CourtListener 10347782•People v. Thomas CA2/4
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Filed 2/28/25 P. v. Thomas CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B334285
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA128810)
v.
CLAUDE HERMAN THOMAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Jonathan Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2014, appellant Claude Thomas pled no contest to one
count of attempted murder and admitted as true the allegation
that he personally used and discharged a firearm in violation of
Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c).1 In 2023, appellant
filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 (former
section 1170.95).2 The trial court summarily denied the petition
without appointing counsel or allowing briefing. The court found
that appellant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because
the record established that he was prosecuted as the actual
shooter.
The parties agree that the court erred by denying
appellant’s petition without appointing counsel, ordering briefing,
or holding a hearing as to whether he had established a prima
facie case for relief. However, respondent Attorney General
contends the error was harmless. Appellant argues that the error
was prejudicial because the trial court relied on inadmissible
evidence in the preliminary hearing transcript. We agree with
appellant. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and
remand with directions to appoint counsel for appellant and
conduct the prima facie inquiry required by section 1172.6,
subdivision (c).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Because appellant did not proceed to trial, the relevant
facts considered by the trial court were drawn from the transcript
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. We hereafter
refer to the statute as section 1172.6.
2
of appellant’s preliminary hearing. We summarize this evidence
here, keeping in mind that appellant has challenged the
propriety of the court’s reliance on the preliminary hearing
transcript for purposes of making a prima facie determination
under section 1172.6.
The preliminary hearing included testimony from a single
witness, officer Scott Wilhelm of the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD). Wilhelm testified that on January 21, 2013,
he and his partner responded to assist LAPD officers Loomis and
Gastelum in a traffic stop of possible shooting suspects. Earlier,
Loomis and Gastelum were in a parking lot at 108th Street and
Spring Street in Los Angeles when they reported hearing
gunshots. As they drove in the direction of the sound, they
observed and then began following a green minivan. After
driving several blocks, the minivan pulled into a driveway on
104th Street, and Loomis and Gastelum conducted a traffic stop.
Wilhelm and his partner arrived at the location shortly
afterward. When they arrived, the two occupants of the minivan
were out of the vehicle and had been placed on the ground.
Wilhelm identified one of the occupants as appellant.
While at the traffic stop, Wilhelm and his partner received
a radio call for a shooting investigation several blocks away.
They responded and spoke with Jamal Harris, who told them
that a short time earlier, he was walking on 107th Street when a
green minivan approached him. The minivan slowed and the
passenger said something that Harris could not discern. The
passenger then reached out of the vehicle with a gun in his hand
and fired approximately 10 shots at Harris. Harris dove to the
ground and avoided being hit.
3
Wilhelm brought Harris to the 104th Street location to
conduct a field identification. As they approached, Harris
immediately identified the green minivan as the vehicle that was
involved in the shooting. Harris then identified appellant as the
minivan’s passenger who shot at him, and identified the other
suspect, co-defendant James Dunn, as the driver.
Additionally, Wilhelm reviewed video surveillance footage
of the shooting captured by a homeowner on 107th Street. As
Wilhelm described the footage to the court, it showed victim
Harris walking on 107th Street and a green minivan
approaching. The minivan slowed (Wilhelm estimated it was
travelling five to 10 miles per hour), and a black male individual
in the passenger seat extended his body outside of the vehicle
with his arm out, holding a black object consistent with a
semiautomatic handgun. Wilhelm testified that he heard
multiple gunshots on the video and then saw Harris dive to the
ground.
Wilhelm also testified that Loomis reported that he had
searched for a weapon along the path driven by the minivan.
Loomis recovered a weapon in the gutter next to the sidewalk on
104th Street. No weapon was found inside the minivan.
During cross-examination, Wilhelm acknowledged that he
did not personally see the minivan driving and did not see the
suspects until they were out of the van. His understanding that
appellant was the passenger was based on Harris’s identification.
He also testified that the surveillance video showed a black male
individual shooting from the minivan, but he could not identify a
specific individual from the video.
