Wooten v. Five Keys Schools and Programs CA1/3

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Filed 2/27/25 Wooten v. Five Keys Schools and Programs CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RAINIE S. WOOTEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169784
v.
FIVE KEYS SCHOOLS AND (City and County of San
PROGRAMS et al., Francisco Super. Ct.
No. CGC-23-606322)
Defendants and Appellants.

Five Keys Schools and Programs (Five Keys) appeals from the trial
court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of Rainie S. Wooten’s wage
and hour class action lawsuit.1 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts, as described below, are not in dispute.
Five Keys is a nonprofit organization that offers educational programs,
housing, and other services to underserved communities in California. Five
Keys utilizes Paycom, a third-party human resources platform, to distribute
and manage employment documents and data.

1 Wooten listed “Does 1 to 100” as additional defendants in her

complaint but did not name them during the trial court proceedings, and the
parties do not discuss them in their briefs. Therefore, we do not consider the
Does for purposes of this appeal.

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Five Keys Employee Handbook and Arbitration Policy
From 2020 to 2023, Wooten worked in Five Keys’ housing program. On
March 1, 2022—about a year and a half into Wooten’s employment—Five
Keys electronically distributed a 78-page employee handbook through
Paycom entitled “ ‘Employee Handbook – Housing’ ” (the Handbook) to all
housing program employees, including Wooten.
The first four pages of the Handbook contain the table of contents,
eight “Part[s]” with 150 total subparts. One of the subparts listed on the first
page of the table of contents is titled “Arbitration Policy”; it is in the same
font as all 149 other subparts and is not highlighted or distinguished in any
way.
Part 1—“Welcome”—provides background information about Five Keys,
including an “Introduction” subpart and a “Legal Stuff We Have To Include”
subpart. The Introduction, located on page seven, states:
“We prepared this handbook to help employees find the
answers to many questions that they may have regarding their
employment with Five Keys. We also want to establish the
foundational guidelines that enable us to treat employees with
kindness and consistency. Our intention is to create a positive
culture where people feel supported and enjoy working at Five
Keys. . . .

[¶] . . .

“Although this handbook is long, it’s worth the read!

“Please take the time to read through this handbook. We
encourage you to save an electronic copy of the handbook where
you can easily access it in the future.”

Also on page seven, just below the “Introduction,” the subpart “Legal
Stuff We Have To Include” states in relevant part:

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“With the sole exceptions of the policies of at-will
employment and arbitration, neither this handbook nor any other
verbal or written communication by a Five Keys employee or
representative is, nor should be considered, an agreement,
contract of employment, express or implied, or a promise of
treatment in any particular manner in any given situation, nor
does it confer any contractual rights whatsoever. . . .

[¶] . . .

“This handbook states only general guidelines. Five Keys
may, at any time and in its sole discretion, modify, rescind, delete,
add, or vary from anything stated in this handbook, with or
without notice, except for the policies of at-will employment and
arbitration, which may only be modified by an express written
agreement signed by the employee and President/CEO. Five Keys
will attempt to provide employees with prompt notification of such
changes as they occur.”

Pages 10 through 13 of the Handbook contain the “Arbitration Policy”
providing in relevant part:
“The Five Keys has established a timely and fair procedure
of binding arbitration to resolve disputes that arise out of your
employment. As a condition of employment and continued
employment, all employees shall agree to submit any complaints
or disputes to the arbitration process, as described in this
policy. . . .

[¶] . . .

“As a condition of employment at Five Keys, Employee
agrees to submit all disputes covered by this Arbitration Policy to
final and binding arbitration before an arbitrator rather than a
court or jury. In exchange for Employee’s agreement to submit all
covered disputes to final and binding arbitration, Five Keys
likewise agrees to the use of arbitration as the exclusive forum for
resolving disputes covered under this Arbitration Policy. Five
Keys and Employee agree that covered disputes shall not be
resolved by way of court or jury trial, except as otherwise noted.”

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The Arbitration Policy states it is governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., FAA). Among the disputes covered by the
Arbitration Policy are “any claims arising out of or relating to the
employment relationship between Five Keys and Employee,” including claims
under the Labor Code and related statues. It also contains a class action
waiver.
Wooten Electronically Signed the Handbook
Three days after the Handbook was distributed, on March 4, 2022,
Wooten’s supervisor told her at a daily staff meeting that she needed to sign
the Handbook in the Paycom application by the end of her shift “or [she]
would get written up.” Wooten also received a text message after the meeting
reminding her to sign the Handbook. No one explained the Handbook or its
policies to Wooten, that she needed to read it, or that she was bound by an
arbitration policy if she continued employment. Wooten never reviewed the
arbitration portion of the Handbook; she did recall reviewing sections
concerning dress code and clocking in to work at some point during her
employment.
That same day, March 4, Wooten accessed the Handbook through the
Paycom application on her cell phone, scrolled to the last page, and affixed
her electronic signature to the signature line. The signature line appears
beneath the final subpart; it contains no accompanying language indicating
what the signature is meant to acknowledge or otherwise signifies. Wooten
did not initial or sign the Handbook on any other page and nowhere on the
signature page is the arbitration agreement referenced. Wooten understood
her signature to be an acknowledgment that she received the Handbook.
Wooten’s Lawsuit and Motion to Compel Arbitration
Wooten’s employment at Five Keys ended in early 2023.

