People v. Quiroz CA2/8

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Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Quiroz CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B331767

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA481286
v.

ALEJANDRO CESAR QUIROZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Sentence stayed in part
and judgment affirmed in all other respects.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________
SUMMARY
Defendant Alejandro Cesar Quiroz was convicted of sexual
penetration by force (two counts), assault with intent to commit a
felony, and false imprisonment by violence. Two of the
three aggravating factors charged were found true. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing his
proposed instruction on third party culpability. He also asserts
prosecutorial misconduct; error in imposing consecutive
sentences on the first three counts; the trial court’s failure to
exercise its discretion properly in imposing the middle term on
three of the counts; and a violation of the Penal Code section 654
ban on multiple punishments for the same act. (Further
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
We agree that the sentence for false imprisonment by
violence should have been stayed, but otherwise affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
1. The Crimes
Late in the evening of September 14, 2019, Veronica V.,
then 19 years old, met defendant at some stairs near her home
and near Montecito Heights Community Park. Defendant had
texted Veronica in response to a post of Veronica’s on social
media, and asked her to meet. Veronica was acquainted with
defendant, and knew him by his gang monikers as “Lunitik” and
also as “Cray.” They had seen each other at social gatherings
with other friends over the past year. Defendant wanted to meet
at the park, but Veronica felt safer at the stairs.
Defendant and Veronica hung out and drank beer at the
stairs for a while. At some point Veronica needed to use the
restroom, and said she was going home, but defendant persuaded

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her to go to the park and use the restroom there. He said he had
the keys to the restroom and showed her keys.
When Veronica went to the restroom, the entrance door
was open and the lights were on. She went into the stall, and
while she was using the restroom defendant came in. The stall
did not have a lock on it and defendant was holding the door.
Veronica asked him why he was in the restroom and he said he
was holding the door for her. She said, “You’re weird.” As she
finished, defendant slammed the stall door open. Veronica said,
“What are you doing?” and walked past him to wash her hands in
the sink. Defendant told her that she had been “playing with
him,” and she said, “What are you talking about?” She washed
her hands and tried to walk out, but defendant “blocked the exit
way.” At some point while her back was to defendant at the sink,
he took his pants down.
Defendant told Veronica to take off her pants, and if she
didn’t do it, he would do it. She asked him “why he was doing
this,” and defendant “just kept repeating that I have been playing
with him.” At first, she thought she would “just let him do this to
me and go home to my baby. But when he was about to touch
me, I just fought.”
At the beginning of the encounter when she was at the sink
and defendant told her to take down her pants, “[i]t was scary.
His eyes—he didn’t have emotion.” Then, “he told me to turn
around and bend over the sink.” When she took her pants down,
“he had me then at the sink. So he tried to—he was going to put
his penis inside of me, but then I swung at him.”
When Veronica swung at him, “that’s when he grabbed my
neck and everything.” He pushed her to the floor, and she “was
crying and screaming and telling him to stop, please. And he put
his fingers inside of me. And . . . he was behind me. I kept
fighting him from behind me. I kept shoving at his face. I left

3
him a scratch.” Veronica “[f]elt like I was getting stabbed” when
defendant put his finger inside her vagina.
Defendant “was behind [Veronica], and I would break free a
few times and try to run, but he would catch me and throw me
back to the floor.” When he got her back on the floor, he put his
fingers in her vagina again. She broke free and tried to run
“[p]robably like three times.” Veronica “would get to almost the
door area, but he caught me each time.” Each time defendant got
her on the floor, “he did it.” He penetrated her vagina again the
third time he got her on the ground.
At one point after he had penetrated her vagina with his
fingers, defendant pulled Veronica’s shirt up, saying he wanted to
see her pink nipples, “and then he pulled my arm up, and he
started sucking on my boob.”
Defendant had closed the entrance door, which was heavy.
The fourth time Veronica ran, she got to the door and held on to
the handle. Defendant told her “to suck his part at least instead.”
She pretended she would do it so she could push him, but “he told
me that he knew what I was doing.” Then, he started slapping
her face.
Veronica would not let go of the door handle. Defendant
was trying to close the door with his body, but Veronica was able
to put her bare foot “in between the door,” and “got my foot
bruised, but I didn’t move my foot.” She thought defendant
realized she was going to get away; he said, “If you leave, you will
leave naked.” Defendant kept trying “to seal the door,” but she
was able to get her arm and foot through and push it open. She
“ran to the closest house with no pants or underwear, barefoot.”
The ordeal lasted “[p]robably more than” 20 minutes.
Veronica “knocked like crazy” at the door, and asked the
man who answered to call the police. The man’s wife came and

