CourtListener 10320047•Durand v. Beitchman CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/23/25 Durand v. Beitchman CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
RUDY DURAND, B329298
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC648317)
v.
DAVID BEITCHMAN et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Douglas W. Stern, Judge. Reversed.
Gilbert Azafrani for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seanez Legal, Olga Michelle Seanez; Beitchman & Zekian
and Rouben Varozian for Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant Rudy Durand appeals from an order
dismissing the underlying action for failure to prosecute.1
Durand contends the trial court erred in granting dismissal while
the matter was stayed pending contractual arbitration. We agree
and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2005, Durand and his nephew, Jeffrey Durand, filed “a
fraud case to recover their condo[minium].” In 2012, before the
case went to trial, their counsel withdrew. The Durands retained
David Beitchman of Beitchman and Zekian, PC as replacement
counsel.
The parties executed a “representation agreement” in
which Durand agreed to pay Beitchman a flat fee of $50,000 “for
the sole purpose of preparing the case for trial, and trying the
case.” An arbitration policy was attached to the agreement. It
required the parties to submit all disputes arising out of or
relating to the representation agreement, “or to the relationship
of the parties, our engagement and/or our performance or failure
to perform services,” to binding arbitration. The parties waived
their right to a jury trial and their right to conduct discovery,
except as permitted by the arbitrator. The parties also agreed to
pay equal shares of the arbitrator’s fee. The policy provided that
it would “survive the termination of [Beitchman and Zekian’s]
representation or this Agreement.” Durand signed an
acknowledgment stating that he read, understood, and consented
to the arbitration policy.
1 Although the opening brief identified both Durand and his
nephew, Jeffrey Durand, as appellants, Durand concedes that
Jeffrey Durand is not a party in the underlying action and is not
a party to this appeal.
2
In January 2017, Durand filed a complaint alleging that on
the eve of trial, Beitchman refused to represent the Durands at
trial or to refund the $50,000 flat fee. The complaint asserted
causes of action for financial elder abuse, breach of contract, and
breach of fiduciary duty against Beitchman and Beitchman and
Zekian, PC (collectively, defendants).
From May 2017 through early 2020, the trial court
continued the case management conference several times for
various reasons, including Durand’s counsel’s failure to appear in
court and the court’s unavailability. Throughout this period, the
parties disputed whether Durand had effected proper service of
the complaint on defendants.
In February 2020, defendants moved to compel arbitration.
They also requested that the court stay the case pending
completion of arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure,
section 1281.4.2 Durand did not file an opposition. In June 2020,
the court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and
stayed the case “pending binding arbitration as to the entire
action.”
The arbitration did not take place. In January 2023,
defendants filed a motion asking the trial court to dismiss the
action for failure to prosecute. Defendants asserted dismissal of
the matter was required under the five-year mandatory dismissal
rule of sections 583.310 and 583.360, or was permitted under the
section 583.420 three-year discretionary dismissal provision. In a
supporting declaration, Beitchman’s counsel asserted the action
was improperly delayed at the outset because Durand failed to
properly serve defendants and, for the first three years after the
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
3
complaint was filed, he refused to arbitrate. She further declared
that after the court granted defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration, Durand “refused to commence arbitration” for the
next two-and-a-half years. Durand had claimed an inability to
move forward with the arbitration due to illness and his
advanced age.
Beitchman’s counsel further informed the court that after
defendants indicated they would move to dismiss Durand’s action
for failure to prosecute, Durand provided notice that he had
commenced the arbitration. He repeatedly requested that
defendants remit their half of the arbitration fee. Beitchman’s
counsel refused since, by then, defendants were seeking to have
the entire matter dismissed. Defendants notified the arbitration
case manager about their pending motion seeking dismissal in
the trial court and asked that the arbitration be stayed until the
trial court ruled on the motion.
