CourtListener 10338222•People v. Guevara CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/24/25 P. v. Guevara CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086514
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 17CMS-1626)
v.
LORENZO GUEVARA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Robert S.
Burns, Judge.
Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Clara M. Levers and Galen N. Farris,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Lorenzo Guevara was convicted in 2020 of committing three offenses
against his former wife, nine offenses against his stepdaughter, and five offenses against
his daughter. He was sentenced to eight years, plus 210 years to life in prison. This
second appeal arises from defendant having been resentenced to seven years, plus
190 years to life1 on remand ordered by the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
Division Four’s opinion, which affirmed defendant’s convictions, struck one of the jury’s
findings as to two counts, and vacated the upper term sentence as to one count as required
by new legislation enacted after defendant’s initial sentencing under Senate Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).
Defendant contends his sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for
resentencing. Defendant argues his sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
under the state and federal Constitutions. He also claims the trial court should exercise
its discretion as to whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences on counts 14
and 16 for violations of Penal Code2 section 288, subdivision (a). Defendant further
1 The trial court’s initial tentative ruling reflects a total term of six years, plus 190 years to
life. This included a two-year term on count 15, which vacated the original upper term of
four years on that count. The abstract of judgment also reflects a total term of six years, plus
190 years to life. On appeal, both defendant and the People erroneously rely on the court’s
tentative ruling and the abstract of judgment, indicating a term of six years, plus 190 years to life.
The court thereafter orally pronounced judgment, vacated the upper term, and said the new term
on count 15 for the attempted Penal Code former section 288a, subdivision (c)(1) is half the
middle term, or three years. We note the court’s oral pronouncement of a three-year term on
count 15 is also in accordance with the law. (See §§ 287, subd. (c)(1) [the middle term
punishment for oral copulation with another person who is under age 14 is six years], 664,
subd. (a) [an attempted crime is punishable by one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed
upon a conviction of the offense so attempted].) The three-year term on count 15 is also
reflected in the minute order. We find the three-year term on count 15 in accordance with the
court’s true oral pronouncement of judgement. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380,
385 [where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the abstract of judgment,
the oral pronouncement controls].) Therefore, as set forth below, we direct the trial court to
amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the proper sentence, which is seven years, plus
190 years to life.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
argues he was constructively denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his
resentencing hearing. We reject defendant’s contentions, affirm the judgment, and direct
the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2018, the Kings County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with spousal rape (former § 262, subd. (a)(1); count 1), criminal
threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 2, 5, 11), false imprisonment by violence (§ 236;
count 3), forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 4), forcible lewd acts (§ 288,
subd. (c)(1); counts 6, 10), forcible oral copulation of a minor over age 14 (former
§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 7), forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 8, 12), forcible
sodomy with a person over age 14 (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 9), forcible sexual
penetration of a child under age 14 (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(B); count 13), lewd act on a child
under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 14, 16), attempted oral copulation of a person
under age 14 (§ 664; former § 288a, subd. (c)(1); count 15), and forcible sodomy of a
person under age 14 (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(B); count 17). The information alleged
defendant committed the offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (a),
(e)(4)) and administered a controlled substance to Y.D. (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (e)(6)) as to
all counts, and personally inflicted bodily harm on a person under age 14 (§ 667.61,
subds. (a), (d)(7), (j)(1)) as to counts 15, 16, and 17.3
On February 27, 2020, a jury found defendant guilty on all 17 counts and found
the special allegations true on all applicable counts except count 7, which the jury found
the drug administration allegation not true.
3 The multiple victim allegations (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)) were presented to the jury only in
connection with counts 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17; the drug administration allegations
(§ 667.61, subd. (e)(6)) were presented to the jury in connection with counts 4, 7, 8, 9 and 12;
and the bodily harm allegations (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(7)) were presented to the jury in connection
with counts 16 and 17.
3.
On March 26, 2020, the trial court sentenced defendant to eight years, plus
210 years to life as follows: consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 4, 8, 9, 12,
16, and 17; consecutive terms of 15 years to life on counts 1, 7, 13, and 14; the upper
term of four years on count 15 to run consecutively; and consecutive eight-month terms
(one-third middle terms) on counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 11.
On January 24, 2023, after defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, the
First District Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for
resentencing. (People v. Guevara (Jan. 24, 2023, A165852) [nonpub. opn.].)
On May 30, 2023, the trial court held a resentencing hearing and followed the
opinion from the First District Court of Appeal. The court struck the section 667.61
allegations on counts 4 and 12, imposed the middle term on count 15, and otherwise
reaffirmed defendant’s sentence in its entirety.
The trial court resentenced defendant to seven years, plus 190 years to life as
follows: consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 8, 9, 16, and 17; consecutive
terms of 15 years to life on counts 1, 4, 7, 12, 13, and 14; a consecutive term of three
years (the middle term) on count 15; and consecutive eight-month terms (one-third
middle terms) on counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 11.4
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
L.D. and defendant were husband and wife; they were married in about 2005 in
Mexico. At the time they married, L.D. had a daughter, Y.D. who was about four years
old. Y.D. is defendant’s stepdaughter.
