CourtListener 10324113•People v. Grayson CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/30/25 P. v. Grayson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099468
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62-191883)
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY GRAYSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Michael Anthony Grayson guilty of possessing and
transporting methamphetamine for sale. Defendant argues on appeal two reversable
errors occurred at trial: (1) The trial court committed prejudicial misconduct with its
comments and questions and (2) the trial actors’ frequent use of the word “street”
violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Racial Justice Act) (Stats. 2020,
1
ch. 317). We affirm defendant’s convictions but conclude his sentence stayed under
Penal Code1 section 654 was unauthorized and remand for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At defendant’s trial, Placer County Deputy Sheriff Michael Stoicich testified he
pulled defendant over on May 23, 2023, for expired registration. After noticing a glass
methamphetamine pipe, Deputy Stoicich and his partner searched the car and found a
“satchel or fanny pack” that held about four ounces of suspected methamphetamine. He
also found a cell phone and an electronic tablet in the car and approximately $400 in cash
in defendant’s wallet. Deputy Stoicich arrested defendant and the substance was later
determined to be 107.852 grams of methamphetamine.
Rocklin Police Officer Anthony Handley testified, as a narcotics expert, that
several messages recovered from the electronic tablet found in defendant’s car looked
like drug deals. Officer Handley believed that a hypothetical person found with the same
amount of methamphetamine and cash as defendant, and who had the same message
exchanges shortly before arrest, intended to sell the methamphetamine.
The parties stipulated defendant was convicted in 2016 of transportation of
methamphetamine with the intent to sell. Placer County Deputy Sherriff Alisha Slater, a
former West Sacramento police officer, testified that for the 2016 conviction, defendant
helped an individual he did not know was an undercover officer buy methamphetamine
from another party.
Defendant testified in his own defense that the messages involved selling cannabis
not methamphetamine, he found the fanny pack with the methamphetamine at a gas
station, and he intended to use the methamphetamine found in the bag only for personal
use.
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
The jury found defendant guilty of both charged counts of felony possession of
methamphetamine for sale (count one) and transportation of methamphetamine for sale
(count two). The trial court sentenced defendant to four years (upper term) for
transporting methamphetamine and eight months (one-third the midterm) for possession
of methamphetamine, stayed under section 654.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant Cannot Demonstrate Entitlement
To Relief Based On Judicial Misconduct
Defendant argues that, through the trial court’s “repeated interruptions and
remarks, the court portrayed to the jury a clear bias against the defense, and an overall
tenor that neither this [defendant] nor his defense was credible. The judicial misconduct
cost [defendant] his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process under the Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reversal is now required.” Predicting the
People’s argument for forfeiture, defendant contends his claim is not forfeited because
any objection would have been futile. Alternatively, defendant asserts he suffered
ineffective assistance of counsel.
We conclude defendant has forfeited this claim and cannot demonstrate his
counsel was ineffective.
A
Additional Background
The trial court made several objections and comments throughout trial. During
Officer Handley’s testimony, defense counsel asked what physical manifestations a
methamphetamine user would have if he stopped using for a few months. The trial court
twice sustained its own objections to this line of questioning based on a lack of
foundation. Defense counsel then asked foundational questions about Officer Handley’s
3
knowledge of these physical manifestations and established he did not have the requisite
knowledge.
During defendant’s testimony, defendant testified he started using
methamphetamine “[a]round [the year] 2000” but started and stopped throughout the
years. Later, defendant was explaining he did not need as much methamphetamine
“[b]ack in 1998, ‘99, 2000 when [he] first started.” The trial court interjected and said:
“I’m sorry. I need some clarification on that for his testimony. You’re saying back in
1998 and ‘99. You told us earlier you started in 2001. Did you start before 2001 then?”
Defendant responded: “No, sir, what I was saying, just to clarify, I was saying -- I was
just throwing a number out there as far as ‘98, ‘99, 2000, around those times stuff was
more potent then, but it’s nothing like it is now.” The court stated: “Okay. The
testimony is what it is. Go ahead, sir.” Defense counsel then asked what
methamphetamine was like when defendant “first used it in 2005.” The court again
interjected: “That’s not when he first used it.” Defendant stated: “2000 is when I first
used.” The court said to this: “Now it’s 2000.”