Durand opposed the motion to dismiss. Citing Brock v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790 (Brock),
Durand argued that under section 583.340, subdivision (b), the
court was required to exclude the period of the arbitration stay
from its calculation of section 583.310’s five-year clock for
mandatory dismissal. Durand further contended defendants
were responsible for delaying the litigation by avoiding service,
making bad faith claims of improper service, and refusing to file
an answer. In a supporting declaration, Durand’s counsel
attested that Durand had filed a demand for arbitration, paid the
entire fee, and informed the arbitration service of his selection of
arbitrators from a list sent to the parties. He contended
defendants were attempting to avoid arbitration by refusing to
pay their share of the fees and refusing to select an arbitrator.
4
In reply, defendants argued Brock did not apply because it
concerned a plaintiff who failed to diligently prosecute an
arbitration that had already commenced, whereas Durand had
failed to commence arbitration at all. They instead relied on
Lockhart-Mummery v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 103
Cal.App.3d 891 (Lockhart-Mummery), to support their contention
that the court could dismiss an action if the plaintiff failed to
commence arbitration within five years of filing the complaint.
Defendants again asked the court to dismiss the action with
prejudice for lack of prosecution pursuant to sections 583.310 and
583.360, and to vacate the order compelling arbitration.
Durand filed a “supplemental opposition” arguing that
Lockhart-Mummery was inapposite considering section 583.340,
subdivision (b), and relying on Brock, which had rejected
Lockhart-Mummery’s holding. The opposition quoted a portion of
the Brock decision in which the court held a trial court has no
jurisdiction to dismiss an arbitration proceeding for failure to
prosecute in a reasonably diligent fashion. Durand attached a
declaration in which he stated that after he unilaterally
commenced arbitration, defendants refused to select an
arbitrator. He also explained that the arbitration had been
stopped as a result of defendants’ claims that there was no need
to select an arbitrator since they anticipated the trial court would
dismiss the action.
In February 2023, the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss. The court noted Durand filed his complaint over six
years before defendants filed the motion to dismiss. The court
also observed that Durand had “only recently initiated the
arbitration,” and defendants claimed he had done so only after
they stated their intention to move to dismiss the case. The court
5
acknowledged that there were “conflicting pronouncements by
the Courts of Appeal” as to whether the trial court has the
authority to entertain a request for dismissal of a matter once it
has been compelled to arbitration. However, the court concluded
that under Lockhart-Mummery, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 891, it
“retain[ed] the power to dismiss a case . . . where a party had
failed to timely proceed in the initiation and prosecution of the
arbitration, at least where the party has prevented the
arbitration forum from attaining the power and authority to
begin to adjudicate aspects of the claim.” The court recognized
that periods when an action is stayed are excluded from the five-
year mandatory dismissal period. But the court reasoned
Durand was able to prosecute the action during the stay—in the
arbitral forum—and he failed to do so, thus dismissal was
appropriate.
Durand timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Durand contends the trial court erred by declining to
exclude the arbitration stay from its calculation of the five-year
mandatory dismissal period. Defendants’ appellate briefing does
not argue the trial court ruling was correct. Instead, defendants
describe relevant case law, including cases holding that the trial
court does not have jurisdiction to dismiss a case for failure to
prosecute after the matter has been ordered into arbitration and
stayed under section 1281.4. With that discussion, defendants
“submit this matter on the record.” We conclude the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to dismiss for failure to prosecute and
therefore reverse the trial court order.3
3 The parties and the trial court appeared to understand the
6
I. The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Dismiss
Durand’s Claims Based on His Failure to Prosecute
the Arbitration
Under the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1280 et seq.) (CAA), a court must grant a party’s motion to
compel arbitration if it determines an agreement to arbitrate
exists. (§ 1281.2.) Once a court orders a controversy to
arbitration, it must, “upon motion of a party to such action or
proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is
had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier
time as the court specifies.” (§ 1281.4; Gaines v. Fidelity National
Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1096 (Gaines).)
“The purpose of the statutory stay is to protect the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator by preserving the status quo until
arbitration is resolved.” (Federal Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1374.) “Once a court grants the
petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the
action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial
court’s order as dismissing both the action pending in the
superior court and the arbitration. (Brock, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1796, 1794 [action at law and arbitration were “two
separate proceedings over which the trial court had separate
fonts of jurisdiction”].) We determine the trial court erred as to
both proceedings. We further agree with the many courts that
have concluded the dismissal of a trial court action does not
terminate related pending arbitration proceedings. (Finley v.
