CourtListener 10325132•People v. Mitchell CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Mitchell CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B333738
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA087647
v.
WILLIE LEE MITCHELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. Lecky,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2013, a jury convicted Willie Lee Mitchell of robbery
and forgery. The trial court sentenced Mitchell to an aggregate
term of 19 years and four months, which included a five-year
prior serious felony enhancement and three one-year prison prior
enhancements. The court later reduced the forgery conviction
to a misdemeanor and struck two of the three prison prior
enhancements. In 2023, the court determined Mitchell is
eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75.1
At resentencing, Mitchell asked the court to dismiss the prior
serious felony enhancement under section 1385. The court
declined to do so, dismissed the sole remaining prison prior
enhancement, and otherwise imposed the same sentence.
On appeal, Mitchell argues the trial court failed to
exercise its informed discretion when considering whether
to dismiss the prior serious felony enhancement. Specifically,
he contends the court failed to recognize that it was required
to dismiss the enhancement unless it found doing so would
endanger public safety. He also argues the court failed to give
sufficient weight to the remoteness of the prior conviction.
We conclude Mitchell forfeited these arguments and they
also lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The offenses and original sentence2
On June 10, 2013, Mitchell robbed a woman of her purse
and its contents, including a checkbook and cellphone. Two days
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We take these facts from a 2015 opinion in Mitchell’s prior
appeal. (People v. Mitchell (Dec. 3, 2015, B254321) [nonpub. opn.]
(Mitchell I).)
2
later, Mitchell tried to cash a personal check by forging the
woman’s signature.
A jury convicted Mitchell of second degree robbery (§ 211)
and forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)). The trial court found Mitchell
had suffered a 1987 first degree burglary conviction (§ 459),
which qualifies as a serious felony for purposes of the prior
serious felony enhancement and the Three Strikes law. The
court also found Mitchell has six prior felony convictions
for which he served separate prison terms.
In February 2014, the trial court—the Honorable Alan B.
Honeycutt—sentenced Mitchell to an aggregate term of 19 years
and four months. The sentence consisted of 10 years for the
robbery (the upper term of five years, doubled because of
the strike); a consecutive term of 16 months for the forgery
(one-third the midterm of eight months, doubled because of
the strike); plus consecutive terms of five years for the prior
serious felony enhancement, and one year for each of the three
prison prior enhancements. The court dismissed the other
three prison prior enhancements in the interests of justice under
section 1385 “based upon the age of th[ose] particular cases.”
Mitchell appealed, and a different panel of this court affirmed
the judgment. (See Mitchell I.)
2. Mitchell’s petition under Proposition 47
On April 22, 2016, Mitchell petitioned for resentencing
under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (§ 1170.18,
subds. (b), (g))—commonly known as Proposition 47—seeking
to have his forgery conviction reduced to a misdemeanor. Judge
Honeycutt granted the petition and resentenced Mitchell to an
aggregate term of 19 years. The court imposed 12 months for
the forgery conviction—rather than the original 16 months—
3
and otherwise imposed the same sentence it imposed in 2014.
Mitchell appealed, and a different panel of this court affirmed
the judgment. (See People v. Mitchell (June 8, 2017, B277743)
[nonpub. opn.] (Mitchell II).)
3. Mitchell’s 2021 petition for writ of habeas corpus
In May 2021, Mitchell filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, seeking dismissal of the three prison prior enhancements.
The court—the Honorable Nicole C. Bershon—construed the
petition as a request for relief under Proposition 47. The People
conceded the court should strike two of the three prison prior
enhancements. The court dismissed those enhancements
and found Mitchell failed to meet his burden of proof as to
the third enhancement. The court resentenced Mitchell
to an aggregate term of 17 years.
4. Mitchell’s 2023 petition for writ of habeas corpus
and resentencing under section 1172.75
On June 30, 2023, Mitchell filed a new petition for writ
of habeas corpus. As we understand it, the petition asserted
Mitchell’s defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to move to strike the prior serious felony enhancement
under section 1385.
Around the same time, the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) informed the court
that Mitchell may be entitled to relief under section 1172.75,
which requires courts to resentence defendants who are serving
terms that include a one-year prison prior enhancement.
The court considered Mitchell’s petition and the CDCR’s
notice at a hearing on July 12, 2023. The court determined
Mitchell is entitled to a full resentencing under section 1172.75.
The court noted it could “easily” resentence him by “simply
4
reincorporating everything that was done and previously said.”
The court stated its tentative decision was to strike the prison
prior enhancement and otherwise reimpose the same sentence.