Later, when defendant testified he was a “regular [cannabis] user” and a “regular
[cannabis] seller” for the last 10 years, the court asked: “Can you clarify for the [l]adies
and [g]entlemen of the [j]ury, what does that mean a ‘regular user’ and a ‘regular
seller?’ ” Defense counsel responded: “Thank you, Your Honor. That actually was my
next question.” Defense counsel then asked defendant: “How often were you selling
[cannabis] around May 23, 2023, for let’s say the six months going backwards?”
Defendant responded: “Pretty often.” Defense counsel then asked where he was selling
on May 23, 2023. After defendant responded, defense counsel again asked how often he
was selling during the six months prior to May 23, 2023, and the trial court stated: “He
answered that. Let’s move on. You said pretty often, whatever that means.” Defense
counsel then asked what pretty often meant and defendant responded: “Nine, ten times a
day.”
4
In discussing one of the text messages, defense counsel asked defendant how
much cannabis is worth $80. Defendant responded: “I mean, it just depends . . . .
Somewhere around an ounce.” The trial court interjected: “How much was it for this
particular transaction?” Defendant responded: “About an ounce.” Then, regarding a text
message asking defendant if the person could “come back and get 40,” defendant said
this was also about cannabis. The court asked: “40 is what? How much?” Defense
counsel said: “That was my next question.” Defendant answered the question: “At that
time it would have been only a quarter ounce because of how good it is.” The trial court
said: “If it’s a quarter ounce, you were selling a whole ounce for $80, so you were losing
$80 in an ounce transaction?” Defendant responded: “Like I said, it changes and varies
due to the fact of how potent the [cannabis] is usually.” To which the court said: “That’s
why we asked you about this specific transaction.”
After defendant testified about another message where someone asked defendant
whether he would “trade [defendant] for some tree,” the court responded to defendant’s
testimony: “I need clarification. Is it your testimony that you believe he was contacting
you for purposes of him purchasing some [cannabis] from you?” Defendant responded:
“Yeah, I think so.” The court followed up: “Can you explain to the [l]adies and
[g]entlemen then why he would want to trade weed for weed?” Defendant then explained
that “sometimes people have better weed. . . . And people have traded [him] weed for
weed.”
Defense counsel asked defendant about his 2016 conviction by stating: “Were you
involved in any actual selling from one person to another that day?” Defendant
answered, “No,” but the court interjected: “Court’s going to sustain its own objection.
The answer is stricken. That calls for a legal conclusion the way you phrased it.”
Defense counsel started asking another question but the court clarified: “Aiding and
abetting is being involved.” Defense counsel then asked if defendant personally sold any
methamphetamine during that incident and the prosecutor objected based on the
5
stipulation. Defense counsel explained: “I’m not trying to debate that he’s been
convicted. That next question will clarify. I promise.” But the court stated: “It’s
sustained. You have a stipulation.”
Finally, during defense counsel’s questioning about the fanny pack, which
defendant called a “murse,” the trial court asked: “So you found another murse other
than the one you testified to, the red one?” Defendant responded: “No, I’m saying --,”
but the trial court interjected: “Well, it says here I found the murse, and you’re saying
that’s a different murse?” Defendant responded: “No, I’m saying I’m taking
accountability for the murse. I found a murse but it’s not the same exact bag.”
Defense counsel never made an objection based on judicial misconduct.
B
Defendant Forfeited His Judicial Misconduct Claim
And Fails To Establish Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
“A ‘trial court commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and
disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the
impression that it is allying itself with the prosecution.’ [Citations.] Jurors rely with
great confidence on the fairness of judges, and upon the correctness of their views
expressed during trials. [Citation.] When ‘the trial court persists in making discourteous
and disparaging remarks to a defendant’s counsel and witnesses and utters frequent
comment from which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is
not believed by the judge . . . it has transcended so far beyond the pale of judicial fairness
as to render a new trial necessary.’ ” (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1233.)
“As a general rule, judicial misconduct claims are not preserved for appellate review if no
objections were made on those grounds at trial. [Citations.] However, a defendant’s
failure to object does not preclude review ‘when an objection and an admonition could
not cure the prejudice caused by’ such misconduct, or when objecting would be futile.”
