CourtListener 10327847•People v. Ibarra CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/5/25 P. v. Ibarra CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063475
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2203274)
FERNANDO RIOS IBARRA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Cheryl Mills, Judge. (Retired judge of the Contra Costa Super. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Fernando Rios Ibarra was sentenced to an
indeterminate life term after a jury found him guilty of kidnapping for rape,
assault with the intent to commit rape, and forcible sexual penetration. On
appeal, he contends: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his
kidnapping conviction, (2) the trial court erred in imposing a full consecutive
sentence on the penetration count, and (3) the imposition of certain fines and
fees violated his due process rights. We reject these contentions and affirm
the judgment. However, we remand with directions for the trial court to
modify the minute order of the sentencing hearing to accurately reflect the
court’s oral pronouncement of judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 17, 2022, Jane Doe (Jane) was a 21-year-old single
mother who was living with her father in Riverside. She was also struggling
with schizophrenia. Following an argument with her father, she was arrested
and taken into custody for vandalizing the tires on his and her aunt’s cars.
She was released from the Riverside county jail at around 3:45 a.m. the next
morning, May 18.
Lacking money or transportation, Jane set out to walk from
downtown Riverside to her aunt’s house in Eastvale. About 10 minutes into
her journey, Ibarra, a 47-year-old homeless man, approached her on his
bicycle and engaged her in friendly conversation. Jane, who was only about
five foot three and a hundred pounds, felt uncomfortable talking to Ibarra.
But she was polite to him as he rode alongside her on his bicycle.
As they continued along, they ended up on a public bike trail that
runs along the Santa Ana riverbed. At one point on the trail, Ibarra let Jane
ride his bicycle, which she appreciated because she was getting tired of
walking. However, while she was riding the bike and Ibarra was jogging
2
alongside her, Ibarra touched her buttocks. Jane did not say anything for fear
of making Ibarra angry, but she did give him a disapproving look.
After that, Ibarra grabbed Jane by the waist and pulled her off
the bicycle and onto the ground beside the trail. Jane wrestled with Ibarra to
get free, but he overpowered her and dragged her down the hill on the side of
the trail. They ended up by a fence near the riverbed, about 19 to 35 feet from
the bike trail.
Jane could see houses in the distance, on the other side of the
fence. However, Ibarra pinned her against the fence from behind and used his
bodyweight to keep her from getting away. Then he pulled down her pants
and underwear, spread her legs apart, and tried to rape her. That effort
failed because Ibarra could not obtain an erection. Even after he rubbed his
penis on Jane’s buttocks and vagina and commanded her to fondle his
genitals, he could not get an erection. He did, however, insert his finger into
her vagina at one point.
During the attack, Jane managed to call 911 on her phone.
Although Ibarra was hitting her on the head and trying to take her phone
away, she could be heard begging Ibarra not to rape her before the call cut
out. Eventually, Ibarra abandoned the assault and fled the scene. Jane then
redialed 911 and reported what had happened.
Because Jane did not know exactly where she was, it took the
police some time to find her. When they did, they noticed she was crying and
distraught, and she had multiple abrasions on her arms and legs. A sexual
assault exam revealed a small amount of sperm on Jane’s vagina that was
linked to Ibarra by DNA testing.
Ibarra was arrested after Jane identified him from a
photographic lineup. He was charged with kidnapping for rape (count 1),
3
assault with the intent to rape (count 2), and sexual penetration by force
(count 3). (Pen. Code, §§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 220, subd. (a)(1), 289, subd.
1
(a)(1)(A).)
At trial, Ibarra admitted getting into a physical altercation with
Jane on the bike trail and forcibly dragging her down the hill to the riverbed.
However, he claimed he only did so because she tried to steal his bicycle. He
denied trying to rape Jane or sexually assaulting her in any fashion. But, in
speaking with the police about the incident before trial, Ibarra conceded he
tried to have intercourse with Jane and that he put his finger inside her
vagina.
The jury convicted Ibarra as charged. In a bifurcated proceeding,
the trial court then found Ibarra had suffered a prior serious felony for
purposes of the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (c)(2), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd.
