CourtListener 10328533•People v. Jimenez CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/6/25 P. v. Jimenez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B330356
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA109517)
v.
ANTHONY DANIEL JIMENEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Kevin Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Anthony Daniel Jimenez appeals
from the order denying, at the prima facie stage, his petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (former
§ 1170.95).
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2015, defendant, a member of the Azusa 13 gang, and
another gang associate confronted two victims at gunpoint. (People
v. Jimenez (June 22, 2020, B297604) [nonpub. opn.].) When the
victims attempted to flee, shots were fired and one of the victims
received a nonfatal facial wound. (Ibid.) A jury found defendant,
who was tried alone, guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
664) and found true the allegations the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate and premeditated and that the offense was
committed for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). (People v.
Jimenez, supra, B297604.) The firearm use allegations were found
not true (§12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)). (People v. Jimenez, supra,
B297604.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true
prior conviction allegations, including that defendant had suffered a
prior qualifying strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three
Strikes” law. (People v. Jimenez, supra, B297604.) The court
sentenced defendant to 36 years to life. (People v. Jimenez, supra,
B297604.)
In 2020, this court modified defendant’s judgment of
conviction by striking the one-year prison prior in light of
amendments to Penal Code section 667.5 and otherwise affirmed
defendant’s conviction in its entirety. (People v. Jimenez, supra,
B297604.)
After defendant’s judgment became final, the Legislature
passed Senate Bill 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) which made several
amendments to Penal Code section 1172.6. Section 1172.6 had been
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enacted three years earlier with the passage of Senate Bill 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). Senate Bill 1437 amended sections 188 and
189 regarding liability for murder and added section 1172.6 which
provided a procedure for individuals convicted of felony murder or
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to
petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3 & 4.)
Senate Bill 775 expanded the scope of those entitled to seek
sentencing relief to individuals convicted of attempted murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory and to those
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In March 2022, defendant filed, in propria persona, a form
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6
asking for relief from his attempted murder conviction and
requesting the appointment of counsel. The court appointed
counsel for defendant, and the People filed opposition. Defendant,
through appointed counsel, filed a reply brief.
After a hearing at which defendant waived his presence and
was represented by counsel, the trial court denied defendant’s
petition, finding he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
This appeal followed. We grant defendant’s request to take
judicial notice of this court’s opinion from his direct appeal. (People
v. Jimenez, supra, B297604.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
petition for resentencing and that a remand for further proceedings
is warranted. Defendant says the relief afforded by Penal Code
section 1172.6 to defendants convicted of attempted murder is not
limited to convictions based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. He says the statutory language should not
be construed so narrowly because the legislative history shows that
convictions for attempted murder based on a theory of imputed
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malice were also intended to be included within the statute’s
purview. Defendant further argues the jury instructions permitted
the jury to convict him on a theory of imputed malice based solely
on his participation in the crime. He contends the record of
conviction therefore does not show conclusively he is ineligible as a
matter of law and denial at the prima facie stage was improper.
“We review de novo a trial court’s prima facie determination
that a petitioner is ineligible for [Penal Code] section 1172.6 relief
as a matter of law.” (People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395
(Allen); accord, People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) We
reject defendant’s contentions.
Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (a) identifies, and
limits, the individuals that “may file a petition” seeking sentencing
relief to those persons “convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.”
(Ibid., italics added.)
The statutory language is plain and unambiguous. For
individuals convicted of attempted murder, the statute affords relief
only to those convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539,
548 [Pen. Code, § 1172.6, “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”]; accord, People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
268, 276, petn. for review pending, petn. for review filed Jan. 17,
2025, People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1129, review
den. Aug. 28, 2024, S285876, & People v. Lovejoy (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865, review den. July 24, 2024, S285447.)
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Defendant’s jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Rather, the jury was instructed on
attempted murder, premeditation and direct aiding and abetting.
