CourtListener 10332732•People v. Reddix CA2/7
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Filed 2/13/25 P. v. Reddix CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B335776
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA081677)
v.
SCHNIRE SOWN REDDIX,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.
Elana Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Kristen J. Inberg,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Schnire Sown Reddix, who was convicted of attempted
murder and armed assault in 2012, appeals the superior court’s
order resentencing him under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 The
superior court struck Reddix’s two enhancements under
section 667.5, subdivision (b), for prior prison terms, which
reduced his sentence by two years. The court also reimposed the
middle term of seven years for Reddix’s base offense of attempted
murder.
Reddix also asked the superior court to exercise its
discretion under section 1385 to strike or reduce his sentence
enhancement of 25 years to life for use of a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). Reddix presented evidence of his postconviction
rehabilitation and demonstrated a mitigating circumstance under
section 1385 because the firearm enhancement resulted in a
sentence of over 20 years. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) The court
considered these factors, but it declined to strike Reddix’s firearm
enhancement because it determined the serious circumstances of
the crime were such that “the furtherance of justice” did not
support striking the enhancement. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
Although reasonable minds could differ given the evidence
of Reddix’s postconviction rehabilitation, we cannot say the
superior court’s resentencing was irrational or arbitrary, and
accordingly we affirm.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Reddix’s Conviction and Sentence
On July 4, 2011, Reddix threatened his ex-girlfriend Teena
Hines with a gun as she returned to her car after a party.2
Reddix discovered she had been messaging a friend, Rashid
Green, and said, “I’m going to call him, and you ask him for
money.” Hines did as Reddix told her to do. Reddix forced Hines,
at gunpoint, to drive to pick up the money from Green. At the
meetup, Hines had just collected the money from Green when
Reddix emerged from Hines’s car saying, “Is that all you got?”
Reddix shot Green in the shoulder, knocking him to the ground.
Reddix continued to “‘play[] with the gun,’ as if it were jammed,”
and Green was able to escape. Reddix told Hines to drive away,
continuing to threaten her, but she escaped from him later that
evening.
In 2012, Reddix was charged with attempted premeditated
murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); Count 1); attempted second degree
robbery (§§ 664, 211; Count 2); and assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); Count 3). As to Count 1, the
information alleged Reddix personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)-(d)). As to all counts, the information alleged Reddix
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Green (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)) and that Reddix had served two prior prison terms
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
2 We recount the facts of the offense, as relevant, from this
court’s unpublished opinion in Reddix’s direct appeal. (See
People v. Reddix (May 12, 2014), B244917 [nonpub. opn.].)
3
A jury acquitted Reddix on Count 2 but convicted on
Counts 1 and 3, finding all special circumstance allegations on
Counts 1 and 3 true. The jury also found the attempted murder
was not committed with premeditation.
At sentencing on October 25, 2012, the trial court imposed
a total prison term of 34 years to life: a middle term of seven
years on Count 1, plus 25 years to life for the section 12022.53
firearm enhancement, and two years for the section 667.5 prior
prison term enhancements. The sentence on Count 3 and the
section 12022.7 enhancement were stayed pursuant to
section 654.
This Court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (See
People v. Reddix (May 12, 2014), B244917 [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Reddix’s Section 1172.75 Petition
In 2023, Reddix moved for resentencing under
section 1172.75. Reddix alleged that his section 667.5 prior
prison term enhancements were no longer valid under Senate Bill
No. 483, and the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) had notified the court he was eligible for
resentencing. Reddix argued the court should strike his two
section 667.5 enhancements and conduct a full resentencing.
As part of full resentencing, Reddix requested the court
strike his section 12022.53 firearm enhancement in the interest
of justice under section 1385, subdivision (c). He argued that
under section 1385, the court was required to afford “great
weight” to the mitigating fact that his firearm enhancement
“result[ed] in a sentence of over 20 years.” (See § 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(C).) Reddix asked the court to strike his
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement of 25 years to life
4
and instead impose a 20-year enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (c).
In support of his resentencing request, Reddix cited his
“exemplary” record of rehabilitation while incarcerated. Attached
to Reddix’s petition were commendations from three correctional
officers, attesting to Reddix’s “transformation” and describing
him as “respectful,” a “leader,” “a model inmate,” “mature, well
spoken, and stable.” The letters described Reddix’s absence of
disciplinary violations and his participation in programs like
“criminal gangs anonymous, life skills, physical health and
wellness, mental health and wellness, and education to get his
GED.” Reddix included a fourth letter from a therapeutic group
nurse, explaining Reddix had “exceptional” attendance in mental
health group therapy and he “is trying to become a better person
with life coping skills that will help him to reintegrate [in]to
society.”
The trial court held a resentencing hearing on
November 15, 2023, and stated it reviewed Reddix’s motion and
his evidence of mitigation, among other sentencing evidence.
