CourtListener 10347780•Thompson v. Moon CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/28/25 Thompson v. Moon CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MICHAEL THOMPSON et al., B322777
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV12391)
v.
DANIEL MOON et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.
Levi Reuben Uku for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Decker Law, James Decker, Griffin Schindler for
Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Michael Thompson was the sole owner of 4 River
Investments, LLC (collectively, plaintiffs) and Daniel Moon was
the sole owner of Green Dream Collective Corp. (collectively,
defendants). In April 2018, plaintiffs contracted with defendants
to purchase “Green Dream,” a marijuana business in Los Angeles
owned by defendants. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants
defrauded plaintiffs and breached the sale agreement based on
theories that shifted over the course of the case. Initially,
plaintiffs alleged that the fraud and breach related to defendants’
collection of rent money from plaintiffs on a sublease while
defendants failed to pay rent to the landlord, and defendants’
failure to secure a ten-year extension of the lease for the Green
Dream premises. At trial, plaintiffs alleged in part that the sale
agreement required defendants to convey to plaintiffs a valid
marijuana dispensary retail license, which defendants did not do.
After a one-day bench trial, the court found that plaintiffs had
not proven their claims and entered judgment for defendants.
On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the Green Dream sale
agreement implied that a valid retail license was included in the
sale. Plaintiffs also argue that defendants had certain
obligations under the sublease, and that the court erroneously
excluded important evidence. We find no error, and therefore
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Complaint
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in April 2019. In the
operative first amended complaint, filed in June 2019, plaintiffs
alleged three causes of action: breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.
2
Plaintiffs alleged that in negotiating the sale of Green Dream,
Moon represented that he “had a wonderful personal relationship
with the landlord of the premises wherein Green Dream
operates,” and Moon “personally guaranteed the performance of
the lease on Green Dream behalf and [sic] the Landlord at 1600
S. Main Street, Los Angeles, California.” Moon also represented
that he “was going to obtain the extension of lease of the said
premises from the landlord for 10 years,” and that “the landlord
needs $20,000 from the sale of the said business to be deposited
by him Moon as an option for the landlord to extend the lease for
10-years [sic].” Moon prevented Thompson from meeting the
landlord in person by telling him that the landlord “did not like
black people.” Defendants “at all times relevant knew that the
lease agreement for the said premises would not be renewed or
extended by the landlord, yet made assurances and material
representations to the Plaintiffs for the sole purpose of inducing
reliance.”
The parties executed a sale agreement in April 2018, and
plaintiffs deposited $83,265 into an escrow account. Plaintiffs
“understood [Moon’s] promises as stated in the purchase
agreement . . . to include obtaining the landlord’s consent to
extend the lease agreement for 10-years.”
After the sale was completed in April 2018, Moon “failed or
refused to cooperate with the Plaintiff[s] in making a good faith
effort on Plaintiffs’ behalf” to extend the lease. Moon had
“demanded [an] additional $20,000 from Plaintiff Thompson to be
paid to the Landlord on Plaintiffs’ behalf[.] Thompson gave Moon
the $20,000.00 . . . but Moon embezzled the said $20,000.00 and
failed to pay the landlord the rent arrears.” Thompson later
learned that Moon’s representation of an “excellent relationship”
3
with the landlord was false, and “the landlord’s relationship with
[Moon] was irretrievably broken and indeed, the Landlord had
filed an action for unlawful detainer” against defendants.
Thompson attempted to directly pay the rent owed to the
landlord, but the landlord refused to accept it.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants “breached the agreement
between the parties when they failed to timely honor their
obligation and duty to obtain the lease extension as required
under the agreement,” and as a result, “plaintiffs suffered
substantial and material damages in [an] amount in excess of
$800,000.00.” Plaintiffs further alleged they had to pay attorney
fees defending an unlawful detainer action, and that they were
“damaged by the entry of unlawful detainer judgment against the
Plaintiff [sic].” Plaintiffs sought actual and punitive damages,
attorney fees, and costs.
