People v. Chism CA4/1

CourtListener 10348655Calctapp03.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 2/28/25 P. v. Chism CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083673

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS324638)

WILLIAM RAY CHISM II,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carlos Varela, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Robin Urbanski and Flavio Nominati,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The court granted the People’s motion to consolidate three separate
cases alleging one count each, over appellant William Ray Chism II’s
objection. The People thereafter filed a consolidated information alleging
Chism made a criminal threat (Pen. Code1, § 422; count 1), possessed a
weapon at a penal institution (§ 4502, subd (a); count 2), and committed
battery by gassing (§ 243.9, subd. (a); count 3). They further alleged that
Chism suffered three prior convictions for serious felonies, and four prior
convictions that qualified as strikes within the meaning of the “Three
Strikes” law. (§ 667 subds. (b)-(i); 668; 1170.12.)
A jury convicted Chism of counts 1 and 2 but found him not guilty of
count 3. In bifurcated proceedings, Chism admitted a prior conviction under
section 422, a dangerous or deadly weapon use enhancement allegation
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)), and an allegation that he had served a prior prison
term. The court sentenced Chism to eight years four months in state prison.
Chism contends: (1) the court erroneously joined the cases, and (2)
insufficient evidence supports his weapon possession conviction. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Count 1—Threat
A San Diego Sheriff’s Department sergeant testified that in February
2023, while he was working at the San Diego Central Jail, Chism complained
to him about inmates of a different race sharing his living module. Chism
was in shackles but had one arm free. Chism was angry, animated, and
yelling, and identified himself as a “Hells Angels” criminal street gang
member while pointing to his arm tattoo. He called the San Diego Sheriff’s
Department a racist organization. As the sergeant turned away, Chism stood
up, lunged toward him in a threatening manner, and yelled, “I will fucking
stab you,” and “I will fucking kill you.” When the deputies tried to escort
Chism, he kept thrashing his body and trying to get closer to the sergeant.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
They eventually brought him down to the ground. Chism yelled that “he had
shanks in his cell.”
Chism also screamed that the sergeant was “green lit,” which the
sergeant explained gang members use to mean “that you are to be killed on-
sight” by “other inmates that have an association with the person issuing the
green light.” Chism tried to spit on the sergeant, and later told him he would
kill him “with a shank” if he ever saw him again in the jail’s dayroom. The
sergeant placed a “spit sock” over Chism’s head to prevent him from further
spitting on deputies, and he was eventually subdued.
Another sergeant testified that while he attempted to escort Chism
back to his cell, Chism yelled at him, “I’m going to kill you, White boy.”
A video recording of a portion of this incident was played for the jury.
Count 2—Weapon Possession
A San Diego Sheriff’s Department deputy who was employed at the
George Bailey Detention Facility testified about an October 2023 incident:
“[A]fter serving lunch, I was trying to close the cuffing ports that [are] located
on each cell. At that point when I approached [Chism’s] cell, he was refusing
. . . to let me allow him to close the cuffing port but instead he had his arm
sticking out, and I noticed he was holding an object sharp to a point, orange
in color. And he was just saying, ‘Hey. Don’t approach me. Don’t come here
because whoever comes around here, I’m going to stab him.’ ” For
approximately 15 minutes, Chism yelled, “Nobody get close to me” and, “I
have a shank.” Chism waved the weapon back and forth.
The deputy described the weapon he saw: “It was like a toothbrush
made as a jail weapon.” He added, “So it was pretty much just like the
handle. . . . [I]t was sharp like—like pointed because they’re regular[ly]
round, but this one is like pointy kind of like—looked like a knife.”

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The prosecutor asked the deputy, “Are you familiar with what these
improvised weapons can do to other inmates or employees at these facilities?”
He replied, “I experienced before people getting stabbed. I transported people
with injuries coming from weapons that . . . were made in the jail settings.
And I’ve seen people, you know, how they get slashed. And not only that
space . . . but we also had training on situations like that.”
After some deputies forcibly removed Chism from his cell, they found
no makeshift weapon there. But the deputy testified he believed Chism could
have flushed it down the toilet located in his cell, which he alone occupied.
The jury viewed a video recording of Chism’s extraction from his cell.
Count 3—Battery by Gassing
A San Diego Sheriff’s Department sergeant testified that in October
2023, Chism was in the George Bailey Detention Facility’s dayroom and
refused to return to his cell. Chism was upset because he was trying to make
a phone call, but was hindered by noise from other inmates. A tactical team
of several deputies was enlisted to return Chism to his cell. Three hours
later, when the sergeant tried to talk to him, Chism yelled, “Fuck you. I have
a shank for you. Fuck you.” Chism spat on the face of the sergeant, who was
not wearing a face guard or mask.
DISCUSSION
I. Joinder
Chism contends joinder was improper: “[T]he three actions involved
different offenses, against different victims, that occurred at different times
and involved different witnesses and evidence, and that as a result, the
primary justifications for such consolidation or joinder—i.e. judicial economy
and the cross-admissibility of evidence—were not present in this case. In
addition, even if the statutory requirements for joinder were arguably met,

