CourtListener 10340536•People v. Simpson CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/26/25 P. v. Simpson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337029
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA127755)
v.
DONALD ALAN SIMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal; Donald Simpson, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
On November 20, 2012 Donald Alan Simpson planned and
participated in the armed robbery of the Las Palomas Meat
Market. During the robbery, Luis Valadez, the store owner, was
shot and killed by codefendant Davion Woodspage. A jury
convicted Simpson of multiple counts, including first degree
murder. In 2024 the trial court denied Simpson’s petition for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 after conducting
an evidentiary hearing. In denying the petition, the court found
Simpson was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
After reviewing the record, Simpson’s appointed appellate
counsel did not identify any arguable issues. Nor, after
independently reviewing the record and the contentions
presented by Simpson in his supplemental brief, have we.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 18, 2012 Simpson, 14-year-old Cindy J.,
Woodspage, and Jermaine Stanley entered a neighborhood
market in Torrance to commit a robbery. Simpson pointed a
firearm at the cashier and took $7,000 from the cash register
after accidentally discharging his firearm. A second store
employee, who had been stocking shelves when Simpson entered,
hid when he saw Simpson with the gun.
Two days later, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Simpson,
Woodspage, and Cindy went to the Las Palomas Meat Market
with a plan to rob the store. Simpson drove the car to the market
and told Cindy the plan was for her to buy something, then once
the register was open, “they would take action,” meaning
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Simpson and Woodspage would take money from the register by
pointing a gun at the owner of the store. A fourth person served
as a lookout. Simpson had a handgun, and Woodspage had a
rifle. When they arrived at the market, Simpson and Woodspage
had their guns in the waistband of their pants. Simpson was
wearing a hoodie over his head and a blue bandana covering the
bottom half of his face; Woodspage wore a skeleton mask that
covered his face. Cindy walked in the front door; Simpson and
Woodspage entered through the back door.
When he entered the store, Simpson encountered Jose
Garcia, a store employee, in the back section of the store. Garcia
turned around and saw Simpson wearing a bandanna over his
nose and mouth. Garcia believed Simpson was holding a gun,
and the two struggled. Garcia batted away Simpson’s arm,
causing Simpson’s firearm to discharge. The shot missed Garcia,
and Garcia crouched down. Simpson then hit Garcia on his head
with a hard object (the gun); Garcia felt a hard blow, and blood
flowed from his head. At that point Simpson turned around and
went toward the front of the store where Luis Valadez was
working at the cash register. Garcia ran from the store bleeding
from the head and hid under a vehicle.
When Woodspage entered the store, he walked toward the
front of the store, where Valadez was at the cash register.
Woodspage walked toward Valadez while pointing his rifle at
him. Valadez struggled with Woodspage for control of the rifle.
During the scuffle, Woodspage fired four shots, one of which
struck Valadez in the chest. Valadez later died from a gunshot
wound.
After Woodspage shot Valadez, he and Cindy ran out the
back door of the store. Cindy waited there for Simpson. Simpson
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grabbed some money from the front of the store near the register
where Valadez lay dying and escaped out of the back of the store,
in the process dropping 11 crumpled one dollar bills. Simpson
and Cindy then ran toward their car, where Woodspage and the
lookout were waiting. Simpson drove away with the group.
The information charged Simpson with 12 counts, including
first degree murder (§ 187), with the special allegation the
murder was committed while Simpson was engaged in the
commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). The
information further alleged Simpson personally used a firearm in
connection with the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and the
murder was committed to benefit a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The jury convicted Simpson on all
counts and found each of the special allegations true.
In People v. Simpson (July 12, 2017, B271460) (nonpub.
opn.) (Simpson I) we affirmed Simpson’s convictions but
remanded for resentencing in light of multiple sentencing errors.
On remand Simpson was sentenced to an aggregate state prison
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, plus 44 years
four months. We affirmed but directed the court to delete the
reference in the abstract to an additional life term with a 25-year
minimum eligibility. (People v. Simpson (Apr. 3, 2019, B291875)
[nonpub. opn.] (Simpson II).)
On February 7, 2019 Simpson, in pro per., filed a petition
for resentencing under former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6) stating he met the requirements for relief under
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437),
effective January 1, 2019, including that (1) the information
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder; (2) Simpson was convicted of murder based on a theory
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of felony murder; and (3) Simpson could not be convicted of first
or second degree murder under changes to sections 188 and 189
effective January 1, 2019. Simpson requested the trial court
appoint him counsel and vacate his murder conviction.
On February 11, 2019 the trial court summarily denied
Simpson’s petition without Simpson or any counsel present,
relying on the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance
finding under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A), that the
murder was committed while Simpson was engaged in the
commission of a robbery. The court concluded that “by finding
the allegation to be true, the jury had to have found that
petitioner, even if not the actual killer, acted with the intent to
kill or was a major participant and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. [¶] Therefore, due to the jury’s
findings as stated and pursuant to . . . section 189 (e)(3), the
petitioner does not qualify for resentencing [under]
section 1170.95.”
We affirmed the trial court’s ruling in People v. Simpson
(Mar. 10, 2020, B296083) (nonpub. opn.) (Simpson III), but the
Supreme Court granted Simpson’s petition for review and
transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our decision
and reconsider Simpson’s appeal in light of People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong) and People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952. In our subsequent opinion, we agreed with
Simpson that under Lewis, which was decided after the superior
court’s denial and our original decision, Simpson had filed a
sufficient petition under section 1172.6 and the trial court erred
in denying Simpon’s petition without first appointing counsel.