The case proceeded to trial in June 2022.
B. Trial
1. Thompson
Thompson testified that he had worked in the cannabis
business since 1996 in a variety of capacities, including growing,
working in a dispensary, transporting product around the state,
working as security, and helping with licensing and paperwork.
Thompson testified that a retail cannabis business must have a
retail dispensary license issued by the relevant city, and that a
license is site-specific.
Thompson testified that Green Dream was “basically out of
business” when he first encountered it, with “no product on hand”
and “no equipment.” Moon owned it, and Thompson “bought
into” it. Thompson testified that based on Moon’s
representations, Thompson understood that he was buying Green
4
Dream along with “[t]he marijuana dispensary license for the
location at 1600 Main” Street in Los Angeles. Thompson paid
$65,000 for Green Dream. The parties executed a “business sale
agreement” on April 17, 2018.1 Thompson stated that he paid the
amount in cash into an escrow account. He testified that he
would not have bought the business if he thought it did not have
a valid license.
Thompson testified that he expected to receive Green
Dream’s retail license “through escrow,” but he never received it.
When Thompson tried to find information about Green Dream’s
license, he discovered that one had never been issued in Los
Angeles. Rather, Green Dream had a license issued in Long
Beach.
Thompson also testified that he paid defendants $17,245.09
in addition to the sale price for Green Dream, because Moon “said
he was going to pay the rent up for a couple of months, first, last,
security or something. I don’t know what he was talking about.”
Moon told Thompson that he could get the property lease
extended for ten years, because Moon and the landlord, Daniel
Shilacum, were good friends. Moon also told Thompson that
Shilacum “didn’t like blacks” so he “didn’t want to do business
1 The agreement was admitted as a trial exhibit. As
defendants correctly point out, none of the trial exhibits have
been submitted to this court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.224(a)(1), (b)(2) [the party wanting a reviewing court to review
exhibits must serve and file a notice, and if the exhibits are in the
party’s possession, transmit the exhibits to the reviewing court].)
Plaintiffs did not address this contention in their reply brief.
Because doing so does not prejudice defendants, we will presume
for purposes of this appeal that the sale agreement included in
the record with plaintiffs’ trial brief is the relevant agreement.
5
with me,” and therefore Thompson paid rent by “giving it to Mr.
Moon.”
Thompson said that he learned in September 2018 that
there was an unlawful detainer lawsuit relating to the property,
and therefore realized that Moon had not paid the rent.
Thompson tried to pay $18,000 directly to Shilacum, but
Shilacum refused to accept it. Thompson hired an attorney to
respond in the unlawful detainer case. Thompson testified that
his attorney’s actions “slowed” the unlawful detainer case, but
eventually he received a sheriff’s notice to vacate the premises.
Before Thompson could fully vacate the premises, Moon placed a
padlock on the gate, locking Thompson out. Thompson cut the
lock off.
Thompson testified that after expenses, Green Dream was
making $12,000-$13,000 per month, but “we were only there a
couple of months.” When asked how long specifically, Thompson
said, “five or six – even seven, eight months.”
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Thompson
about the following language in the sale agreement: “Seller’s
business is as follows: [¶] A marijuana dispensary, with all
business fixtures and product as well as the right to the name
and all legal documents business licenses and tax certificates and
other documentation to legally apply for a license to operate a
dispensary.” Thompson said that Moon “was supposed to give me
the license. That was the deal.” Thompson said that a retail
license was implied in the agreement, because the sale was for a
“marijuana dispensary,” which necessarily requires a license.
Referring to escrow documents, defense counsel noted that
the additional $17,245.09 Thompson paid included a security
deposit, rent deposit, sales tax on fixtures, and escrow charges.
6
Thompson agreed that the documents said as much, but said that
he was “under the impression it was for some type of rent.”
Defense counsel asked about unpaid rent listed on the
unlawful detainer notice, which noted a balance due for July
2018, and unpaid rents for August and September 2018.