Defendant was therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Moreover, the language in Penal Code section 1172.6
regarding convictions under any “other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person” applies only to individuals convicted of
murder and has no applicability to defendant. (Id., subd. (a).)
Defendant’s reliance on the legislative history to argue otherwise is
unpersuasive.
As an initial matter, where statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we have no occasion to interpret or construe it. In
any event, the legislative history does not support defendant’s
argument. Of particular note, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for
Senate Bill 775 says: “This bill would expand the authorization to
allow a person who was convicted of murder under any theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or who was convicted of
manslaughter when the prosecution was allowed to proceed on a
theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, to apply to have their sentence vacated and
be resentenced if, among other things, the complaint, information,
or indictment was filed to allow the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill 775 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, italics added.)
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The Legislature specifically limited the right to petition for
resentencing for attempted murder to those convicted under a
natural and probable consequence theory. Each time attempted
murder is mentioned, it is so qualified. Defendant’s contention we
should construe the statutory language more broadly is without
merit.
The record of conviction also conclusively demonstrates the
jury instructions did not leave open the possibility that defendant
was convicted on a theory of imputed malice. The jury at
defendant’s 2018 trial was told that to be guilty of attempted
murder, the person committing the “direct but ineffectual act” must
harbor “a specific intent to kill.” (CALJIC No. 8.66.) The jury was
also instructed that to be guilty as an aider and abettor, a person
must act with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s “unlawful
purpose” and “[w]ith the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission” of that crime.
(CALJIC No. 3.01.) And, the jury was told that it could find the
premeditation allegation true only if it found the attempted murder
was “preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill,
which was the result of deliberation and premeditation.”
(CALJIC No. 8.67.)
The jury was accurately instructed that a perpetrator of
attempted murder must possess express malice (the specific intent
to kill), and an aider and abettor must know of the perpetrator’s
intent to kill and act with the intent of aiding the commission of the
attempted murder. (See People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739
[attempted murder requires specific intent to kill]; People v. McCoy
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 [aider and abettor liability is based on
combination of “director perpetrator’s acts and the aider and
abettor’s own acts and own mental state”].) A reasonable jury
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would not have been misled into concluding that implied malice was
a sufficient basis upon which to find defendant guilty.
To the extent defendant contends these jury instructions were
ambiguous or failed to accurately state the law, any such claim
should have been raised on direct appeal. The argument is not
cognizable in a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.
(People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936
[§ 1172.6 cannot be used to resurrect claims of instructional error
that should have been raised on direct appeal]; People v. Farfan
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [a § 1172.6 petition “does not afford
the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error”].)
Finally, defendant points out the jury found the firearm use
allegations not true, arguing again that the record does not
conclusively establish his ineligibility. He says the jury’s finding
shows he was not convicted as the direct perpetrator and could have
been found guilty for his “mere participation” with the mens rea of
the direct perpetrator imputed to him. Defendant affords the not
true finding more significance than it merits. (See, e.g., People v.
Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 405-407 [because
inconsistencies in a verdict “ ‘may show no more than jury lenity,
compromise, or mistake,’ ” inconsistencies do not undermine the
verdict’s validity; this rule “applies equally” where enhancement
findings are inconsistent with the verdict on a substantive offense].)
Even assuming for the sake of argument the jury’s not true
finding on the firearm use allegations is properly construed as a
finding defendant was not the direct perpetrator, the record
otherwise demonstrates the jury, properly instructed on the
relevant law as discussed above, found him guilty of premeditated
attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor. Defendant
therefore cannot establish one of the requirements for a prima facie
showing under Penal Code section 1172.6, i.e., that the petitioner
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“could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill 1437.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Direct aiding and abetting liability for
attempted murder was not changed by Senate Bill 1437 and
remains valid under current law. The record of conviction therefore
conclusively establishes that defendant was convicted on a theory
not affected by Senate Bill 1437 and he is ineligible for relief.
(People v. Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 931.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant and appellant Anthony Daniel
Jimenez’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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