(c)(1).) The court also found as aggravating circumstances that Ibarra was on
post-release community supervision at the time of the offenses and that he
had previously served a term in prison. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(b)(3),
(4).) In light of Ibarra’s prior record and the seriousness of his present crimes,
the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 30 years to life in
prison.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Ibarra contends the evidence does not support his conviction for
kidnapping because there is insufficient evidence that (1) he had the intent to
1
Unless noted otherwise, all further statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
4
rape Jane at the time he moved her from the bike trail to the riverbed, and
(2) he moved her a substantial distance. For the reasons explained below, we
find both contentions unpersuasive.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is “highly deferential.” (People v.
Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 538.) Our task is to “review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45
Cal.4th 1, 27.)
In so doing, we do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the
credibility of the trial witnesses; rather, “[w]e presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer
from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier
of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.” (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) “The conviction shall
stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [it].”’” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 508; People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270.)
B. Intent Requirement
To convict Ibarra of kidnapping for rape, the jury had to find he
harbored the intent to rape Jane when he moved her from the bike trail down
the hill to the riverbed. (People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 198;
CALCRIM No. 1203.) Ibarra claims that was not his intention at that time,
5
and the only reason he grabbed Jane and forcibly removed her from his bike
was that he feared she was going to steal it. Then, once they ended up on the
ground on the side of the bike trail, it was Jane’s struggling to get away and
the slippery slope of the hill that caused them to tumble down to the riverbed.
In other words, Ibarra contends Jane’s movement from the trail down to the
riverbed was largely a consequence of her own actions and not something he
did for the purpose of sexually assaulting her.
That said, Ibarra acknowledges the jury rejected his trial
testimony on this point and found Jane’s version of events to be more
credible. We are not at liberty to revisit that credibility determination.
Instead, we must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the judgment
below. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 170.) The record shows that
even before Ibarra forcibly removed Jane from his bike, he made an
unwelcome sexual advance toward her by touching her buttocks. Then, while
they were fighting in the dirt on the side of the trail, he grabbed her and
dragged her down to the riverbed, where he forced himself on top of her,
pulled down her pants and underwear, tried to rape her, and penetrated her
vagina with his finger.
These actions are clearly sufficient to support a finding that
Ibarra intended to rape Jane when he moved her from the trail down the hill
to the riverbed. Indeed, the fact Ibarra attempted to rape Jane after moving
her away from the trail is compelling evidence that was his reason for moving
her in the first place. (Cf. People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 508 [there is
no better proof that the defendant entered the victim’s house to commit
robbery than the fact that he actually did so upon entry].) We find no reason
to disturb the jury’s finding to that effect.
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C. Asportation Requirement
Ibarra also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury’s finding that he moved Jane a substantial distance for purposes of
the kidnapping for rape charge. We conclude the record contains ample
evidence to support this finding too.
The asportation element of kidnapping for rape requires proof the
defendant moved the victim a substantial distance, meaning the movement
was not merely incidental to the intended rape, and it increased the victim’s
risk of harm over and above that necessarily inherent in that offense. (§ 209,
subd. (b)(2); People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 233–235, overruled on
other grounds in People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 70; CALCRIM No.
1203.)
Factors bearing on the asportation element include the scope and
nature of the movement and whether it lessened the chances of detection or
enhanced the defendant’s opportunity to commit additional crimes. (People v.
Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1151–1152.) Although the actual distance
of the movement is relevant, no minimum distance is required. “Measured
distance . . . is a relevant factor, but one that must be considered in context,
including the nature of the crime and its environment.” (Id. at p. 1152)
“Application of these factors in any given case will necessarily depend on the
particular facts and context of the case.” (Id. at p. 1153.)
Ibarra asserts that moving Jane a total of 19 to 35 feet away from
the bike trail and down the hill to the riverbed did not materially increase
her risk of harm because they were in a relatively secluded area on the bike
trail to begin with, it was dark outside, and Jane was still able to use her
phone during the attack. We disagree. If Ibarra had attacked Jane on the
bike trail, instead of moving her down to the riverbed, anyone passing by on
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the trail at that time would have been able to see what was transpiring and
assist her, either by intervening on her behalf or calling the police. Indeed,
the mere appearance of a third-party witness might have been enough to
cause Ibarra to abandon his attack and flee the scene.