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On May 5, 2023, Wooten filed a wage and hour class action lawsuit
against Five Keys alleging claims for failure to pay minimum and overtime
wages, permit meal periods, provide accurate wage statements, or timely pay
final wages, as well as unfair business practices based on Labor Code
violations. On July 14, 2023, Wooten filed an amended complaint adding a
cause of action for rest period violations.
On November 27, 2023, Five Keys filed a motion to compel arbitration
and to dismiss or stay Wooten’s lawsuit. Five Keys contended the Arbitration
Policy was a binding contract to which Wooten expressly agreed by her
signature and that her claims were encompassed by the policy. In the
alternative, it argued Wooten’s continued employment after delivery of the
Arbitration Policy constituted implied consent to be bound by its terms.
In support of the motion, Five Keys submitted a copy of the Handbook
signed by Wooten, as well as a declaration by its senior human resources
director describing the processes of distributing employment documents
through Paycom. The declaration stated the Handbook was distributed
electronically to all employees and that Wooten “was asked to, and did,
electronically sign the Handbook containing the Arbitration Policy.”
Wooten opposed the motion on the grounds that Five Keys failed to
establish the parties entered into either an express or implied agreement to
arbitrate. She contended there was no express arbitration agreement as her
signature on the last page of the Handbook without any accompanying
acknowledgement language signified only her receipt of the Handbook, not
assent to the Arbitration Policy. Wooten also argued there was no implied
consent to the Arbitration Policy as she did not have notice that agreeing to
arbitration was a condition of continued employment. Wooten submitted a

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declaration establishing the facts of her receipt and signing of the Handbook
summarized above.
In reply, Five Keys argued it had met its burden to show an implied-in-
fact agreement to arbitrate as the Handbook contained reasonable notice that
agreeing to arbitration was a condition of continued employment. Five Keys
did not submit any further evidence.
On December 20, 2023, after holding a hearing, the trial court denied
the motion to compel arbitration in a detailed written order. The court
concluded no agreement to arbitrate existed as Wooten had neither expressly
nor impliedly consented to the Arbitration Policy. The court framed the issue
of implied consent to arbitrate as “whether [Wooten] received adequate
notice” that an arbitration agreement was a condition of continued
employment and concluded Five Keys had not persuaded the court that
Wooten had “sufficient notice to give rise to implied consent.”
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Five Keys argues only that the court erred as to whether
there was an implied-in-fact agreement to arbitrate based upon the provision
of the Handbook and Wooten’s continued employment thereafter. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
We review de novo whether an arbitration agreement existed where, as
here, the material facts are not in dispute. (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd.,
LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 173 [“Because there are no facts in dispute,
the existence of a contract is a question we decide de novo.”]; accord, Pinnacle
Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle); Diaz v. Sohnen Enterprises (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 126, 129 (Diaz); Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 373, 380 (Harris).)

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The party seeking to compel arbitration—in this case, Five Keys—
bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement.
(Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236.) The enforceability of an arbitration
agreement is determined pursuant to state contract law even where, as here,
the agreement states it is governed by the FAA. (Ibid. [“In California,
‘[g]eneral principles of contract law determine whether the parties have
entered a binding agreement to arbitrate.’ ”].)
To prove the existence of an implied-in-fact agreement to arbitrate, the
employer must first show it provided adequate notice. (See Diaz, supra, 34
Cal.App.5th at p. 130 [implied consent may be found “after notification that
an agreement to arbitration is a condition of continued employment” (italics
added)]; see also Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420–
422 (Craig) [finding implied-in-fact acceptance where employer twice mailed
notices of arbitration agreement to employee].) And while an employer may
unilaterally change the terms of at-will employment after an employee has
been hired (Diaz, at p. 131), it can only do so “upon reasonable and fair
notice.” (Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 695, 708 (Serpa)). Simply put, if and only if adequate notice of
an arbitration agreement was provided can continued employment constitute
acceptance. (Diaz, at p. 130 [continued employment constitutes implied
consent]; accord, Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236; Craig, at p. 420.)
The outcome of this case therefore turns on whether Wooten received
reasonable and fair notice that agreeing to the Arbitration Policy was a
condition of continued employment.2 (See Diaz, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at