4
gave Veronica shorts, gave her water and called 9-1-1 for her,
explaining that a girl had been raped.
2. The 9-1-1 Call and the Identification
Veronica told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that her attacker was
called Cray and Lunitik; that he was a Hispanic man in his 20’s,
five feet four or five inches tall, wearing shorts, a gray and white
shirt and a baseball hat with an “A” on it; and that he hung out
at the park. She was scared because “he was still out there” and
“[t]hey’re going to want to get me.”
Police officers, including Officer Isaias Medrano, came to
the scene at about 3:45 a.m. Veronica was scared, crying and
“really upset.” An ambulance came and Veronica was put on a
gurney in the ambulance. Then the police came with a suspect
they had detained in the park. The ambulance doors were closed.
Veronica looked through the ambulance windows and identified
the suspect, from a distance of about 24 feet, as her assailant.
(On the way to the hospital, Veronica told Officer Medrano that
she and her assailant had met up at the park and were sitting in
the bleachers when she told him she needed to use the restroom.)
According to Officer Medrano, who conducted the field
identification, “[w]e got as close as we could”; Veronica “was
crying, nervous,” and kept saying she was afraid because of her
attacker’s gang affiliation; “[s]he was very afraid.” She did not
want to get any closer to him. Officer Medrano testified that
“[o]nce we got close enough, that’s when she positively ID’d the
suspect.” He wrote in his report that Veronica stated, “That’s
him. That’s him. That’s fucking him.” (At trial, Veronica
testified that she “didn’t want to get close to him,” and when the
police described to her what he was wearing, “it was similar,” so
“I told them that’s probably him.”) At the hospital, Veronica told
Officer Medrano that the assailant’s moniker was Lunitik.

5
Two days later, Detective David Meza interviewed Veronica
at Hollenbeck Station. He showed her a photograph of the person
the police had in custody, and asked if that was the person who
attacked her. She said, “No, it wasn’t.” Then he showed her a
photograph of defendant, and she said, “That’s him. That’s Cray
or [Lunitik].” Throughout the investigation, Veronica was
terrified and would not tell Detective Meza where she was living.
The man Veronica mistakenly identified was Jaime
Ramirez. He lived in her neighborhood, and she had seen him at
the store near her house quite a few times, had spoken with him
and knew his first name. Mr. Ramirez was 36 years old, five feet
nine inches tall, and weighed 150 pounds. When defendant was
booked, he was 21 years old, five feet six inches tall and weighed
140 pounds. Both men had facial hair at the time.
3. Subsequent Events and Proceedings
Veronica was taken to the hospital, where she was
examined by Rosario Aguilar-Tanphanich, a Sexual Assault
Response Team (SART) nurse. Veronica described the assault to
her. The nurse found bruising to Veronica’s arms, knees and
hands, and when she felt Veronica’s head, Veronica complained of
tenderness to the back of her head. The nurse’s vaginal exam
found two abrasions (one of them a bleeding abrasion) and a
bruise. These findings were documented with photographs. The
injuries were consistent with sexual assault. Veronica said she
had had no intercourse or penetration in the five days before the
assault.
Ms. Aguilar-Tanphanich took a urine sample and DNA
samples from Veronica’s mouth, breasts, vagina, cervix, and
other parts of her body. Defendant’s DNA was present in the
cheek face swab and shoulder swabs. Defendant was excluded as
a contributor to the breast and perianal swabs; the DNA of an

6
unknown male was found in those swabs. Other swabs were
inconclusive or too complex for a DNA analysis.
Jaime Ramirez’s DNA was compared to all swabs that were
suitable for testing and he was excluded from all of them.
The urine sample taken from Veronica was analyzed and
only alcohol was found; no drugs were detected.
Defendant was arrested four days after the assault, on
September 18, 2019. Detective Meza did not see any scratch
marks on defendant’s face.
Defendant was charged with sexual penetration by use of
force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A), counts 1 & 2); assault with intent to
commit rape, sodomy, or oral copulation (§ 220, subd. (a)(1), count
3); and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, count 4). The
information also alleged three circumstances in aggravation:
that the offenses involved great violence, great bodily harm,
threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree
of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victim of the offenses was particularly
vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); and defendant took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence to commit the offenses
(rule 4.421(a)(11)).
4. The Trial
In addition to the facts already described, other evidence
was presented at trial, including the following.
Defendant made telephone calls from jail that he knew
were being recorded. He called his girlfriend Monique, “asking
her to get some of [his] homies to go talk to Veronica,” to tell
Veronica to drop the charges. He said he would forgive her for
accusing him if she did not press charges. Detective David Meza
testified defendant told his girlfriend to reach out to “Steady” and
“Chato” to go to Veronica’s house and speak to her. On another