Thompson said the rents were actually paid: “We physically gave
the money. Every month, the first of the month, we paid. We
did. So if it wasn’t paid, they didn’t pay it.” The judge asked
Thompson if he had receipts for the money he gave to Moon.
Thompson said he “paid them in cash,” and got no receipts
because “I trusted him.”
Defense counsel pointed to a portion of the escrow closing
instructions, which stated that the “buyer has received a sublease
from [Moon] without landlord’s consent outside of escrow instead
of obtaining an assignment of lease from landlord directly.”
Thompson said he paid the approximately $17,000 for rent, and
as for the escrow instructions, "I don’t know what you’re talking
about now with this.”
On redirect, Thompson confirmed that he was the
sublessee, Moon was the sublessor, and therefore he paid rent to
Moon in cash.
2. Moon
Plaintiffs’ counsel called Moon to testify. Moon stated that
he owned Green Dream, a “marijuana dispensary,” that he
operated from 2017 to 2018. He testified that Green Dream had
a “retail corporation license” but not a marijuana dispensary
license. Moon said he did not represent to plaintiffs that Green
Dream had a marijuana retail license. Moon sold the business to
Thompson, and subleased the property to him. Moon testified
that he had a one-year lease beginning in September 2017, which
7
he told Thompson about at the time of the sale. Moon said “a
friend” would “collect the money, two months, and then he pay
[sic] the rent to the landlord.” Moon did not have a good
relationship with the landlord. He did not recall whether he
received notice of the unlawful detainer action.
After plaintiffs rested, defense counsel called Moon as a
witness. Moon testified that he operated Green Dream at its
location in Los Angeles for about seven months. He testified that
the business was profitable, but when asked why he decided to
sell it, he said “business wasn’t – you know, I just want to sell it.
I decide to sell it [sic].” Moon met Thompson twice; the first time
was about two months before selling the business, and the second
time was at the escrow office. Moon testified again that he had a
one-year lease for Green Dream, and he never represented that
he could extend the lease for ten years. The sublease with
plaintiffs was from the time of the sale to the end of Moon’s lease,
about five or six months. Moon also testified that he expected
plaintiffs to pay rent directly to the landlord. He testified that he
received no money from plaintiffs after the sale in April.
On cross-examination, Moon testified that when he signed
his lease, he paid a security deposit plus first and last months’
rent. The lease was not terminated upon the sale of the business.
Moon felt that $65,000 was a fair price for the business. Moon
agreed that the landlord never consented to the sublease
agreement.
3. Davis
Witness James Davis, called by the defense, testified that
he worked for Green Dream when Thompson owned it. Davis
managed the business, including making sure the rent was paid.
Davis could not recall exact dates, but estimated that he
8
delivered Green Dream’s rent “[t]hree to four times,” and he was
“still paying rent late into summer.” Rent was paid to the
landlord in cash, somewhere in the ballpark of $7,000 per month.
Davis was later terminated.
On cross-examination, Davis testified that before he
worked with Thompson, Davis and Moon had worked together for
about three years on wholesale marijuana sales to dispensaries.
Moon introduced Davis to Thompson. Davis testified that
Thompson’s partner Doug let Davis go several months after
Thompson bought Green Dream. Plaintiffs’ counsel called
Thompson again to rebut this timeline; Thompson testified that
he fired Davis a week or two after buying Green Dream.
4. Closing arguments
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued in closing that defendants sold
plaintiffs a “dispensary,” but because it never had a license, it
was “a worthless business” and an “illegal business.” Thompson
expected Moon to deliver a license at the end of escrow. The
court interrupted to ask why Thompson, who had been in the
business for 25 years, paid $80,000 “on someone’s word” without
ensuring the documents were in order. Plaintiffs’ counsel said
that Thompson “got taken” and he “fell for” Moon’s false
representations. Plaintiffs’ counsel said that “escrow and Mr.
Moon promised that once the payment was made, . . . they’re
going to prepare a booklet that would have everything in it.” The
court asked, “[W]here in the escrow does it say that after Mr.