2 Though we are conducting a de novo review, we note that Five Keys’

assertion that the trial court applied a heightened notice requirement is
baseless. Five Keys points, out of context, to the court’s references to “ ‘clear
indication’ ” and “ ‘clear notice.’ ” When considered in context, it is apparent

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p. 130; Serpa, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 708.) Contrary to Five Keys’
assertion that the Handbook contained adequate notice, and reviewing this
issue de novo, we do not find that Wooten was provided adequate notice.
A review of the cases cited by Five Keys does not reveal any cases in
which the courts have found an implied-in-fact agreement to arbitrate under
circumstances equivalent to those presented here.
We begin with Craig, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 416, as Five Keys relies
primarily on this case in support of its position. In Craig, the employer
established a new dispute resolution program and mailed a memorandum to
all employees stating: “The enclosed brochure explains the procedures as well
as how the Dispute Resolution Program works as a whole. Please take the
time to read the material. IT APPLIES TO YOU. It will govern all future
legal disputes between you and the Company that are related in any way to
your employment.” (Id. at p. 419.) The brochure referenced in the
memorandum, and sent with the memorandum, explained the dispute
resolution program, including the arbitration process. (Ibid.) The appellate

the trial court properly framed the issue as “whether [Wooten] received
adequate notice,” and answered that question in the negative by finding she
had not received “sufficient notice to give rise to implied consent.” Further,
the court merely contrasted Diaz, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 126, by noting the
employees in that case “were provided with a clear notice” of the new
arbitration agreement. This was not an “enhanced notice” requirement.
We also readily dispose of Five Keys’ argument that the court
“apparently fused” the concepts of contract formation with factors relevant to
the defense of unconscionability. As Five Keys acknowledges, the trial court
expressly stated Wooten did not raise an unconscionability defense. And the
trial court did not proceed to analyze unconscionability at any point in its
order. That the court noted some facts in Wooten’s declaration “ ‘could be
suggestive of procedural unconscionability,’ ” and went on to discuss “the
circumstances surrounding contract formation,” does not mean the trial court
erroneously fused the two issues.

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court concluded that evidence of mailing was substantial evidence for the
presumption of delivery and receipt (despite the employee denying receipt)
and that they provided adequate notice; therefore, her continued employment
constituted an implied-in-fact acceptance of the binding arbitration
agreement. (Id. at pp. 420–422.)
Here, there is no dispute that Wooten received the Handbook but did
not review the arbitration agreement. Five Keys asserts that, under Craig,
Wooten’s failure to review the Arbitration Policy is irrelevant. While we
agree an employee need not have read an arbitration policy to have been
bound by it (see Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236 [“An arbitration clause
within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually
read the clause.”]), an employer still must provide adequate notice of said
policy. Wooten’s failure to read the buried policy does not absolve Five Keys
of its obligation to provide “reasonable and fair notice” of the agreement to
arbitrate (see Serpa, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 708) and Craig provides no
support for the proposition that the notice in this case was adequate. To the
contrary, the employer in Craig mailed a standalone brochure exclusively
concerning dispute resolution along with a separate memorandum stating
arbitration governed all future legal disputes related to employment and, in
all capital letters, that it “APPLIES TO YOU.” (Craig, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th
at p. 419.)
The memorandum in Craig is analogous to a separate acknowledgment
form accompanying an employee handbook. (Mendoza v. Trans Valley
Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 790 (Mendoza).) Here, there was no
separate acknowledgment form, agreement, or memorandum. Wooten was
merely told she had to sign the Handbook on Paycom by the end of her shift;
in response, Wooten scrolled through the 78-page Handbook—on her cell

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phone—to sign the last page. The signature line did not contain any
language explaining what Wooten’s signature meant or whether it bound her
to any specific policy, and she reasonably understood it to mean only that she
had received the Handbook. (See ibid. [“Unlike the memoranda in Craig that
provided clear notice of the alternative dispute program, the acknowledgment
forms here did not mention the Arbitration Policy.”].) And so, Five Keys did
not meet its “obligation to [provide] reasonable and fair notice” of the change
in the terms of Wooten’s employment. (See Serpa, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at
p. 708; see also Mendoza, at pp. 788–791 [rejecting employer’s contention that
employee entered into implied-in-fact arbitration agreement merely by
continuing in employment after receiving a copy of employee handbook
containing arbitration policy].)
Five Keys’ reliance on Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d
1089 (Davis) is similarly misplaced. In Davis, the employee accepted
employment after receiving a handbook stating certain disputes were subject
to arbitration. (Id. at p. 1093.) Thereafter, the employer modified the
arbitration agreement and sent letters to employees to notify them of the
change. (Id. at p. 1092.) The letters expressly stated the employer was
updating its preexisting dispute resolution program and wanted to ensure
employees had the current version; the updated dispute resolution program,
including the arbitration agreement, accompanied the letters. (Ibid.) Hence,
the letters “satisfied the minimal requirements under California law for
providing employees with reasonable notice of a change to its employee
handbook.” (Id. at p. 1094.) As in Craig, and unlike the case before us, the
employee in Davis was provided a standalone document providing notice of
the arbitration agreement along with the standalone dispute resolution
agreement. (Davis, at p. 1094; Craig, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.)

