CourtListener 10320044•In re Y.B. CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/23/25 In re Y.B. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B338126
In re Y.B. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP02809A–B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed and
remanded.
Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
C.R. (mother) appeals from orders selecting legal
guardianship as the permanent plan for minor N.B. and
terminating dependency jurisdiction over him, and an order
selecting another planned permanent living arrangement for
minor Y.B. Mother contends the juvenile court’s findings under
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1900 et seq.)
were erroneous because the court failed to ask the children’s
maternal grandparents on the record whether the children are or
may be Indian children. Mother further argues the ICWA finding
as to Y.B. must be reversed because the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to
make ICWA inquiries of any paternal relatives. DCFS concedes
the matter must be remanded for further inquiry of Y.B.’s
paternal relatives. We reject mother’s argument related to the
maternal grandparents but agree that on remand DCFS must
attempt to make ICWA inquiries of Y.B.’s paternal relatives.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2019, the juvenile court sustained an amended
petition asserting Y.B. (born in 2008) and N.B. (born in 2014)
were persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j),1 based on mother’s
physical abuse of Y.B., her inappropriate physical discipline of
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
N.B., and her history of mental and emotional problems.2 The
court declared Gustavo B. to be Y.B.’s presumed father.
Although mother initially indicated Gustavo B. was also N.B.’s
father, DNA testing established that he was not. Mother did not
provide the names of any other potential fathers. The identity of
N.B.’s father remained unknown for the duration of the
proceedings. In July 2019, the juvenile court asserted
dependency jurisdiction over the children and removed them from
mother. Gustavo B. did not request custody of Y.B. The children
were placed in foster care.
Mother did not reunify with the children and Gustavo B.
did not obtain custody of Y.B.3 The children remained in a foster
care placement for almost five years. Finally, in April 2024, the
juvenile court appointed the children’s caregivers to be N.B.’s
legal guardians and terminated dependency jurisdiction over
him. As to Y.B., neither the caregivers nor Y.B.—now 16 years
old—wished to pursue legal guardianship. The court ordered
Y.B. into another planned permanent living arrangement.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(B)(ii).) This appeal followed.
As to ICWA, at the outset of the case, DCFS reported
mother had previously denied having any American Indian
ancestry and said she was born in Nicaragua. In May 2019,
mother submitted a parental notification of Indian status form,
2 The petition also concerned the children’s younger sibling,
A.R. The juvenile court’s orders regarding A.R. are not at issue
in this appeal.
3 The juvenile court terminated Gustavo B.’s reunification
services at the first six-month review hearing. He did not visit
Y.B. during the first review period and did not respond to DCFS’s
attempt to contact him.
3
indicating she had no Indian ancestry as far as she knew. The
juvenile court found ICWA did not apply as to mother. In June
2019, Gustavo B. also submitted a parental notification of Indian
status form, indicating he had no Indian ancestry as far as he
knew. In September 2019, the juvenile court found it had no
information to believe the matter fell under ICWA “as far as
[Gustavo B.] is concerned.”
Although the maternal grandparents were present at
several initial hearings, the juvenile court did not address them
directly regarding whether the children may be Indian children.
However, according to subsequent DCFS reports, on March 24,
2023, June 20, 2023, and March 5, 2024, the maternal
grandparents denied having any Native American ancestry, with
the maternal grandmother reporting she and the maternal
grandfather are “descendants of Nicaragua.” The record does not
indicate that DCFS had any contact with any of Gustavo B.’s
relatives for any purpose, including inquiring about ICWA,
although a paternal aunt was mentioned in one early report.
DISCUSSION
Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
and DCFS failed to carry out their statutory duties of inquiry
under ICWA by failing to ask the maternal grandparents about
the children’s Indian ancestry, if any, on the record in open court,
and, with respect to Y.B., by failing to attempt to interview any
paternal relatives about ICWA. On appeal, DCFS concedes the
inquiry as to the paternal side of Y.B.’s family was inadequate,4
but contends the juvenile court’s no ICWA finding as to mother’s
4 On appeal, DCFS indicates it “does not oppose” remand for
further ICWA inquiry of Y.B.’s paternal extended family. We
deem this a concession.
4
side of the family was proper. We agree with DCFS and affirm,
remanding the matter for further inquiry of Y.B.’s paternal
family.
The California Supreme Court recently summarized the
duties of the court and the social services agency in determining
whether a child is an Indian child. “Section 224.2 codifies and
expands on ICWA’s duty of inquiry to determine whether a child
is an Indian child. [Fn. omitted.] Agencies and juvenile courts
have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency
proceeding to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring
whether a child is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
This ‘duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including,
but not limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or
neglect whether the party has any information that the child may
be an Indian child.’ (Ibid. [former subd. (a)]; see also [Cal. Rules
of Court,] rule 5.481(a); [citation].)” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1112, 1131–1132 (Dezi C.).)