4 At resentencing, the trial court struck one of the jury’s findings under section 667.61,
subdivision (e)(6) on counts 4 and 12, decreasing the terms on those counts to consecutive terms
of 15 years to life. The court also vacated the upper term sentence on count 15 and imposed the
middle term of three years.
4.
In 2007, L.D. moved to the United States with defendant. When they first moved,
they settled in Riverside. Y.D. did not move with them, she stayed with her grandparents
in Mexico.
In 2008, L.D. and defendant had a daughter together, D.G.
In 2010, L.D., D.G., and defendant moved to Avenal. Y.D. did not move to Avenal
until 2017.
I. Offenses Against L.D.
There were approximately six times when defendant forced L.D. to have sex with
him. On these occasions, defendant grabbed her hands by force, turned her face down
and put his penis in her anus, causing her to bleed. This happened twice in Riverside
(once right after D.G. was born) and four times in Avenal (in two different houses). L.D.
did not report the rapes. L.D. told defendant that she had wanted a divorce since 2008,
but defendant threatened to kill her if she left. L.D. said she stayed with defendant after
he raped her “[b]ecause of [her] children.”
Defendant did not want L.D. to go outside of the house. To prevent her from
leaving, all the windows of the house were bolted and the front door had a lock that could
only be opened from the outside. Defendant locked L.D. and the children in the house
when he went to work on two occasions.
In 2017, a few weeks before L.D. called the police, she came home early and saw
defendant with drugs in the girls’ bedroom.
II. Offenses Against Y.D.
Prior to June 2017, defendant cared for the children while L.D. was at work from
6:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. One day, in June 2017, Y.D. appeared scared and asked L.D.
not to go to work. She told L.D. defendant was abusing her. Y.D. showed L.D. a “glass
of bullets” and told L.D. defendant gave them to Y.D. L.D. called the police.
Y.D. was 18 years old at the time of trial. She was 14 years old when she moved
to Avenal to live with defendant and L.D. A couple of weeks after she moved to Avenal,
5.
defendant came into Y.D.’s room while she was sleeping and touched her vagina and
other parts of her body. He touched her vagina and anus with his penis more than 30
times while she lived with him. Her vagina and anus bled when defendant raped her, and
her anus hurt so that she “could [not] … sit down.”
On the first occasion in Avenal, defendant “got some drugs” and gave them to Y.D.
so that she would have sex with him. Defendant came into her bedroom and gave her
cocaine and “crystal.”
Defendant forced Y.D. to take the drugs and have sex with him by threatening her
with a gun. Y.D. described the gun as a silver revolver with a wood handle and identified
the gun found by the police as the one defendant threatened her with. Y.D. took the
bullets away one time when defendant was “drunk and drugged.”
Y.D. described another time when defendant put pornography on the television,
grabbed her, and said he wanted to have sexual relations with her. When she said “no,”
defendant grabbed her by force, pulled down her pants and his own, and put his penis in
her vagina and in her anus. This incident occurred in Y.D.’s bedroom.5 She bled from
her vagina and anus.
Y.D. described another occasion in her bedroom when she had taken drugs and
defendant grabbed her by force, put his penis in her vagina and in her anus, ejaculated in
her vagina, and touched her breasts and her vagina with his hands. Defendant also
ejaculated on the carpet in Y.D.’s bedroom.
The day of defendant’s arrest, defendant got into the shower with Y.D. Defendant
grabbed her hands and “put his penis in [her] vagina by force” as she tried to push him
5 Asked where it occurred, Y.D. responded, “In my room.” When the prosecutor asked
further questions about the event occurring in the “living room,” Y.D. accepted the
characterization of the incident and did not say anything about the reference to it having occurred
in the living room rather than in her own room.
6.
away. He also touched her breasts, started to put his penis in her anus, and touched her
vagina with his hands and mouth.
Defendant told Y.D. that he abused her in Mexico when she was five years old.
She remembered he grabbed her by her hair, placed her mouth on his penis, and forced
her to “suck his penis.”
III. Offenses Against D.G.
L.D. saw defendant touch D.G.’s anus when she was about six years old.
Defendant was holding D.G.’s feet up with one hand while his other hand was on her
“butt” with his finger in her anus. Defendant told L.D. he was only cleaning D.G.
D.G. was 11 years old at the time of trial. D.G. was nine years old when the police
came to her house in Avenal. On one occasion prior to the police arriving, D.G. fell
asleep on the couch and woke up to her pants down and defendant kissing her on the
mouth. She tried to push defendant away and went to her room.
Another time, while D.G. and defendant were alone in the living room together,
defendant pulled his pants down, pushed D.G.’s head toward his “privates,” and tried to
make her put his “privates” in her mouth. D.G. turned her head, and defendant’s “private
part” hit her cheek. She ran away.
