; (2) appellant
aided and abetted that intentional act; and (3) the killer ‘deliberately performed [the act]
with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life’—whether
or not appellant knew of or consciously disregarded the danger to human life.” (Id. at p.
981.) Langi noted that “under the instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to
conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder, appellant
need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—[there], punching
[the victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to aid or encourage [the victim’s] killing,
and whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.” (Id.
at p. 983.) As a result, section 1172.6 relief was not precluded as a matter of law, and the
Langi court concluded an order to show cause must issue.
The reasoning of Langi does not extend to defendant’s attempted murder
convictions. By its express terms, section 1172.6, subdivision (a) applies only when an
attempted murder conviction is based on a natural and probable consequences theory.
The statute affords relief to persons convicted of “felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,” and to persons
convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”
only. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) As defendant acknowledges, the jury here was not
specifically instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the
absence of such an instruction has been found sufficient to foreclose relief under
section 1172.6 in attempted murder cases. (See People v. Coley (2022)
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77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) In addition, the jury found the attempted murders were
willful, deliberate, and premeditated, which would itself foreclose relief because
defendant was found to have acted with express malice. (See People v. Romero (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 145, 153.)
Despite the jury’s findings and despite the absence of any instruction on natural
and probable consequences, defendant argues the jury nonetheless could have found him
guilty of attempted murder under a theory of imputed malice. Defendant’s argument, as
we understand it, is that the jury could have: (1) incorrectly believed, based on the
court’s instructions, that an attempted killing committed “under a sudden heat of passion”
would always constitute attempted murder rather than attempted voluntary manslaughter;
(2) found that there were multiple shooters; (3) found that defendant attempted to kill the
victims under a sudden heat of passion while another shooter attempted to kill them with
express malice; (4) found defendant guilty of attempted murder (rather than attempted
voluntary manslaughter) based on its misunderstanding of faulty attempted murder
instructions; and (5) found true the allegations of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder based on instructions stating that all principals to a crime are “equally
guilty,” suggesting that only the “would-be slayer” (not any aiders and abettors) needed
the requisite deliberation. In his opening brief, defendant describes the theory generally
as one by which malice could be imputed to him based solely on his participation in a
crime; in his reply brief, acknowledging that the scope of section 1172.6 is more limited
as to attempted murder convictions, he characterizes it as a natural and probable
consequences theory in all but name.
The Attorney General identifies numerous defects in defendant’s argument,
including that it attempts to incorporate claims of instructional error unrelated to changes
in the law of attempted murder. (In order to state a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), a petitioner must allege that he “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
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effective January 1, 2019.”) We agree that defendant’s logic rests on several
questionable premises. But we need not examine every link in the logical chain: even
assuming the described path to guilt was available to the jury, it would not have led to a
conviction for attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The instructions were not ambiguous about the crime defendant was alleged to
have aided and abetted, namely attempted murder. At a minimum, the jury necessarily
concluded defendant specifically intended to assist the direct perpetrator in attempting to
kill the victims while the direct perpetrator harbored an intent to kill. (See People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 [“when the charged offense and the intended
offense—murder or attempted murder—are the same, … the aider and abettor must know
and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator”].) Therefore, because the record
of conviction conclusively establishes that defendant was not convicted of attempted
murder based on a natural and probable consequences theory, he is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. It was proper to deny the petition
at the prima facie stage.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
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____________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________
Wilson, J.
H051240
The People v. Quistian
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