CourtListener 10332730•People v. Salinas CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/13/25 P. v. Salinas CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B336473
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA149506)
v.
ALEJANDRO ARTURO SALINAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Henry J. Hall, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Christopher Lionel Haberman, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Scott A. Taryle and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________________
The trial court summarily denied appellant Alejandro Arturo
Salinas’s motion to vacate his conviction. (Pen. Code,1 § 1473.7.) We
conclude that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on the
motion and accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant was charged with two counts of second degree robbery
in violation of section 211. In December 1997, appellant pleaded no
contest to both counts. The court found a factual basis for the plea. It
sentenced appellant to a total of four years in state prison, consisting of
the mid-term of three years on the first count plus one-third the mid-
term on the second count, to be served consecutively.
In October 2023, long after appellant had been released from
prison, appellant, through counsel, moved pursuant to section 1473.7 to
vacate his conviction. He asserted that, when he entered into the plea,
he did not understand the immigration consequences and that neither
the trial court nor his attorney advised him that his plea would result
in mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United
States.
Appellant’s declaration accompanying his motion stated that he
was born in El Salvador in 1971 and emigrated to the United States
when he was about 18 years old, where he was granted lawful
permanent residency. Each of his eight siblings, as well as his elderly
father, are citizens of the United States and continue to reside in
California. Appellant declared that, after his 1997 arrest, he was
pressured by his attorney to take the plea deal without discussion of
the deportation consequences. Immediately after appellant’s release
from prison, he was transferred to immigration authorities and
deported to El Salvador, where he has been living since. Appellant
stated that he has never attempted to enter the United States
unlawfully. Finally, appellant declared that, if he had understood that
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
his conviction required mandatory deportation and that he would be
separated from his family, he would not have pleaded to the charges
and instead would have “requested that my defense attorney seek an
immigration safe plea or take this case to trial.”
At the initial hearing date on appellant’s section 1473.7 motion
the trial court continued the hearing to allow appellant additional
briefing on the issues of whether a hearing could be held without
appellant’s presence, as well as subsequent procedure should the
motion be granted.
Following appellant’s submission of additional briefing, the trial
court summarily denied appellant’s motion on January 2, 2024. The
court stated, “I’m not going to rule on this motion without the
defendant being here,” giving the reason, among others, that in similar
motions previously before the court, there was “something factually
significantly wrong with the declarations that [were] filed.” The court
continued: “The declarations are generally drafted by lawyers and are
extraordinarily self-serving and I don’t believe that it would be
appropriate to act on this motion without [appellant] being here,
particularly in a case as serious as this is, to allow an—an opportunity
to allow the People to cross-examine him and to determine whether the
allegations in the motion are substantiated and accurate.” The court
concluded that it was denying the motion “without prejudice to
[appellant] being brought to court.”
DISCUSSION
Before examining the correctness of the trial court’s order, we
first address the issue of appealability. In summarily denying
appellant’s section 1473.7 motion, the trial court stated the denial was
“without prejudice.” Generally, a denial order made without prejudice
is not appealable, since the motion can simply be renewed. (See In re
Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 697; People v. Cress (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 421, 425.) A trial court’s characterization of its own order
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as “without prejudice,” however, “is not controlling.” (In re Lauren P.
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 763, 768.)
Here, the trial court’s characterization of the denial as “without
prejudice to [appellant] being brought to court” was functionally
meaningless. Appellant was not in court—and there was no possibility
of appellant being physically present for the hearing in the foreseeable
future—because he had been deported due to the conviction he sought
to vacate. As explained in appellant’s briefing to the trial court, if
appellant attempted to illegally reenter for the purpose of attending the
hearing (no basis for legal entry being apparent), he faced up to 20
years in federal prison. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).) Given these
circumstances, in which appellant’s physical presence at the hearing
was for all practical purposes impossible, the trial court’s order was
effectively final. The order thus immediately affects appellant’s
substantial rights and is appealable pursuant to statute. (Pen. Code,
§ 1473.7, subd. (f) [“An order granting or denying the motion is
appealable under subdivision (b) of Section 1237 as an order after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of a party”].)
Turning to the focus of the appeal, appellant contends, and
respondent agrees, that the trial court erred by denying the section
1473.7 motion without a hearing. Appellant’s motion was brought
pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), which provides: “(a) A
person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate
a conviction or sentence for any of the following reasons: (1) The
conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error
damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand,
defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” The statute is
retroactive and applies to persons convicted or sentenced before its
effective date of January 1, 2017, if the statutory requirements are met.
(People v. Perez (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 818, 820–821, 827–828.)
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The statute further specifies, “All motions shall be entitled to a
hearing. Upon the request of the moving party, the court may hold the
hearing without the personal presence of the moving party provided
that it finds good cause as to why the moving party cannot be present.”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (d), italics added.) This “plain language” entitles the
moving party to a hearing. (People v. Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th
969, 977 (Fryhaat); see also People v. Singh (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 147,
154 [“Every qualifying defendant filing a section 1473.7 motion is
entitled to a hearing on the merits of the motion”].)
The record demonstrates that appellant was deprived of the
hearing mandated by section 1473.7, subdivision (d). The trial court
declined to hold a hearing “without the defendant being here,”
meaning, being physically present in court. This order violated the
statutory entitlement to a hearing set out in section 1473.7, subdivision
(d).
Furthermore, there was ample reason to hold the hearing
without appellant’s personal presence. In his briefing to the trial court,
appellant affirmatively requested that the hearing be held even though
he could not be personally present. Given appellant’s request, the trial
court was obligated to determine whether “good cause” excused
appellant’s personal presence at the hearing. (§ 1473.7, subd. (d).) The
trial court did not undertake this required examination, simply denying
the motion because appellant was not present.
If the trial court had considered the issue, there is no likelihood
that the court could have found an absence of good cause excusing
appellant’s physical presence. In Fryhaat, supra, the appellate court
found that a defendant in federal immigration custody could not “be
personally present” at a section 1473.7 hearing, and that “good cause
exist[ed]” to excuse his presence. (35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 983–984.) In
this case, appellant is unable to legally attend the hearing because he
5
has been deported.2 That is “good cause” for why appellant “cannot be
present.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (d).)
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying appellant’s motion to
vacate his conviction and remand for a hearing pursuant to section
1473.7, subdivision (d).
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellant’s Penal Code section
1473.7 motion is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
2 To the extent the trial court believed that appellant’s presence
may be necessary for purposes of cross-examination if a hearing was
held, the court could have considered the suitability of his being
present remotely. (§ 977.) Appellant, in his briefing to the trial court,
offered to appear remotely via a videoconferencing platform, but the
court did not consider the offer.
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