Mitchell’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the prior
strike conviction because “it was a 1987 case, which is pretty
remote in regards to imposing that strike.” The court noted
that it had reviewed the transcript of the 2014 sentencing and
did not see a motion to dismiss the strike conviction.
The court then explained that it “recognizes and recognized
in 2014 its authority to strike strikes and enhancements,
including the [section] 667(a) prior every time this case has
been before it for purposes of sentencing.” The court stated
it had “considered the factors that are laid out for us in the
appellate decisions, and I recognize those factors. I’ve taken
into consideration those factors in 2014, 2016, as well as today.
And I would deny the request to strike any additional
enhancements or priors as it relates to Mr. Mitchell.” The
court remarked, “[Mitchell’s] received the benefit of reductions.
I’ve exercised my discretion at the time in 2014 and struck three
of the one-year priors. And I continue to recognize my discretion
but decline to strike any additional strikes or enhancements for
Mr. Mitchell. I remember his case quite well, and it was litigated
and litigated thoroughly at every step of the way.”
The court asked if “either side wish[ed] to be heard.”
Mitchell’s counsel replied that he was requesting “resentencing
in regards specifically to that prior,” which he urged the court
to dismiss because of its remoteness.
The court declined to dismiss the prior serious felony
enhancement for the “reasons previously [stated].” The court
then stated it would “resentence the defendant at this time.”
5
The court struck the prison prior enhancement and sentenced
Mitchell to an aggregate term of 15 years. The court stated it
was “incorporating all previous sentencing hearings and what
was said and ordered at that time by myself and Judge Bershon.”
The court paused for a moment, apparently to review the
transcript of the 2014 sentencing. The court then listed the
factors in aggravation that justified the upper term sentence
on the robbery, including that the victim was particularly
vulnerable, Mitchell’s adult convictions were numerous
and increasing in seriousness, and Mitchell’s performance
on probation was unsatisfactory.
After announcing Mitchell’s sentence, the court asked
if there was “[a]nything further on behalf of [the] defense.”
Mitchell’s counsel responded, “No, your honor.”
DISCUSSION
Mitchell argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise
its informed discretion when considering whether to dismiss
the five-year prior serious felony enhancement. According to
Mitchell, because the prior conviction was more than five years
old, there was a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal
unless and until the court found dismissal would endanger
public safety. Mitchell argues the court failed to find dismissal
would endanger public safety and failed to give sufficient weight
to the conviction’s remoteness, as required under section 1385.
Instead, the court simply relied on the same factors it considered
when sentencing him in 2014 and 2016. Mitchell asserts the
court’s error was prejudicial and the appropriate remedy is to
remand the case for resentencing.
6
1. Relevant law
Section 1172.75 declares invalid one-year prison prior
sentencing enhancements imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute requires
the CDCR to identify those individuals in its custody currently
serving a term for a judgment that includes a prison prior
enhancement. (Id., subd. (b).) If the court determines the
defendant’s judgment includes a prison prior enhancement,
the court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.
(Id., subd. (c).) “By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires
a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the
newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
Resentencing under section 1172.75 “shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed . . . , unless the
court finds . . . that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger
public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) When resentencing
a defendant, the court must “apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).)
The court may consider postconviction factors, including the
defendant’s disciplinary record while incarcerated. (Id., subd.
(d)(3).) “Unless the court originally imposed the upper term,
the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury
or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
7
As amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) (Senate Bill 81), section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) “provides that a sentencing court ‘[i]n exercising
its discretion’ to dismiss a sentencing enhancement ‘shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove’ certain enumerated mitigating
circumstances, and ‘[p]roof of the presence of one or more
of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ ” (People v. Walker
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028.) One such mitigating circumstance
is that the “enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H).)
2. Mitchell forfeited his arguments
The Attorney General contends Mitchell forfeited
his arguments by failing to make them in the trial court.
Mitchell responds that he preserved the issues because his 2023
habeas petition sought dismissal of the enhancement under
Senate Bill 81 and section 1385. Mitchell also points to his
counsel’s argument at the hearing that the burglary conviction
underlying the prior serious felony enhancement was from 1987
and remote in time.
In People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), the
California Supreme Court held “complaints about the manner
in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion
and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.” (Id. at p. 356.) To preserve the issue
for appeal, a defendant must object in the trial court that the
court did not “properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices.” (Id. at pp. 351–353.) This forfeiture rule
8
applies to “cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do
not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court
purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular
sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed
to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.”
(Ibid.)
The forfeiture rule applies so long as a defendant had
a meaningful opportunity to object in the trial court. (Scott,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356.) “The parties are given an adequate
opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time
during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the
sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence,
and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties
before the actual sentencing.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31
Cal.4th 745, 752.)