4
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Conviction and Sentence
Appellant was charged by amended information with one
count of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
(§ 664/187, subd. (a)), with allegations that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and one count of
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), with personal use
allegations (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)). The
amended information also alleged that appellant suffered several
prior serious felony convictions and prior prison terms.3
In January 2014, during jury selection, appellant pled no
contest to attempted murder, without the allegations that it was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. He also admitted the
allegation that he personally discharged a firearm in violation of
section 12022.53, subdivision (c). Defense counsel joined in the
plea and stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based on the
arrest reports and preliminary hearing transcript pursuant to
People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. The court found a factual
basis for the plea and accepted appellant’s 4
The superior court sentenced appellant to five years in
state prison on the attempted murder count, plus 20 years for the
personal use enhancement. The court dismissed the remaining
charges and allegations pursuant to the plea agreement.
3 Dunn was charged with attempted murder and assault
with a firearm, but without the personal use allegations. As to
both defendants and both counts, the amended information
further alleged that a principal was armed with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
4 Dunn pled no contest to assault with a firearm.
5
Appellant appealed, arguing that his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance and pressured him into accepting a plea
deal. A different panel of this court concluded that appellant
could not raise that issue without obtaining a certificate of
probable cause and affirmed the judgment. (People v. Thomas
(June 9, 2015, B256255) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
Appellant filed a section 1172.6 petition in July 2023. He
submitted his own typed petition rather than using a form. He
alleged that he had accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial at which
he could have been convicted of attempted murder, and that he
could not presently be convicted of attempted murder because of
changes to the relevant laws. He also requested appointment of
counsel. Appellant included a declaration stating that he was not
a major participant in the shooting because he was not present,
and challenging the victim’s identification of him as the shooter.
The court summarily denied appellant’s petition on August
1, 2023 without appointing counsel or ordering briefing. The
court cited appellant’s plea as well as evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing “that the petitioner was the passenger in the
suspect vehicle, and it was clearly the passenger who fired the
weapon. Petitioner was identified as ‘the shooter’ and it was
verified via a video of the incident!” The court therefore found
that appellant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law,
explaining that appellant’s “plea, . . . conviction, and the sentence
imposed reflects that the petitioner was the actual shooter. The
record is clear that he was prosecuted as being the direct
perpetrator and not on a theory of aiding and abetting or a theory
of natural and probable consequences.”
Appellant timely appealed.
6
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature “‘amend[ed] the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel),
quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) As amended, section 188,
subdivision (a)(3) now provides that “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Section 189 now
provides that a participant in qualifying felonies during which a
death occurs generally will not be liable for murder unless (1) he
or she was “the actual killer,” (2) he or she, “with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree,” or (3) he or she “was a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subds. (e)(1)-(3); accord,
People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868–869 (Wilson).)
A person convicted of murder or attempted murder under a
now-invalid theory may petition the trial court under section
1172.6 to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)5 The statute requires the
5 Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021
Reg. Sess.) amended section 1172.6 in various respects, including
“to clarify that ‘persons who were convicted of attempted murder
7
petition to include a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is
eligible for relief, certain case information, and whether the
petitioner requests appointment of counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(b)(1).)
Upon receipt of a facially sufficient petition, the trial court
“shall appoint counsel” for petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3).) The court must allow for further briefing by the
parties and then “shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).)
The court may consider the record of conviction in
determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case
for relief under section 1172.6. Although the court should not
engage in factfinding at the prima facie stage, “‘if the record,
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified
in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.”’”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) If the
petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the
petitioner is ineligible for relief, the court may dismiss the
petition. (See ibid.; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
If the petition states a prima facie claim for relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, “the prosecution bears the
burden ‘to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
. . . under . . . the natural and probable consequences doctrine are
permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder
under the same theor[y].’” (People v. Whitson (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 22, 30.)
8
is guilty of murder or attempted murder’” under current law.
(Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 869; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to
show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545;
People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
II. Analysis
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to
appoint counsel upon receipt of his facially valid petition.
Respondent agrees, as do we. The court was required to appoint
counsel for appellant, allow briefing by the parties, and hold a
hearing to assess whether appellant established a prima facie
claim for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c); Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 957.) Denying appellant’s petition without meeting
these requirements was error.
