CourtListener 10334804•People v. Solis CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/18/25 P. v. Solis CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087091
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 20CR-01901B,
v. 21CR-05205)
ERIK CHAVEZ SOLIS,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Merced County. Steven K.
Slocum, Judge.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Jennifer M. Poe,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
Defendant Erik Chavez Solis contends on appeal that the judgment in case
No. 20CR-09101B (Case 1) must be reversed and the sentence in case No. 21CR-05205
(Case 2) must be vacated and the matters remanded to the trial court to allow the parties
to withdraw from the plea agreements in both cases and proceed in light of Assembly Bill
No. 333’s (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333) amendments to Penal Code
section 186.22.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3.) Defendant argues Assembly Bill 333’s
amendments to section 186.22 retroactively apply to Case 1, which alleged a gang
enhancement pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (a) (the gang enhancement), and to
Case 2, which alleged defendant’s conviction in Case 1 was a prior strike conviction
based on the gang enhancement.
The People argue the judgments in both cases must be reversed and the matters
remanded, but for different reasons. The People agree that Assembly Bill 333’s
amendments to section 186.22 retroactively apply to Case 1, and the gang enhancement
and the plea agreement in that case thus must be vacated. Accordingly, the People
contend the judgment in Case 1 must be reversed and the matter remanded to allow the
parties to proceed under amended section 186.22 in the positions they occupied before
entering into the plea agreement. The People further contend that, while Assembly
Bill 333 does not retroactively apply to Case 2 because these charges occurred after
Assembly Bill 333’s enactment, the judgment in that case must nonetheless also be
reversed and the matter remanded because the plea agreement in that case is deficient.
We reverse the judgments in both cases, and remand for further proceedings.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Case 1
On May 21, 2020, the Merced County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a);
count 5),2 possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6), and
accessory after the fact (§ 32; count 7).3 As to counts 6 and 7, the information alleged
that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(A)) (“the gang enhancement”).
On November 17, 2020, defendant pleaded no contest to the firearm possession
charge in count 6 and admitted the gang enhancement, making the offense a strike
offense, in exchange for the dismissal of counts 5 and 7.4 The trial court placed
defendant on three years of probation with a condition that defendant serve 364 days in
jail.5 The same day, the court issued credit for time served and released defendant on
probation. Defendant did not appeal.
On July 21, 2021, the probation officer alleged defendant violated the terms of his
probation by failing to appear and, on July 27, 2021, the trial court revoked probation.
2 Counts 5–7 in Case 1 run consecutively to counts 1–4 in Case 2.
3 Defendant’s two codefendants were each charged with attempted premeditated
murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 1), shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246;
counts 2, 3, & 4), and participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a);
count 5), with associated enhancements. Both codefendants were also charged with
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and a gang enhancement
(§ 182.22, subd. (b)(1)(A); count 6).
4 Defendant acknowledges his conviction and admission would amount to a strike
under the “Three Strikes” law. (See §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d),
1192.7, subd. (c)(28).)
5 Defendant agreed to a waiver of credits under section 19.2.
3.
On October 20, 2021, defendant was arrested on various charges, including
firearm violations, and was arraigned on October 29, 2021, for violating his probation in
Case 1. This arrest later formed the basis for Case 2.
On April 3, 2023, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment in Case 1,
arguing the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) was no longer valid pursuant
to Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22. A ruling on the motion does not
appear in the record.
On May 8, 2023, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Case 1,
arguing the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) was no longer valid pursuant
to Assembly Bill 333.
On June 30, 2023, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that Case 1 was
final at that time.
On August 2, 2023, defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate in Case 1,
arguing the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) was no longer valid pursuant
to Assembly Bill 333.
On August 15, 2023, this petition was denied by the trial court because the writ
was not filed in the proper court and because defendant failed to show what duty the
court had not fulfilled.
Case 2
On October 25, 2021, the Merced County District Attorney filed a complaint
charging defendant with fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving
recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 2), possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1);
count 3), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 4). As to
counts 1 through 3, the complaint alleged defendant had suffered a prior serious or
violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 668) in Case 1.
4.
Sentencing
On October 2, 2023, both cases were resolved by plea agreements.
In Case 1, defendant admitted he violated probation. On count 6, he was
sentenced to 16 months (the low term), plus two years (the low term) on the gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)), for a total of three years four months, with
credit for time served.
In Case 2, defendant pleaded no contest on count 2 (firearm possession), with the
remaining counts dismissed. Although he agreed as part of the terms of the plea that he
would admit the strike allegation, at the hearing he was not asked if he had suffered the
alleged prior conviction and did not admit the allegation. He admitted the Case 1
probation violation. Defendant was sentenced to a consecutive term of 16 months
(one-third the midterm, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law), with credit for time
served. Defendant was released on postrelease community supervision.