We agree with the Attorney General that Mitchell forfeited
the issues he raises on appeal. In his habeas petition and at the
hearing, Mitchell urged the court to dismiss the prior serious
felony enhancement based on the conviction’s remoteness in time.
However, he never made the specific arguments he makes on
appeal. He did not assert the court was required to dismiss
the enhancement unless it found doing so would pose a danger
to public safety. Nor did he argue the court gave insufficient
weight to the conviction’s remoteness or otherwise applied the
wrong standard when it declined to dismiss the enhancement.
The record also shows the court gave Mitchell an adequate
opportunity to raise those issues. After announcing Mitchell’s
sentence and the reasons for its sentencing choices, the trial court
asked if there was “[a]nything further on behalf of [the] defense.”
Defense counsel responded, “No, your honor.” By failing to object
9
that the trial court did not make the necessary findings or
applied the wrong standard, Mitchell forfeited those issues
on appeal. (See People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 731
[defendant forfeited arguments by not objecting after the court
announced his sentence and asked if there was “anything else
to discuss”].)
3. Mitchell has not shown the court erred
Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject
Mitchell’s arguments on the merits.
Until recently, there was a split of authority concerning
the standard trial courts must apply when deciding whether to
strike an enhancement under section 1385. In People v. Walker
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, our colleagues in Division Two
concluded the existence of one of the mitigating circumstances
listed in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)—including that the
“enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over
five years old” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H))—creates a rebuttable
presumption obligating a court to dismiss the enhancement
unless it finds dismissal would endanger public safety.
(See Walker, at p. 391.) The court in People v. Ortiz (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1087 disagreed that the statute creates a
rebuttable presumption, holding instead that trial courts must
engage in a “holistic balancing with special emphasis on the
enumerated mitigating factors.” (Id. at p. 1096.)
In his opening brief on appeal, Mitchell urged us to follow
our colleagues in Division Two and hold the remoteness of his
burglary conviction created a rebuttable presumption in favor
of dismissal of the prior serious felony enhancement. However,
not long after Mitchell filed his brief, the California Supreme
Court decided People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker),
10
which resolved the split in favor of the Ortiz court. The high
court held the “plain language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
contemplates that a trial court will exercise its sentencing
discretion in a manner consistent with the Ortiz court’s
understanding. Specifically, absent a finding that dismissal
would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion
to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns
significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances
when they are present.” (Walker, at p. 1029.)
As Mitchell seems to concede in his reply brief, under
the Supreme Court’s holding in Walker, the fact that his
burglary conviction was more than five years old did not create
a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal of the prior serious
felony enhancement. Nor did it require the court to dismiss
the enhancement unless it found doing so would endanger
public safety. Instead, the court had discretion to impose the
enhancement so long as it assigned significant value to the
conviction’s remoteness. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)
Accordingly, there is no merit to Mitchell’s argument that the
court erred by imposing the enhancement without having found
dismissal would endanger public safety.
Nor is there merit to Mitchell’s argument that the court
gave insufficient weight to the remoteness of the burglary
conviction, as required under section 1385, subdivision (c).
Mitchell points to the court’s comments that it “recognizes
and recognized in 2014 its authority to strike strikes and
enhancements,” had “taken into consideration those factors
in 2014, 2016, as well as today,” and “exercised [its] discretion
at the time in 2014 and . . . continue[s] to recognize [its]
discretion but decline[s] to strike any additional strikes or
11
enhancements for Mr. Mitchell.” Mitchell contends these
comments show the court simply adopted its analysis from
the prior sentencings and declined to consider any new factors
when deciding whether to dismiss the prior serious felony
enhancement.
“ ‘The trial court is not required to state reasons for
declining to exercise its discretion under section 1385’ [citations],
and ‘is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors
in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.’ ” (People
v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) Here, the record
does not affirmatively demonstrate that the court declined
to consider—or gave insufficient weight to—the burglary
conviction’s remoteness in time or any other relevant factors.
We do not read the court’s comments to mean it simply adopted
its earlier sentencing decisions. Rather, it seems the court meant
to convey it is familiar with the relevant factors, has consistently
recognized its discretion to dismiss the various enhancements,
has exercised that discretion in the past, and continues
to recognize its discretion. The court’s comments do not
demonstrate it misunderstood the law or applied it incorrectly.
Accordingly, we may presume the court followed the law
and gave sufficient weight to the relevant factors, including
the conviction’s remoteness. (See ibid. [on a silent record,
the reviewing court presumes the trial court correctly applied
the law].) That presumption is fatal to Mitchell’s argument.
12
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
13
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.