Granted, the attack happened at around 5:00 a.m. But it
certainly is not unheard of for people to exercise early in the morning before
work, e.g., by walking, jogging, running, or biking on a trail or path. By
dragging Jane away from the trail and down to the riverbed, Ibarra
substantially reduced the likelihood they would be seen or encountered by
others who could come to Jane’s aid. And although Jane testified that some
houses were visible from the riverbed, there is no indication they were close
enough to permit their occupants to see what Ibarra was doing to her in the
dark.
All told, there is substantial evidence from which the jury could
reasonably find the asportation requirement for kidnapping was satisfied.
Although Ibarra did not move Jane a great distance, it was substantial
enough to materially decrease the chances of detection and increase her risk
of being harmed. We therefore affirm Ibarra’s conviction for aggravated
kidnapping.
II.
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING
Ibarra also claims the trial court erred in imposing a full
consecutive sentence for the forcible sexual penetration offense in count 3.
The claim is not well taken.
A. Background
In his sentencing brief below, defense counsel argued the
multiple punishment prohibition of section 654 barred punishment on all but
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one of Ibarra’s crimes because they were all motivated by the same objective,
i.e., to sexually assault Jane.2 However, the prosecution argued that section
654 did not apply to the forcible sexual penetration offense in count 3 because
the record indicated Ibarra committed that crime as an afterthought,
following his failed attempt to rape Jane. The prosecution also pointed out
that because Ibarra was convicted of violent sexual offenses, the trial court
had discretion to sentence him to full consecutive sentences pursuant to
3
section 667.6, subdivision (c).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court commented, “I’m very
cognizant of the fact that because these are all violent and serious sex
offenses, the first option is that there must be consecutive sentencing;
however, [section] 654 does play into this.” The court then determined that
the aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated assault in counts 1 and 2
were indivisible for purposes of section 654. Therefore, after sentencing
Ibarra to 14 years to life in prison on count 1, the court stayed execution of
his eight year sentence on count 2.
However, the court went on to find the forcible sexual penetration
offense in count 3 was separately punishable from the other two offenses. It
thus imposed a full consecutive sentence on that count.
2
Section 654 provides, “An act or omission that is punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under
more than one provision.” (Id., subd. (a).)
3
That statute provides, “In lieu of the term provided in Section
1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each
violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) [including forcible sexual
penetration] if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion.” (§
667, subd. (c).)
9
B. Analysis
Seizing on the trial court’s statement that “there must be
consecutive sentencing,” Ibarra argues the court sentenced him based on the
erroneous assumption that consecutive sentencing was mandated on count 3.
In so arguing, Ibarra correctly notes that, although full consecutive
sentencing for violent sex offenses is required where the crimes involve
separate victims or were committed on separate occasions (§ 667, subd. (d)),
that is not the case when, as here, the crimes were committed against the
same victim on the same occasion (§ 667, subd. (c)). Ibarra contends the trial
court misunderstood this distinction and mistakenly believed that full
consecutive sentencing was required on the penetration count, even though
he committed that offense against the same victim and on the same occasion
as his other crimes.
We cannot agree. First, in reviewing the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence, we are not limited to the snippet quoted by
Ibarra. Viewing the court’s comments as a whole, it is clear the court was not
operating under an erroneous assumption that it had no choice but to impose
consecutive sentences. In the portion of the transcript not cited by Ibarra, the
court went on to qualify its statement about mandatory consecutive
sentencing by referencing section 654, which generally prohibits multiple
punishment when the defendant’s crimes were based on a singular act, or
they were committed for a singular purpose. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2
Cal.5th 307, 311–312.) The fact that the court invoked section 654 to stay
Ibarra’s sentence on count 2 for assault with the intent to rape demonstrates
the court did not believe consecutive sentencing was mandatory.