(Id. at p. 1237.)
6
Defendant argues two cases from our Supreme Court establish any objection here
would have been futile; we disagree. First, in People v. Mahoney (1927) 201 Cal. 618,
the trial court made “twenty-three utterances . . . and numerous instances where [it] took
to [it]self the task of examining witnesses.” (Id. at pp. 621-622.) Though counsel failed
to object, our Supreme Court found such effort would have been “entirely fruitless”
because “it [was] evident from the attitude of the trial judge, as shown by the record, that
any assignment of misconduct would have been disregarded.” (Id. at p. 622.) This
included telling a witness he did not need to answer because the question was “ ‘ “too
utterly silly to require an answer.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 624.) And when a defense attorney
started speaking, the court said: “ ‘ “Wait just a minute. I think [counsel] is laboring
with an objection.” A little later the same situation presented itself, when this occurred:
“The [c]ourt[:] Just a moment. [Counsel] is a little bit slow in getting started, so we will
have to give him a little chance to make his objection.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 624-625.) And to
another defense counsel: “ ‘ “[Counsel] has made that objection so many times that I
think he ought to have it sustained at least once.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 625.) Our Supreme Court
found judicial misconduct, in part, because: “ ‘Under our present system judges are not
permitted to comment upon the evidence or its effect. They cannot be too careful or
cautious lest they by word, look or inflection of the voice bring to bear upon the jury an
influence not compatible with an unbiased verdict of the jury.’ ” (Id. at p. 623.)
Defendant also relies on People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1218. There, the trial
court “belittled defense witnesses on several occasions,” “disparaged defense counsel in
front of the jury,” “chastised defense counsel for attempting to rephrase a question to
which an objection had been sustained,” and “[o]n numerous occasions, the trial judge
interposed his own objections to questions asked by defense counsel. . . . During the
presentation of mitigating evidence by the defense, there were over 30 occasions in which
the trial judge either objected sua sponte or otherwise intervened to disallow a question.”
(Id. at pp. 1233-1235.) The trial court “acknowledged the danger that [its] conduct
7
appeared to favor the prosecution, but one attempt by the court to address this problem
only made matters worse,” by making comments such as: “ ‘And I don’t want the jury to
think because it appears that I’m ruling against [defense counsel] 99 times out of 100 or
making these comments, but the reason I’m doing it is it seems to me that it is up to me to
make the proper rulings.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1235-1236.) Our Supreme Court concluded,
“[W]e are convinced that any attempt by defense counsel to object to the trial court’s
numerous sua sponte objections and derogatory comments ‘would have been futile and
counterproductive to his client.’ ” (Id. at p. 1237.)
The trial court here never explicitly indicated it would not have considered
defendant’s objection, and its behavior does not rise to the level of either court in
Mahoney or Sturm to give the impression the trial court was biased against defendant
such that it would not have entertained an objection to its comments. The objections the
trial court made and the questions it interjected did not include any language belittling
defendant or his counsel or explicitly stating it disbelieved any of defendant’s testimony.
The trial court did ask questions of witnesses, something Mahoney found improper.
(People v. Mahoney, supra, 201 Cal. at p. 623.) But the law has changed on this point
since Mahoney. Effective in 1934, seven years after Mahoney, the California
Constitution was amended to state: “The court may make any comment on the evidence
and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the
proper determination of the cause.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; see People v. Rodriguez
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 766 [“In 1934, however, the Constitution was amended to restore
the power of comment in broad terms”].) We therefore conclude defendant forfeited his
claim on this issue because it was not fruitless for defendant to object if he believed there
was judicial misconduct.
We also conclude defendant has not established he suffered ineffective assistance
of counsel. “ ‘In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider
whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
8
under prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a
reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] If the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
either component, the claim must fail. [Citation.] ‘If the record on appeal sheds no light
on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation. [Citation.] Otherwise, the claim is more appropriately raised in a petition
for writ of habeas corpus.’ [Citations.] ‘A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption
that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and
that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.’ ”
(People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1158.)