7
call, he told his girlfriend “to have some of his people, Sparky and
Chato and his sister, go talk to [Veronica].”
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated he was a
gang member with the gang name of Lunitik, and lived with his
girlfriend at the time of the incident. He said Veronica was his
“home girl” and they would “mess around” and “do certain things
with each other.” On the night of the incident, he met Veronica
at the stairs at around 11:00 p.m., and they hung out for an hour
and a half or two hours. He told Veronica he had found out he
was having a baby with his girlfriend and “was ending our little
relationship that we were having.” He said they were talking,
kissing and hugging, and he “reached down there” and “fingered
her.” Ninibeth Rodriguez and her brother Chato came after 15 or
20 minutes. Defendant left no later than 1:00 a.m. and went
home. When he left, Ninibeth and Chato were still there. He did
not have a key to the park restroom and never went to the park
that night.
After he was arrested, defendant spoke with Detective
Meza. He was cooperative and had no hesitation in agreeing to
provide a DNA sample. He was “in shock” because of the
charges. He described to Detective Meza what happened that
evening; “I was very honest and very descriptive.” However, he
did not tell Detective Meza anything about breaking up with
Veronica. (According to Detective Meza, defendant told him
Veronica “was going crazy on him, upset with him,” and that’s
when he left the stairs.) Defendant testified that “[t]oday is the
first time” he was “mentioning anything about breaking up with
Veronica.”
Detective Meza testified that, when he interviewed
defendant after his arrest, he asked defendant about whether
Veronica scratched his face when she “went crazy on him.”
Defendant told Detective Meza that he did have a scratch on the

8
left side of his face. There was no scratch when Detective Meza
interviewed defendant, but defendant told the detective that “it’s
healed now.”
Ninibeth Rodriguez testified that her brother Julio (also
known as Chato) and defendant were friends. She was with
Chato on the night of the incident, and saw defendant and
Veronica at the stairs around 11:00 p.m. She, Chato and
Veronica were drinking beer; defendant was not. Veronica was
also “doing another substance,” smoking from a little pipe, and
“she was intoxicated.” Defendant left the stairs at 12:30 a.m.
because he had to work in the morning. Ninibeth and Chato
walked to the park, around 1:00 a.m. Veronica and another girl
were at the park, too. They left the park at 1:30 a.m., and
Ninibeth, who was driving, dropped Veronica off at her house.
They stayed there for 10 or 15 minutes, and Ninibeth saw
Veronica being picked up by some female.
Adrian Morales became the facility director of the park in
2022. He had no knowledge of the 2019 assault. He testified that
Jaime Ramirez lived in his car in the parking lot of the park.
Toward the end of 2022, he saw Mr. Ramirez opening a gate at
the park, and Mr. Morales confiscated the key, which was a
general key that would open outdoor restrooms and outdoor
gates. Anyone could make a copy of the key, and Mr. Morales did
not know how many copies there might be.
5. The Verdict
The jury found defendant guilty of all four counts. The jury
found true the allegations that the victim was particularly
vulnerable and that defendant took advantage of a position of
trust and confidence to commit the offenses. The jury found not
true the allegation that the offenses involved great bodily harm
or acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty.

9
The court imposed a 14-year prison sentence, consisting of
consecutive six-year middle terms on counts 1 and 2 (sexual
penetration by force) and a consecutive low term of two years on
count 3 (assault with intent to commit a felony). The court
imposed the middle term of two years on count 4 (false
imprisonment by violence), to run concurrently with the principal
term. The court made various other orders not at issue on
appeal.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The Claim of Instructional Error
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on third party culpability. Defendant is
mistaken.
a. The legal principles
We review a claim of instructional error de novo. The legal
principles we apply are these.
“[I]t is well settled that ‘ “ ‘evidence of mere motive or
opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without
more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a
defendant’s guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence
linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.’
[Citation.] . . . [S]uch [third party culpability] evidence is subject
to exclusion under Evidence Code section 352.” ’ ” (People v.
Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 496 (Hartsch).)
“ ‘ “[I]n appropriate circumstances” a trial court may be
required to give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a
defense theory of the case . . . . [Citations.] But a trial court need
not give a pinpoint instruction if it is argumentative [citation],
merely duplicates other instructions [citation], or is not supported

