People v. Davis CA3

CourtListener 10347791Calctapp28.02.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 2/28/25 P. v. Davis CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100317

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-
CNV-1997-17439,
v. SP061873A)

WILLIS DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Over 26 years into his 15-years-to-life sentence for second degree murder, and
long after his judgment had become final, defendant Willis Davis moved in the trial court
for additional presentence credit. The court summarily denied his request. On appeal, he
contends that the court abused its discretion and asks us to remand the matter for an
evidentiary hearing at which the trial court can calculate the proper credit award. We
conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider Davis’s contention. We therefore dismiss
the appeal without prejudice to Davis’s ability to file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.

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BACKGROUND
In October 1997, the trial court sentenced Davis to prison for 15 years to life
following his conviction for second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187).1 The court
awarded him 117 days of credit, consisting of 102 actual days and 15 days of conduct
credit.
In November 2023, Davis, acting in propria persona, filed a motion in the trial
court requesting additional presentence credits and a full resentencing. He argued that he
was entitled to 60 additional days of credit (for a total of 154 actual days and 23 days of
conduct credit) for time he spent in a juvenile detention facility between May 7 and
June 27, 1997, before being booked into county jail.
In January 2024, without appointing an attorney or holding an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied Davis’s motion, reasoning that there was “insufficient proof
provided regarding credits to change the award of credits at this time.” The court denied
“[a]ll other requests” as well.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion by summarily
denying his motion for additional credits. He asks us to remand the matter for an
evidentiary hearing so the trial court can calculate the proper award. The People concede
error and agree the matter should be remanded.
We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to consider Davis’s appeal.
“The general rule is that ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has
begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.’
[Citations.] And, ‘[i]f the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to
vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is nonappealable, and any

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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appeal from such an order must be dismissed.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
629, 634; see also id. at p. 640, fn. 6 [“if the trial court has no jurisdiction, no appeal
lies”].)
In People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 62-63 (Boyd), the Court of Appeal
held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a postjudgment motion to
recalculate custody and conduct credits filed by a defendant who was nearly 17 years into
his sentence. The court explained that, while a trial court has inherent power to correct
clerical errors at any time, the defendant in that case was arguing that the trial court had
committed judicial error by selecting the wrong date for his credits to start accruing. (Id.
at pp. 63-64.) The court further rejected the defendant’s reliance on the principle that an
unauthorized sentence may be corrected even after a defendant starts to serve the
sentence. (Id. at pp. 65-69.) The court reasoned that “ ‘the unauthorized sentence
doctrine does not itself create jurisdiction for a trial court to rule on an incarcerated
defendant’s motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence after the conviction is final and
after the execution of the sentence has begun.’ ” (Id. at p. 67, quoting People v. King,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 641-642.) Instead, the proper procedure is for a defendant
to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Boyd, at p. 68 [“the availability of habeas
corpus relief to correct unauthorized sentences suggests that trial courts do not have
inherent jurisdiction to correct such sentences”].)
The same conclusion follows here. When Davis filed his motion in 2023 seeking
recalculation of his credit award, his criminal judgment was long final, and execution of
his sentence had begun. His claim that the judgment failed to award him credit for time
spent in juvenile custody alleges judicial, rather than clerical, error. (Boyd, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 63.) And any assertion that the erroneous calculation of credit
rendered his sentence unauthorized does not provide a basis for the trial court’s
jurisdiction. (People v. King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 634-637.) Accordingly, as in

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Boyd, the trial court in this case lacked jurisdiction to entertain Davis’s motion, and its
order is not appealable. (Boyd, at pp. 63-69.)
In asserting that this court has jurisdiction to consider his appeal, Davis cites
sections 4019 and 1237.1, People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, and People v.
Hyde (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 97. Neither section 4019 nor section 1237.1, however,
provides a procedural mechanism for an incarcerated defendant to challenge a credit
award in the posture present here. In People v. Fares, the Court of Appeal broadly stated
that there “is no time limitation upon the right to make the motion to correct the
sentence.” (People v. Fares, supra, at p. 958.) But for reasons we have explained, we
conclude that a trial court may modify an erroneous credit calculation only when it
otherwise may exercise jurisdiction. Finally, the court in Boyd comprehensively
explained why People v. Hyde does not establish that a trial court has jurisdiction to
consider a freestanding motion to recalculate presentence credit filed long after a criminal
judgment has become final. (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 69-70.) We agree with
that conclusion.
The proper mechanism for Davis to seek modification of his credit award is
through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 71;
People v. King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.) Although we have the authority to
construe Davis’s appeal as such a petition (Boyd, at p. 72), we decline to do so under the
circumstances present here. Unlike in Boyd, the trial court in this case has made no
determination that Davis is entitled to additional credits, and the parties do not agree on
any revised calculation. (See id. at p. 62.) The trial court is the appropriate forum to
address those matters in the first instance on a properly filed and supported petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. (See In re Masters (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1054, 1077 [“ ‘To obtain
relief, [a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus] must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts that establish entitlement to relief’ ”].) Accordingly, we will dismiss

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the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to Davis seeking a writ of habeas
corpus in the trial court.2
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to Davis filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

2 Given our conclusion, we need not address the People’s request that we take judicial
notice of the record in Davis’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition under
section 1172.6. (People v. Davis (Jan. 24, 2024, C097495) [nonpub. opn.].)

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