Saturn of Roseville (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1258–1259;
Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 482, 488 & fn. 8 (Titan/Value); Brock, at p. 1804;
Nanfito v. Superior Court (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 315, 318–319 &
fn. 3 (Nanfito); Byerly v. Sale (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1316
(Byerly).)
7
court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters
submitted to arbitration. This vestigial jurisdiction over the
action at law consists solely of making the determination, upon
conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, of whether there was
an award on the merits . . . or not . . . .” (Brock, supra, 10
Cal.App.4th at p. 1796; Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1096; see
§ 1286 [court shall confirm, correct, or vacate arbitral award upon
party petition].) “The court also retains a separate, limited
jurisdiction over the contractual arbitration” to consider
subsequent petitions relating to the same arbitration agreement
filed in the same proceeding. (Brock, at p. 1796, citing § 1292.6.)
Upon motion of a party, the court may take limited steps
“to aid in the prosecution of an arbitration.” (Blake v. Ecker
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 738, fn. 8 (Blake), disapproved on
other grounds in Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094.) For
example, at a party’s request, the court may appoint an
arbitrator (§ 1281.6); grant a provisional remedy to give effect to
future arbitrable awards (§ 1281.8, subd. (b)); disqualify neutral
arbitrators (§ 1281.91, subd. (b)(2)); and compel a drafting party
to pay arbitration fees to continue an ongoing arbitration
(§ 1281.98, subd. (b)(3)). (Blake, at p. 738; Titan/Value, supra, 29
Cal.App.4th at p. 487.) “Absent an agreement to withdraw the
controversy from arbitration, however, no other judicial act is
authorized.” (Titan/Value, at p. 487, citing Byerly, supra, 204
Cal.App.3d at p. 1315.) “It is the job of the arbitrator, not the
court, to resolve all questions needed to determine the
controversy.” (Titan/Value, at p. 487.)
Numerous courts have therefore held that a trial court
lacks the authority to dismiss an action based on the plaintiff’s
8
failure to prosecute once the matter is compelled to arbitration.4
For example, in Brock, the trial court dismissed the parties’
medical malpractice action due to the plaintiffs’ failure to
prosecute the arbitration with reasonable diligence in the five
years after the court ordered the matter to arbitration and stayed
the case. (Brock, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1793–1794.) The
appellate court reversed, concluding the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to dismiss contractual arbitration proceedings for
failure to prosecute. (Id. at p. 1807.) The trial court retained
only “vestigial jurisdiction” over matters submitted to arbitration,
and its authority was limited to taking the specific actions
delineated in the CAA. (Id. at pp. 1796, 1801–1805.)
Similarly, in Blake, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 728, the trial
court ordered the matter into arbitration. (Id. at p. 735.) For
nearly two years, the plaintiff took no steps to initiate the
arbitration. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. (Id. at p. 737.) A panel
of this division reversed, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to grant the motion. (Id. at p. 738.) Citing Brock, the court
concluded: “Once the trial court stayed plaintiff’s civil action, it
was stayed for all purposes during the arbitration proceedings.
Defendants’ only avenue for redress when plaintiff failed to
timely prosecute the arbitration was in the arbitration
proceeding.” (Id. at p. 737.)
Most recently, our colleagues in Division Seven of this court
came to a similar conclusion in Lew-Williams, supra, 101
4 “Where, as here, the procedural facts are undisputed, the
question whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction is a
legal question subject to de novo review.” (Lew-Williams v.
Petrosian (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 97, 106 (Lew-Williams).)
9
Cal.App.5th 97. There, the trial court dismissed claims against
one set of defendants because the plaintiffs failed to initiate
arbitration for nearly two years after the court granted a motion
to compel arbitration. (Id. at pp. 100–104.) The reviewing court
reversed. (Id. at p. 101.) Citing Brock and other supporting
authority, the court held the trial court exceeded its vestigial
jurisdiction by dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to
prosecute. (Id. at pp. 101, 105–106, 107.) The power to
terminate proceedings for dilatory tactics was solely within the
arbitrator’s purview. (Id. at p. 106.) The Lew-Williams court
further reasoned that the defendants had “recourse within the
arbitration process to prevent unreasonable or abusive delay.”