Here, there is nothing in the record shedding light on why defense counsel did not
object to the trial court’s comments. There is also a reasonable explanation for the lack
of any objections; defense counsel believed there was no basis to object. Again, the trial
court was permitted to ask witnesses questions, including to clarify testimony. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 10.) Defendant also does not challenge on appeal as baseless any one of
the trial court’s rulings or comments. Defendant instead presents statistics on how many
times the trial court ruled against the defense and in favor of the prosecution as proof of
bias. But this does not eliminate the possibility the trial court was right on each of those
rulings. For example, the trial court objected on foundation to one of defense counsel’s
questions to Officer Handley but defense counsel’s later questioning established Officer
Handley did not have the requisite knowledge. And defense counsel mentioned multiple
times he intended to ask the same questions the trial court asked first.
Defense counsel was also better positioned to assess the court’s statements. The
import of the statements could depend on context, context we cannot discern from the
record. For example, the statement defendant takes most issue with is the trial court
9
saying “[a]iding and abetting is being involved.” Defendant contends that “[w]hen the
[trial] court told the jury that [defendant] was aiding and abetting in 2016[,] it took upon
the role of fact finder as well.” But this is only one way to understand this statement.
The trial court’s statement could also be understood as focusing on whether “[a]iding and
abetting” legally constituted being “involved” in a drug sale. This would be a legal ruling
on general legal standards applicable to the parties’ stipulation, not a factual
determination of defendant’s involvement. Context could matter here if the trial court
somehow indicated through emphasis, volume, speed, or body language it thought
defendant’s culpability was anything other than what defendant indicated during
testimony. But this is context we lack but defense counsel had.
Context is also important for the other statements defendant challenges: “The
testimony is what it is,” “[n]ow it’s 2000,” “whatever that means,” and “[t]hat’s why we
asked you about this specific transaction.” Even assuming the trial court’s comments
were improper, defense counsel could have reasonably determined they were minimal
based on how the trial court made them, and also within in the entire context of the trial.
From this, defense counsel could have decided calling attention to them would have
needlessly distracted from defendant’s case.
We therefore conclude there was a reasonable basis for defense counsel not to
object to the statements defendant now challenges on appeal. “Accordingly, we cannot
conclude ‘this is one of those “rare” cases in which counsel’s failure to object amounts to
constitutionally deficient performance.’ ” (People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76,
118 (Singh).)
II
Defendant Cannot Demonstrate Entitlement
To Relief Based On The Racial Justice Act
Defendant next contends the trial actors violated the Racial Justice Act by
“impermissibly us[ing] negative racial stereotypes about Black people’s propensity for
10
drug sales or ‘street’ crimes.” We conclude defendant also forfeited this claim and failed
to establish his counsel was ineffective.
A
Additional Background
The parties, attorneys, witnesses, and court used the word “street” many times
throughout trial. Officer Handley explained he was trained on “typical street crime
narcotics offenses,” which included investigations “from street level dealer[s] all the way
up to cartel level dealer[s].” Officer Handley later testified $40 could buy an “eightball”
of methamphetamine, and the court asked, “Is that street talk or what type of vernacular
is that?” Officer Handley explained, “[I]t’s an 8th of an ounce.” The court followed up:
“And is that an eightball, is that how it’s referred to amongst users and dealers?” Officer
Handley replied: “Yes, sir, that’s street slang typically when referring to an 8th of an
ounce.” Officer Handley later, in analyzing one of defendant’s messages, explained
some users are “just trying to get by. Like at the time that’s your typical street level
user.”
On cross-examination of Officer Handley, defense counsel asked whether he had
experience with cannabis investigations and if he knew “what the cost of that product
[wa]s on the street.” The trial court eventually sustained the prosecutor’s objection to
these questions on relevance grounds. Defense counsel then asked Officer Handley if he
knew whether the cost of illegal drugs generally changed over the last seven or eight
years “on the street.” The court again sustained a relevance objection on these questions.
Defense counsel later asked Officer Handley how methamphetamine can be
ingested, including whether “it can actually be taken in a pill form and prescribed for
[attention deficit hyperactivity disorder].” Officer Handley was aware of a pill called
“Desoxyn” that is a “pharmaceutical, manufactured in a laboratory” and may have some
chemical similarities with methamphetamine, but said that’s not the same as the “street
11
level methamphetamine,” which he testified can be manufactured “in a bathtub in Del
Paso Heights.”