Thompson pays the money, he will get a booklet with all of these
materials?” Plaintiffs’ counsel said, “Of course that is not in the
escrow,” but Thompson testified that Moon represented that such
information would be provided.
9
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Moon breached the sale
agreement by selling a business that had no license. The court
asked about the provision in the sale agreement stating that the
seller would provide the documentation “to legally apply for a
license” for a dispensary. Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that
language could reference the need for further inspection by the
city to “approve the transfer.”
Defense counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to
support plaintiffs’ causes of action. He stated that the parties
reached an agreement about the sale, the escrow period ended,
and Thompson took over the business. Moon left the business
completely, and an unlawful detainer action was filed long after
Moon left. The court noted that Moon had an ongoing lease, and
therefore had “an ongoing or continuing obligation to pay the rent
directly to the landlord.” Defense counsel agreed that “Mr. Moon
remained on the lease, but there is no obligation for Mr. Moon to
pay out of pocket” or to pay rent “while Mr. Thompson operates
the business for himself.”
The court noted that the sale agreement said there was an
assignment of the lease, but there was in fact no assignment of
the lease, so “is that a breach of contract?” Defense counsel said
no, because the escrow instructions and Thompson’s agreement
to take the property showed that the parties agreed there would
be no assignment of the lease.
In his rebuttal argument, plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that
Moon, “being at the tail [end] of his obligation, decided not to
perform” by not paying rent for August.
5. Verdict
The court delivered a verdict from the bench. The court
summarized the evidence, and said, “I will tell you the court
10
believes neither the plaintiff nor defendant. I think both were
being casual on the truth.” The court cited Thompson’s claim
that he did not understand why he was paying an extra $17,000
during the sale, and said, “I don’t believe this. Mr. Thompson is
an experienced business person. He’s been doing this work for
25, 27 years, according to his own testimony. And I don’t think
that someone is given [sic] an extra $17,000 in escrow and just
decides, ‘Oh, well, I don’t know what it’s about, but I’m going to
pay it anyway.” The court was also skeptical about Thompson’s
claim that he paid the rent in cash with no receipts, because if
Thompson “was paying $7500 a month rent, he would get a
receipt from the landlord” to protect against an unlawful detainer
action or eviction.
The court continued, “I also don’t believe Mr. Moon
completely. He says that [Thompson] was to pay the rent directly
to the landlord,” but the escrow instructions “says the landlord’s
unaware of the sublease.” “So it strikes me as a little strange
that Mr. Moon would say that [Thompson] is supposed to pay the
landlord directly.” The court added, “Also, Mr. Moon is either
very cagey or forgetful as to why he decided to sell the business.”
The court did not believe Moon’s testimony that he did not recall
whether he received the unlawful detainer paperwork, because
“[i]f you’re being evicted, you remember.” The court noted that
Davis’s testimony about paying rent into late summer
corresponded with the unlawful detainer’s notice of unpaid rent
in August and September.
The court stated that the burden was on plaintiffs to prove
their causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. The court
continued, “The court believes simply that plaintiff hasn’t [sic]
11
proven their case.” Neither side was “truthful,” but “the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff, and I don’t believe the plaintiff has
presented any evidence that’s credible” to support the three
causes of action. So the court stated that it would “enter
judgment for the defendant and against the plaintiff.”
Defendants prepared a proposed judgment, which the court
signed and entered on July 13, 2022. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs assert three arguments: first, the
court incorrectly interpreted the sale agreement; second, the
defendants had certain obligations under the sublease; and third,
the court erred in excluding Exhibit 14, a copy of a notice to
vacate. We consider each argument in turn. “[I]t is a
fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is
on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed
an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)
A. Interpretation of the sale agreement
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law
by awarding judgment to defendants “based on [an] incorrect and
erroneous interpretation of the agreement between the parties.”