On another occasion, when D.G. was sitting on defendant’s bed counting coins,
defendant came from behind and put his “private part” inside her “butt.” D.G. said it
“hurt” and her anus was bloody after the incident.
Another time, while D.G. was in the living room trying to fix the television,
defendant came from behind and got on top of her with his pants off. She could feel his
“private part” on her “bottom” over her clothes. She kicked him and went to her room.
IV. Defendant’s Statements
In an interview with Sergeant Kevin Carr at the police station, defendant denied
any wrongdoing. He denied ever doing anything to hurt his family and said he had a
caring relationship with his children and he protects them. He initially denied owning a
7.
gun, however, he admitted owning one when the police told him they found one in his
home. Defendant said the locks on the doors were because Y.D. walked in her sleep.
Carr told defendant about the suspected DNA evidence on the carpet. Defendant
said he masturbated in Y.D.’s room. When asked further, he said he masturbated and Y.D.
saw him doing it. Then, he said he had been having consensual sex with Y.D. since she
moved into his house. He also admitted to having anal sex with her. He maintained the
sex was consensual and denied ever threatening Y.D. When asked why Y.D. was scared
of him, defendant told Carr, “I deserve it, I need help.” After initially stating that his
sexual relationship with L.D. was also consensual, defendant later admitted he forced
L.D. to have sex with him about four years before.
Defendant first denied ever touching D.G. Then, defendant said he touched D.G.’s
vagina with his hand. Carr asked if he penetrated D.G., and defendant said he did, but he
“did [not] tear anything.” Defendant said he touched D.G. two times and did it to “make
himself feel good in that moment.” He said the girls performed oral copulation on him.
Defendant told Carr that Y.D. wanted to do it and D.G. “did [not] say yes, but she also did
[not] say no.” He said he would give D.G. money for the oral copulation. Carr asked
whether defendant thought an eight-year-old would want to have sex, and defendant said
he thought D.G. wanted to because he would pay her.
V. Physical Evidence
Police officers who responded to defendant’s house observed that the lock on the
front door was on “backwards.” The back door had a padlock that prevented the door
from being opened. There were nails in the window frames so the windows could not be
opened.
A search of the house revealed a .38-caliber firearm, ammunition, and
methamphetamine. In Y.D.’s bedroom, there was the presence of semen containing the
same DNA makeup as defendant.
8.
Analysis of a swab taken from Y.D.’s right breast during a sexual assault exam
showed defendant to be the major contributor and Y.D. the minor contributor.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s Sentence Does Not Constitute Cruel and/or Unusual
Punishment
Defendant contends his sentence is so disproportionate to his convictions that it
violates the state Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 17) and the federal Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
(U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The People disagree. We agree with the People.
A. Additional Background
At defendant’s resentencing hearing, the trial court stated its reasons for imposing
the sentence as follows:
“[A]s to [c]ounts 4 and 12 the appellate court struck the
[section] 667.61 allegation for the use of an intoxicant …, which that in
combination with multiple victims imposed a 25-[year-]to-life sentence. It
appears to me the multiple victim[s] is still present, so without those it
would be 15[ years to ]life on each of those counts instead of 25 [years].
And on [c]ount 15 it … become[s] the middle term….
“[¶] … [¶]
“[T]he [c]ourt will follow the direction of the Court of Appeal[]. As
to [c]ounts 4 and 12 the allegation under [section] 667.61 for use of an
intoxicant is stricken .… There is still a finding of both of those counts of
multiple victims, those will both be reduced from the 25[ years to ]life that
was imposed to 15[ years to ]life.
“As to the attempted [section] 288 in [c]ount 15 … the upper term
will be stricken, and it will be the middle term … it is an attempt [so] it is a
half … that is a three-year term instead of the four-year term the [c]ourt
[previously] imposed. Otherwise[,] the [c]ourt will reaffirm the sentence in
its entirety.
“[¶] … [¶]
9.
“[Defendant] will have six sentences at 15[ years to ]life consecutive
to each other. Four terms at 25[ years to ]life consecutive to each other.
And then [defendant] will have the additional three-year term on the
attempted [former section 288a] [count 15]. And then there is a number of
… circumstance counts that are one-third the mid term at eight months
each.”
There was no objection by either party to the sentence the trial court imposed.
About one month after defendant’s resentencing hearing, defendant wrote a letter
in propria persona requesting that he be given a “release date” because he did not “kill
anyone” and asked for forgiveness.
B. Forfeiture
Before turning to the merits of defendant’s challenge, we must decide whether the
issue is preserved on appeal. Defendant argues that although his counsel did not object to
his sentence as cruel and/or unusual, the issue is cognizable on appeal because his letter,
written about one month after the sentencing hearing, should be construed as an
objection. In the alternative, he claims he received ineffective assistance when his
counsel failed to object.
