CourtListener 10337420•People v. Hernandez CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/21/25 P. v. Hernandez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H050928
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21CR000746)
v.
ANTONIO CAMPOS HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted Antonio Campos Hernandez of a felony sex offense against a
minor. Hernandez challenges his conviction by arguing the district attorney made
comments during the rebuttal closing argument at trial that were intended to inflame the
jurors’ passions and emotional responses. Hernandez contends his defense counsel’s
failure to object to the statements made by the district attorney constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because we conclude the record does not affirmatively
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2021, the district attorney charged Hernandez with a single felony
count of a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) [count 1]). At trial, the
prosecution presented the following evidence. Jane Doe was born in January 2008. She
has three sisters, one older and two younger. Hernandez, who was Doe’s mother’s
boyfriend, has a daughter and a son from a prior relationship, both of whom are older
than Doe, and is also the biological father of Doe’s two younger sisters. At the time of
the incident underlying the charge, in October 2020, Doe lived at her aunt’s house in
Watsonville because her family had lost their home a few months earlier.
Prior to the incident, Hernandez would sometimes ask for kisses on the cheek or
hugs from Doe and she did not appreciate this because she did not feel close enough to
him. Nevertheless, she felt compelled to do what he asked “[b]ecause he was an
authority figure.”
On October 19, 2020, Doe and her family spent the night at the house of
Hernandez’s daughter from his prior relationship. Doe slept on a bed in one room. Her
mother, three siblings, and Hernandez slept in the same room; her sisters were on the bed
with her, her mother slept on a couch, and Hernandez slept on a made-up bed on the
floor.
During the night, Doe woke up because she “felt something in [her] private part.”
She saw Hernandez on his knees and his hands “were doing [an] inwards-outwards
motion” over her underwear. Doe asked Hernandez what he was doing and Hernandez
“mumbled something, and he went back to bed.” Doe stayed in bed, thinking about
whether to tell someone. After around an hour, she decided to report the incident to her
mother.
Doe woke her mother and asked her to accompany her to the bathroom. Once they
were in the bathroom, Doe closed the door and told her mother that Hernandez had
touched Doe. Doe’s mother initially told Doe that they would “deal with it in the
morning.” After they went back to the room, however, Doe told her mother that
Hernandez was fake sleeping, and Doe’s mother kicked Hernandez and he got up.
Hernandez asked, “What did I do? What did I do?” Doe was angry and told him, “You
know what you did.”
Doe and her family left the house around 3:00 a.m. and went to her aunt’s house.
Hernandez did not try to stop them.
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Hernandez testified in his defense at trial. In 2023, at the time of trial, Hernandez
was 50 years old. He acknowledged that the sleeping arrangements were as described by
Doe, but he denied that he had touched Doe. Hernandez stated that Doe’s accusation
made him feel “Bad. Confused.”
As is relevant to this appeal, in the district attorney’s rebuttal closing argument he
pointed to Hernandez’s conduct at the time of the incident, stating: “Mr. Hernandez, this
supposedly loving father, just let his children walk out the door without a fight. He never
really made any attempt to get them back. Just a couple of text messages. Now, why
might somebody act like that? It’s because they don’t want what they did to be said out
loud. They’re trying to avoid that accusation. They know it’s out there, and they’re
slinking away.” The district attorney argued further: “Look at his actions afterwards.
Those aren’t normal. Those are the actions of somebody who is afraid of being
confronted with what he did.” The district attorney later commented that Hernandez “just
snuck up, touched a 12-year-old’s vagina, snuck away. . . . Why so feeble? Why so
feeble, if right and justice is on his side? Why so pathetic?”
The district attorney concluded his rebuttal by telling the jurors: “The law . . . will
explicitly tell you that in cases like this, the testimony of the complaining witness, the
testimony of Jane Doe is enough. Now, why is there a specific instruction, that the law is
telling you that Jane Doe is enough? It is so that people who touch little girls, in the dark
of the night, can’t hide behind he said/she said. The law provides that to you. The law
says Jane Doe was enough. She was. Don’t let him avoid accountability by hiding
behind the fact that he did it in the dark, when everybody was sleeping. [¶] I’ve told you
that this case was about one voice, Jane Doe’s voice. I now ask each of you to add your
voices to hers. Twelve voices, in unison saying, we condemn the actions of this man. He
did what she says he did, and we will protect our little girls, when they cry out for help, in
the middle of the night. Thank you.”
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Before the start of testimony at trial, the court told the jury: “You must not be
influenced in your decision by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, or
prejudice towards any party, witness, or attorney, in this case, or public opinion, or public
feeling. On the following day of trial, the court told the jury: “The fact that a criminal
charge has been filed against the defendant is not evidence that the charge is true. You
must not be biased against the defendant just because he’s been arrested, charged with a
crime, or brought to trial. A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent.