During Deputy Slater’s testimony about defendant’s prior offense, the prosecutor
asked how an undercover drug deal is typically organized. Deputy Slater testified a
surveillance team and cover team are present because “a lot of times[,] at the street level[,
circumstances] can become very, very dangerous, so a lot of rip offs and things like that.
So the surveillance team is usually there, set, ready to go in case something bad
happens.” Later, when the prosecutor asked if she tested the suspected methamphetamine
from that drug deal, Deputy Slater responded: “Yes. So during this time we were still
testing the drugs on the street ourselves because we didn’t have a Fentanyl problem at
that time.” At the end of Deputy Slater’s testimony, she responded to jury questions,
including one asking who sold the methamphetamine to the undercover officer if it was
not defendant. Deputy Slater stated: “[T]he undercover officer was negotiating the
purchase of the methamphetamine from [defendant] on this day. He did not know that
there was going to be what’s called on the streets ‘a connection’ that was going to show
up,” and it was this “connection” who sold the methamphetamine.
Finally, during cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor asked whether
defendant knew it was illegal for defendant to sell cannabis “on the street.”
Defense counsel never made an objection based on the Racial Justice Act.
B
Defendant Forfeited His Racial Justice Act Claim And
Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Defendant contends, “From the outset, [his] trial was racialized.” Defendant
explains, “[T]he associations the jury drew about our Black [defendant], because of the
trial actors’ more than two dozen references to the ‘street’, are obvious: Dangerous drugs
are found on the ‘street’, and the ‘street’ is the habitat of Black people and other
minorities.” To support his claim, defendant provides several articles, studies, and
12
“mainstream hip-hop songs [that] reference not only the ‘code of the street’, but
specifically reference dealing drugs ‘on the street.’ ” Again predicting the People’s
forfeiture argument, defendant argues against forfeiture because (1) this is a “question of
law” and (2) this is a matter “ ‘involving the public interest or the due administration of
justice.’ ”
The Racial Justice Act created section 745, effective on January 1, 2021. (Stats.
2020, ch. 317, § 3.5.) Section 745, subdivision (a) provides: “The state shall not seek or
obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence, any of” a list of specific circumstances. Relevant here,
one circumstance is: “During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings,
the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an
expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race,
ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.”
(§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) “ ‘Racially discriminatory language’ means language that, to an
objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not
limited to, racially charged or racially coded language.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)
Racial Justice Act claims may be forfeited if not brought with the trial court.
Section 745, subdivision (c) states, “A motion made at trial shall be made as soon as
practicable upon the defendant learning of the alleged violation. A motion that is not
timely may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court.” (Italics added.) Section
745, subdivision (b) also states: “For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may
raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction
or sentence.” Other courts have found “it significant that the Legislature did not include
any language to the effect that a section 745 claim may be raised on direct appeal ‘for the
first time,’ which it could have easily done . . . . The omission of such language strongly
13
suggests the Legislature intended to leave the issues of preservation and forfeiture of
claims on direct appeal to be resolved by the courts based on long-standing procedural
canons. . . . Here, we see no compelling reason to add words to the statute as the
legislative history does not evince an intent by the Legislature to strip the courts of their
discretionary authority to determine whether a section 745 claim is reviewable on direct
appeal where the claim could have been but was not presented in the trial court.”
(People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 814-815; see Singh, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 114, quoting Lashon, at p. 814.)
Defendant does not contest the forfeitability of Racial Justice Act claims, instead
making two arguments against applying forfeiture here; both lack merit. First, defendant
claims he is presenting a pure issue of law. To the contrary, his claim requires reference
to the specific testimony delivered in his case within the context of the case as a whole.
This would also include weighing the extensive evidence defendant presents for the first
time on appeal regarding an objective observer’s expectation. (See Singh, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 116 [finding whether a witness used racially discriminatory
language in violation of the Racial Justice Act “is not a constitutional challenge that
presents a pure question of law”].)