Reddix’s appointed counsel argued that, in addition to striking
the section 667.5 enhancements, the court should resentence
Reddix with a 20-year firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)) or, in the alternative, “completely strike” the firearm
enhancement. Counsel noted that, if the court did not strike the
firearm enhancement, it must determine that Reddix “would
endanger public safety,” despite the evidence of Reddix’s
rehabilitation. The People argued the court should reimpose the
original 25-years-to-life enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), based on “the facts of the case” and Reddix’s
escalating “criminal history at the time of the trial.”
5
The court struck the two one-year section 667.5
enhancements but declined to otherwise modify Reddix’s
sentence, resulting in a total sentence of 32 years to life. The
court ruled that it would not exercise its discretion under
section 1385, subdivision (c), to strike the section 12022.53
firearm enhancement, reasoning as follows:
“[R]arely do I see someone who is in a position like
Mr. Reddix where he has letters from the correctional
officers talking about how well he’s been doing. . . . I
recognize that he has really changed and turned his
life around while he’s been incarcerated.
“The court is also aware of the underl[y]ing facts of
this case. . . . [Reddix] imprisoned or kidnapped
someone or forced that person to secrete him in their
car, to drive him to a location, and he sprung out
from the car overtaking the victim by surprise and
shooting the victim. He attempted to shoot the
victim a second time, and the gun jammed. . . .
“I’m certain that Mr. Reddix is not the same person
that he was then. I’m well aware of all my discretion.
I’ve re-read 1385, 1385(c), the enhancements. And
really the enhancement sections talk about multiple
enhancements as opposed to a single
enhancement. . . .
“Mr. Reddix should be recognized for what he has
done, and I’m sure for the positive things that he will
6
continue to do. He has served a substantial period of
time. . . .
“But I also recognize that he laid in wait; that he was
trying to murder this person, and the jury found that
to be true. And I think but for the gun jamming, the
victim would have been killed.”
The court “reincorporat[ed] all of the findings . . . that
occurred at the original date of sentencing” and ruled, “I find
those same factors in aggravation; the same factors in
mitigation.”
Reddix timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Reddix argues the resentencing court erred by declining to
strike or reduce his section 12022.53 firearm enhancement.
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
At the time of Reddix’s original sentencing in 2012,
“section 667.5, subdivision (b), required that trial courts ‘impose a
one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail
term’ that the defendant had served, unless the defendant had
remained free of custody for at least five years. [Citations.]
Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg.
Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit the one-year
prison prior enhancement to only prison terms served for
convictions of sexually violent offenses.” (People v. Christianson
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 309 (Christianson), review granted
7
Feb. 21, 2024, S283189; accord, People v. Carter (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.)
Through Senate Bill No. 483 (effective Jan. 1, 2022), the
Legislature extended retroactive relief to defendants previously
sentenced to the section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement.
(See People v. Kimble (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 746, 751, review
granted Apr. 24, 2024, S284259.) Senate Bill No. 483 “added
section 1171.1, later renumbered as section 1172.75, to the Penal
Code, which provides [in subsection (a)]: ‘Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually
violence offense . . . is legally invalid.’” (Kimble, at p. 751; accord,
People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.)
Section 1172.75 authorizes resentencing for defendants
sentenced with section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements.
Once CDCR identifies a defendant whose sentence includes such
an enhancement, “[t]he trial court then reviews the judgment
and, if it determines the judgment includes [a section 667.5]
enhancement . . . , ‘the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.’” (People v. Santos (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 666, 672 (Santos), review granted May 29, 2024,
S284341; accord, Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 310.)
In addition to striking the invalid prior prison term
enhancements, section 1172.75 requires a “full resentencing,”
applying “the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and . . . any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2); see
People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 373; accord, People v.
8
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855 (Garcia).)
Section 1172.75 further provides that a resentencing court “may
consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3); accord, People v. Dowdy (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1, 7; Garcia, at p. 856.)
Effective 2018, the Legislature amended the law with
respect to the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement, granting
sentencing courts new discretion to dismiss or strike a
section 12022.53 enhancement “‘in the interest of justice
pursuant to Section 1385.’”3 (People v. McDavid (2024)
15 Cal.5th 1015, 1024 (McDavid); see § 12022.53, subd. (h).) This
discretion expressly “applies to any resentencing that may occur
pursuant to any other law.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (h); see People v.
Pillsbury (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 776, 786.)
Section 1385, in turn, provides that “[n]otwithstanding any
other law, the [sentencing] court shall dismiss an enhancement if
it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1);
3 A court that chooses to strike a section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), firearm enhancement retains discretion to
“impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement,” including
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) or (c)
(People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 692), or any other lesser
included enhancement “supported by facts that have been alleged
and found true” (McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030).
9
accord, People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295
(Mendoza).) “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the [enumerated]
mitigating circumstances,” including (as relevant here) that
“[t]he application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of
over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be
dismissed.” (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2), (c)(2)(C).) “Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
Interpreting these provisions, the California Supreme
Court recently explained that even “absent a finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the
discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it
assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating
circumstances when they are present. [Citation.] In other words,
if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public
safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance
will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless
the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal
of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’” (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 (Walker).)