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Of course, an arbitration agreement need not be a standalone document
to be enforceable. (See Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 383–384
[employee consented to arbitration agreement in employee handbook and its
appendix by commencing work after acknowledging receipt of both].) But
Five Keys’ reliance on Harris for the proposition that notice to Wooten was
adequate is not persuasive as, in Harris, the employee signed an
acknowledgement form that “included acknowledging receiving both the
Employee Handbook and the attached arbitration agreement”—no such
acknowledgment was signed by Wooten. (Id. at p. 383.) Further, the
employee handbook in Harris stated on page one that it was “ ‘each
employee’s responsibility to read, understand and follow the provisions of this
Handbook.’ ” (Id. at p. 377.) Here, there was no language indicating the
employees had a responsibility to read or understand the provisions in the
Handbook; rather, the Introduction—which appeared only on page seven—
stated the Handbook was “worth the read,” and asked employees to “Please
take the time to read through this handbook.” Finally, although the table of
contents in both cases referenced arbitration, the subject heading in Harris
referred to “ ‘BINDING ARBITRATION OF CLAIMS’ ” (id. at p. 383),
whereas the table of contents here referenced an “Arbitration Policy”—which
does not inherently indicate it was either binding, as in Harris, or an
agreement to arbitrate—in a font that was neither bolded nor capitalized and
appeared identical to the other 149 subparts. The absence of these factors in
this case sets it apart from Harris.
The remaining cases cited by Five Keys concerning implied-in-fact
agreements in the employment context are also inapposite. (See Diaz, supra,
34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 129–131 [implied-in-fact arbitration agreement existed
where employer informed employee at in-person meeting about arbitration

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agreement and employee was personally told twice that continued
employment would itself constitute acceptance of the agreement]; Asmus v.
Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1, 15 [employees accepted new employment
terms by continuing employment after employer terminated original policy
and “offered continuing employment [under modified policy] to employees
who received notice and signed an acknowledgement to that effect”];
DiGiancinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 629, 632, 637–
639 [no breach of employment contract where employee continued in
employment after employer notified him both by letter and orally of changed
employment terms].)
Finally, Five Keys cites Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 245, for the
proposition that actual notice is not required. Pinnacle concerned an express
arbitration agreement contained in a condominium property’s easements,
restrictions, and covenants. (Id. at pp. 232-233.) In that context, the
California Supreme Court found an express agreement to arbitrate existed,
noting an “important feature . . . of condominium developments is that actual
notice is not required for enforcement of a recorded declaration’s terms
against subsequent purchasers.” (Id. at pp. 238, 246.) That the Court
“decline[d] to read additional unwritten procedural requirements, such as
actual notice and meaningful reflection, into [an] arbitration statute” that
“ ‘govern[s] enforcement actions filed by an owner or an association’ ” (id. at
pp. 244–245) is of no moment for our purposes. Rather, as we have noted,
and consistent with cases concerning implied consent in the employment
context, our decision turns on the lack of “reasonable and fair” notice.3 (See
Serpa, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 708; Davis, supra, 755 F.3d at p. 1094.)

3 Similarly, we find unconvincing Five Keys’ citations to Sanchez v.

Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 914, and Doctor’s

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For these reasons, we conclude Five Keys has failed to carry its burden
to prove the existence of an implied-in-fact agreement to arbitrate with
Wooten. Accordingly, we do not reach Five Keys’ arguments concerning the
enforceability of the Arbitration Policy.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Five Keys’ motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Wooten shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1996) 517 U.S. 681, 687–688, for the proposition
that it was “not required to explain arbitration or specifically highlight or call
the arbitration clause to Wooten’s attention.” Neither case addressed the
circumstances surrounding the existence of an arbitration agreement, either
implied or express, and they are therefore not relevant to the notice
requirement at issue here.

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_________________________
PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.

_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

A169784/Wooten v. Five Keys Schools

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