This presumption requires the People prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
Immediately following closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on the
applicable law. As it had before, the court again told the jury: “Do not let bias,
sympathy, prejudice, public opinion, influence your decision.” The court also stated that,
“[i]n their opening statements, and closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case, but
their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses’
answers are evidence. . . . Do not assume something is true just because one of the
attorneys asked a question that suggested that it was true.”
The jury found Hernandez guilty. On March 28, 2023, the trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed Hernandez on formal probation for three years. As
one of the conditions of probation, the court ordered Hernandez to serve 364 days in jail.
Hernandez timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Hernandez argues his constitutional rights were violated when the district attorney
made “improper and inflammatory” comments in closing argument. Hernandez contends
his own attorney’s failure to object to the comments constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. We conclude Hernandez has not demonstrated either deficient performance by
his counsel or prejudice.
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We note that Hernandez challenges only defense counsel’s performance and does
not directly argue that the judgment must be reversed because of misconduct by the
district attorney. This is for good reason: Hernandez forfeited any claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 952 [“ ‘[A] defendant may not
complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the
same ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the
jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. [Citation.]’ ”, quoting People v.
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.] We therefore consider whether the prosecutor
committed misconduct in argument solely to determine whether trial counsel’s failure to
object fell below the relevant standard of care, resulting in prejudice compelling reversal.
A. Legal Principles
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both
deficient performance by counsel and prejudice. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th
353, 414.) The defendant first bears the burden of showing trial counsel’s performance
was deficient: that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” in light of the prevailing professional norms. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland).) “ ‘Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
[citation], and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[W]e accord great deference
to counsel’s tactical decisions’ [citation], and we have explained that ‘courts should not
second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight’
[citation]. ‘Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and counsel’s decision
making must be evaluated in the context of the available facts. [Citation.]’ ” (People v.
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925-926 (Weaver).) “In the usual case, where counsel’s
trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we
will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no
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conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 926; see also
In re Cudjo (1999) 20 Cal.4th 673, 692 [“ ‘[S]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable.’ ”, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691.].) “Indeed, in
assessing a Sixth Amendment attack on trial counsel’s adequacy mounted on direct
appeal, competency is presumed unless the record affirmatively excludes a rational basis
for the trial attorney’s choice. [Citations.]” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th
1216, 1260 (Musselwhite).)
Second, the defendant must show the asserted deficiency in counsel’s performance
resulted in prejudice. (Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 961.) “[A] court need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that
course should be followed.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) To establish
prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate “there is a ‘ “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. [Citation.]” ’ ” (Weaver, supra, at p. 955.)
B. Hernandez did not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To determine whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient, we first
examine whether the district attorney committed misconduct in his rebuttal argument as
Hernandez asserts. “ ‘[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude to vigorously argue his or her
case and to make fair comment upon the evidence, including reasonable inferences or
deductions that may be drawn from the evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Dykes (2009)
46 Cal.4th 731, 768.) However, “[i]t has long been settled that appeals to the sympathy
or passions of the jury are inappropriate at the guilt phase of a criminal trial.” (People v.
Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 362, fn. omitted.) “ ‘It is . . . improper to make arguments
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to the jury that give it the impression that “emotion may reign over reason,” and to
present “irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s attention
from its proper role, or invites an irrational, purely subjective response.” [Citation.]’ ”
(People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1210 (Linton).)
“A prosecutor is allowed to make vigorous arguments and may even use such
epithets as are warranted by the evidence, as long as these arguments are not
inflammatory and principally aimed at arousing the passion or prejudice of the jury.
[Citations.]” (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1251 (Pensinger).) The
California Supreme Court has therefore held that statements such as referring to a
defendant as a “ ‘perverted maniac’ ” or a “sadist” did not constitute prosecutorial error
when “there was evidence in the record which, if the jury believed it, would warrant each
of the arguments.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 762-763.)
In support of his argument that the district attorney argued the case improperly,
Hernandez cites People v. Bandhauer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 524 (Bandhauer), a case in which
the California Supreme Court found the use of the word “depraved” by the prosecutor
was error. Bandhauer is distinguishable because in that case the prosecutor made the
testimonial statement that “defendant was one of the most depraved characters that the
prosecutor had seen,” a statement that was “not related to the evidence in the case and
was not subject to cross-examination. It presented to the jury an external standard by
which to fix the penalty based on the prosecutor’s long experience.” (Id. at pp. 529-530.)
The district attorney here did not rely on his own personal experience or any facts outside
the record.