10
by substantial evidence [citation].’ ” (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th
at p. 500.)
b. This case
Here, the trial court did not exclude any third party
culpability evidence. The question is whether there was any
substantial evidence supporting the defense theory that someone
else was the perpetrator.
Defense counsel proffered this instruction: “You have
heard evidence that Jaime Ramirez committed the offenses with
which the defendant is charged. . . . [¶] The defendant is not
required to prove Jaime Ramirez’s guilt. The defendant is not
required to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to
be entitled to a verdict of not guilty, the evidence establishing
that Jaime Ramirez committed the charged offenses need only
raise a reasonable doubt in your mind that the defendant is
guilty.”
In support of the instruction, defense counsel cited
Veronica’s initial field identification of Jaime Ramirez; Officer
Medrano’s testimony about how he conducted the field
identification, and that on the way to the hospital, Veronica told
him that she and her assailant had met up at the park and were
sitting in the bleachers when she told him she needed to use the
restroom; Veronica’s testimony that defendant told her he had a
key to the restroom; and Mr. Morales’s testimony that (three
years after the assault) he caught Mr. Ramirez with a key that
opens all the restrooms.
The trial court refused the instruction, based on the
established principle requiring direct or circumstantial evidence
linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.

11
The court concluded that “what we have is . . . opportunity, but
no direct link whatsoever.”
The trial court’s ruling was correct. Hartsch supports this
conclusion. In Hartsch, the court held that two instructions – one
of them similar to defendant’s proposed instruction – “add little
to the standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Hartsch,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504.) “[E]ven if such instructions properly
pinpoint the theory of third party liability, their omission is not
prejudicial because the reasonable doubt instructions give
defendants ample opportunity to impress upon the jury that
evidence of another party’s liability must be considered in
weighing whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.”
(Ibid.) Hartsch concluded the first instruction “simply restated
the reasonable doubt standard in connection with the possibility
that one or more others might be guilty parties.” 1 (Ibid.) The
court observed that “[t]he omission of this instruction, if error,
could not have affected the verdict. It is hardly a difficult concept
for the jury to grasp that acquittal is required if there is
reasonable doubt as to whether someone else committed the
charged crimes.” (Ibid.)

1 The first proposed instruction in Hartsch was: “ ‘If the
evidence presented in this case convinces you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, you should so find,
even though you may believe that one or more other persons are
also guilty. [¶] On the other hand, if you entertain a reasonable
doubt of the defendant’s guilt after an impartial consideration of
the evidence presented in the case, including any evidence of the
guilt of another person or persons, it is your duty to find the
defendant not guilty.’ ” (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504.)

12
As to the second proposed instruction in Hartsch – the one
most similar to the instruction defendant proposed – Hartsch
further concluded that it was “unduly argumentative.”2 (Hartsch,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504.) This was so “because it told the jury
that evidence ‘indicat[ed] or tend[ed] to prove that someone other
than the defendant committed, or may have had a motive and
opportunity to commit, the offenses(s) charged.’ It is improper for
an instruction to indicate an opinion favorable to the defendant
regarding the effect of the evidence.” (Ibid.)
In short, there was no evidence directly linking Ramirez or
anyone else to the crimes, and the trial court did not prevent the
defense from arguing that someone else committed the offenses.
There was no error.
2. The Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial
misconduct by impermissibly vouching for the credibility of a
witness (Veronica) during closing argument. Specifically,
defendant objects to the prosecutor’s statement that Veronica’s
“manner and behavior on the stand” was “consistent with

2 The second proposed instruction in Hartsch was:
“ ‘Evidence has been presented during the course of this trial
indicating or tending to prove that someone other than the
defendant committed, or may have had a motive and opportunity
to commit, the offense(s) charged. In this regard, it is not
required that defendant prove this fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. [¶] The weight and significance of such evidence are
matters for your determination. If after consideration of all of
the evidence presented, you have a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the offense(s) charged, you must give the
defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.’ ”
(Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504.)