They assert that the “language of the [sale] Agreement and
undisputed extrinsic evidence before the court show the mutual
understanding that a License would be conveyed to [plaintiffs]
with the purchase of Green Dream.” They contend the trial court
interpreted the sale agreement incorrectly on this matter,
because the court failed to “determine the intent of the parties, or
whether the contract is reasonably susceptible to . . . competing
12
interpretations.” Plaintiffs also contend that defendants
“procured the contract by fraud and misrepresentation.”
Defendants correctly point out that the lack of a retail
dispensary license was not the basis of plaintiffs’ complaint.
Rather, the three causes of action in the first amended complaint
are based on an alleged breach of Moon’s promise to get the
landlord to extend the lease for ten years and Moon’s alleged
failure to pay rent. Generally, a court may not award a plaintiff
relief on an issue not included in the pleadings. (See, e.g.
McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 913.) Plaintiffs did
not move to amend the complaint to include such a claim. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 576.) However, because the lack of a
dispensary license was addressed at trial, and defendants will not
be prejudiced by this court considering the issue on the merits,
we address plaintiffs’ argument.
“‘The interpretation of a contract is a judicial function.
[Citation.] In engaging in this function, the trial court “give[s]
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed” at the
time the contract was executed. [Citation.] Ordinarily, the
objective intent of the contracting parties is a legal question
determined solely by reference to the contract’s terms.” (Brown v.
Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 432.) “‘The court generally
may not consider extrinsic evidence of any prior agreement or
contemporaneous oral agreement to vary or contradict the clear
and unambiguous terms of a written, integrated contract.
[Citations.] Extrinsic evidence is admissible, however, to
interpret an agreement when a material term is ambiguous.’”
(Ibid.)
“On appeal, a ‘trial court’s ruling on the threshold
determination of “ambiguity” (i.e., whether the proffered evidence
13
is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is
reasonably susceptible) is a question of law, not of fact. [Citation.]
Thus[,] the threshold determination of ambiguity is subject to
independent review.’” (Brown v. Goldstein, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th
at p. 433.)
In the sale agreement, Green Dream was represented as
follows: “A marijuana dispensary, with all business fixtures and
product as well as the right to the name and all legal documents
business licenses and tax certificates and other documentation to
legally apply for a license to operate a dispensary.”
Plaintiffs argue this “representation that the business was
up-to-date with legal documentation implies that Green Dream
was a licensed marijuana dispensary.” They also assert that the
“mere recital of Green Dream as a marijuana dispensary
presupposes licensure,” since a dispensary cannot be legally
operated without a license.
We disagree. The statement that Green Dream’s
documentation would allow the buyer to “legally apply for a
license to operate a dispensary” makes clear that no license was
included in the sale, either because Green Dream had no active
license at the time of the sale or because the active license would
not transfer to a new owner. Because the language of the
contract demonstrates that no retail license is included in the
sale, there is no need to consider extrinsic evidence about the
parties’ understanding.
Plaintiffs also argue that the “statutory underpinning of
the licensing regime does not provide that a party could lend
proxy documentation to an applicant for a License.” They further
assert that defendants “have not demonstrated that they
possessed any such documents. One cannot give that, which they
14
do not have [sic].” Plaintiffs cite no authority regarding what
documentation is required for a license. Furthermore, no
evidence was proffered regarding what documentation or licenses
were or were not conveyed as part of the sale. Without any legal
authority or supporting evidence, this contention does not
support a finding of error.
B. Defendants’ obligations under the sublease
Plaintiffs also assert that “the sublease created obligation
[sic] on [defendants] to defend [plaintiffs] against eviction by the
landlord.” They argue that the trial court “misdirected itself
when it found that” plaintiffs’ nonpayment of rent “under the
purported sublease was [a] proper ground for eviction by the
landlord.” Plaintiffs also assert that Davis collected the rent and
paid the landlord, but after Davis was dismissed, defendants “did
not demand or receive or appoint any other person to collect the
rent,” so “the departure of Mr. Davis[ ] frustrated [plaintiffs’]
ability to pay rent under the contract.”