Generally, “complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356; see also People v. Mustafaa
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1311 [favoring contemporaneous objection to statement of
reasons].) “A claim that a sentence is cruel or unusual requires a ‘fact specific’ inquiry
and is forfeited if not raised below.” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720;
see also People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27.) Defense counsel failed to
object or otherwise raise the issue below that defendant’s sentence constituted cruel
and/or unusual punishment under either the state or federal Constitutions. Defendant has
forfeited his claim.6
6 We also reject defendant’s claim that his letter, raising general concerns about his
“release date” and filed one month after the sentencing hearing, constituted a valid objection.
10.
Assuming the issue is forfeited, defendant claims his counsel was prejudicially
ineffective for failing to object. We reject his contention but will address the merits to
show defense counsel was not ineffective by failing to make a “futile or meritless
objection.” (See People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 86.)
C. Defendant Fails to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must establish
both deficient performance and prejudice, that is, “a ‘reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”
(People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746.) Tactical errors are generally not deemed
reversible, and counsel’s decisions are evaluated in the context of the record.
(See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689 (Strickland).)
The reviewing court must determine whether the record contains an explanation
for the challenged conduct. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, overruling
recognized on another ground in People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 559.) If the
record sheds light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, the
conviction will be affirmed if counsel’s acts or omissions resulted from an informed
tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence. (See People v. Fain (1969)
70 Cal.2d 588, 600.) However, in some cases, the record on appeal is silent regarding
why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged. These cases are affirmed on
appeal “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless
there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Pope, at p. 426.) An assertion that
counsel was ineffective on a silent record is more appropriately made in a petition for
(See, e.g., People v. Mustafaa, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311; see also People v. de Soto
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [a defendant must raise “sufficiently specific objections” at the time
of sentencing or waive his right to claim any sentencing errors on appeal].)
11.
habeas corpus, which promotes judicial economy.7 (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th
884, 926; see also People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to whether defendant received ineffective
assistance for defense counsel’s failure to object on the grounds that defendant’s sentence
constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment. There is nothing in the record that shows
the reason defense counsel did not object. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed
defendant’s convictions, struck one of the jury’s findings, and remanded for resentencing
in light of recently enacted legislation that occurred after defendant was initially
sentenced. The same judge who presided over defendant’s trial and at the initial
sentencing hearing also conducted defendant’s resentencing hearing. The court imposed
a lesser sentence at the resentencing hearing. It is reasonable to conclude defense
counsel, acting as a diligent advocate, made a tactical decision not to object to a more
favorable sentence than what was previously imposed at defendant’s initial sentencing.
Because there was no basis for objection, trial counsel was not remiss in failing to object
to defendant’s sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 931.)
However, even if defendant demonstrated his counsel’s performance was deficient,
remand is not required unless it is reasonably probable that a different result would have
occurred in the absence of error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) As we
will show, defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice. (See People v. King (1993)
16 Cal.App.4th 567, 572 [it is a defendant’s burden to prove that the punishment
prescribed for an offense is unconstitutional].)
1. The California Constitution
The California Constitution prohibits infliction of “[c]ruel or unusual
punishment.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) The punishment violates the California
7 A habeas corpus proceeding provides an evidentiary hearing and allows trial counsel the
opportunity to set forth his or her reasons for acting or failing to act in the manner challenged.
(See §§ 1483, 1484; People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426.)
12.
constitutional prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment if, “although not cruel or
unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.) A defendant must overcome a “considerable burden” in
challenging a punishment as cruel or unusual under the California Constitution. (People
v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174.) Whether a punishment is cruel and/or unusual is a
question of law subject to our independent review. (People v. Abundio (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1217.)
To determine whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the offense
for which it is imposed, a three-part test is used. The first part of the test examines “the
nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger
both present to society.” (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 425.) Second, the
punishment imposed is compared to punishments prescribed by California for more
serious offenses. (Id. at pp. 426–427.) Last, the challenged punishment is compared with
punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions. (Id. at pp. 427–429.) We consider
the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the commission of the offense, including
the defendant’s motive, the way the crime was committed, the extent of the defendant’s
involvement, and the consequences of the defendant’s acts. (People v. Romero (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1431.)
We turn to the first part of the In re Lynch test, under which the nature of the
offense and the offender is considered. (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 425.) Here,
defendant’s offenses are particularly horrific. The circumstances of the present offenses
include multiple serious and violent sexual crimes to multiple victims who were
defendant’s family members. The nature of the offenses against Y.D., a minor, consisted
of forcible sodomy, rape, forcible oral copulation, criminal threats, and lewd acts. The
nature of the offenses against D.G., his daughter who was under age 14 at the time the
offenses were committed, included forcible sexual penetration, lewd acts, forcible
13.
sodomy, and attempted oral copulation. Defendant also raped his former wife. During
the commission of these offenses, defendant was directly involved and intended the
results; he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions and their foreseeable
consequences. (Cf. People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 451, 488 (plur. opn. of Mosk,
J.) [our Supreme Court found the defendant’s life sentence for felony murder at age 17 to
be cruel and unusual because of the defendant’s immaturity, state of mind, and the fact
that he did not foresee the risk he was creating nor was able to extricate himself from it
without panicking].)