(Id. at p. 109.) The rules of the parties’ chosen arbitral forum
allowed a defendant to initiate arbitration, provided a means for
the defendants to ask the arbitrator to issue orders to “control
and expedite” the arbitration, and authorized the arbitrator to
issue sanctions. (Ibid.)
Likewise, here, the trial court granted the motion to compel
arbitration and ordered the case “stayed pending binding
arbitration as to the entire action.” During the stay, the trial
court retained only vestigial jurisdiction over the matter. No
statute conferred the trial court with the authority to dismiss
because Durand failed to prosecute the arbitration. (See Brock,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1796, 1805 [Title 9 of the CAA “is
the font of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the arbitration
proceeding” and did not allow party to petition to dismiss
arbitration].) Only the arbitrator had this authority.
(Titan/Value, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 488; Blake, supra, 93
Cal.App.4th at p. 737; Byerly, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1316.)
10
We note that in the proceedings below, defendants argued,
and the trial court agreed, that Lockhart-Mummery, supra, 103
Cal.App.3d 891, permitted a different result. However, we agree
with the courts that have rejected the reasoning adopted in
Lockhart-Mummery and similar cases.
In Lockhart-Mummery, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of an action and pending arbitration after
finding the plaintiff did not act with reasonable diligence in
initiating the arbitration. (Lockhart-Mummery, supra, 103
Cal.App.3d at p. 898.) The court relied on Kaplan v. Eldorado
Ins. Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 587 (Kaplan), in which the Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s imposition of terminating
sanctions after the plaintiff failed to obey its orders to comply
with discovery sought in a pending uninsured motorist
arbitration proceeding. (Id. at pp. 589, 591–593.) The Lockhart-
Mummery court reasoned that if the trial court in Kaplan had
jurisdiction to dismiss when a plaintiff failed to comply with
discovery in arbitration, the trial court could also dismiss a
matter when a plaintiff did not act with reasonable diligence in
initiating arbitration. (Lockhart-Mummery, at p. 898.) According
to the Lockhart-Mummery court, “[t]o hold otherwise, would place
a defendant in an untenable position as it would be unable,
without the appointment of appellant’s arbitrator, to move the
litigation along nor could it seek dismissal despite the passage of
three years of inaction.” (Ibid.)
Yet, Kaplan did not specifically address the scope of a trial
court’s jurisdiction after a case is stayed and a matter
is submitted to contractual arbitration. Instead, the Kaplan
court’s analysis was limited to whether the trial court’s
imposition of a terminating sanction was proper under the
11
relevant discovery statute in the uninsured motorist context.
(Kaplan, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at pp. 591–593; see Miranda v.
21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 922–924
[distinguishing Kaplan from contractual arbitration cases
because specific statute gives superior court jurisdiction over
discovery disputes in uninsured motorist arbitrations].) The
Kaplan court did not address the issue of whether the trial court
had the authority to rule on a motion seeking dismissal as a
sanction for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery
obligations in a pending contractual arbitration. “ ‘It is axiomatic
that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’
[Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381,
388.) The Lockhart-Mummery court relied on no other legal
authority for the proposition that the trial court has jurisdiction
to dismiss contractual arbitration proceedings when the matter
has been ordered into arbitration and the action stayed. As the
Brock court concluded, “Lockhart-Mummery’s conclusion that a
court may dismiss arbitration proceedings is not supportable in
authority . . . .” (Brock, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1804.)
We further agree with courts such as Brock and Lew-
Williams in their rejection of Lockhart-Mummery’s rationale that
the trial court must have jurisdiction to dismiss an action for
failure to prosecute an arbitration, otherwise the plaintiff could
infinitely stall the proceedings. (Lockhart-Mummery, supra, 103
Cal.App.3d at p. 898.) As the Brock court reasoned, to the extent
a delay in commencing arbitration is caused by one party’s
inability to agree on a specific arbitrator, any other party may
petition the trial court to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to
12
section 1281.6.5 (Brock, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1803; Blake,
supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 & fn. 8 [accord].) The rules of the
arbitral forum may also prevent abusive delay. (Lew-Williams,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 109.) And “[i]t is . . . up to the
arbitrator, and not the court, to grant relief for delay in bringing
an arbitration to a resolution.” (Titan/Value, supra, 29
Cal.App.4th at p. 488, fn. omitted; Lew-Williams, at p. 110;
Brock, at p. 1804; Byerly, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1316
[“arbitration has a life of its own outside the judicial system, and
only the arbitrator should determine whether there has been an
unreasonable delay in prosecution which would justify
dismissal”]; Young v. Ross-Loos Medical Group, Inc. (1982) 135
Cal.App.3d 669, 673 (Young).)