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somebody who’s been sexually assaulted,” describing her initial
breakdown on the stand and her detachment about what
happened to her as “all consistent behaviors and attitudes of
someone who has been sexually assaulted.”
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s statement at
trial, and argues alternatively that defense counsel’s failure to
object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant’s failure to object at trial forfeits his claim of
prosecutorial misconduct. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691,
746 [“[A] defendant must object and request an admonition in
order to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.”].) In any
event, there was no misconduct. Because we find no misconduct
and accordingly no reason for the defense to have objected at
trial, defendant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel fails as well.
a. The legal principles
“ ‘Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor either
(1) suggests that evidence not available to the jury supports the
argument, or (2) invokes his or her personal prestige or depth of
experience, or the prestige or reputation of the office, in support
of the argument.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 480
(Rodriguez).) Stating facts not in evidence “is ‘clearly’ misconduct
‘because such statements “tend[] to make the prosecutor his own
witness—offering unsworn testimony not subject to cross-
examination.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Statements of supposed facts not in
evidence . . . are a highly prejudicial form of misconduct, and a
frequent basis for reversal.” ’ [Citation.] We ‘view the
statements in the context of the argument as a whole.’ ” (Ibid.)
When a prosecutorial misconduct claim concerns a
prosecutor’s comments before the jury, “ ‘the question is whether

14
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied
any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ”
(People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960.)
b. The prosecutor’s comments
The prosecutor’s closing argument included the following
remarks about Veronica’s demeanor while testifying. Defendant
quotes only the first two paragraphs, but we quote the
prosecutor’s entire statement on the subject.
“Her [Veronica’s] manner and behavior on the stand . . . I
would submit that is consistent with somebody who’s been
sexually assaulted. It was sincere, and it was appropriate in the
sense that you saw her initially sort of break down when she saw
the defendant here. She doesn’t want to hear the calls again.
She doesn’t want to – doesn’t want to be – she doesn’t want to
remember if she doesn’t have to.
“She – you know, she’s slightly detached about what
happened to her. You can see that from her demeanor. These
are all consistent behaviors and attitudes of someone who has
been sexually assaulted.
“She didn’t exaggerate or offer more. She could have said
he raped her. She could have said he did all kinds of things to
her. From day one, she said – in her mind, she said rape.
Legally speaking, rape is defined a certain way. And she might
have thought he raped her because, as we all know, she wasn’t
exactly sure at any point when he was behind her if his penis
went in her, but she was sure that his fingers did. So that’s why
he is only being charged with digital penetration.
“I submit to you that she answered his questions without
becoming combative. Yeah, she was, at some point, maybe
uncomfortable. And if there was a question that she felt
offensive, could she have been a little bit defensive? Yes, but I
think that’s normal human nature when you are being cross-

15
examined. But she answered questions to the best of her ability,
and I don’t recall her saying she never—she—I don’t recall her
not wanting to answer a question from the defense or avoiding a
question or trying to skirt around a question.
“So her testimony makes sense. And the physical evidence,
in my opinion, corroborates her version of the events.”
c. Contentions and conclusions
Defendant characterizes the prosecutor’s comments as
improper vouching because there “was no testimony about other
sexual assault victims, how they acted,” and “[t]he prosecutor’s
opinion that Veronica was sincere was not evidence.”
We do not consider the prosecutor’s brief comments as
impermissible vouching. “ ‘ “[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude
to vigorously argue his or her case and to make fair comment
upon the evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions
that may be drawn from the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Peoples
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 796.) The scope of the prosecutor’s
latitude allows her to “ ‘ “state matters not in evidence, but which
are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common
experience.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221.)
“Misconduct arises only if, in arguing the veracity of a witness,
the prosecutor implies she has evidence about which the jury is
unaware.” (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540,
561.)
This is not such a case. The prosecutor’s argument that
Veronica’s demeanor on the stand was consistent with someone
who has been sexually assaulted did not imply that the
prosecutor had evidence the jury did not have. It is within
common experience that one who has undergone a traumatic
experience, sexual assault or otherwise, may break down when
confronted with the assailant or exhibit detachment about what

16
happened. Nothing in the prosecutor’s comments “ ‘invite[d] the
jury to abdicate its responsibility to independently evaluate for
itself’ ” whether Veronica should be believed. (Rodriguez, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 480-481.) There was no misconduct.
3. The Claim of Error in Consecutive Sentencing
a. The sentencing
As stated earlier, the court imposed a 14-year prison
sentence.
It was undisputed that section 667.6 applies to the sex
offenses of which defendant was convicted. Subdivision (d) of
section 667.6 requires consecutive sentences if the crimes involve
the same victim on separate occasions.3 Subdivision (c) is a
discretionary provision, allowing the court to impose a
consecutive term “for each violation of an offense” if the crimes
involve the same victim on the same occasion.4

3 Section 667.6, subdivision (d) provides: “(1) A full,
separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each
violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes
involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate
occasions. [¶] (2) In determining whether crimes against a
single victim were committed on separate occasions under this
subdivision, the court shall consider whether, between the
commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to reflect upon the defendant’s actions
and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior. Neither
the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the
defendant lost or abandoned the opportunity to attack, shall be,
in and of itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes
in question occurred on separate occasions.”