Several counts included offenses listed under section 667.61. “Section 667.61
mandates indeterminate sentences of 15 or 25 years to life for specified sex offenses that
are committed under one or more ‘aggravating circumstances .…’ ” (People v. Alvarado
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 186.) In People v. Estrada (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1270,
1277–1282, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded the defendant’s sentence of
25 years to life under section 667.61 for committing a first degree burglary with the intent
to commit the forcible rape was not cruel or unusual punishment under the California
Constitution. (Accord, People v. Crooks (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797, 803–809.) “The
purpose of the One Strike law is ‘to ensure serious and dangerous sex offenders would
receive lengthy prison sentences upon their first conviction,’ ‘where the nature or method
of the sex offense “place[d] the victim in a position of elevated vulnerability.” ’ ”
(Alvarado, at p. 186.) Considering the facts of our case and the Legislature’s decision to
increase punishment for offenses listed under section 667.61, defendant’s contention of
disproportionality is without merit.
Defendant relies heavily on the first part of the In re Lynch test, and highlights
mitigating circumstances, such as facts that he was employed, had no prior convictions,
and suffered from drug and alcohol abuse. Defendant cites People v. Avila (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1149, stressing his alcohol and drug abuse should be a factor we
should consider when determining whether his punishment was cruel or unusual. We
14.
agree a defendant’s drug or alcohol addiction may be considered a mitigating
circumstance when imposing a sentence. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(2) [a
factor relating to the defendant includes whether the defendant suffered from a mental or
physical condition that significantly reduced his culpability for the crime]; People v.
Simpson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 919, 927–928; People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308,
316.) However, there is no support for the conclusion that a defendant’s life sentence
should be deemed cruel or unusual punishment because of the defendant’s drug
addiction. (See Avila, at p. 1149, fn. 15; Simpson, at pp. 927–928; Jordan, at p. 316.) In
People v. Alvarado, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pages 199–200, while the defendant
suffered from substance abuse, the court nevertheless rejected the defendant’s claim that
his sentence was cruel or unusual. The Sixth District Court of Appeal reasoned: “[T]he
callous and opportunistic nature of [the defendant’s] sexual assault against a neighbor he
knew to be particularly vulnerable seems to us precisely the sort of sexual offense that
warrants harsh punishment.” (Id. at p. 200.) We agree with the Alvarado court’s
reasoning and apply it here.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record that shows defendant abused drugs or
alcohol.8 While defendant used drugs to perpetrate the crimes in this case, specifically
the rape of Y.D., there is no evidence that defendant was addicted to drugs or alcohol or
that the drugs or alcohol significantly reduced defendant’s culpability for the crimes.
Turning to the second part of the In re Lynch test, which compares the challenged
punishment with punishment prescribed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction
(In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 426), defendant does not fare any better. Defendant
argues his sentence is harsher than sentences imposed in California for any type of
8 There is also nothing in the probation report showing defendant suffered from drug or
alcohol abuse. The probation report states defendant consumed “two to three beers on the
weekends” prior to his arrest. Although defendant experimented with cocaine, he reported he
last used the drug in approximately 2000. He experimented with marijuana on a single occasion
at age 14.
15.
unlawful killing, such as second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. However,
“the Legislature has made offenses not involving homicide punishable by life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and such sentences are not cruel or
unusual in view of the fact that they involve an ‘inherent danger to the life of the victim
… even if no death occurs.’ ” (People v. Reyes, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 88 [the
defendant’s life sentence without the possibility of parole for oral copulation, forcible
rape, lewd acts upon a child under age 14, and first-degree burglary was not
disproportionate under either the California Constitution or the Eighth Amendment].)
The Second District Court of Appeal also came to a similar conclusion and
reasoned: “[A] defendant who commits both forcible rape and residential burglary …
[compared] to a defendant who commits an unpremeditated murder ignores the fact the
first defendant committed two offenses, not just one, and committed the burglary for the
purpose of committing the rape. [Citation.] The penalty for a single offense cannot be
properly compared to the penalty for multiple offenses especially where one offense was
committed in order to commit the other.” (People v. Estrada, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1282.)
