People v. Reece CA2/3

CourtListener 10325131Calctapp31.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Reece CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B328717

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A363127-01
v.

NORRIS LARUE REECE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Laura F. Priver, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A court sentenced Norris Larue Reece to more than
98 years in prison for offenses he committed when he was 16
years old. Reece filed two petitions for recall and resentencing
under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)).1
Reece relied on People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608
(Heard), which held juvenile offenders sentenced to terms
that are functionally equivalent to life without the possibility
of parole (LWOP) are entitled to section 1170(d) relief under
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. We recently
came to the same conclusion in People v. Sorto (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 435 (Sorto).
The Attorney General concedes reversal is required under
Heard and Sorto. We agree. We reverse the orders denying
Reece’s petitions and remand the case for further proceedings
under section 1170(d).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1982, a jury convicted Reece of attempted robbery,
residential burglary, involuntary manslaughter, five counts of
robbery, and three counts of murder.2 Reece was 16 years old
when he committed the offenses. The trial court sentenced Reece
to 17 years and six months plus 81 years to life.
In 2023, Reece—acting without counsel—filed a petition
for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d). Reece argued
that, under Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, he is entitled
to relief because he was sentenced to the functional equivalent
of LWOP for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The facts underlying the convictions are not relevant to
this appeal, so we do not summarize them here.

2
The trial court misconstrued the petition as a request for recall
of the sentence under section 1172.1, which it denied for lack of
jurisdiction.
Reece filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court
challenging the denial of his petition. We construed the petition
as a timely notice of appeal.
While Reece’s appeal was pending, he retained counsel
who filed a new petition for recall and resentencing under section
1170(d). Reece again argued he is entitled to relief under Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, because he was sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP.
The trial court concluded Reece is ineligible for relief
and denied his petition. The court distinguished Heard on the
ground that—unlike the petitioner in that case—Reece had
already had a parole hearing under section 3051. Therefore,
the court reasoned, he is not currently serving the functional
equivalent of an LWOP sentence. The court stated it did
not believe the Legislature or the Heard court intended
section 1170(d) to apply to offenders who are eligible for
parole hearings under section 3051.
Reece appealed the order denying his petition. We
consolidated that appeal with Reece’s pending appeal.
DISCUSSION
Reece argues the trial court erred by denying his section
1170(d) petition on the ground that he was not sentenced to—
and is not currently serving—an LWOP term. Reece concedes
section 1170(d) expressly applies only to juvenile offenders
sentenced to explicit LWOP terms. Nevertheless, he argues
the statute violates the equal protection clauses of the federal

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and state constitutions to the extent it denies relief to juvenile
offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
1. Relevant law
a. Equal protection
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution
prohibit the denial of equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const.,
14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) “At core,
the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government
does not treat a group of people unequally without some
justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288.)
Where, as here, the challenged law is not based on a suspect
classification and does not burden fundamental rights, the law
denies equal protection “only if there is no rational relationship
between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate
government purpose.” (Id. at pp. 288–289; see Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 631–634 [applying rational basis review
to a claim that section 1170(d) violates equal protection].)
We independently review equal protection claims. (People
v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345.)
b. Section 1170(d) and related law
In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, our nation’s
high court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders who committed non-homicide
offenses. (Id. at p. 82.) In response to Graham, the Legislature
enacted section 1170(d), creating a recall and resentencing
procedure for certain juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP
terms. (See In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049–1050.)
Section 1170(d) provides, in relevant part, “[w]hen a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the

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commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has
been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit
to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
(§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) The petition must include a statement
describing the defendant’s remorse, identifying any work towards
rehabilitation, and stating one of four qualifying circumstances
is true. (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Courts must recall the sentence of any
defendant who meets the eligibility criteria. (Id., subd. (d)(5).)
The court must then hold a hearing “to resentence the defendant
in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been
sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater
than the initial sentence.” (Ibid.)
c. Section 3051
Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings
to conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” at specified times
during the incarceration of certain youthful offenders. (See
§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b).) As relevant to this case, young
adult and juvenile offenders convicted of a controlling offense
“for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be
eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing
during the person’s 25th year of incarceration.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
As of January 1, 2018, most juvenile offenders sentenced to
explicit LWOP terms are also eligible for parole during their
25th year of incarceration. (Id., subd. (b)(4), as amended by
Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.)
2. Section 1170(d)’s exclusion of functionally equivalent
LWOP offenders violates equal protection
The court in Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, decided
the precise equal protection issue that Reece raises in this case.

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In Heard, a court had sentenced the defendant to 23 years
plus 80 years to life for crimes he committed when he was 15
years old. (Id. at p. 612.) The defendant petitioned for relief
under section 1170(d) after serving 15 years of his sentence.
The trial court denied the petition, finding the defendant
ineligible for relief because he had not been sentenced to
an explicit LWOP term. (Heard, at p. 612.)
The Court of Appeal reversed on equal protection grounds.
The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that
the defendant was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d)
because “section 3051 has ‘ “reformed” ’ [the defendant’s]
sentence so that it is no longer the functional equivalent of
life without parole.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 612,
628.) The court explained that section 1170(d) does not expressly
require that the defendant currently be serving an LWOP
sentence. (Heard, at pp. 629–630.) Instead, it requires only
that the defendant “was sentenced” to an LWOP term. (Id. at
p. 629; see § 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) The court also was “unable
to identify a rational basis for making juveniles sentenced
to an explicitly designated life without parole term, but not
juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without
parole, eligible to petition for resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1).” (Heard, at p. 633.) Accordingly, the court
held denying functionally equivalent LWOP offenders the
opportunity to petition for relief under section 1170(d) violates
their right to equal protection of the laws. (Heard, at pp. 633–
634.)
We recently came to the same conclusion in Sorto, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th 435. In that case, the defendant was sentenced
to 140 years to life for crimes he committed when he was 15 years

6
old. The trial court denied the defendant’s section 1170(d)
petition on the ground that he is not currently serving a
functionally equivalent LWOP term because he is eligible for
a parole hearing under section 3051. (Sorto, at pp. 440–441.)
We reversed, explaining the plain language of section 1170(d)
does not require that the defendant currently be serving an
LWOP sentence. (Sorto, at p. 454; see People v. Lopez (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 649, 653–654 [the plain language of section 1170(d)
requires only that the defendant “ ‘was sentenced’ ” to an LWOP
term, not that he is currently serving an LWOP term].) We then
rejected the Attorney General’s proposed justifications for the
unequal treatment of functionally equivalent LWOP offenders.
(Sorto, at pp. 450–454.) Like the Heard court, we were unable
to identify a rational basis for the Legislature to grant relief
to explicit LWOP offenders while denying it to functionally
equivalent LWOP offenders. (Sorto, at p. 454.)
In this case, the Attorney General concedes that Reece
was sentenced to a functionally equivalent LWOP term. He also
concedes that, under Heard and Sorto, the trial court erred by
denying Reece’s petitions on the ground that he is not currently
serving an LWOP term or its functional equivalent.
We accept the Attorney General’s concession and agree that
the trial court erred. We express no opinion on whether Reece
has met section 1170(d)’s other requirements. Nor do we express
an opinion on what relief the court should grant if it concludes
Reece is eligible for recall and resentencing. On remand,
the trial court shall consider those issues for the first time.

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DISPOSITION
We reverse the orders denying Reece’s petitions for relief
under section 1170(d). On remand, the court shall reconsider
Reece’s petitions in accordance with this opinion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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