4 Section 667.6, subdivision (c) provides in part that “a full,
separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation

17
By way of background, the defendant refused the
prosecution’s plea offer of eight years, countering with a proposal
for nine years on kidnap and assault charges in order to avoid the
consequence of sex offender registration. The defense’s
sentencing memorandum asked for the low term total sentence of
eight years. Counsel identified factors in mitigation as a criminal
record that was insignificant; defendant’s “accept[ance of]
responsibility before trial by offering to serve nine years” to avoid
the consequences of a sexual assault conviction; and defendant’s
history of being a victim of abuse. A psychiatric evaluation
identified defendant’s prior treatment for psychosis and
depression, a history of substance abuse, “some history of PTSD
with molestation,” and his removal from his home at a very
young age.
The prosecution did not file a sentencing memorandum or
propose a sentence at the hearing, deferring to the court. But the
prosecution stated its position that there were two separate acts
of penetration inflicted on the victim, as well as a third separate
act where defendant tried to get Veronica to perform oral sex and
was pulling her back and slapping her (count 3). (The court
observed the evidence showed three acts of penetration but only
two were charged.)
The trial court stated it found Veronica to be “very
credible”; that “this was a very, very traumatic event in her life”;
and “I’m sort of surprised that there’s been no expression of
sympathy or remorse or anything for how she feels and only the
consequences that [defendant] will suffer.” The court selected
consecutive six-year middle terms on counts 1 and 2 (sexual

of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the
same victim on the same occasion.”

18
penetration by force, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)), citing the two factors
in aggravation found true by the jury. The court stated that it
could impose the high term, but chose the midterm in light of the
minimal criminal history and that defendant “has had some
abuse and mental health issues . . . and has been in the system
himself.”
The court found “there were three times that the victim got
up and was taken back down to the ground, and then there was
digital penetration. . . . I find that [the two charges] are distinct
because of the break and the victim getting up, making a run for
the door, and then being taken back down to the ground.” The
court found the two counts were within the mandatory section
667.6, subdivision (d) provision, and “[n]evertheless, if it was
within [the discretionary subdivision (c) provision], I would
exercise my discretion and impose full term consecutive
sentencing as well.”
The court found count 3 (assault with intent to commit a
felony, § 220, subd. (a)(1)) was “for the act where she was on the
sink and he was bending her over and attempting to penetrate
her,” and that was “a completely different type of conduct.” The
court imposed a consecutive low term of two years. On count 4
(false imprisonment by violence, § 236), the court imposed the
middle term of two years to run concurrently with the principal
term.

19
b. Contentions and conclusions
Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining the
offenses occurred on separate occasions because the evidence
showed he lacked a reasonable opportunity to reflect between the
crimes. We disagree.
“Once the trial court has found, under section 667.6,
subdivision (d), that a defendant committed the sex crimes on
separate occasions, we will reverse ‘only if no reasonable trier of
fact could have decided the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity for reflection after completing an offense before
resuming his assaultive behavior.’ ” (People v. King (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1325 (King).)
“Under the broad standard established by Penal Code
section 667.6, subdivision (d), the Courts of Appeal have not
required a break of any specific duration or any change in
physical location.” (People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 104; see
People v. McPherson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 527, 531 [citing
precedent that “sexual assaults could occur on separate occasions
even if there was no more than a change in the physical positions
of attacker and victim”].)
Defendant relies on People v. Pena (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th
1294 (Pena), where the court found no “appreciable interval”
between a rape and oral copulation, observing that after the rape,
the defendant “simply flipped the victim over and orally
copulated her.” (Id. at p. 1316.) The Pena court stated the
assault was “continuous” and the defendant “simply did not cease
his sexually assaultive behavior, and, therefore, could not have
‘resumed’ sexually assaultive behavior.” (Ibid.) Pena does not
help defendant here, where defendant’s successive assaults
during a 20-minute period were interrupted by the victim’s