Here, defendant fails to appreciate that he was sentenced on 17 counts, many of
which consisted of violent sex crimes against three family members, one of whom is his
own child. This is not a case involving a single, isolated crime. Defendant repeatedly
assaulted his victims and kept them in fear with threats of personal harm. A defendant
convicted of multiple sex crimes has been consistently labeled as one of “ ‘the most
dangerous’ from a legislative standpoint.” (People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 930–
931; see also People v. DeSimone (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 693, 698 [§ 667.61 intended to
impose a separate life term on a defendant convicted thereunder].) Defendant’s sentence
it is not so disproportionate as to shock the conscious and offend fundamental notions of
human dignity, and thus not constitutionally infirm. (See, e.g., People v. Retanan (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230–1231 [a term of 135 years to life was not cruel or unusual
16.
punishment for a defendant who committed multiple sex offenses against four children];
People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 531–532 [upholding sentence of
129 years for a defendant convicted of multiple sex offenses].)
Turning to the final part of the In re Lynch test, defendant fails to compare his
sentence with punishments in other states for the same offense. (In re Lynch, supra,
8 Cal.3d at p. 427.) We take this as a concession that his sentence withstands
constitutional challenge on that basis. (See People v. Crooks, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at
p. 808 [defendant bears burden of establishing disproportionality].) Nevertheless, in
Edwards v. Butler (5th Cir. 1989) 882 F.2d 160, 166–167, the Fifth Circuit held a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for aggravated rape under the Louisiana
statute did not offend Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, since the offense was
“extremely serious” (Edwards, at p. 166) and the defendant’s “sentence of life without
parole is not greater than the sentence the Louisiana legislature has mandated for crimes
involving a comparable or lesser degree of violence” (id. at p. 167).
Defendant’s sentence is not so disproportionate or obviously excessive to warrant
a finding of cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution.
2. The United States Constitution
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to the states and
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; People v. Caballero
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265.) The appropriate standard for determining whether a
particular sentence violates the Eighth Amendment is gross disproportionality. (Ewing v.
California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 21.) Successful challenges to proportionality are
extremely rare. (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 265–266, 272 [a life sentence
for credit card fraud of $80, passing a $28.36 forged check, and obtaining $120.75 by
false pretenses was not grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment];
Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 994–996 [a life sentence without parole for
possessing a large quantity of drugs did not surpass constitutional bounds].) Similarly,
17.
the standard for what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is extremely rigorous.
(Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 66, 69 [two consecutive 25-year-to-life
sentences imposed for two thefts of items worth less than $155 is not cruel or unusual].)
These cases demonstrate the very narrowness of the Eighth Amendment’s
disproportionality rule.
The parties agree, as do we, there was nothing passive or nonviolent about
defendant’s conduct in this case. Looking to the gravity of defendant’s offenses and
comparing them to his life sentence, we do not believe that the comparison gives rise to
an inference of gross disproportionality. In Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, a case
cited by defendant, the court invalidated the defendant’s life sentence due to the
nonviolent, passive nature of the defendant’s fraudulent check writing. (Id. at p. 296.)
However, the court recognized that a life sentence for violent criminals, including those
who committed rape, would pass constitutional muster. (Id. at pp. 297–299.)
Defendant cites Ramirez v. Castro (9th Cir. 2004) 365 F.3d 755, to support his
argument that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to other sentences imposed in
California. There, the court held that the defendant’s 25-year-to-life sentence for his third
shoplifting offense was grossly disproportionate to the to the crime he committed. (Id. at
p. 767.) The court focused on the gravity of the defendant’s current offense, a nonviolent
petty theft, and his two other prior nonviolent robbery convictions, and concluded that a
life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment given the defendant did not threaten to
cause “grave harm to society,” and his prior criminal history was considerably less
serious than that of other recidivists. (Id. at pp. 768–769.) Defendant also cites Gonzalez
v. Duncan (9th Cir. 2008) 551 F.3d 875, where the court concluded a 28-year-to-life
sentence for the defendant’s failure to update his annual sex offender registration was
cruel and unusual punishment and grossly disproportionate due to the “ ‘entirely passive,
harmless, and technical violation of the [sex] registration law.’ ” (Id. at p. 889.)
18.
The facts in the Ramirez and Gonzalez cases are vastly different from those here.
While we acknowledge defendant is not a recidivist, given the nature, the number of
offenses, and the number of victims, the fact that defendant is a first-time offender does
not change our analysis. It is not so disproportionate for a person who engages in
multiple heinous sex crimes with a pattern of preying on vulnerable family members over
a long period of time to receive a longer sentence than an entirely passive, harmless, and
nonviolent offender. (See Gonzalez v. Duncan, supra, 551 F.3d at p. 889.) Moreover,
given the United States Supreme Court has upheld life sentences for minor, nonviolent
property crimes, it follows that defendant’s life sentence for 17 counts of sexually violent
offenses against multiple victims does not violate the federal Constitution.
It is not reasonably probable that a sentence more favorable to defendant would
have been imposed if defense counsel objected to the imposition of defendant’s sentence
on the grounds that it was cruel and/or unusual. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d
at p. 836.) Defendant has failed to demonstrate the necessary prejudice to support his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. Consecutive Sentences are Appropriate on Counts 14 and 16
Defendant argues the record is not clear as to whether the trial court understood its
discretion when it imposed consecutive rather than concurrent sentences on counts 14 and
16. Defendant asks us to remand for resentencing. The People maintain the court
understood its discretion and rightly imposed consecutive sentences. We agree with the
People.