On October 26, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal in both Case 1 and 2.6
DISCUSSION7
I. CASE 1
The parties agree that Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 apply
retroactively to Case 1, and accordingly, the judgment in that case must be reversed and
the matter remanded to the trial court to allow the parties to withdraw from the plea
agreement. We agree Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to Case 1 and remand for
further proceedings.
6 Defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause was neither granted nor
denied.
7 We omit the underlying facts, as they are irrelevant to defendant’s appeal.
5.
A. Law
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22 regarding
the showing necessary to prove gang offenses and enhancements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699,
§ 3.) Assembly Bill 333 narrowed the definition of a “ ‘criminal street gang’ ” (§ 186.22,
subd. (f)), modified the “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” element of the gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (e)), and clarified that to “benefit, promote, further, or
assist” a gang “means to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the
common benefit is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g)).
Assembly Bill 333 also added section 1109. Section 1109 requires that, if
requested by the defendant, the trial of a gang enhancement charged under
section 186.22, subdivision (b), be bifurcated from and follow trial of the underlying
offenses (§ 1109, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5, pp. 11–12).
Further, Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22, subdivision (b)(3), effective
January 1, 2023, to provide that the sentencing court “shall order the imposition of the
middle term of the sentence enhancement, unless there are circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4, p. 10.)
Questions of retroactivity and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. (In re
David C. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 514, 519.)
B. Analysis
The parties agree that Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22,
effective January 1, 2022, apply retroactively to defendant’s conviction in Case 1
pursuant to In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).
Absent evidence to the contrary, the Legislature intends amendments to statutes
that reduce the punishment for a particular crime to apply to all defendants whose
judgments are not yet final on the amendment’s operative date. (People v. Superior Court
(Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307–308 [discussing Estrada]; People v. Brown (2012) 54
Cal.4th 314, 323.) The “consideration of paramount importance” is whether the
6.
amendment lessens punishment. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) If so, the
“inevitable inference [is] that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute”
apply retroactively. (Id. at p. 745.)
While Assembly Bill 333 does not directly reduce punishment for a gang
enhancement, the Estrada rule also applies where “an enhancement has been amended to
redefine to an appellant’s benefit the conduct subject to the enhancement” (People v.
Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 344, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Clark
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 764, fn. 8) or modifies the elements of a penalty enhancement
(People v. Roberts (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466). Assembly Bill 333 changed the
elements of the gang enhancement in a way that potentially favors the defendant, and
nothing in the legislation rebuts the Estrada inference of retroactivity.
Under these authorities, the relevant amendments to section 186.22 apply
retroactively to defendant’s case because the ultimate judgment in Case 1 was not yet
final. (See People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 822; People v. E.H. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 467, 478; People v. Delgado (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1087,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 764, fn. 8.)
A presumption exists that our Legislature intends for ameliorative enactments to
apply as broadly as is constitutionally permissible, and they apply to all nonfinal
judgments. (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 677, citing Estrada, supra, 63
Cal.2d at p. 745.) For purposes of the Estrada rule, finality occurs “when the availability
of an appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5.)
Our Supreme Court recently offered further clarification as to when a case
becomes final for purposes of retroactivity under Estrada in People v. Esquivel, supra,
11 Cal.5th 671, where it concluded that the test for finality is “whether the criminal
prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.” (Id. at p. 679.) In Esquivel, the
defendant was sentenced, but the execution of the sentence was suspended, and the
7.
defendant was placed on formal probation. (Id. at p. 673.) In People v. McKenzie (2020)
9 Cal.5th 40, the Supreme Court also stated that the question is whether the “criminal
prosecution or proceeding concluded before the ameliorative legislation took effect.”
(Id. at p. 46.) In McKenzie, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and
placed the defendant on formal probation. (Id. at p. 43.) In both Esquivel and McKenzie,
neither defendant initially filed an appeal. After several years, however, the defendants in
each case appealed after they were found to have violated their respective terms of
probation and their sentences had been ordered into effect. (Esquivel, at p. 673;
McKenzie, at p. 43.) The Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s argument in both
Esquivel and McKenzie that the criminal judgments had already become final. Instead,
the court concluded that because the defendants had been on probation, their criminal
cases had not concluded and they were entitled to the benefits of intervening ameliorative
legislation.8 (See Esquivel, at pp. 679–680; McKenzie, at pp. 48–51; accord, People v.
Lopez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 409, 414.)