(People v, Simpson (Feb. 7, 2023, B296083) [nonpub. opn.]
(Simpson IV).) We also agreed with Simpson that because his
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special circumstance finding under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17)(A), predated People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), he
was not ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Simpson IV,
supra, B296083.)
On remand, the trial court appointed counsel for Simpson,
and the People conceded Simpson was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. Following additional briefing, the court held an
evidentiary hearing on February 23, 2024. Simpson waived his
physical appearance at the hearing (although he appeared by
telephone), and the parties proceeded without calling witnesses.
The court stated it had considered the trial transcripts, jury
instructions, and verdict forms.
After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied
the petition for resentencing. The court found that under Banks,
Clark, and In re Scoggins (2009) 9 Cal.App.5th 67 (Scoggins),
Simpson was a major participant and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The court explained that Simpson
was “on notice” of “the dangers of carrying and arming people
with weapons and what could happen . . . . He knows the danger
of an accidental discharge, he continues to arm
individuals. . . . He was armed and he armed the individuals,
gave specific roles to them. He was physically present. Sure
there may be an argument as to whether he was right next to the
actual shooter, Mr. Woodspage, but he was still present at the
scene. It wasn’t that he was outside, he was hoping that this
would all end. He took advantage of the situation. Once
[Valadez] was shot, did he even make any attempts to call 911,
render aid? There’s no evidence of such. . . . All he was
concerned about was getting the money and escaping. . . . There
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[were] no efforts to minimize the risk of violence in this case.
There [were] no efforts to mitigate his previous actions or the
actions of his cohorts.”
Simpson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Simpson on appeal from
the denial of his petition for resentencing. After reviewing the
record, appointed counsel did not identify any arguable issues
and so informed this court. Appointed counsel advised Simpson
that he was filing a brief stating he “did not find any arguable
issues to raise” and Simpson had a right to file a supplemental
brief. Appointed counsel also sent Simpson a copy of the brief
and the transcripts of the record on appeal.
On December 9, 2024 we received a nine-page
supplemental brief from Simpson. In his supplemental brief,
Simpson “conceded he was a major participant in the robbery,”
but he argued “there was insufficient evidence to establish that
he acted with reckless indifference beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Specifically, Simpson argued there was no evidence he supplied
Woodspage with the weapon, he knew Valadez had been shot, or
the accidental discharge of his firearm in the prior robbery put
him on notice of the danger an armed robbery posed to human
life. Further, Simpson “did not instigate, taunt, or otherwise
contribute to Woodspage engaging in a struggle with Valadez,”
and there was nothing Simpson could have done to prevent the
shooting because he was in another room, and his only “intent
was to commit robberies.” Simpson asserted that pursuant to the
factors set forth in Banks and Clark, we should reverse the trial
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court’s order denying his resentencing petition or grant a new
evidentiary hearing.
Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708; People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-848.)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). Section 189 requires the People to prove that the
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); that the
defendant, though not the actual killer, with the intent to kill
aided or assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2)); or that the defendant was a major participant in a
felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and “acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of Section 190.2,” the felony-murder special-circumstance
provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 448-449; see People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869;
Strong, at p. 708; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
In Clark and Scoggins, the Supreme Court specified the
relevant factors in determining whether a defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life under the totality of the
circumstances. The court observed these factors “‘significantly
overlap’” with the major participant factors because “‘the greater
the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more
likely that he [or she] acted with reckless indifference to human
8
life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.) The factors relevant to
whether an individual acted with reckless difference to human
life include: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be
used during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately
used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did
he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the
victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the
defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for
violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the
defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the
felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; accord, Clark, at
pp. 618-622; see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706 [describing
Clark’s “nonexhaustive list of considerations relevant to this
determination [of reckless indifference], including use of or
awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical
presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or
aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat
the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize
risks”].)
As the Scoggins court explained, “Reckless indifference to
human life is ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’” (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 676; accord, Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 808 [“[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient”; reckless
indifference to human life requires “knowingly creating a ‘grave
risk of death’” (italics added)].) “Whether [a defendant] was a
major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with
reckless indifference to human life is predominantly a factual
9
question reviewable for substantial evidence.” (People v. Oliver
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480; see People v. Underwood (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 303, 317 [substantial evidence did not support
superior court’s finding that defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life].)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Simpson acted with reckless indifference to human life.
“Reckless indifference ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to
assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the
defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome
of his actions.’” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 676-677,
quoting Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 616-617.) The evidence at
trial showed Simpson’s willingness to kill or assist Woodspage in
killing Valadez. Simpson planned the robbery, and he knew that
he and Woodspage would be armed before entering the meat
market. Simpson was prepared to use violence, as shown by his
holding a firearm as he encountered Garcia, resulting in a bloody
struggle. Although Simpson highlights that he was in a different
section of the store when Valadez was shot, Simpson was in close
proximity to the shooting. And after Valadez was shot, Simpson
went to the front of the store to complete the robbery, taking
money from the cash register in the area where Valadez lay dying
on the floor. Simpson then fled the store without rendering aid to
Valadez or calling for help. (See In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 679 [“A defendant’s actions after the shooting may also bear
on the defendant’s mental state.”].)
Because neither Simpson nor his appellate counsel has
identified a cognizable legal issue, and our independent review
has not identified one either, we affirm the order denying
Simpson’s petition for resentencing. (See People v. Delgadillo
10
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231-232; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th
106, 118-119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Simpson’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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