A. Additional Background
The probation report, which the trial court indicated it had read, recommended
each count be served consecutively because “[t]he crimes in relation to each count
involve separate acts of violence, as well as independent objectives, and happened over a
19.
period of time .…” 9 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a)(1), (3).) The probation
report also stated that counts 14 and 16 were not subject to mandatory consecutive
sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d), but left to the court’s discretion as to
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences on those counts.
At the most recent hearing, the trial court addressed the issues raised in the
opinion of the appellate court. The court set forth its reasons for reducing the total term
on defendant’s sentence and then said, “Otherwise, the [c]ourt will reaffirm the sentence
in its entirety.” The court did not discuss its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences
on counts 14 and 16.
B. Forfeiture
Our Supreme Court has held that a defendant cannot complain for the first time on
appeal about the trial court’s failure to state reasons for a sentencing choice. (People v.
Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 352–353 [the trial court’s failure to properly make or
articulate its discretionary sentencing choices are forfeited on appeal for failure to object
below].) Here, the trial court did not state its reasons for imposing consecutive rather
than concurrent sentences on counts 14 and 16. However, the reason appears to be
because the court was not asked to make such a finding. “[A] party cannot argue on
appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to
conduct.” (People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 208.) Defendant forfeited his
claim.
However, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of defendant’s contention
to forestall the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Crittenden (1994)
9 At the initial sentencing hearing, the trial court said it read the probation report and
further noted it was adopting the recommendation set forth in the probation report and sentenced
defendant to consecutive sentences on counts 14 and 16. The same judge who handled the initial
sentencing also conducted defendant’s resentencing hearing.
20.
9 Cal.4th 83, 146 [reviewing court may exercise discretion to consider forfeited claims to
forestall ineffective assistance of counsel arguments].)
C. Merits
A trial court’s decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences
under section 667.61 for multiple violations of section 288, subdivision (a) is
discretionary under section 669. (People v. Valdez (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1524;
People v. Shaw (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 453, 458 [“[s]ection 669 grants the trial court
broad discretion to impose consecutive sentences when a person is convicted of two or
more crimes”].) The sentencing rules specify criteria to guide the trial court’s
determination as to whether to impose consecutive or concurrent terms. In this case, the
probation report set forth two criteria which are applicable: the “crimes and their
objectives were predominantly independent of each other”; and the “crimes were
committed at different times or separate places.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a)(1),
(3).)
Defendant claims the trial court failed to recognize it had discretion in deciding
whether to impose consecutive sentences, but rather assumed consecutive sentences
applied under section 667.61.10 However, there is nothing to indicate the court did not
understand its discretion. Instead, the probation report, which the court indicated it read,
specifically noted that consecutive sentences on counts 14 and 16 were not mandatory
and further stated the court should exercise its discretion as whether to impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences on those counts.
A trial court is presumed to be aware of its sentencing discretion. (People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) In the face of a silent record, we will not infer
the court was unaware of its sentencing discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
10 Section 667.61 mandates consecutive sentences for certain enumerated sex offenses listed
in subdivision (c)(1) to (7) not applicable to counts 14 and 16.
21.
367, 378; People v. Weddington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 492 [“On appeal, we
presume that the trial court followed established law and thus properly exercised its
discretion in sentencing a criminal defendant.”].) Defendant has failed to carry his
burden of affirmatively demonstrating error. (See People v. Davis (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
168, 172.)
We conclude the record does not support defendant’s contention that the court
misunderstood its discretion. Thus, even if defendant did not forfeit his claim, it fails on
the merits.
III. Defendant Fails to Show He Was Constructively Denied His Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel
Defendant argues he was constructively denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel due to defense counsel’s inaction at the resentencing hearing, and claims he is
entitled to reversal without showing prejudice. The People disagree, maintaining
defendant was represented at the resentencing hearing and not constructively denied the
right to counsel. We agree with the People.
A. Additional Background
The trial court discussed the purpose of the resentencing hearing:
“[This case] is here … on a remittitur from the … Court of
Appeal[], which struck a few findings, but then also indicated resentencing
needed to take place on … [c]ount 15 as the [c]ourt [previously] imposed
an upper term, which is no longer authorized absent the finding of specific
aggravating factors. But it seems to suggest the People could have a jury
trial on that issue .…”
The prosecutor decided not to proceed to trial on the aggravating factors and
accepted the sentence set forth by the trial court in conformity with the appellate court’s
decision. Defense counsel also accepted the sentence and “[s]ubmitted.” There was no
oral argument offered by either the prosecutor or defense counsel at the resentencing
hearing prior to the court imposing defendant’s sentence.
22.