Again, defendants correctly point out that these arguments
were not asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint. In addition, these
issues were not litigated in the trial court. The argument has
therefore been forfeited. (See, e.g., Wu v. Public Employment
Relations Board (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 715, 724 [“‘a reviewing
court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the first time
on appeal which could have been but were not presented to the
trial court’”].)
Moreover, no sublease is included in the appellate record.
(See fn. 1, supra.) Thus, even if we were inclined to consider
plaintiffs’ arguments on the merits, it would be impossible to
determine the parties’ duties under that agreement. In addition,
plaintiffs’ argument misrepresents the trial court’s ruling; the
15
court did not find that plaintiffs’ nonpayment of rent was a
“proper ground for eviction.” The court did not make any findings
regarding eviction.2
Thus, because the contention has been forfeited and
plaintiffs have not pointed to evidence in the record to support
their argument, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the trial
court erred with respect to defendants’ duties under the sublease.
C. Exclusion of Exhibit 14
During Thompson’s testimony in the morning session of the
trial, plaintiffs’ counsel sought to introduce Exhibit 14, which he
described as “the notice to vacate.” Defense counsel objected
because the document was “not fully legible.” The court
sustained the objection, stating, “Normally I would admit a notice
to vacate if the foundation was laid, but I just can’t read this.
Quite honestly, it’s not legible in the court’s file. I can’t read what
it says.” Plaintiffs’ counsel asked to submit an electronic copy,
and the court agreed, saying, “If you get an electronic copy in
today,” “we’ll see what the electronic copy says.” The court noted
that the judicial assistant cannot enter an electronic copy, “So if
you need to email something and print it out, by all means . . . .
And then come back to the court, and we’ll substitute a better
copy for Exhibit 14 and then see if there’s an objection.” The
record includes no additional discussion about this exhibit.
2 Plaintiffs twice sought judicial notice of certain documents
from an unlawful detainer action, but stated that the documents
had not been presented to the trial court. We denied both
requests. “‘Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice
of evidence not presented to the trial court’ absent exceptional
circumstances” (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372,
379 fn. 2), and no such circumstances were presented in
plaintiffs’ request.
16
Plaintiffs now argue that the trial court “committed
prejudicial error when it rejected the Exhibit on the ground solely
that it was not fully legible,” because the document was
sufficiently “identifiable.” Although “the trial court provided
[plaintiffs an] opportunity to cure the perceived defect,” “the task
was virtually insurmountable” because the trial was completed in
a single day. Plaintiffs argue that the court’s erroneous exclusion
prevented it from proving fraud, because Exhibit 14 would have
demonstrated that defendants “had no right or interest in the
premises” at the time they sold it. “Trial court rulings on the
admissibility of evidence . . . are generally reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.)
Plaintiffs’ argument is somewhat difficult to interpret,
because Exhibit 14 is not in the record on appeal. (See fn. 1,
supra.) Plaintiffs cite one page in the Clerk’s Transcript, which
includes a dark photograph of a partially folded paper titled
“Notice to Vacate,” with a Sheriff’s Department heading. Neither
the briefs nor the appellate record identify the document as
Exhibit 14. It appears that the dates on this document are from
April 2018, which is the month the sale agreement was signed.
At trial, however, Thompson testified that in response to the
notice to vacate in Exhibit 14, he vacated the premises.3 Thus,
the Exhibit 14 Thompson saw at trial must have been a notice to
vacate dated after plaintiffs had operated Green Dream for
several months—not the notice to vacate in the record dated
around the same time as the sale agreement.
3 Attached to plaintiffs’ trial brief was an unlawful detainer
complaint filed in November 2018. Thus, it appears there were
multiple unlawful detainer actions.
17
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated error. The trial court told
plaintiffs it could not read the document and asked plaintiffs to
submit a legible copy. Plaintiffs did not. The court did not abuse
its discretion by declining to admit an illegible exhibit. Moreover,
even if excluding the evidence was error, it could not be
prejudicial; an illegible exhibit could not support plaintiffs’ case.
In sum, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the trial
court erred in finding in favor of defendants at trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P.J.
MORI, J.
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