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the trial court nonetheless abused its discretion in granting the People’s
motion and refusing to sever the cases against [him].”
A. Background
At a hearing on the People’s joinder motion, the prosecutor argued the
cases shared common characteristics; specifically, in each instance Chism
engaged in threats of violence and assaultive behavior against detention
officers while in custody.
Defense counsel countered: “We have several weak cases against [ ]
Chism that are tied together and that will prejudice the jury . . . and judicial
economy cannot be the reason—the only reason for the court to do this. And
based on due process and fair trial considerations, we would request that the
motion for joinder be denied.”
The court granted the motion: “The three cases that the People are
requesting to have joined are properly joined because . . . each case [was]
committed while the defendant was in [a] penal, carceral environment. They
all share the quality of violence[ ], assaultive nature, and defiance, and
disobedience in a penal environment. . . . But even if the counts are properly
joined, the court, in the interest of justice and/or good cause shown, has [ ]
discretion to order them to be tried separately. [¶] Generally, when the
statutory requirements of joinder are met, the defendant must make a clear
showing of prejudice before severance must be granted. In this case, I’m
finding that [ ] Chism has not made a . . . clear showing of prejudice. There
does not appear to be a real concern for prejudice in this case. There does not
seem to be much occasion for cross admissibility. This factor alone is not
dispositive. [¶] But the court examined other factors regarding prejudice.
Will it inflame the jury against the defendant? Well, the defendant’s conduct
and liability appear[ ] to be equally egregious, willful, and offensive in each

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case, so there’s no basis to conclude that his actions in one count would
prejudice him so heavily relative to the other counts in the eyes of the jury.
And we have [the factor of whether] a weak case is bolstered by a stronger
case. [¶] And, again, the court does not find that anything suggests that this
would be a factor in both cases. They’re very similar in that it is the victim-
witness identification testimony and any surveillance that would be
presented in this case. So there is no basis to conclude that the jury would
bootstrap guilt as to one count or counts based on the strength of the evidence
against him in other counts. [¶] This case is not a capital offense, and also
the court considered judicial economy.”
B. Applicable Law
Section 954 authorizes the joinder of two or more different offenses that
are “connected together in their commission” or that are “of the same class of
crimes or offenses.” Joinder of charges is favored because it avoids the
increased expenditures of funds and judicial resources that may result from
separate trials. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122; People v.
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 37.) Thus, joinder “ ‘is the course of action
preferred by the law,’ ” but “a trial court [nonetheless] has discretion to sever
properly joined charges in the interest of justice and for good cause.” (Simon,
at p. 122.)
“ ‘When exercising its discretion, the court must balance the potential
prejudice of joinder against the state’s strong interest in the efficiency of a
joint trial.’ [Citation.] To successfully claim that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a motion to sever, a ‘ “ ‘defendant must make a clear
showing of prejudice’ ” ’ by demonstrating that the denial ‘exceeded the
bounds of reason.’ ” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 689.)

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In assessing whether the court’s order denying the severance motion
constituted an abuse of discretion, we review four factors based on the record
before the trial court: “[F]irst, we consider ‘whether evidence of the crimes to
be jointly tried is cross-admissible.’ [Citation.] Second, we address whether
the charges are especially inflammatory. Third, we consider whether a weak
case has been joined to a strong one ‘so that the spillover effect of aggregate
evidence might alter the outcome of some or all of the charges.’ [Citation.]
Finally, we consider whether joinder renders the case capital when it would
not otherwise have been.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 817.)
Even if we conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion in
denying severance pretrial, we must also discern whether events after the
court’s ruling demonstrate that joinder actually resulted in “gross unfairness”
amounting to a denial of defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial or due
process of law. Whether joinder worked a gross unfairness turns upon
assessing whether it was reasonably probable that the jury was influenced by
the joinder in its verdict of guilt. (People v. Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
819.)
C. Analysis
The charged crimes met the statutory requirements for joinder because
they were connected together in their commission. (§ 954.) As set forth
above, the three crimes all occurred in the same year, in detention facilities
where Chism was incarcerated, and involved his verbal threats or physical
acts of aggression towards detention officers. This court independently
reviews the legal question of whether two or more offenses may be joined as
being “connected in their commission” or “of the same class.” (People v.
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188.)