20
repeatedly breaking free and defendant’s “catch[ing] [her] and
throw[ing] [her] back to the floor.”
Defendant also relies on People v. Collins (1983)
143 Cal.App.3d 742, where the defendant pled guilty to one count
of rape in concert with use of a knife and one count of oral
copulation in concert, in exchange for dismissal of multiple other
counts in connection with forcible sex offenses against the victim
during a two- to three-hour period. (Id. at p. 744.) The court held
the trial court’s “imposition of a consecutive sentence for [the
defendant’s] conviction of oral copulation in concert was not
mandated under section 667.6, subdivision (d). As heinous as
[the defendant’s] behavior was, there was an insufficient lapse of
time between each of his specific acts to treat those acts as
having occurred on separate occasions.” (Id. at p. 746.)
Collins is not persuasive either. The court did not discuss
the specific facts. In addition, Collins was decided before
section 667.6, subdivision (d) was amended in 1986 to add
direction on determining whether crimes were committed on
separate occasions, including that “ ‘[n]either the duration of time
between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or
abandoned his or her opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of
itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in
question occurred on separate occasions.’ ” (See Pena, supra,
7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314, quoting § 667.6, subd. (d); Stats. 1986,
ch. 1431, § 1; see also People v. Corona (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 13,
17.)
As the trial court pointed out, there were three times where
the victim got up, made a run for the door, and then was taken
back down to the ground, after which there was digital
penetration. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that “ ‘no

21
reasonable trier of fact could have decided the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity for reflection after completing an offense
before resuming his assaultive behavior.’ ” (King, supra, 183
Cal.App.4th at p. 1325.)
Having concluded section 667.6, subdivision (d) mandated
imposition of consecutive sentences, we necessarily conclude the
trial court acted well within its discretion in stating it would in
any event exercise its discretion under section 667.6,
subdivision (c) to impose consecutive sentences.
4. The Assembly Bill No. 124 Claim
Sentencing occurred on September 11, 2023. Defendant
contends remand for resentencing is required because the trial
court did not properly exercise its sentencing discretion under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), which defendant refers to as
Assembly Bill No. 124.
As relevant here, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides
that “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court
shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following
was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶]
(A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth or
was a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7
[under 26 years of age] at the time of the commission of the
offense.” (Ibid.)
The substance of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) has been
in effect since January 1, 2022. (See People v. Salazar (2023) 15

22
Cal.5th 416, 423 & fn. 3.) Defendant was born on September 23,
1997 and the crimes occurred on September 14, 2019.
Defendant contends it is “unclear if the court considered
the amendment to Penal Code section 1170.” He says there was
no finding that the aggravating factors found true by the jury
outweighed mitigating factors or that low terms would be
contrary to the interests of justice. He recites the details in his
psychiatric evaluation, and cites People v. Suazo (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 681, where the court stated that Assembly Bill No.
124 (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) was an ameliorative change that applied
retroactively to the defendant. (Suazo, at p. 705.) In Suazo, the
court stated that the defendant’s statement in mitigation
“suggests defendant may have a history of childhood trauma,
including childhood abuse, thus potentially implicating Assembly
Bill No. 124.” (Ibid.) In Suazo, the prosecution “concede[d] the
matter must be remanded for resentencing consistent with the
changes made to section 1170, subdivision (b),” and the court
accepted the concession. (Ibid.)
Here, when defendant was sentenced, section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) had been in effect for more than 18 months.
The trial court described defendant’s sentencing memorandum,
and specifically stated the court had read and considered the
psychiatric report, “indicating that at times [defendant] has
suffered from some mental health issues, has some substance use
and alcohol issues, has been in the system since he was a child,
and has been victimized himself.”
The court stated: “I think that this case is best as midterm
given that two factors in aggravation were found true” (a
particularly vulnerable victim and the defendant in a position of
trust and confidence). The court further observed that it “could

23
impose the high term in this matter,” but “look[ing] at the
factors” cited by the defense in mitigation, the court thought
“midterm is the best way to go.”
We see nothing in the court’s comments to indicate it was
not aware of the presumptive lower term in cases where the
defendant has experienced childhood abuse or is a youthful
offender. The court began by stating the case was “best as
midterm given that two factors in aggravation were found true,”
necessarily implying that the low term was inappropriate
because of those aggravating factors. Indeed, the court further
observed that it could impose the high term, but did not do so
because of defendant’s mental health and abuse issues. The
court’s comments make it clear that it weighed aggravating and
mitigating factors and necessarily concluded—despite not using
the statutory language—that “imposition of the lower term would
be contrary to the interests of justice.” (Cf. People v. Parra
Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322 [“Unless the record
affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to
have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set forth in
the rules.”].)
5. The Section 654 Claim
The trial court sentenced defendant to a concurrent two-
year term on count 4, false imprisonment by violence. We agree
with defendant that imposition of the sentence violated the
section 654 ban on multiple punishments for the same act.
a. The law
Section 654 precludes “multiple punishments for a single
act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Miller (1977)

24
18 Cal.3d 873, 885.)5 “ ‘The proscription against double
punishment . . . is applicable where there is a course of conduct
which violates more than one statute and comprises an
indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute . .
. . The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent
and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to
one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them
but not for more than one.’ ” (Ibid.; see also People v. Latimer
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208 [same].) “If, on the other hand,
defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may
be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of
each objective, ‘even though the violations shared common acts or
were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ”
(People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
“A trial court’s express or implied determination that two
crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be
upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (People
v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
b. This case
At sentencing, the trial court made no express findings
about independent criminal objectives. Defendant offered no
argument on this point at sentencing, but both parties agree that

5 Section 654 states: “An act or omission that is punishable
in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or
omission be punished under more than one provision. An
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a
prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” (Id.,
subd. (a).)