“[N]otwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance,
trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement
10
based on the circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the
“furtherance of justice” inquiry,’” including circumstances in
aggravation and in mitigation under the California Rules of
Court, rules 4.421 and 4.423.4 (Id. at p. 1033.)
“In general, we review for abuse of discretion the trial
court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (a). (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 298; accord, People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215,
225.) “A trial court may abuse its discretion where ‘its decision is
so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree
with it,’ ‘where the trial court was not “aware of its discretion”’ to
dismiss a sentencing [enhancement] under section 1385, or
‘where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to
dismiss.’” (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478,
490.)
“‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two
fundamental precepts. First, “‘[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’” [Citation.] Second, a “‘decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”’”’”
4 Further rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.
11
(People v. Pearson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 112, 116 (Pearson),
quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.)
B. Reddix Does Not Demonstrate the Superior Court Abused
Its Discretion by Reimposing the Section 12022.53,
Subdivision (d), Firearm Enhancement
Reddix argues the court abused its discretion under
section 1385 by failing to “afford great weight to the numerous
postconviction mitigating circumstances and instead only
focus[ing] on the underlying offense.” He also contends the court
did not make an “explicit finding” of danger to public safety or
“provide any rationale for how dismissal of the enhancement . . .
would endanger public safety.”
We conclude the superior court’s decision not to strike the
section 12022.53 firearm enhancement was within the bounds of
its discretion and Reddix has not demonstrated the court’s
determination was arbitrary or irrational. First, in declining to
strike the enhancement, the trial court was not required to make
any finding that dismissal would endanger public safety. As the
California Supreme Court explained, when a defendant invokes
one or more mitigating circumstances under section 1385,
subdivision (c), there is no “rebuttable presumption in favor of
dismissal that can only be overcome by a finding that dismissal
endangers public safety.” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.)
Instead, the court must afford “great weight” to a mitigating
circumstance when assessing whether dismissal of a sentencing
enhancement furthers the interest of justice. (Id. at p. 1036.)
The record indicates the resentencing court exercised its
discretion accordingly. The court stated it considered Reddix’s
motion for resentencing, which argued the court should strike the
12
section 12022.53 enhancement based on the mitigating
circumstance of a sentence over 20 years. The court further
stated it understood the scope of its discretion to strike the
enhancement and addressed whether doing so would further the
interest of justice. In assessing the interest of justice, the court
was entitled to consider aggravating factors particular to Reddix
and the circumstances of the crime, including that Reddix used a
weapon (rule 4.421(a)(2)), caused great bodily harm
(rule 4.421(a)(1)), engaged in violent conduct indicating serious
danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)), and had prior convictions of
increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)). (See Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1033; Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 857-
858; Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.)
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors
under section 1385, subdivision (c), the court concluded that
dismissing Reddix’s section 12022.53 enhancement would not be
in the furtherance of justice. This determination was not an
abuse of discretion. (See People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1087, 1099 [resentencing court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to strike enhancement by “assess[ing] the claimed
mitigating factors and, finding one such factor, acknowledg[ing]
its great weight but determin[ing] that other factors were
collectively weightier”]; Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117
[same, where resentencing court declined to strike firearm
enhancement based on aggravating factors: defendant’s use of
gun, his violent conduct, and great bodily harm to victim].)
Reddix contends the court misunderstood its discretion
because it stated that in section 1385, subdivision (c), “the
enhancement sections talk about multiple enhancements as
opposed to a single enhancement.” He contends that this
13
statement reveals the court did not assign “great weight” to the
mitigating circumstance that his section 12022.53 enhancement
“result[ed] in a sentence of over 20 years.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(C).) But it appears the court was referring to a
different mitigating circumstance in subsection (c)(2)(B)—when
“‘[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case . . . all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.’”
Reddix concedes that this mitigating circumstance was also
relevant to his resentencing, since multiple enhancements were
imposed at his original sentencing. In this context, the court’s
comment did not indicate that it misunderstood its discretion.
Finally, Reddix argues that the court failed to give his
postconviction evidence of rehabilitation “great weight.” At
section 1172.75 resentencings, the court is authorized to consider
postconviction factors such as rehabilitation and positive
disciplinary record. (See § 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) [court “may
consider postconviction factors”].) But, unlike the “great weight”
afforded to the mitigating factors in section 1385, subdivision (c),
section 1172.75 does not require a court to assign postconviction
factors any particular weight in the resentencing decision. (See
ibid.)
The record here indicates the court expressly considered
and discussed Reddix’s postconviction evidence in accordance
with section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), including the four letters
from correctional staff and numerous certificates achieved in
leadership training, substance abuse, and counseling programs.
Reasonable minds could differ regarding the weight given to the
postconviction rehabilitation evidence Reddix presented when
balanced against the nature of the underlying offense. Under
these circumstances presented, however, the resentencing court
14
did not abuse its discretion by declining to strike the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
15
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