Hernandez argues that the prosecutor’s use of terms such as “feeble” or “pathetic”
in reference to Hernandez, or stating that he was slinking or sneaking, were intended to
paint him as an “innocuous predator” and invited the jury to hate and fear Hernandez on
that basis. The district attorney’s use of such language, however, was tied to the district
attorney’s argument, based on the evidence, that Hernandez’s actions were those “of
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somebody who is afraid of being confronted with what he did,” and who “did everything
that he could to avoid confrontation about it.” The comment that Hernandez acted
surreptitiously was a fair comment on Jane Doe’s description of the molestation. In this
context, the district attorney’s use of terms such as “feeble” and “pathetic” was less
damning than referring to a defendant as a “perverted maniac” or a “sadist,” terms which
the California Supreme Court in Pensinger found did not result in prosecutorial error.
Hernandez also objects to the conclusion of the district attorney’s rebuttal
argument: “I’ve told you that this case was about one voice, Jane Doe’s voice. I now ask
each of you to add your voices to hers. Twelve voices, in unison saying, we condemn the
actions of this man. He did what she says he did, and we will protect our little girls,
when they cry out for help, in the middle of the night.” “ ‘It [i]s not improper for the
prosecutor to argue that the jury would be acting as the representative of the community
or for society as a whole. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1178
(Johnsen).) The California Supreme Court has routinely upheld as proper the practice of
comparing the jury to “ ‘ “the conscience of the community. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v.
Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 789 [concluding it was not
misconduct for the prosecutor “to urge the jury to solve the social problems of gangs and
violence by returning convictions”].) However, it is improper to “invite the jury to view
the case through the victim’s eyes” or to appeal to jurors’ sympathy for the victim to
obtain a conviction. (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1406.)
Asking the jury to act as the voice of the community by condemning the defendant
was proper argument; asking the jury to vindicate the complaining witness by reinforcing
her “voice” was an invitation to stand in the shoes of the victim and an appeal to the
jurors’ sympathy for her, which was not proper. The district attorney’s argument that
Jane Doe’s testimony, or “voice,” was sufficient to return a conviction was proper.
Cloaking that argument in an appeal to return a conviction to protect vulnerable little girls
who cry out for help at night arguably was an invocation of community and parental fear
8
of the predation of children. These appear to be inflammatory comments, invoking an
“irrational response,” rather than encouraging the jury’s assessment of the evidence or a
just societal response to criminal conduct. (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)
However, assuming the district attorney’s comments were improper, “a mere
failure to object to evidence or argument seldom establishes counsel’s incompetence.
[Citations.]” (People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772 (Ghent).) The comments were
brief and immediately followed permissible argument focusing on the instruction that
allows a jury to return a guilty verdict based on the testimony of a single witness
determined by the jury to be credible. Defense counsel may have concluded that an
objection would run the risk of being overruled, and even if sustained, could have drawn
undue attention to the statements just before the jury was instructed and retired to
deliberate. (See id. at p. 773 [“[c]ounsel may well have tactically assumed that an
objection or request for admonition would simply draw closer attention to the
prosecutor’s isolated comments”].) Therefore, because the record does not affirmatively
exclude any rational basis for defense counsel’s choice, competency must be presumed.
(Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1260.) Accordingly, we conclude Hernandez has
not demonstrated his counsel’s performance was deficient.
Further, even if the comments were improper, we conclude there was no prejudice
constituting reversible error. Hernandez describes the district attorney’s comments as
infecting the entire rebuttal closing argument, stating “there truly was nothing significant
in the prosecutor’s rebuttal summation except the improper comments.” A review of the
record, however, shows the comments to which Hernandez now objects occurred at the
end of the rebuttal argument. Earlier in the argument, the district attorney emphasized
that the jurors could rely on Doe’s testimony alone. He argued that Hernandez’s actions,
or rather his failure to act, when his wife and children left after the incident were
consistent with and supported the accusations against him. The district attorney’s limited
comments in rebuttal did not rise to the level of prejudicial error. (See Johnsen, supra,
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10 Cal.5th at p. 1179 [concluding that “the district attorney’s statement urging the jurors
to ‘confront evil and eradicate it’ ” was “limited and fleeting such that any error was
nonprejudicial”]; see also Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 771-772 [noting that a brief
reference to the impact of the victim’s death on her family was “arguably inappropriate,”
but concluding the remarks were “brief and mild” and “the prejudicial effect of the
prosecutor’s comments was undoubtedly minimal or nonexistent”].)
We also observe that the trial court several times instructed the jurors not to let
“bias, sympathy, prejudice, public opinion, influence your decision.” “The crucial
assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally
understand and faithfully follow instructions. [Citation.]” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54
Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17.) Hernandez acknowledges this foundational principle, but argues
that “there is a meaningful difference between the ability of a qualified juror to accurately
apply an elemental test, versus the ability to proactively disinfect oneself of insidious and
inflammatory rhetoric such as that employed here.” We are not persuaded, as on this
record we see no basis to conclude the jurors could not follow the trial court’s
instructions.
For the reasons discussed, we conclude Hernandez has shown neither deficient
performance by his trial attorney nor prejudice stemming from his attorney’s actions.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H050928 People v. Hernandez
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