25
the waiver doctrine does not apply to questions involving the
applicability of section 654. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th
290, 295.)
Defendant contends that “[s]topping Veronica from leaving
the bathroom, false imprisonment, was done with the single
intent and objective of committing the sex crimes against her.”
Among other precedents, defendant cites People v. Martinez
(1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 851, where the defendant was charged
with and convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and
false imprisonment with force and violence. (Id. at p. 854.) The
court held the two offenses charged “involved the same criminal
event. The defendant assaulted his victim, dragged her under a
bridge and, after he desisted from his attempted rape, held her
for a few moments to attempt to convince her not to complain to
the police. Under all of the cases applying section 654 of the
Penal Code, only one sentence can be served for that sequence of
events and the sentence on count II [false imprisonment] must be
stayed.” (Id. at p. 858.)
Similarly, in People v. Wall (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 978
(Wall), the defendant was convicted of rape by force and violence
and false imprisonment. (Id. at p. 981.) The court held that
concurrent sentences violated section 654: “Assuming arguendo
the facts found true by the jury, [the defendant’s] ‘intent and
objective’ was manifestly the crime of rape, and the false
imprisonment was but a means of its accomplishment. Upon
conviction of both of those crimes under such circumstances, an
accused may be punished only for one.” (Wall, at p. 990; see also
People v. Williams (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 644, 695 [the false
imprisonment and robberies of victims who were forced into the
back rooms of stores and forced to lie down “were an indivisible

26
course of conduct committed ‘pursuant to a single intent and
objective,’ that is, to rob the victims of the cell phones, cash, and
other merchandise in the back rooms of the stores”].)
Here, respondent describes the false imprisonment as
defendant’s “course of conduct in repeatedly preventing Veronica
from leaving by violence or menace throughout the ordeal,” but
argues that “[n]evertheless, this did not preclude punishment” for
the false imprisonment “for a number of reasons.” These were
that defendant had “an opportunity to reflect on his actions each
time Veronica was able to break free, and because the gratuitous
violence in restraining her had the separate objective of
exercising control and domination over her, apart from the sexual
assaults.” We are not persuaded.
Respondent says that when defendant first blocked the exit
and bent Veronica over the sink, Veronica testified “he was scary
and his eyes were devoid of emotion.” According to respondent,
this is substantial evidence that defendant’s intent was not only
to restrict her movements so he could sexually assault her, “but
also to frighten her into submission.” Then respondent cites
other things defendant said, such as that Veronica was “playing
with him” and “must like being slapped and the only way she
would leave was naked,” as showing that defendant’s objective
“was to also humiliate her.” Respondent concludes that
defendant’s objective of “dominating and exercising control over
Veronica . . . was separate from [defendant’s] sexual intent,” and
the “grabbing, pushing, slapping and injuring Veronica’s foot”
were “beyond what was necessary for the sexual assaults to be
completed.”
We fail to see how objectives to “humiliate” or “dominat[e]”
or “exercis[e] control over” Veronica are in any way separable

27
from defendant’s intent and objective in his sexual assaults on
her. Punishment for the false imprisonment requires an
independent criminal objective, such as exists in cases where
“gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim”
has been viewed as “not ‘incidental’ to robbery for purposes of
Penal Code section 654.” (People v. Nguyen (1988)
204 Cal.App.3d 181, 190.) Respondent does not address the
Martinez, Wall or Williams case, and cites no authorities where
sexual assault and false imprisonment were found to have been
committed with independent criminal objectives.
We thus conclude there is no substantial evidence to
support an implied finding that defendant harbored “multiple
criminal objectives” that could justify separate punishment for
the false imprisonment by force; as in Wall, defendant’s intent
and objective was “manifestly” the sexual assault crimes, “and
the false imprisonment was but a means of [their]
accomplishment.” (Wall, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 990.) The
sentence on the false imprisonment count must be stayed.
DISPOSITION
The two-year concurrent sentence on count 4 (false
imprisonment by violence) is stayed under section 654. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J.

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