Here, Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 became effective
January 1, 2022. At that time, in Case 1, as in Esquivel and McKenzie, defendant had
been placed on probation and the probation had been revoked, but he had not yet received
his final sentence. Accordingly, we agree with the parties that, under these
circumstances, Case 1 was not yet final and Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to
section 186.22 apply retroactively to Case 1. Thus, we conclude the judgment in Case 1
must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
8 Courts also consistently affirmed this principle before Esquivel and McKenzie.
(See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 746–747 [finality when “prosecutions” are “reduced
to final judgment”]; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 304 [“any such proceeding
which, at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in
the highest court authorized to review it”]; People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789,
fn. 5 [“a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court has passed”].)
8.
II. CASE 2
Defendant contends the sentence in Case 2 must be vacated and the matter
remanded to allow defendant to withdraw his plea based on retroactive application of
Assembly Bill 333 to Case 1.
The People argue that Assembly Bill 333 does not retroactively apply in Case 2
because it was already in effect at the time defendant entered into the plea agreement.9
However, the People contend that although Assembly Bill 333 does not retroactively
apply in Case 2, the judgment in that case must nonetheless be reversed and the matter
9 As discussed above, the conviction making up defendant’s strike offense (felon in
possession of a firearm; § 28900, subdivision (a)(1)) with the gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) in Case 1 is subject to being vacated in this appeal based on
Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22. Currently, there is a split of
authority on whether the application of Assembly Bill 333 retroactively alters a prior
conviction’s strike status. Several courts have concluded that Assembly Bill 333 does not
retroactively alter a prior conviction’s strike status. (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 1300, review granted Apr. 10, 2024, S286060; People v. Aguirre (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 488, review granted Jan. 10, 2024, S282840; People v. Fletcher (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 1374, review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S281282; People v. Scott (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 1176, review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S280776.) These courts concluded the
plain language of the Three Strikes law compels the conclusion that the status of
defendant’s prior conviction as a strike was fixed upon the date of his prior conviction.
(§ 1170.12, subd. (b)(1); see § 667, subd. (d)(1); see also Aguirre, at p. 491.) However,
the Third District recently concluded, in contrast, that Assembly Bill 333 retroactively
alters a prior conviction’s strike status. (People v. Farias (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 619,
review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S281027.) The Supreme Court has taken the issue under
review in Fletcher. The issues for review in Fletcher are: (1) whether Assembly Bill 333
amends the requirements for a true finding on a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)), or whether that determination is made on “ ‘the date of that prior conviction’ ”
(see §§ 667, subds. (d)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b)(1)); and (2) whether Assembly Bill 333,
which modified the criminal street gang statute (§ 186.22), unconstitutionally amended
Proposition 21 and Proposition 36, if applied to strike convictions and serious felony
convictions. (See Fletcher, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 1374.) The People contend that
Case 2 is unusual in light of the split in authority because the conviction making up the
strike offense (felon in possession of a firearm; § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) with the gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)) is subject to being vacated in this appeal based
on Assembly Bill 333.
9.
remanded for the trial court to permit the parties to withdraw from the plea agreement
and proceed with the cases under section 186.22, as amended by Assembly Bill 333,
because the conviction making up defendant’s strike offense, felon in possession of a
firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) with the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A))
(count 1 in Case 1), is subject to being vacated based on retroactive application of
Assembly Bill 333 to Case 1, as discussed above, in addition to other inadequacies in the
plea agreement in Case 2.
Regardless of whether Assembly Bill 333 retroactively implicates Case 2, there are
deficiencies in the plea in Case 2 that require the judgment in that case to be reversed and
the matter remanded. First, the trial court neglected to take defendant’s admission to the
prior strike at the plea hearing. Strike convictions must be pled and proved.
Section 1025, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “When a defendant who is
charged in the accusatory pleading with having suffered a prior conviction pleads either
guilty or not guilty of the offense charged against him or her, he or she shall be asked
whether he or she has suffered the prior conviction.” (§ 1025, subd. (a); see §§ 667,
subds. (c), (e), & (f); 1170.12, subds. (a), (c), & (d).) Further, the court in Case 2 did not
find a factual basis for the plea.10 The determination that there is a factual basis for a
guilty plea is procedurally mandated by section 1192.5. (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1170, 1174.) Section 1192.5 imposes on trial courts the burden of inquiry into a
factual basis for a guilty plea for negotiated pleas specifying the punishment to be
imposed. (§ 1192.5; see Hoffard, at p. 1174.)
10 The People concede these deficiencies in the plea agreement go to the validity of
the plea but are not cognizable on appeal without a certificate of probable cause.
However, to forestall subsequent habeas corpus challenges, the People agree the
judgment should be vacated.
10.
Accordingly, in light of the deficiencies in the plea agreement in Case 2, we
conclude that the judgment in that case must be reversed and the matter remanded for
further proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The judgments in case Nos. 20CR-01901B and 21CR-05205 are reversed and the
matters remanded for further proceedings.
11.
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