“Section 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies that once a child is
placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare
department, the duty to inquire ‘includes, but is not limited to,
asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,
extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the
child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ [Fn. omitted.][5] (See also
[Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 5.481(a)(1).) ‘[E]xtended family
member’ means ‘a person who has reached the age of eighteen
and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother
or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or
5 Following statutory amendments effective September 2024,
this language is now reflected in section 224.2, subdivision (b)(2).
5
second cousin, or stepparent.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see also
§ 224.1, former subd. (c) [adopting ICWA definition of ‘extended
family member’].) [¶] While this duty of inquiry is sometimes
referred to as the initial duty of inquiry, this is a bit of a
misnomer, as the duty ‘continues throughout the dependency
proceedings.’ [Citations.]” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.)
Under current section 224.2, subdivision (c), “[f]or a court
presiding over any juvenile proceeding that could result in
placement of an Indian child with someone other than a parent or
Indian custodian . . . the duty to inquire begins at the first
hearing on a petition. At the commencement of the hearing, the
court shall ask each party to the proceeding and all other
interested persons present whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child, whether they know or have reason to know that the
child is an Indian child, and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian are domiciled, as defined in Section 224.1.
Inquiry shall also be made at the first appearance in court of each
party or interested person who was not present at the first
hearing on the petition. The inquiry and responses shall occur on
the record.”
Here, as to both children, mother argues on appeal that the
juvenile court erred in failing to make the inquiries described in
section 224.2, subdivision (c), of the maternal grandparents when
they were present in court. However, as DCFS points out, the
maternal grandparents appeared in court twice in 2019, once in
2020, and maternal grandmother attended a portion of one
hearing in 2022. At the time, section 224.2, subdivision (c) did
not require that the juvenile court conduct an ICWA inquiry on
the record of all “interested persons.” Instead, the prior version
of the law mandated that “[a]t the first appearance in court of
6
each party, the court shall ask of each participant present in the
hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to know
that the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, former subd. (c),
italics added.) Although the maternal grandparents were present
at early hearings, they were not parties and did not participate in
the hearings. Mother has not argued that under the former
version of the statute, the juvenile court erred in failing to make
a direct inquiry of the maternal grandparents on the record.6
Moreover, even if the juvenile court were required to
conduct an in-court inquiry of the maternal grandparents in
2019, 2020, or 2022, we would conclude that mother’s argument
has been rendered moot by subsequent events. In 2023 and 2024,
DCFS asked the maternal grandparents on three occasions about
the family’s Indian ancestry and reported the results to the court.
Mother does not contend other relatives should have been
interviewed or that DCFS’s inquiry of the maternal grandparents
was insufficient. The maternal grandparents are not parties to
the proceedings. The record does not indicate that they have
attended any hearings since 2022. It is unclear what further
relief this court could provide under these circumstances. (In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [case becomes moot if no effective
relief can be granted, even if appellant prevails].) We therefore
find no basis to conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s orders
as to N.B. or to remand for further proceedings as to Y.B. related
to potential Indian ancestry through the maternal family.
We agree with the parties, however, that remand is
required for the juvenile court to direct DCFS to conduct further
inquiries of Gustavo B.’s family members. The record indicates
DCFS asked only Gustavo B. whether Y.B. is or may be an Indian
6 Mother opted not to file a reply brief in this appeal.
7
child. There is no indication that DCFS attempted to contact any
extended family members. Further, there is no information in
the record suggesting the limited inquiry may have been
nonetheless adequate. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141
[court expressly did not decide what constitutes an adequate and
proper inquiry necessary to satisfy § 224.2].) Substantial
evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA
does not apply as to Gustavo B., or the implied finding that
DCFS’s inquiry as to Gustavo B. was proper, adequate, and duly
diligent. (Id. at p. 1137; In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
388, 401.)
Y.B. remains under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The
matter is continuing, as the juvenile court ordered Y.B. into
another planned permanent living arrangement, which requires
ongoing court supervision. (§ 366.3, subd. (d).) Further, DCFS
concedes its ICWA inquiry of Y.B.’s paternal family was
inadequate since it failed to attempt to contact Gustavo B.’s
available relative. “So long as proceedings are ongoing and all
parties recognize the continuing duty of ICWA inquiry, both the
Agency and the juvenile court have an adequate opportunity to
fulfill those statutory duties.” (In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
166, 179.) We therefore do not conditionally reverse the juvenile
court’s April 25, 2024 orders as to Y.B. We instead vacate the
juvenile court’s September 24, 2019 finding that ICWA did not
apply with respect to Gustavo B. and direct the juvenile court to
conduct further proceedings consistent with section 224.2 and the
court and DCFS’s continuing ICWA inquiry duty.
8
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
9
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