These errors are subject to harmless error analysis under
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 957–958 [failure to appoint counsel under § 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3) is “state law error only, tested for prejudice under
[Watson]”], 974.) Thus, reversal is required only if appellant can
show a reasonable probability that, absent the error, his petition
would not have been summarily denied. (See id. at pp. 972–974;
People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 676.) Conversely, the
error is harmless if the record of conviction refutes appellant’s
prima facie showing and establishes as a matter of law that he is
not entitled to relief. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-
974; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47-48.)
Respondent contends that the errors were harmless
because the amended information, plea, and preliminary hearing
transcript establish that appellant was the actual shooter and
9
thus ineligible as a matter of law. Both respondent and the trial
court relied on evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript
to establish that appellant was prosecuted as the actual shooter
and therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Appellant’s
contention that the trial court erred in relying on the preliminary
hearing transcripts is two-fold. First, appellant contends the
transcript contained inadmissible hearsay that could not support
a finding of ineligibility. Second and more generally, he argues
that the trial court was not entitled to rely on any portion of a
preliminary hearing transcript, as it would require impermissible
factfinding at the prima facie stage. We agree with appellant’s
first contention and therefore need not reach the second.
Whether and to what extent a court may rely on a
preliminary hearing transcript to deny a petition at the prima
facie stage is currently under review by the California Supreme
Court in People v. Patton, S279670. We need not decide that
broader issue, because here the preliminary hearing transcript
contained almost no admissible evidence to conclusively establish
that appellant was the only shooter.
At a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, the admissibility of
evidence is governed “by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing
or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) However, “hearsay evidence that was
admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless
10
the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the
hearsay rule.” (§ 1172.6 (d)(3).)6
We note that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) specifically
prohibits the use of such hearsay evidence during a section
1172.6 evidentiary hearing. Given this statutory restriction on
the use of hearsay testimony for purposes of proving facts at the
evidentiary hearing, it is unclear “how such evidence could
establish, as a matter of law a petitioner’s ineligibility for
resentencing at the prima facie stage.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988; accord People v. Williams (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 375, 397, fn. 11, review granted, S286314 [hearsay
testimony introduced at the preliminary hearing under section
872, subdivision (b) “is likewise inadmissible to determine a
petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6”]; see also People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 652,
fn. 2, review granted, S279670 [disregarding testimony admitted
at preliminary hearing under § 872, subd. (b)].)
Here, virtually none of the testimony at the preliminary
hearing would be admissible under section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3). Testifying officer Wilhelm did not have any personal
knowledge that appellant was the passenger of the minivan, of
the details of the shooting, or the recovery of the weapon. Thus,
this evidence was hearsay and only admitted at the preliminary
hearing pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b). Notably,
respondent makes no effort to establish that any of this evidence
was admissible under another hearsay exception. As such, the
6 Section 872, subdivision (b) permits a law enforcement
officer to testify at a preliminary hearing as to “statements of
declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.”
11
only preliminary hearing testimony establishing that there was a
single shooter and identifying appellant as that shooter was
inadmissible hearsay.
Thus, even if the preliminary hearing transcript could
otherwise properly be relied upon as part of the record of
conviction at the prima facie stage, the preliminary hearing
transcript in this case almost entirely consists of inadmissible
hearsay. The trial court erred in relying on this evidence to find
that the record conclusively established that appellant was the
actual shooter and the direct perpetrator of the attempted
murder.
As such, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to comply
with the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivisions (b) and (c)
was not harmless and requires remand. We will not, however,
direct the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing, as appellant requests. Because the court
failed to appoint counsel for appellant and received no briefing or
argument from the parties, the record does not demonstrate the
court made an adequate inquiry concerning whether appellant’s
petition establishes a prima facie case for relief under section
1172.6, subdivision (c). We decline to perform this statutorily
mandated task for the first time on appeal.7
We reverse the order denying appellant’s petition, with
directions to the trial court to appoint counsel for appellant and
proceed as required pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
We express no view as to whether the court ultimately should
7 We also note that the Supreme Court’s forthcoming
decision in Patton should provide further guidance on the trial
court’s ability to rely on the preliminary hearing transcript.