Moreover, immediately after finding section 654 applicable to
count 2, the trial court found consecutive sentencing was warranted on the
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forcible sexual penetration offense in count 3 because it was a “separate”
offense from the other two crimes Ibarra committed. This factual finding is
significant because in cases involving multiple sex crimes, “[e]ven where the
defendant has but one objective—sexual gratification—section 654 will not
apply unless the crimes were either incidental to or the means by which
another crime was accomplished.” (People v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
999, 1006.) “If the rule were otherwise, ‘the clever molester could violate his
victim in numerous lewd ways, safe in the knowledge that he could not be
convicted and punished for every act.’” (Ibid.)
In this case, the record contains substantial evidence to support
the trial court’s determination that Ibarra’s commission of the penetration
offense was separate from his other offenses, meaning it was neither
incidental to nor the means by which he committed the kidnapping for rape
and assault with the intent to rape. (See generally People v. Petronella (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 945, 964 [the trial court’s application of section 654 will be
upheld on appeal if its findings, whether express or implied, are supported by
substantial evidence].) Whereas Ibarra committed the kidnapping and
assault by dragging Jane down the hill and physically attacking her, he
committed the penetration offense by other means. And while the kidnapping
and assault occurred close in time to the penetration offense, the latter
offense was not incidental to the former ones in the sense it was likely to
occur under the circumstances.
Rather, the evidence indicates Ibarra penetrated Jane out of
frustration, or as an afterthought, after he was unable to obtain his primary
objective of raping her. Under these circumstances, section 654 would not
apply to bar punishment on the penetration count. (People v. Ratcliffe (1981)
124 Cal.App.3d 808, 819.)
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In sum, the trial court’s ruling reflects it properly understood
that consecutive sentencing is not required in every case in which the
defendant commits multiple sexual offenses against a single victim. Indeed,
the court’s remarks indicate it opted for a full consecutive sentence on count 3
not because such a sentence was mandated under the law, but because the
factual circumstances of that offense warranted imposition of that sentence.
Given that the court’s sentencing decision was factually driven and consistent
with the law, we reject Ibarra’s contention that it resulted from the court’s
misunderstanding of its sentencing authority.4
III.
FINES AND FEES
Lastly, Ibarra contends the trial court erred in ordering him to
pay certain fines and fees. Again, we disagree.
A. Background
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel initially asked the
trial court not to impose any monetary penalties above the statutory
minimum. He then requested the court to strike all such penalties on the
basis Ibarra lacked the ability to pay them. However, the court ordered
Ibarra to pay “a mandatory restitution fine in the sum of $10,000” under
section 1202.4. It also imposed—but stayed—a parole revocation fine of
$10,000 pursuant to section 1202.45. And it assessed a court operations fee of
4
Ibarra also claims the trial court may have wrongly double-
counted the aggravating circumstances to impose both the upper term and a
consecutive sentence on count 3. However, Ibarra forfeited this claim by
failing to raise it at the sentencing hearing. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 353.) In any event, there is no evidence the trial court double-counted
the multiple aggravating circumstances it found applicable in this case.
12
$40 and a criminal conviction fee of $30 for each of the three counts on which
Ibarra was convicted. (§ 1465.8; Gov. Code, § 70373.)
B. Analysis
Ibarra first takes issue with his $10,000 restitution fine. He
correctly points out that although the imposition of a restitution fine was
statutorily mandated under section 1202.4, the amount of the fine was not.
Instead, the trial court had the authority to impose a fine ranging from $300
to $10,000, depending on his ability to pay and the circumstances
surrounding his offenses. (§ 1202.4, subds. (b)–(d).) Because the court
described his restitution fine as “mandatory,” Ibarra presumes the court
incorrectly believed a fine in the amount of $10,000 was required by law.
However, “‘“a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and
followed the applicable law. [Citations.]”’” (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
487, 499.) Applying that presumption here, we interpret the trial court’s
reference to Ibarra’s restitution fine as “mandatory” as referring to the fine
itself, and not the amount. Although the record is somewhat ambiguous in
that regard, the presumption of correctness demands that we give the trial
court the benefit of the doubt on this issue. (People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 398; People v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
787, 813–814.) Accordingly, the court’s reference to the restitution fine as
mandatory is not cause for reversal.
