CourtListener 10326173•People v. Carter CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Carter CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B333813
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA419941)
v.
ERIC TYRONE CARTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sam Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Eric Tyrone Carter appeals from an order
resentencing him pursuant to our directions in a prior appeal.
He contends that the court, in declining to strike enhancements
imposed under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b),1 was
unaware of its discretion to impose lesser included enhancements
under section 12022.5, and that we should remand for a further
resentencing hearing to allow the court to exercise such
discretion. Because we conclude that Carter forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2016, a jury found Carter guilty of seven counts of
second degree robbery. (§ 211.) The jury also found true
allegations that Carter personally used a firearm in committing
three of the robberies (§ 12022.53, subd. (b))2 and that a principal
in the commission of the other four robberies had been armed
with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced
him to 39 years 8 months in prison. The sentence included a
total of 16 years 8 months pursuant to the three personal use
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The court
struck the four principal armed allegations under section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1).
1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 Under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), a person who
personally uses a firearm in the commission of certain felonies
“shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years.” (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b).)
2
At the time of Carter’s initial sentencing, courts were
statutorily prohibited from striking “an allegation under
[section 12022.53] or a finding bringing a person within the
provisions of [that] section.” (Former § 12022.53, subd. (h).)
In 2017, while Carter’s direct appeal was pending, the
Legislature amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h). (Sen. Bill
No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) § 2.) The amendment authorized
the sentencing court, “in the interest of justice pursuant to
[s]ection 1385” to “strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise
required to be imposed” under section 12022.53. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (h).)
In 2018, we affirmed Carter’s convictions in an unpublished
opinion. (People v. Carter (Apr. 13, 2018, B275973).)3 We
held, however, that Senate Bill No. 620’s amendment of
section 12022.53, subdivision (h), applied retroactively to
defendants whose judgments were not yet final, and that Carter
was thus entitled to a new sentencing hearing at which the court
could exercise its discretion to strike any of the personal use
enhancements.
After remand, the court held a resentencing hearing and
declined to strike the enhancements. Carter appealed.
In 2021, while his appeal from the resentencing hearing
was pending, the Legislature added subdivision (b)(6) to
section 1170. (Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) § 1.3.)
The new subdivision created, under certain circumstances, a
presumption in favor of the lower term of a sentencing triad.
3 Carter states in a footnote in his opening brief that he
“has asked the court to take judicial notice” of our prior opinion.
Although our file does not include such a request, we interpret
the footnote as making that request, and hereby grant it.
3
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); see People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
419.)
In an unpublished opinion, we agreed with Carter and the
Attorney General that Senate Bill No. 567 applied to defendants
whose judgments were not yet final, including Carter. (People v.
Carter (June 1, 2022, B311329).) We directed the trial court to
resentence Carter, noting that “the court may reconsider all of
its prior discretionary decisions when resentencing Carter.”
The court held Carter’s second resentencing hearing on
August 1, 2023. By that time, at least two Courts of Appeal
had published opinions holding that if a sentencing court strikes
an allegation under section 12022.53, it may impose a lesser
included enhancement under section 12022.54 (People v. Fuller
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 394, 399 (Fuller), review granted Nov. 22,
2022, review dism. & remanded June 26, 2024, S276762; People
v. Johnson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1093 (Johnson), review
granted Dec. 14, 2022, review dism. & remanded June 26, 2024,
S277196), one court held to the contrary (People v. Lewis (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 34, 39, disapproved in People v. McDavid (2024)
15 Cal.5th 1015, 1030 (McDavid)), and our state Supreme Court
had taken up the issue (People v. McDavid (July 14, 2022,
D078919), review granted Sept. 28, 2022, S275940).
Carter did not request in his written sentencing
memorandum or at the resentencing hearing that the court
strike his section 12022.53 enhancement and impose a lesser
included enhancement. During the hearing, the court addressed
4 Under section 12022.5, the court may impose a prison
term of 3, 4, or 10 years if the defendant “personally uses
a firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted felony.”