B. Assistance of Counsel
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of
counsel. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215.) The right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 686.) This right applies at all “ ‘critical stages’ ” of a criminal proceeding in which the
substantial rights of a defendant are at stake, including sentencing. (People v. Bauer
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155.)
Defendant claims his case falls into the narrow holding set forth in United States v.
Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 (Cronic), even though he was represented at the resentencing
hearing. Defendant claims prejudice must be presumed because his counsel’s conduct
was so egregious it amounted to a complete denial of counsel within Cronic’s meaning.
In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the appellate court
properly reversed the defendant’s conviction based on the conclusion that the defendant
was deprived of the right to counsel for his defense guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
(Chronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 650.) The court focused its analysis not on whether the
defendant’s counsel made any specified errors or that his performance prejudiced the
defense, rather, it considered whether there could be a Sixth Amendment violation if the
assistance of counsel was totally absent. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court found prejudice
presumed when the defendant is denied the presence of counsel at a “critical stage” of his
trial. (Id. at p. 659.) Similarly, prejudice is presumed when counsel failed “to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (Ibid.) Thus, Cronic “uniformly
found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either
totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the
proceeding.” (Id. at p. 659, fn. 25.)
In Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, the United States Supreme Court grappled
with the issue of whether the principles articulated in Cronic applied to the defendant’s
counsel, where prejudice is presumed in limited circumstances, or whether a showing of
23.
prejudice must be made under Strickland. (Id. at pp. 694–695.) There, the defendant’s
counsel waived closing argument and did not present mitigating evidence during the
sentencing phase. (Id. at p. 692.) After the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death, he petitioned for relief arguing the standard set forth in
Cronic should apply. (Ibid.) The court disagreed that the defendant’s case fell within the
meaning of Cronic, reasoning that the “attorney’s failure must be complete” for the
presumption of prejudice to apply. (Id. at p. 697.) The court held that Strickland should
be used because the defendant’s counsel’s failure to “adduce mitigating evidence” and his
decision to waive closing argument were “specific attorney errors” that were “subject to
Strickland’s performance and prejudice components.” (Id. at pp. 697–698.)
Relying on Cronic, the defendant in In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, claimed he
was entitled to reversal without having to show prejudice due to the “minimal nature” of
his counsel’s representation. (Id. at p. 726.) Defense counsel “waived opening argument
at the guilt phase, called no defense witnesses, and did not address either the two murders
or the two special circumstance allegations in a brief closing argument.” (Id. at p. 727.)
Our high court reasoned that defense counsel’s representation was “minimal at best.”
(Ibid.) However, the court found the defendant’s case fell “outside the small exception
carved out by Cronic” (id. at p. 728) because counsel was neither “ ‘totally absent’ ” nor
“ ‘prevented’ ” by outside influences, or anything else, from assisting the defendant at
trial (id. at p. 727).
Relying on these authorities, we are not persuaded that defendant’s case falls
within Cronic’s narrow exception. Here, defendant was not totally deprived of counsel at
his resentencing hearing. Like the attorneys in Bell v. Cone and In re Avena, defense
counsel did not completely fail to render meaningful assistance, counsel was not “totally
absent,” nor was this a situation where even competent counsel could not, or was
prevented from, assisting defendant at the hearing. (See Bell v. Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at
p. 697; In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 727–728.)
24.
While defense counsel did not make any arguments at the hearing, we cannot
conclude his decision was not tactical. The prosecutor also did not make any arguments.
The trial court explained the reasons for resentencing defendant. The prosecutor
indicated he accepted the sentence as directed by the appellate court and did not want to
proceed to a trial on the aggravating factors. Defense counsel also accepted the decision
and “[s]ubmitted.” The court’s sentence resolved both issues in defendant’s favor and
decreased his total term. On this record, defendant was not constructively denied the
assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to offer any additional arguments
at the hearing.
Defendant also points out that defense counsel failed to offer mitigating evidence,
did not obtain an updated probation report, or object to defendant’s disproportionate
sentence.11 However, defendant fails to demonstrate he suffered any prejudice. The
record shows the court was aware of defendant’s only mitigating circumstance, the fact
that he did not have a prior record. Moreover, since defendant was continuously
incarcerated from the time of his initial sentencing to his resentencing hearing, defense
counsel could have reasonably inferred that defendant knowingly waived a supplemental
probation report because he knew it would not benefit him. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1433.)
There is no evidence that defense counsel was absent, unprepared to represent
defendant, or that his decision not to present additional arguments or evidence at the
resentencing hearing was not strategic. Defendant fails to show the minimal nature of
defense counsel’s participation at the resentencing hearing was presumptively prejudicial.
11 Defense counsel’s failure to object to defendant’s allegedly disproportionate sentence is
addressed in part I of the Discussion, ante.
25.
DISPOSITION
The judgment affirmed. We direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment reflecting the oral pronouncement at resentencing, which is seven years, plus
190 years to life, and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
FAIN, J.*
* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
26.
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