12
determine that appellant has established a prima facie case for
section 1172.6 relief.8
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions that the
trial court appoint counsel and perform the prima facie inquiry
required by section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
I concur:
MORI, J.
8 In light of our conclusion, we need not address appellant’s
additional arguments that the trial court’s summary denial of his
section 1172.6 petition violates his state and federal due process
rights.
13
CURREY, P. J., Dissenting.
Because I see this case differently than my colleagues, I
respectfully dissent.
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial
court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the
courts to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 971 (Lewis).) Because Thomas’s record of conviction
conclusively demonstrates his petition is meritless, I would
affirm.
As Presiding Justice Gilbert of this Court’s Division Six
recently noted (also in dissent): “Where a defendant pleads no
contest to attempted murder, admits that he intentionally
discharged a firearm, and is the sole and actual shooter, he is
ineligible for resentencing.” (People v. Alazar (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 1100, 1112, review granted December 31, 2024,
S287917 (dis. opn. of Gilbert, J.).) That description fits Thomas.
The only petitioners potentially eligible for relief under
section 1172.6 are those who “could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder” based on the changes to Penal
Code sections 188 and 189, which eliminated imputed-malice
theories of murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) The question,
therefore, is whether Thomas has shown he was convicted under
an imputed malice theory that has since been rendered invalid.
(Id.at subd. (a)) He has not made and cannot make that showing.
It is irrefutable that the prosecution proceeded at the
preliminary hearing on the theory that Thomas committed
attempted murder as the actual shooter in a drive-by shooting,
rather than on an imputed-malice theory. As the majority notes,
1
the preliminary hearing included testimony from a single
witness, Officer Scott Wilhelm of the Los Angeles Police
Department. In response to questions from the prosecutor,
Wilhelm testified that Jamal Harris, the victim of the attempted
murder, told Wilhelm that Thomas was the shooter, and that the
other suspect, co-defendant James Dunn, was the driver.
After the preliminary hearing, Thomas pled no contest to
attempted murder and admitted he personally discharged a
firearm in violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). This is
consistent with the prosecution theory that Thomas was the
shooter and his co-defendant Dunn was the driver in the drive-by
shooting. No personal use firearm allegation was brought
against Dunn, which also is consistent with the prosecution
theory.
The majority contends that because Wilhelm’s testimony
consisted almost entirely of hearsay, it cannot be used to
ascertain the prosecution’s theory, supposedly because that
would require us to accept the testimony for its truth. Not so.
We can tell from the charges brought, as well as the questions
posed and answers given during the prosecutor’s questioning of
Wilhelm that the prosecutor’s theory was that Thomas was the
shooter.
Theories of prosecution are neither true nor false. And we
need not accept the truth of Wilhelm’s testimony to identify the
theory of prosecution. “‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a
statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying
at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) But the hearsay doctrine
is not implicated when an out-of-court statement is “not received
2
to prove the truth of a fact it asserts.” (People v. Sanchez (2016)
63 Cal.4th 665, 681.)
So, although Wilhelm’s testimony currently is inadmissible
for its truth under the plain language of section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), it nonetheless is admissible for a valid non-
hearsay purpose at the prima facie stage of these proceedings.
That valid purpose is to ascertain that the legal theory under
which Thomas was charged with (and pled guilty to) attempted
murder was not one that is now prohibited; i.e.; Thomas was not
prosecuted under an imputed-malice theory of liability.
Because the testimony of Officer Wilhelm is admissible for
that valid non-hearsay purpose, and because it shows Thomas
pled to attempted murder on the theory that he was the actual
shooter, the record demonstrates Thomas is ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law. And because the record
demonstrates ineligibility as a matter of law, it was harmless
error for the trial court not to appoint counsel on Thomas’s behalf
or allow briefing. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972-974
[reversal is warranted only if the appellant can show a
reasonable probability that, absent error, his petition would not
have been summarily denied].)
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s order
denying relief.
CURREY, P. J.
3
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