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
4
the question whether to strike the personal use enhancements
under Senate Bill No. 620, and declined to do so, stating:
“[T]his court finds that the vulnerability of the victims, the
sophistication and planning in how the robberies were carried
out, the brazen manner in which the robberies took place and
the number of times the defendant participated in committing
robberies through the use of firearms, either personally
or principally, militate against the dismissal of any of the
gun enhancements.” The court did not indicate whether it
was aware that, if it had decided to strike the section 12022.53
enhancements, it had discretion to impose a lesser included
enhancement under section 12022.5.
After hearing argument, the court resentenced Carter to
a total term of 32 years 8 months—a seven-year reduction from
the original sentence. The reduction is attributable to the court’s
selection of the low term on the principal term, instead of the
medium term previously imposed, and the striking of a five-year
prior serious felony enhancement previously imposed under
section 667, subdivision (a).
Carter timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
While this appeal was pending, our state Supreme Court
decided McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1015. In McDavid, the court
resolved a conflict among Courts of Appeal, holding that a “court,
after striking a section 12022.53 enhancement, [may] impose a
lesser included, uncharged enhancement authorized elsewhere in
the Penal Code.” (McDavid, supra, at p. 1021.) Carter contends
that his resentencing court was apparently unaware that it
had the discretion to impose a lesser gun enhancement under
section 12022.5, and that we should remand this case to the
5
trial court for another resentencing hearing so that the court
can consider whether to exercise such discretion.
The Attorney General contends that Carter has forfeited
this argument by failing to raise it below. We agree.
“As a general rule, only ‘claims properly raised and
preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.’ [Citation.]
[Our state Supreme Court] adopted this waiver rule ‘to reduce
the number of errors committed in the first instance’ [citation],
and ‘the number of costly appeals brought on that basis’
[citation]. . . . Thus, all ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure
to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing
choices’ raised for the first time on appeal are not subject
to review.” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852; see
People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856 [the forfeiture rule
generally “ ‘applies in the context of sentencing as in other areas
of criminal law’ ”].) Here, Carter has forfeited the argument he
asserts on appeal because he failed to raise it below.
Carter suggests that the forfeiture rule should not
apply because McDavid was not decided until after his latest
resentencing hearing. The argument that a court has discretion
to impose an enhancement under section 12022.5 after striking
an enhancement imposed under section 12022.53, however, was
indisputably available to Carter during his latest resentencing
hearing. The Fuller and Johnson decisions, which supported the
argument, and the Supreme Court’s grant of review in McDavid,
had been announced 10 months prior to Carter’s sentencing
hearing.5 Although, as Carter points out, the rule was unsettled
5 Although the Supreme Court had granted review
in Fuller and Johnson pending its decision in McDavid, the
6
prior to McDavid, that circumstance is not an exception to the
forfeiture rule. (Cf. People v. Drew (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 253,
259 [unsettled state of law does not justify failure to assert
argument based on such law].) Nor does the record indicate
that the court was unaware of its discretion under Fuller and
Johnson. (See People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515,
527 [we presume that the trial court is aware of the applicable
law, including discretionary sentencing principles]; People v.
Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 [same].)
Carter also relies on the rule that when a court announces
a new rule of law, the rule ordinarily applies to all cases pending
on direct review when the rule is announced. (People v. Guerra
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 399–400.) McDavid announced such a
rule, Carter argues, and it should apply to him on appeal. We
do not disagree with this rule; McDavid would govern a challenge
to the court’s failure to exercise discretion in deciding whether
to impose a lesser included enhancement if that challenge had
not been forfeited by failing to raise it below. Because Carter
forfeited the issue, however, McDavid has no application in this
appeal.
published opinions in Fuller and Johnson remained published
and citable for their “persuasive value.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1115(e)(1).)
7
DISPOSITION
The August 1, 2023 order resentencing appellant is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
KIM, J.
8
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