Ibarra also challenges his fines and fees on the basis they are
unconstitutional under the reasoning of People v. Dueñas (2019) 30
Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). In that case, Division Seven of the Second
Appellate District ruled that imposing financial penalties on a criminal
defendant without a prior determination of ability to pay violates due
process. While recognizing the state has a legitimate interest in imposing
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revenue-raising fees on people who violate the law, the court stated,
“Imposing unpayable fines on indigent defendants is not only unfair, it serves
no rational purpose, fails to further [any] legislative [policy], and may be
counterproductive.” (Id. at p. 1167.) Dueñas concluded trial courts must
conduct an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing financial penalties on a
criminal defendant. (Id. at p. 1164.)
A number of courts have criticized the soundness of that ruling
and rejected the idea that due process is the appropriate measure by which
the constitutionality of criminal fines and fees should be assessed. (See, e.g.,
People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, review granted Nov. 26, 2019,
S258946 [Dueñas improperly expanded the boundaries of due process]; People
v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1060 [“Dueñas was wrongly decided”
and should have based its analysis on the Eighth Amendment’s excessive
fines clause instead of the due process clause]; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 1027, 1034 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.) [same]; People v. Caceres
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 920 [“the due process analysis in Dueñas does not
support its broad holding”].) Having granted review in People v. Kopp (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted November 13, 2019, S257844, the
California Supreme Court is poised to provide guidance on these issues.
In the meantime, we are convinced that even if Dueñas were
correctly decided, that decision is factually distinguishable from the case at
hand. In Dueñas, the defendant was a poor woman who had suffered an array
of “cascading consequences” because she could not afford to pay various fines
and fees that were leveled against her for committing minor offenses related
to her indigency. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1163.) Not only did she
lose her driver’s license, she was subjected to additional jail time and the
prospect of civil collection efforts, all because she lacked the means to pay her
14
initial financial penalties. (Id. at pp. 1161–1164.) Given that her criminal
history stemmed largely from the lack of monetary resources, the Dueñas
court determined there was no rational basis for subjecting her to additional
financial penalties in her current case, and the trial court’s decision to do so
therefore violated due process.
Although Ibarra is an indigent repeat offender, there is nothing
in the record suggesting his recidivism was attributable to any financial
penalties he was ordered to pay in his prior cases. That is a key point of
distinction from Dueñas, in which the financial penalties triggered by the
defendant’s initial crimes had severe consequences on her daily life and
created the conditions that contributed to her current offense. (See People v.
Caceres, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 923–924, 928 [distinguishing Dueñas on
that basis]; People v. Kopp, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 95, review granted
[same].) We reject Ibarra’s due process claim.
We also note that, having been sentenced to a term of 30 years to
life, Ibarra will have the opportunity to pay his financial penalties by
working in prison. Although Ibarra claims there is nothing in the record to
suggest he has the physical capacity for prison work, we disagree. The
evidence showed Ibarra rode his bike and then jogged next to Jane for quite
some time before launching a fierce physical attack on her. From this, we can
reasonably infer he is physically capable of performing some kind of job in
prison. Accordingly, to the extent it was error for the court not to inquire into
Ibarra’s ability to pay, any such error was harmless. (People v. Aviles, supra,
39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1075–1076; People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028,
1035; People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139–140; People v.
DeFrance (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 486, 505; People v. Hennessey (1995) 37
15
Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837; People v. Frye (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1486–
1487.)
One final point. As the Attorney General correctly notes, the
clerk’s minute order of the sentencing hearing does not accurately reflect the
trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. Because the oral pronouncement
controls, we will order a modification of the minutes to conform to the court’s
sentencing decision. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; People v.
Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471–472.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the trial
court to modify the minute order of September 8, 2023, to reflect the court
ordered Ibarra to pay a restitution fine of $10,000 (§ 1202.4), a stayed parole
revocation fine of $10,000 (§ 1202.45), a court operations fee of $120 (§
1465.8), and a criminal conviction fee of $90 (Gov. Code, § 70373).
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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