Here, Durand delayed significantly in commencing the
arbitration. Yet, defendants could have petitioned the trial court
to appoint an arbitrator under section 1281.6. Further, it is
undisputed that by the time defendants filed their motion to
dismiss in the trial court, Durand had initiated the arbitration by
filing a demand and paying the full arbitration fee. Defendants
could therefore have proceeded with the selection of an arbitrator
and presented a motion to dismiss to that arbitrator. (Young,
supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 673.)
We therefore agree with Lew-Williams, Brock, and other
courts holding a trial court has no jurisdiction to dismiss for
failure to prosecute a contractual arbitration. (E.g., Nanfito,
supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 319, fn. 3; Byerly, supra, 204
5 Under section 1281.6, if the parties do not have an agreed
upon method for appointing an arbitrator, or if that method fails
or cannot be followed, the trial court “on petition of a party to the
arbitration agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator.”
13
Cal.App.3d at p. 1316; Titan/Value, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at
p. 488, fn. 8.)
II. The Trial Court Erred in Declining to Exclude the
Arbitration Stay When Calculating the Five-Year
Mandatory Dismissal Period
Finally, to the extent the trial court dismissed the superior
court action pursuant to section 583.310, we conclude the five-
year period had not expired and dismissal was improper.6
Section 583.310 requires a plaintiff to bring a case “to trial
within five years after the action is commenced against the
defendant.” A court must dismiss the case if the plaintiff fails to
do so. (§ 583.360, subd. (a).) When computing the five-year
period, courts must exclude any period during which “(a) The
jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended. [¶]
(b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined. [¶]
(c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was
impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340.)
The trial court stayed the action approximately three years
and five months after Durand filed his complaint. The court was
required to exclude from the five-year mandatory dismissal
period the approximately two-and-a-half years that elapsed after
the court entered the stay. Thus, the five-year period under
section 583.310 had not expired at the time of dismissal. (Gaines,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1096 [“A party seeking to enforce
contractual arbitration is statutorily entitled to a stay of pending
legal actions.”]; Byerly, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1314.)
6 Although defendants’ motion referenced the discretionary
and mandatory dismissal rules, the trial court ruling referred
only to the five-year rule.
14
The trial court acknowledged section 583.340,
subdivision (b), and the need to exclude any period when the
action was stayed, but reasoned that Durand was not prevented
from bringing the matter to trial in the arbitral forum and he
“simply did not properly prosecute” the action. However, we
again agree with the Brock court, which rejected a similar
analysis in Lockhart-Mummery. As the Brock court explained,
section 583.340, subdivision (b) explicitly carves out stays from
the calculation of the five-year period and does not condition the
application of the stay exclusion on a plaintiff’s “reasonable
diligence” in related arbitration proceedings. (Brock, supra, 10
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1798–1799.) “ ‘[R]easonable diligence’ is not a
concept that has any pertinence to a plaintiff who is prevented
from pursuing an action at law by an arbitration stay. The stay
for all intents and purposes prevents the plaintiff from ever again
pursuing the action at law by virtue of the claim-preclusive effect
of the arbitration (unless the arbitration concludes without
resolving the merits of the dispute); thus, a plaintiff diligently
advancing an arbitration proceeding only brings the action at law
closer to dismissal, not trial. A stay on proceedings consequently
stays the five-year period until such time as it is no longer in
abeyance.” (Id. at p. 1799.)
There was no basis for the trial court to dismiss Durand’s
action, or the arbitration proceedings, for delay in prosecution.
15
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss is reversed. Durand to recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
16
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