Second, defendant argues reaching the merits of his claim benefits the public
interest by citing to the Legislature’s intent to eliminate racial bias in criminal
proceedings. If we were to follow defendant’s logic that the public generally benefits
from application of its laws, then every Racial Justice Act claim would be excused from
forfeiture. For the reasons previously articulated, the Legislature did not foreclose
forfeiture of Racial Justice Act claims and instead granted courts discretion to consider
forfeited claims under settled authority. Defendant has pointed to no benefit outside of
his own that would result from reaching the merits of his case, and we therefore conclude
defendant forfeited this claim.
14
We also reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue.
Incorporating the above standards for such a claim, we again find no reason given in the
record for defense counsel’s failure to make a Racial Justice Act claim and instead
conclude there is a reasonable reason for such a tactic: Defense counsel could have
believed there were no racial overtones, implicit or otherwise, in the usage of “street.”
(See Singh, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 117 [“defense counsel could reasonably have
concluded the statement, specifically the question about whether the shooting was an
‘honor kill,’ did not violate the Racial Justice Act”].) This is supported by defense
counsel’s own use of the word street when questioning Officer Handley. And most of the
instances of “street” were used for seemingly innocent reasons, to either describe the
level of the drug interaction—a low-level user or dealer as opposed to a high-level or
cartel-level dealer—or the physical place where the activity took place—such as Deputy
Slater testifying to testing the drugs “on the street.” Defendant offers alternative words
he argues would have eliminated the racial undertones of “ ‘street’ ” such as “ ‘typical’,
‘routine’, ‘run-of-the-mill’, ‘average’, ‘regular’, [and] ‘conventional.’ ” But these do not
describe the comparative placement on a hierarchy, nor do they describe a physical
location.
There were instances of a more abstract usage, such as describing “street slang,”
which included phrases like “eightball.” But again, we are at a disadvantage to fully
assess how these words were used given the state of the record and lack of objection.
More importantly, defense counsel could better assess usage, tone, and body language,
and whether bias was inherent in the term’s use.
Finally, it could have been a legitimate tactic not to draw attention to these few
phrases in the scheme of the entire trial. It does not appear the word street, or any of the
phrases defendant challenges, were used in direct relation to defendant, neither calling
him the product of the streets, nor that he was connected with methamphetamine made
“in a bathtub in Del Paso Heights,” for example. Defense counsel could have reasonably
15
decided not to object to these statements or “seek a redaction of the statement because the
defense did not want the jury to think the defense was hiding anything from them.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude ‘this is one of those “rare” cases in which counsel’s
failure to object amounts to constitutionally deficient performance.’ ” (Singh, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 118.)
III
There Was No Cumulative Error
Defendant finally contends, if we conclude “each error [is] individually harmless,
the cumulative effect of the errors nevertheless demonstrates that a miscarriage of justice
occurred.” We have no basis to conclude cumulative error because defendant forfeited
each individual claim of error and did not demonstrate his counsel was ineffective. (See
People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 316.) We must therefore reject this cumulative
error claim.
IV
Defendant’s Sentence Is Unauthorized
The People ask us to remand for resentencing because the trial court erroneously
imposed one-third the midterm on count one, the possession conviction, which it stayed
under section 654. Defendant does not address this issue in his reply brief.
We agree with the People defendant’s sentence is unauthorized. Section 654
provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions
of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or
omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) “ ‘The one-
third-the-midterm rule of section 1170.1, subdivision (a), only applies to a consecutive
sentence, not to a sentence stayed under section 654.’ ” (People v. Relkin (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1197-1198.) “To effectuate section 654, the trial court must impose
a full term and stay execution of that term.” (Relkin, at p. 1198.)
16
Because the trial court imposed a consecutive eight-month term (one-third the
midterm) for count one and stayed this term under section 654, which is not subject to the
one-third the midterm limitation for consecutive sentences (see People v. Cantrell (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1164), we shall remand for resentencing. The trial court must
determine whether to impose a lower, middle, or upper full term on count one, and then
stay the sentence of either count one or two under section 654.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is reversed. The case is remanded for resentencing for the trial court
to impose full sentence on both counts and stay sentence on either count one or count two
under section 654.
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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