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We turn to whether the court’s failure to sever the charges prejudiced
Chism. First, even if we agree with the trial court that the evidence here was
not cross-admissible as the incidents took place on different dates, in two
separate detention facilities and involved different detention officers, that
factor alone is not dispositive. “[E]ven if the evidence underlying these
charges would not be cross-admissible in hypothetical separate trials, that
determination would not itself establish prejudice or an abuse of discretion by
the trial court in declining to sever properly joined charges.” (People v. Soper
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 775.)
Courts have found no due process violation from joinder where, as here,
evidence of each crime is simple and distinct, even if that evidence is not
admissible in separate trials. (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 784.)
The incident involving Chism’s threat that the deputy was green lit had
simple and distinct evidence separating it from the incident involving the
cuffing port and the toothbrush repurposed into a weapon. Here, the fact the
jurors could not reach a verdict on the battery by gassing charge clearly
demonstrates the jurors “considered and weighed the evidence carefully as to
each charge separately.” (People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013.)
Third, to demonstrate prejudicial spillover, the defendant needs to
demonstrate that the trial court joined a weak case with a strong case so that
the totality of the evidence altered the outcome as to some or all of the
charges. (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775.) Here, the three cases
involved similar disruptive conduct and when taken together did not
heighten the likelihood of inflaming the jury.
Because no charged offense converted this into a capital case, this
factor did not cause prejudice.

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We next decide “ ‘whether events after the court’s ruling demonstrate
that joinder actually resulted in “gross unfairness” amounting to a denial of
defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial or due process of law.’ ” (People v.
Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 129.) Whether joinder worked a gross
unfairness turns upon assessing whether it was “reasonably probable that
the jury was influenced by the joinder in its verdict of guilt.” (Id. at p. 130.)
Here, “strong evidence warranting conviction” supported the two convictions.
(Ibid.) In each instance, the experienced detention officer who was on the
receiving end of Chism’s threats and aggressive behavior testified. As to the
weapon possession charge, although no weapon was found, the jury could
have reasonably concluded based on the trial record that the officer was
familiar with the toothbrush issued to the inmates and correctly perceived
that Chism was waving a modified one, referring to it as a shank.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
Chism contends: “[T]he evidence adduced at trial was insufficient, as a
matter of law, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the object
possessed by [him] constituted an actual weapon, and in particular one of the
weapons enumerated in [section 4502]. To the contrary, the undisputed
evidence was that the alleged victim [ ] could not conclusively identify the
object, and instead believed it to be a toothbrush; that no such object was
found during a thorough search of [his] cell following the incident; and that
there was no evidence, other than pure speculation, to indicate that [he] had
flushed a weapon down the toilet, or otherwise disposed of it.”
“ ‘To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the

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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38
Cal.4th 72, 118.) The standard of review is “highly deferential” to the verdict.
(People v. Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 538.) “ ‘We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably
could infer from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p.
713.)
Section 4502, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who, while at or
confined in any penal institution, while being conveyed to or from any penal
institution, or while under the custody of officials, officers, or employees of
any penal institution, possesses or carries upon his or her person or has
under his or her custody or control any instrument or weapon . . . or sharp
instrument . . . is guilty of a felony[.]”
As set forth above, the deputy who Chism threatened with the weapon
had many years of experience with weapons in detention facilities. He
described the weapon he saw, saying it looked like a modified, jail-issued,
travel-size, toothbrush. The handle, which was normally rounded, had been
filed down to a sharp point. He also testified Chism was swinging his arm
back and forth, and yelling he possessed a “shank.” Chism also yelled
persistently, “Nobody get close to me otherwise I’m going to stab you.” That
direct evidence suffices to support the conviction.
Chism contends that since no weapon was found, there was insufficient
evidence that he possessed a weapon. However, the jury was entitled to
believe the deputy’s reasonable testimony that Chism could have flushed the
weapon down the toilet. Chism certainly had the motive to do so—to avoid a
serious charge and conviction. He also had the opportunity to do so, as he
was the sole occupant in his cell at the time of the incident.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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